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Abstract 
 
 
The enactment of the national Right to Information (RTI) Act in 2005 has been produced, 
consumed and celebrated as an important event of democratic deepening in India both in 
terms of the process that led to its enactment (arising from a grassroots movement) as well as 
its outcome (fundamentally altering the citizen-state relationship). This thesis problematises 
this narrative and proposes that the explanatory factors underlying this event may be more 
complex than thus far imagined.  
 
First, the leadership of the grassroots movement was embedded within the ruling elite and 
possessed the necessary resources as well as unparalleled access to spaces of power for the 
movement to be successful. Second, the democratisation of the higher bureaucracy along with 
the launch of the economic liberalisation project meant that the urban, educated, high-caste, 
upper-middle-class elite that provided critical support to the demand for an RTI Act was no 
longer vested in the state and had moved to the private sector. Mirroring this shift, the 
framing of the RTI Act during the 1990s saw its ambit reduced to the government, even as 
there was a concomitant push to privatise public goods and services. Third, the thesis locates 
the Indian RTI Act within the global explosion of freedom of information laws over the last 
two decades, and shows how international pressures, embedded within a reimagining of the 
role of the state vis-à-vis the market, had a direct and causal impact both on its content, as 
well as the timing of its enactment. 
 
Taking the production of the RTI Act as a lens, the thesis finally argues that while there is 
much to celebrate in the consolidation of procedural democracy in India over the last six 
decades, existing economic, social and political structures may limit the extent and forms of 
democratic deepening occurring in the near future.  
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Prologue 
 
On the 5th of April 2011, Anna Hazare, a well-known social activist, began an indefinite fast 
at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi to pressurise the Government to enact a strong and effective 
Lokpal (Ombudsman) Act to root out corruption from the country.1 His specific and 
immediate demand was that the Government should set up a joint committee to draft a 
Lokpal (Ombudsman) bill “comprising 50 per cent officials and the remaining citizens and 
intellectuals”.2 The build up to this event had taken place over several months. In January 
2011, Hazare launched a campaign for the enactment of a Lokpal Act, including holding 
several rallies across the country. In response, the Prime Minister held a meeting with Hazare 
and some of his colleagues in March, and subsequently set up a sub-committee comprising of 
senior ministers to consider the demands. However, with the government not showing any 
signs of conceding any ground, Hazare began his fast in the first week of April.  
 
The context that informs these events is important. The preceding months had seen a spate of 
financial scams of unprecedented scale, including the telecom spectrum scam, which by some 
accounts had short-changed the treasury by USD 40 billion. The Commonwealth Games held 
in Delhi in 2010 had become better known for the “organizers [buying] $80 rolls of toilet 
paper” rather than “signal[ling] to the world that India is rapidly marching ahead with 
confidence.”3 Another scandal reported in the media revealed that housing in Mumbai meant 
primarily for families of soldiers killed in the Kargil War of 1999 had instead been allotted at 
below-market rates to politicians, senior bureaucrats, and their families. Apart from these 
                                                 
1 Jantar Mantar is an area in central Delhi that is the officially sanctioned site for protests against the 
government.  
2 As stated by Hazare in “Activist Anna Hazare’s crusade against corruption continues”, Indian Express, 6 April 
2011. 
3 From “Toilet-Paper Scandal in India ‘Shames’ Commonwealth Games Host”, Business Week magazine, 19 
August 2010.  
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examples of financial and procedural impropriety at an epic scale, tapes of tapped phone 
conversations leaked to the media in 2010 seemed to suggest that large corporate entities had 
been directly involved in the process of cabinet berth selection and the allocation of key 
ministerial portfolios when the current Congress-led coalition government had taken charge 
in 2009.4  
 
Public trust in government seemed to be at an all-time low and this meant that Hazare’s fast 
drew an impassioned response. Thousands descended upon the site of the fast in New Delhi 
in his support, some even calling it ‘India’s Tahrir Square’.5 Social media websites saw a 
huge outpouring of support for Hazare’s cause, the dominant tone of which was an anguished 
tirade against corruption. Arguably, this was the largest popular protest in India in recent 
memory. An editorial in The Indian Express stated: “By now, it’s been compared to Tahrir, to 
1968, even to Woodstock. For those who have never experienced the energy of a mass 
movement, the Anna Hazare-led movement over the Lokpal bill feels like catharsis, like 
revolution, a tidal wave that will sweep away the entire venal political class and replace it 
with those who feel their pain. What connects this crowd of ex-servicemen, yoga enthusiasts, 
autorickshaw unions, candle-light vigilantes, actors and corporate big shots and students? 
That they all feel let down, in different ways, by the political apparatus, and they are mad as 
hell. And it is indeed satisfying for them to wrest compromise from the government, force it 
to correct some flaws in the draft of the Lokpal bill.”6 After several weak attempts to brazen 
it out over the next days, the government, under intense public pressure (fuelled in part by 
breathless television news coverage), conceded all of Hazare’s demands, and he ended his 
fast on the 9th of April, 2011. 
 
                                                 
4 See “Some Telephone Conversations”, Open magazine, 20 November 2010.  
5 From “Media overkill” by T.S. Rajalakshmi, Frontline magazine, Volume 28, Issue 9, 23 April - 6 May, 2011.  
6 “Make it better”, Indian Express newspaper, 9 April 2011.  
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While this was considered a great victory of the people over a recalcitrant government by 
some sections of the media (a headline in The Times of India crowed, “India wins again, 
Anna Hazare calls off fast”7), the events of that week brought fundamental debates on the 
nature, practice, and institutions of representative parliamentary democracy in contemporary 
India to the fore. With Jantar Mantar providing a backdrop suffused with the emotional 
intensity that often attends popular protest (and also much colour, as a Manmohan Singh 
lookalike traipsed into the protest site to express his support for Hazare), the strengths and 
weaknesses of democracy, constitutionalism, electoral politics, and the desirable degree of 
public participation in the legislative function of the state were intensely debated in the 
media.  
 
Although the suggestion that this movement “was the first nationwide people’s movement 
after the one launched by late Jayprakash Narayan” is reason enough to conduct a detailed 
and sophisticated examination of it, this research will not do so for the simple reason that the 
‘struggle’ for a Lokpal Act still continues.8 Attempting to meaningfully understand an 
ongoing process such as the Lokpal movement is fraught with risks that this research is 
unwilling to take. However, the ‘Lokpal movement’ possesses a striking resemblance with 
the ‘Right to Information (RTI) movement’ that preceded it by some years. The overarching 
thematic framework of fighting corruption, the assertion that legislative intervention is best 
placed to provide a comprehensive solution to this ‘problem’, the locating of the demand 
within the vocabulary of democratic deepening, a ‘people’s movement’ leading the charge for 
such an intervention, the involvement of civil society in the drafting process of the RTI Act, 
                                                 
7 From The Times of India newspaper, 9 April 2011.  
8 “Lokpal Bill Protest Biggest After JP Movement: Hazare”, Outlook magazine, 11 April 2011. The well-
chronicled and much celebrated ‘JP movement’ was led by a veteran Gandhian and socialist political figure, 
Jayaprakash Narayan, over 1974-75 against the Indira Gandhi-led government alleging rampant misrule and 
corruption. By scale and response, it was indeed a large-scale national movement the likes of which had not 
been seen since the struggle for independence.  
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and the subsequent celebration of its enactment in 2005 as a momentous victory of ‘the 
people’ over a resistant state - the parallels are significant.9 In this sense, the movement 
demanding a Lokpal bill appears to rest on the same continuum as the one that sought an RTI 
Act, arguably extending it much further.  
 
Given that the RTI Act has now been in place for some years, it possesses at least one 
definitive culmination point - the enactment of the Act itself. From the perspective of 
conducting research, this means that at least one well-defined boundary is already marked 
out. This research is therefore unapologetically pragmatic in choosing to focus on the RTI 
Act to explore the question of democratic deepening in India.10 It is hoped that by examining 
the experience of the RTI Act, this study will provide some insights into the practice of 
democracy in India (and elsewhere), which in turn may provide some analytical tools to 
understand the ongoing evolution of the Lokpal movement, which is undoubtedly a 
significant event in the contemporary socio-political landscape of ‘the world’s largest 
democracy’. 
 
                                                 
9 These characteristics of the popular narrative that describes the ‘RTI movement’ are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3 and also inform the thesis as a whole.  
10 At the same time, it should be noted that the RTI Act also remains far from being a closed chapter. Vigorous 
debate on the implementation and implications of the RTI Act continues to take place. 
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Chapter 1 
Democratic Deepening and the Right to Information 
 
“What’s wrong with open government? Why shouldn’t the public know more about what’s 
going on?” 
“My dear boy, it’s a contradiction in terms. You can be open, or you can have government.” 
“But surely the citizens of a democracy have a right to know?”  
“No. They have a right to be ignorant. Knowledge only means complicity and guilt, 
ignorance has a certain dignity.”11  
 
 
Thirty five years after Sir Humphrey uttered his priceless homily on knowledge, ignorance 
and democratic citizenship, the President of India, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, gave his assent to a 
bill on 15 June 2005, which the Parliament of India had passed a few weeks before.12 His 
signature gave the country its national Right to Information (RTI) Act which had been 
enacted “to provide for setting out the practical regime of right to information for citizens to 
secure access to information under the control of public authorities, in order to promote 
transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority, the constitution of a 
Central Information Commission and State Information Commissions and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto”13.  
 
The RTI Act has been widely hailed as a landmark piece of legislation both within and 
beyond the country, primarily for three reasons. First, the fact of enacting a right to 
information law is a radical departure from the access to information regime that existed prior 
to the enactment of this law. Previously, under the Official Secrets Act (OSA) of 1923, all 
                                                 
11 Conversation between Bernard Woolley, Private Secretary to the Minister for Administrative Affairs, Sir 
Arnold Robinson, Cabinet Secretary, and Sir Humphrey Appleby, Permanent Secretary at the Department of 
Administrative Affairs, in the episode titled “Open Government” in the iconic BBC television series of the 
1980s, Yes Minister. The Minister in the series is the Rt. Hon. Jim Hacker, Lord Hacker of Islington KG PC 
BSc.  
12 The Freedom of Information Act for the UK (except Scotland) was enacted in 2000, and came into force on  
1 January 2005. Scotland has its own Act which also came into force on the same date.  
13 Excerpt from the RTI Act 2005. See Annexure I for the full text of the RTI Act 2005.  
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information held by public authorities was considered secret by default, unless the 
government itself deemed it otherwise.14 The second reason is the specific nature of the Act – 
it is generally considered to be a very strong one within the context of access to information 
laws anywhere in the world, and is considered to be a transformatory piece of legislation 
which is fundamentally altering the citizen-state relationship in the country.15 Finally, the 
narrative describing the process leading to the enactment of this Act traces it to a ‘grassroots’ 
struggle, which locates the vocabulary and the representation of the RTI discourse within a 
framework of ‘real’ and ‘meaningful’ democracy with respect to both the process and its 
outcome.  
 
With some estimates suggesting that over two million applications for information were filed 
across the country under the RTI Act between its enactment in 2005 and 2008, it is not a law 
which has simply been enacted and shelved, but is being actively used.16 Media reports 
extolling “India’s powerful and wildly popular Right to Information law”17 abound, citing 
myriad cases where the Act has been used by citizens or non-governmental organisations to 
unearth all manner of information from the government, in some cases resulting in its 
embarrassment, in others unearthing corruption, and in yet others allowing individuals to 
wrench from the government what is ordinarily their due.18 Portrayed as a tool which in part 
enhances entitlement, in part increases empowerment, and in general attempts to hold public 
                                                 
14 A detailed discussion on the access to information regime which existed in India prior to the RTI Act is 
provided in Chapter 5.  
15 The law is considered to be a strong one as it has clauses related to time-bound responses, public interest 
overrides, well-defined exceptions, and clearly defined sanctions for non-compliance. Advocates of the RTI Act 
often highlight its potential to effectively realise all other civil, political rights, economic and social rights. A 
discussion on the comparative aspects of the law is provided in Chapter 6. 
16 See RAAG and NCPRI (2009). 
17 From “Right-to-Know Law Gives India’s Poor a Lever”, International Herald Tribune newspaper, 29 June 
2010.  
18 Although by law only citizens, and not groups or organisations, can seek information from public authorities, 
in many cases an individual associated with an organisation files an application, and then the information 
received is used publicly with credit to the organisation and not the individual who may have actually filed the 
application.  
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authorities accountable to citizens, some of these stories are heart-warming indeed. For 
example, a recently reported case recounted the story of a poor and socially marginalised 
woman who applied for a grant under a government scheme to construct a house. Not hearing 
anything about her application for four years, she filed a request for information to the 
relevant public authority seeking a list of successful grantees, and on the status of her 
application for the grant. While the story does not say whether she received the information, 
she received a grant to build a house within a few days.19  
 
In other instances, information regarding the framing of government policies has been sought 
and responses from the government received. For example, the response to an RTI 
application regarding the Indian government’s policies on climate change “revealed that no 
process exists within the Ministry of Environment and Forests and the Prime Minister’s 
Office to identify, prioritise and pass on new scientific knowledge about climate change to 
the heads of the two institutions, which play the most significant role in determining India’s 
climate policy”.20 Another application under the RTI Act sought, and received, copies of all 
correspondence between the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi, the 
Chairperson of the United Progressive Alliance, the ruling coalition in the Parliament.21 In 
yet another case, a request for information brought an amusing, if worrying statistic to light – 
“42 cases of pilots report[ed] drunk for duty” in 2009.22  
 
Inebriated pilots notwithstanding, the story is intriguing. The state in India (across the 
colonial and post-independence eras) has zealously guarded its ‘right’ to produce and control 
                                                 
19 See “Right-to-Know Law Gives India’s Poor a Lever”, International Herald Tribune newspaper, 29 June 
2010. 
20 See http://www.alertnet.org/db/an_art/60167/2010/05/7-154006-1.htm. Accessed 29 June 2010.  
21 See “Focus on NAC-I issues in Sonia letters to PM” by D.K. Singh, Indian Express newspaper, 12 April 
2010.  
22 See “Eight ‘tipsy’ pilots sacked: DGCA”, India Today magazine, 6 June 2010.  
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information. In a radical and relatively sudden departure from this position, it gives up this 
‘right’ without making any incremental changes in policy. To confound the situation further, 
not only does it do so in a formal sense, but it does so very substantially. This event, both in 
its process and in outcome, is then produced and consumed as the marker of ‘modern’ 
democracy,23 of voice, of empowerment, of the reclaiming of sovereignty by the people, of 
accountability, of the creation of citizenship, and of even being the “second freedom 
struggle”24. 
 
How did this come to be and what does this imply? While these are indeed the first questions 
that come to mind, several others abound. Why should a state give up control over what in 
many formulations is the very source of its power, viz. information? What is the nature of a 
state that would do so? Was public pressure on the state so great that it was not allowed any 
room to manoeuvre? Even if it was responding to pressures of some kind, why must it 
seemingly capitulate so completely? Has the nature of the state in India changed so 
immeasurably over the past few decades that this should not be a surprising phenomenon? 
Does this indicate that the conception of the state itself must be recalibrated? What was the 
nature of the process which allowed this ‘event’ to be produced and consumed in the way it 
was? What were the roles of and the relationships between civil and political society in this 
process? Have their nature and relationship with the state changed as represented by this 
particular process? What was the relationship between the process and its outcome? Is this 
indeed a significant historical moment, a tipping point as it were, where the practice of 
democracy in India shifts from being merely a formal one to a substantive one? Does this 
                                                 
23 For example, the headline of the editorial published in The Economic Times newspaper on the fifth 
anniversary (15 June 2010) of the enactment of the RTI Act was “Right to information, key to democracy”. 
24 Noted social activist Anna Hazare in a media interview in February 2005, a few months before the national 
RTI Act was enacted. The quote continues as “The first [freedom struggle] was against the white sahib, this one 
will be against the brown sahib”. See http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/feb/rti-hazare.htm. Accessed 30 June 
2010.  
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indicate that power has indeed begun to move inexorably downwards? Is the imagination of 
and aspiration to a ‘modern’ and effective liberal democracy actually coalescing into reality?  
 
The Puzzle 
 
The enactment of the RTI Act in India at this particular juncture seems to dramatise and bring 
into sharp relief questions such as these which lie at the heart of several ongoing debates 
around democracy and its deepening, the production and evolution of civil society and 
citizenship, the nature of the post-colonial developmental state, and citizen-state 
relationships, amongst others. Informed by these debates, this thesis will therefore attempt to 
investigate the following questions: 
 
1. How and why was the RTI Act enacted in India at the time that it was? 
2. How and why did it take the specific form that it did?  
3. What does this tell us about the nature of the democratic process in India? 
4. How does this improve our understanding of debates on democratic deepening, the 
location and exercise of power, and the relationship between these? 
 
While these are the questions that the thesis will engage with, it will not attempt to evaluate 
the nature of implementation, or the impact of the usage of the RTI Act on governance or 
corruption. Although these are important questions in themselves and do have a bearing on 
the questions above, they are not the centrepiece of this thesis, in part because the legislation 
has been in force for just under seven years, a period of time that is too short to assess its 
impact on structures of governance and the implications for some of the questions mentioned 
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above.25 But perhaps more importantly, the organising principle of this thesis concerns itself 
with the political processes that bring about what appear to be substantial changes in the 
policy environment within a democratic polity.  
 
This orientation of this research also points to a gap in the literature related to ‘policy 
processes’, particularly in the Indian context. Even as much energy is expended on analysing 
the implementation of various social policies, “The issues and questions, for instance, of why 
policies are formulated and designed in particular ways in the first place, and the political 
shaping of policies ‘on the ground’, do not receive much attention” (Mooij and de Vos, 2003: 
vii). The politics which informs the policy-making process ex-ante is more often than not 
definitive in terms of the contours any policy might eventually take. In this context, this 
research also attempts to redress this imbalance by focusing on the processes preceding the 
institutionalisation and implementation of new policies. Thus even as outcomes are 
important, the processes which produce an event, which in turn allow certain (expected or 
unexpected) outcomes to take place, is the primary focus of this research. Therefore, the 
thesis will be developed primarily by tracing, unpacking and analysing the processes leading 
up to the enactment of the RTI Act, and will refer to post-enactment events only when 
relevant to the sphere circumscribed by the questions above. 
 
Literature on the RTI in India 
 
Over the last two decades, the world has seen a sharp rise in the number of countries which 
have some sort of a law pertaining to public access to government documents. Until 1989, 
                                                 
25 Although a geographically limited study analysing the impact of the RTI on, for example, public service 
delivery, could have been carried out, it would be a different thesis. However, scattered studies on the impact 
aspect of the RTI Act are in fact beginning to emerge, albeit not on a large scale, either geographically, or in 
scope.  
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only eight countries in the world had any such legislation. In 2011, this number stood at 
eighty eight.26 Unsurprisingly, a number of publications which address the issue of 
transparency, accountability and access to information have also emerged concomitantly.27 
Curiously, only limited academic literature has specifically addressed the RTI Act in India. In 
addition, within this literature that has appeared intermittently over the last decade or so, a 
few consistently repeated tropes can be discerned.28 First, much of this literature has placed 
its attention on a ‘grassroots struggle’ for the right to information in rural Rajasthan, a state in 
western India. This literature primarily locates (and more often than not celebrates) the RTI 
Act as a highly successful example of innovations being carried out by social activists and 
movements in rural India within the larger project of pressuring the state to become more 
responsive to the needs of the poor and the marginalised, as well as creating and expanding 
new democratic spaces. The second broad trend which appears in the literature is of placing 
this narrative within the conceptual framework of accountability of public institutions. The 
discussion is then circumscribed by questions such as how accountability is exercised, 
between whom, in which forms, and at which sites. The third trend is the location of the RTI 
Act within the deepening democracy debate where this particular example is posited as 
evidence of democratic deepening in India, both because it was produced as a result of a 
‘people’s movement’ and a ‘people’s campaign’, as well as for what it sought to do – create 
an institutional framework within which citizens could directly, and on an everyday basis, 
hold the government to account.  
 
For an event which is being produced as immensely momentous to the democracy debate in 
India, there is a singular lack of diversity of perspectives on the issue. Virtually every version 
                                                 
26 See Vleugels (2011).  
27 A review of this literature is taken up in Chapters 3 and 6.  
28 Baviskar (2007), Goetz and Jenkins (1999), Roberts (2010), Roy and Dey (2002) and Singh (2007, 2011) are 
key publications which develop and reinforce the dominant narrative. The dominant narrative, its veracity, and 
why it has become so are analysed in greater detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 6.  
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of the history of the production of the Act consistently invokes the narrative of a grassroots 
struggle which led to the enactment of the Act, a vision which suggests vast multitudes of the 
masses locked in an epic contest against a government which eventually, though 
begrudgingly, gives in to a widely popular demand for access to public information. Armed 
with this new weapon in an otherwise limited arsenal that promotes the practice of 
citizenship, the masses emerge victorious. Democracy has now been deepened exponentially, 
even as the struggle to hold on to this victory continues.  
 
This, as Neera Chandhoke (2003) points out in the context of the discourse on civil society, 
flattening of the RTI narrative in India is intriguing and needs deeper examination, especially 
given the fact that obvious silences exist in this literature. For example, the existing literature 
does not address the issue of the arrangement of formal political forces or the political 
context within which the ‘people’s struggle’ was carried out and how these might have 
impacted the process. Even as the dominant narrative focuses on how the struggle was carried 
out, it does not discuss the constitutive characteristics of individuals and civil society groups 
which were involved in the struggle and the campaign for the RTI Act, which had immense, 
if not defining, implications on the outcome of the process. There is also an obvious silence 
on the role of various governments, both past and present, in the process of enacting the RTI 
Act. While the literature celebrates the RTI Act as a very successful outcome of a movement, 
very little has been written about possible causal factors behind the lack of effective 
resistance from a powerful adversary, the bureaucracy, to the RTI Act. Further, existing 
literature does not speak of the possibility of international processes influencing relevant 
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domestic events given the fact that the enactment of the Indian RTI Act falls squarely within 
a larger global trend.29  
 
That the narrative has been flattened to this extent points to a peculiar incongruity. On the 
one hand, the existing narrative suggests a fairly straightforward thesis – that of a democratic 
state responding to pressures from below. At the same time, it also locates the narrative 
within the framework of democratic deepening, which is an area of inquiry that continues to 
engender wide and diverse debates. It may thus be of some value to review the terrain of 
democratic deepening (digging up becoming a necessary action for deepening, as it were) to 
better locate the RTI Act within this debate, as well as problematise the claims of the existing 
literature. In this chapter I will therefore first review debates around democracy and its 
deepening, followed by reviewing key ideas related to the specificities of Indian democracy.30 
Finally, I will revisit the organising questions of this thesis and locate them across these 
overlapping conceptual categories.  
 
Deepening Democracy31 
 
The Rise and Rise of Democracy  
 
Perhaps the very idea of the need for deepening democracy arose from a tension between a 
sharp rise in the number of formal democracies on the one hand, and a growing concern 
                                                 
29 Even as it attempts to fill these gaps, this thesis will also unpack each of the assertions mentioned above in 
later chapters. 
30 Entering the debate through a discussion on the ‘state’ could have been another possible approach. However, 
given that the dominant narrative of the production of the RTI Act (as also its consumption) lies squarely within 
the framework of democratic deepening, even as significant claims have been made in terms of its 
transformatory potential, entering the debate through this lens allows for greater conceptual coherence. 
31 For the purposes of the thesis, deepening democracy means “a process through which citizens exercise ever 
deepening control over decisions which affect their lives, and as such it is also constantly under construction” 
(Gaventa, 2006: 11).  
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around what has come to be known as ‘democratic deficits’ on the other. In the literature 
which analyses the expansion of democracy, democratisation processes have often been seen 
as coming in ‘waves’ (Huntington, 1992), with the third wave being the most pronounced. 
Electoral democracies seem to be generally on the rise, at least in terms of numbers, with 115 
countries out of 194 conducting elections regularly, and 87 of these being considered ‘full’ 
democracies, if the defining characteristics are taken to be respect for rule of law and 
protection of civil and political rights of citizens, apart from holding free and fair elections 
regularly (Freedom House, 2011).  
 
Figure 1.1:  Global trends in governance, 1946-200832 
 
Source:  Marshall and Cole, 2009: 11  
 
Although the causes behind this sharp increase have been widely debated (Ackerman, 1992; 
Higley and Gunther, 1992; Huntington, 1992; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986), what is 
                                                 
32 The report defines an ‘anocracy’ as “a middling category rather than a distinct form of governance. 
[Anocracies] are countries whose governments are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic but, rather, 
combine an, often, incoherent mix of democratic and autocratic traits and practices” (Marshall and Cole, 2009: 
9).  
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uncontested is that there certainly has been an increase in the number of formal democracies 
in the world in recent decades. The graph above can be taken as representative in terms of the 
overall trends being observed, even if the methodology of data collection could well be 
contested.33 In tandem with this increase in numbers, the language of global politics is 
suffused with a victorious note, where liberal democracy is being increasingly seen as the 
desirable form of government for all humanity. From Bhutan, where a ruling and popular 
monarchy almost seems to foist democracy onto a people unwilling to let go of their king, to 
the recent events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, to Iraq and Afghanistan, where attempts to 
produce democracy are being made primarily by external actors, liberal democracy seems to 
be on an unassailable ascendant.  
 
However, the approach which focuses on the ‘scaffolding’ that makes democracy possible 
has been critiqued by suggesting that an overbearing focus on the procedural aspects of 
democracy is an extension of the democratic elitism experienced by the north, and foisting 
this form of democracy upon the global south in fact depoliticises the practice of democracy 
itself. “Democratic elitism was based on two main theses: first that in order to be preserved, 
democracy must narrow the scope of political participation; and the second that the only way 
to make democratic decision-making rational is to limit it to elites and to restrict the role of 
the masses to that of choosing between elites” (Avritzer, 2002: 14-15, quoted in  
Gaventa, 2006: 13). Thus politics is “stripped of its horizontal elements, which are replaced 
                                                 
33 For example, there is some debate (Dahl, 1971; Di Palma, 1990; Huntington, 1989, 1991; O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986; Schumpeter, 1947) in terms of what are the minimum defining features of a functioning 
democracy, and hence at what point does a country ‘make the grade’. Further, even as there is a clear trend in 
the increase in the numbers of procedurally democratic countries in this graph, the data underlying it does not 
take into account an overall increase in the number of countries itself, especially after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, as well as countries in the Balkans splitting into several new countries. If such details were to be overlaid 
with this particular data, perhaps the trend line showing the ascendance of democracy would not display such a 
steep curve as of 1990. However, a general consensus seems to exist that the number of countries espousing 
liberal democracy as the desired form of government is definitely on the rise. As Heller (2000) says, “there are 
far more countries today in which democracy is the only game in town than was the case just fifteen years ago” 
(Heller, 2000: 484; emphasis added).  
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by the political authorization of elites through elections” (Avritzer, 2002: 23). In this context, 
“ the hegemonic model of democracy (liberal, representative democracy), while prevailing on 
a global scale, guarantees no more than low-intensity democracy, based on the privatization 
of public welfare by more or less restricted elites, on the increasing distance between 
representatives and the represented, and on an abstract political inclusion made of concrete 
social exclusion” (Sousa, 2005: ix-x). Avritzer goes on to develop the idea of ‘participating 
publics’ and suggests that “the most sensible way to further democratize state-society 
relations is to transfer democratic potentials that emerge at the society level to the political 
arena through participatory designs” (2002: 8-9).  
 
Democratic Deficits 
 
Apart from such critiques that question the legitimacy of manufacturing a specific type of 
democracy from above, a parallel stream of literature focuses on the evolution and 
consolidation of democracies around the world, both in the global north and south. Although 
the typology of questions varies, in the north questions are being asked about the degree of 
political engagement of citizens (or lack thereof) (Clarke 2002; Putnam, 2000; Skopcol, 
2003; Wainwright, 2003), while in the south the nature of inquiry has often focused on the 
relationship between democracy and poverty (Moon and Dixon, 1985; Przeworski et al 2000; 
Ross, 2006; Sen 1981, 1999). In either case, the underlying conceptual underpinnings are 
broadly similar. Are citizens actually participating in democratic processes, not limited 
merely to exercising their franchise? Who is taking decisions on behalf of the ‘public’, even 
in countries where the architecture of democratic governance has been in place for long? 
What is the level of public involvement with political life and engagement with politics? 
What are the structural limitations which need to be overcome to achieve meaningful 
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democracy? Does democracy axiomatically lead to the material betterment of people? As 
Sousa puts it, “At the very moment of its most convincing triumphs across the globe, liberal 
democracy becomes less and less credible and convincing not only in the “new frontier” 
countries but also in the countries where it has its deepest roots. The twin crises of 
representation and participation are the most visible symbols of such a deficit of credibility, 
as well as, in the last instance, of legitimacy” (Sousa, 2005: xxx). In light of such 
questioning, a variety of epithets have emerged which seem to qualify the practice of 
democracy in different national and political contexts. ‘Elite democracy’ (Wainwright, 2003), 
‘diminished democracy’ (Skocpol, 2003), ‘downsized democracy’ (Crenson and Ginsberg, 
2002), ‘exclusionary democracy’ (Abrahamsen, 2000) are some, each pointing to concerns 
being raised about the practice and relational aspects of democracy, rather than its procedural 
characteristics. This qualifying of democracy in such a manner has also led to a rise in 
describing ‘democracy with adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). These range from 
“authoritarian, neo-patrimonial, or military-dominated forms of democracy on the one hand, 
to more substantive, inclusionary, participatory, deliberative, or deepened democracy on the 
other, with perhaps forms of representative, procedural or delegative democracy occupying a 
type of middle ground” (Gaventa, 2006: 10). 
 
Given that most such adjectives point to ““diminished” subtypes of democracy” (Collier and 
Levitsky, 1997: 431), there is a clear concern amongst scholars of democracy and 
democratisation regarding the limitations of democracy in its practice(s). These limitations 
have been usefully organised into four broad types of ‘democratic deficits’ by Luckham et al 
(2000: 22-24).  
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1. Hollow citizenship, where deep inequalities exist in the exercise of citizenship in both 
formal arrangements and the practice of power; 
2. Lack of vertical accountability, where citizens are unable to hold their governments to 
account effectively; 
3. Weak horizontal accountability, where existing formal institutions, such as the judiciary, 
are unable to exercise their monitoring and sanctioning role over the government; and 
4. International accountability dilemmas, where governments themselves are unable to 
exercise control over national policies and decisions due to a shift in power towards 
transnational entities. 
 
Addressing Democratic Deficits by Deepening Democracy 
 
Given this tension between the growth of formal, procedural democracies, along with the 
overwhelming evidence documenting its limitations in practice, has led to a growing interest 
in unearthing and conceptualising spaces, forms and processes which address such deficits. 
However, all these formulations continue to presume procedural democracy as the point of 
embarkation from which the imagination of a system of governance arises. Other ways of 
exploring what is essentially a question of the distribution and exercise of power in a society 
and the nature of its power relations, but not necessarily circumscribed by a formal 
conception of democracy, are rarely found. In this manner, this exercise to articulate gaps, 
identify contestations, and then propose solutions returns to reinforce one of the basic causes 
of the tension, that of the establishment of the liberal representative democratic way as a 
hegemonic ideal in the Gramscian sense of the term (Escobar, 1995; Santos, 2005). 
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It is within this conceptual terrain that the deepening democracy approach has arisen. While 
taking on board the importance of procedural aspects of democracy, the deepening 
democracy argument also attempts to produce more nuanced conceptions of citizenship, and 
questions the political aspects of the relationship that citizens have with the institutions and 
actors who represent and govern them. The focus then, in comparison to strengthening 
procedural aspects, shifts to the relationship between the governing and the governed. This 
relationship and its changing nature has been defined through a varied vocabulary – 
‘expansion of politics’ and deepening the ‘intensity of citizenship’ (O’Donnell, 1993), 
‘degrees of democracy’ (Heller, 2000) and ‘expansive democracy’ (Warren, 1992). However, 
all of these formulations agree on a basic conceptual springboard – that if “control by citizens 
over their collective affairs, and equality between citizens in the exercise of that control, are 
the key democratic principles” (Beetham, 1999: 3), then greater attention needs to be given to 
the spaces in which democracy can be redefined beyond its procedural forms.34 Linz and 
Stepan state this more elegantly, “Within the category of consolidated democracies there is a 
continuum from low to high quality democracy; an urgent political and intellectual task is to 
think about how to improve the quality of most consolidated democracies” (1996: 6).  
 
Types of Democratic Deepening 
 
Although there is a substantial level of consensus in literature on democracy that its ‘quality’ 
needs to be improved, there is much debate on how this is being (or can be) done. John 
Gaventa has developed a useful, if simplified, classification which identifies broad 
approaches in the thinking on how democracy is being, and can be deepened, viz. civil 
                                                 
34 By formal procedural democracy I mean “universal suffrage, regular and competitive elections, accountability 
of state apparatuses to elected representatives, and legally codified and enforced rights of association” (Heller, 
2000: 487-88).  
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society democracy, deliberative democracy and participatory democracy (2006: 14).35 While 
there are considerable overlaps between these approaches, using this classification provides a 
coherent structure in the examination of different institutional structures, sites, strategies and 
processes that deepen democracy.  
 
Civil Society Democracy 
 
The first of these approaches focuses on the centrality of ‘civil society’ in the process of 
democratic deepening and draws its philosophical moorings from the Tocquevillean tradition 
of celebrating the associational characteristic of formal procedural democracies. Civil society, 
in this conceptualisation, constitutes the ‘third sphere’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992), with an 
attendant logic, organisation, political impulse and ethos which is very different from the 
other two spheres – the state and the market. Vibrant and widespread associations, such as 
voluntary organisations, social movements, self-help groups, unions, associations and so on, 
lead to deeper democracy. The free association of individuals is considered to be good in and 
of itself, and an increase in the densities of such interactions is essential if democracy is to 
become more meaningful (Diamond, 1994; Fukuyama, 1991; O’Donnell, 1993; Putnam, 
2000; Seligman, 1992). In the broadest sense then, the celebratory aspect of civil society is 
premised on it being able to create the possibility of people defining their political realities on 
their own through interaction, debate and deliberations on an equal footing in a democratic 
                                                 
35 Although he has also suggested a fourth category, that of ‘empowered, participatory governance’, I will not 
include that in this review since it is premised on a single work (Fung and Wright, 2003), and is essentially a 
more layered and nuanced articulation of the three approaches mentioned already. In addition, although this 
classification appears to have been produced within the context of donor-led democratisation processes, I have 
used this here as it provides a good general overview of the types of approaches that are informing the thinking 
around democratic deepening. At the same time, it assumes greater salience since an important cause of the rise 
of the democratic deepening project has been the push which it has received from donor governments and 
international financial institutions, which has translated into related policy changes. Indeed, some evidence 
regarding the genesis of the RTI Act in India also seems to highlight the influence of such external actors in the 
process, even if the dominant narrative locates it within a ‘grassroots’ movement. See Chapter 6 for more 
details.  
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space, and through such processes, constantly reclaim power from the state. It is indeed a 
very attractive image. “The picture here is of people freely associating and communicating 
with one another, forming and reforming groups of all sorts, not for the sake of any particular 
formation – family, tribe, nation, religion, commune, brotherhood or sisterhood, interest 
group or ideological movement – but for the sake of sociability itself. For we are by nature 
social, before we are political or economic beings” (Walzer, 1998: 16).  
 
However, this approach, where civil society is considered to be the lynchpin of the 
democratic deepening project, has been critiqued in many ways. In the first instance, 
conceiving of it as separate from the state has itself been seen as problematic. Historically, 
“for De Tocqueville civil society limits the state, for Hegel civil society is a necessary stage 
in the formation of the state, for Marx civil society is the source of power of the state, and for 
Gramsci civil society is the space where the state constructs its hegemony in alliance with the 
dominant classes” (Chandhoke, 2003: 11). Other criticisms take the idea further and question 
the very notion of ‘civil society’, and suggest that civil society is itself deeply limited and 
implicated within the rubric of the state, when not constituted or co-opted by it, and hence 
cannot, by definition, exercise any kind of meaningful countervailing power against the state 
(Chandhoke, 2001; Harriss, 2007; Houtzager et al, 2003). Whichever political predilection 
one may subscribe to, it is, after all, the state that legitimises civil society, as “the conditions 
of civil society – for instance, the rule of law, which regulates the sphere and guarantees the 
rights of the inhabitants – are institutionalised by the state” (Chandhoke, 2003: 10, emphasis 
in original). Another critique highlights power relationships within societies, the ways in 
which these relationships define spaces of association, which in turn affects the constitution 
of civil society itself in terms of whose voices can be heard (Hirschmann, 1994). Other 
critiques have gone further to make a distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ societies, 
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suggesting that these are defined by the social and institutional spheres that their constituting 
publics are embedded in (Chatterjee, 2004). These formulations question the very 
composition of civil society, and by extension also question its legitimacy in terms of making 
claims on behalf of the ‘voiceless’. 
 
Deliberative Democracy 
 
Building on the work of Habermas (1987, 1991, 1996), Rawls (1993, 1997a, 1997b) and 
Cohen (1997), the second strand of democratic deepening espouses the idea of deliberative 
democracy as a tool to deepen it, and attempts to create discursive public spheres which seek 
to take the focus away from “bargaining, interest aggregation, and power, to the common 
reason of equal citizens as a dominant force in democratic life” (Cohen and Fung, 2004: 24). 
It fundamentally “affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their 
representatives. Both are expected to justify the laws they would impose on one another” 
(Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 3). With a focus on public debate, civil society is 
reimagined as a public sphere where such discursive practices can take place. The 
problematic of who participates in the debate is addressed by laying a focus on “processes of 
recruitment which seek to avoid capture by organised groups and special interests, rather than 
on mobilising and supporting such groups to demand inclusion in public processes” 
(Gaventa, 2006: 18).36 
 
This deliberative approach which privileges the importance of reasoned public debate on 
issues central to the lives of ordinary citizens has been critiqued on several counts. To begin 
with, the notion of what is ‘reasonable’ may vary across cultures and contexts and may 
                                                 
36 A detailed discussion of elements of this approach which find resonance in the RTI experience in India 
through the practice of jan sunwais (public hearings) are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
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therefore not result in the formation of any consensus (Holt, 1993; Manin et al, 1987). 
Further, as this approach focuses on building consensus and mitigating conflict, this 
diminishes the importance of difference and how it may actually enrich the discursive process 
(Young, 2001). In addition, the notion of the public sphere and who inhabits it continues to 
be an area of concern in this formulation, attention being paid to recruitment notwithstanding 
(Dryzek, 2001; Goodin, 2000; Parkinson, 2006).  
 
Participatory Democracy 
 
The third broad approach which has attracted much attention in the recent past has been the 
development of participatory processes to deepen democracy (Chambers, 1994a, 1994b, 
1997; Manor, 2004; Narayan et al, 2000; UNDP, 2002; World Bank, 2000). With a 
considerable overlap with the thesis of ‘civil society as a democratising force’, the underlying 
principle which informs this approach is that the citizenry, through its varied associational 
avatars, works with the state instead of acting in opposition to it. The state of course has to 
create the enabling framework within which such activities can take place, and where the 
governance space is shared with citizens. Activities within this framework could include 
participatory planning processes, the establishment of monitoring groups, and the creation of 
structures that allow the joint management of public resources. Although these forms of 
deepening the intensity of citizenship are more action oriented than those proposed by the 
civil society approach, it is state intervention which allows the creation of these spaces of ‘co-
governance’ (Ackerman, 2004). Whether these spaces are created by the state as a result of a 
top-down approach or as a response to demands from below is a different discussion – the 
desired end result in this participatory approach to democracy is the greater involvement of 
citizens in decision-making processes, by engaging with institutionalised processes and 
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spaces. In this, the approach can also trace its lineage to the larger good governance agenda 
with its attendant focus on decentralisation and subsidiarity in the institutions of governance.  
 
In some ways, then, the difference between the civil society approach and the participatory 
one are twofold. First, in the civil society strand, there are at least some elements of 
contestation and opposition in the relationship between the state and citizens, premised on 
consistent claims that civil society is inherently separate from the state and the market. In the 
participatory democracy strand, even if opposition exists, it is negotiated through state-
sanctioned (or at the very least recognised) institutions (which could well be institutions 
considered to be a part of civil society). By extension, the second difference lies in the aims 
of the two types of processes. While the civil society argument is premised on exercising a 
countervailing influence over the power of the state, the participatory strand is given more 
towards shaping and directing the state and its constitutive institutions so that it reflects the 
‘will of the people’ more substantially. 
 
However, criticisms similar to those made with regard to the civil society approach have been 
articulated for this approach as well. Even when spaces of participation are created, the 
preconditions for entering these spaces, and who is able to participate in them is dependent on 
existing power relations, and the risk of elite capture is rife (Houtzager et al, 2003; Lavalle et 
al, 2005). The implication is that the same structural problems of exclusion and low degree of 
citizenship which require the development of these spaces to ensure participatory processes 
of governance in the first instance are replicated in these spaces (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; 
Cornwall and Coelho, 2007; Webb, 2010a; Zittel and Fuchs, 2007). In addition, a different 
kind of tension has also developed in recent years. Even as the idea of participation has seen a 
confluence with ideas of democratic deepening, the concurrent shrinking of the state at the 
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expense of the market in many countries has meant that the political value of participation is 
being slowly enervated (Dagnino, 2005). If there is no state to participate in, then what is the 
point of participation?  
 
Accountability 
 
In most formulations, the deepening democracy literature displays a direct bidirectional 
relationship with accountability, especially within the framework of democratic 
decentralisation and increasing the intensity of citizenship through participatory mechanisms. 
Essentially, the problem of accountability can be traced to the principal-agent problem. 
“When decision-making power is transferred from a principal (e.g. the citizens) to an agent 
(e.g. government), there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agent to account for 
their decisions and if necessary for imposing sanctions, ultimately by removing the agent 
from power” (Lindberg, 2009: 1).37 Variations of this basic theoretical conception of 
accountability can be traced to at least three distinct traditions found in democratic theory, 
political science and public administration literatures (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Schedler, 
1999). Even as the meanings of the state, the distinctions between the political and the 
administrative, and the meaning of civil society have undergone substantial recalibrations, the 
evolution of accountability as a critical constitutive element of these categories and the 
relationships between them has also seen much debate in the recent past. 
 
Classical democratic theory, particularly informed by a focus on procedural aspects of 
democracies, has laid emphasis on the accountability of elected representatives to the 
citizenry, which is typically exercised through the process of elections (Dahl, 1971; Mulgan, 
                                                 
37 Although the burgeoning literature on accountability seems to be taking the direction of ‘democracy with 
adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). Lindberg (2009: 2) has identified over 100 sub-types of 
‘accountability’ in the relevant literature.  
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2000: 556). Thus, it concerns itself primarily with the answerability aspect of accountability – 
that elected representatives must be answerable to their constituencies, and this answerability 
is instrumentalised through regular elections, which in turn remains one of the cornerstones 
of liberal democracy. The election process, of course, remains a central constitutive element 
of what has come to be known as vertical accountability – through which citizens exercise 
political control over their governments. In this sense, accountability intersects with human 
rights literature as a ‘first generation’ civil-political right which is premised on a citizen’s 
relationship with the state.  
 
In the political science tradition, questions of accountability tend to be framed in terms of the 
power relations that inform the normative notions of accountability, as well as its practice. If 
answerability is a central aspect of accountability, how, by whom and at what sites is it 
enforced become important questions (Cornwall and Coelho, 2004; Fox and Brown, 1998, 
Newell and Bellour, 2002: 11). This literature also attempts to analyse in greater detail the 
overlaps and differentiation between vertical and horizontal accountabilities (Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2001). Can vertical accountability be exercised only through elections? When an 
elected representative questions the government on behalf of her constituency, does that 
constitute vertical or horizontal accountability? Even as issues around the distinctions 
between the two are debated, a related strand which engages with the role of non-state actors 
in accountability relationships with the state has emerged. Civil society groups, which are not 
individual citizens, just as they are not entities of the state, which “use voice rather than the 
vote” (Jayal, 2008: 106) in seeking accountability from the state, are instances of neither 
vertical not horizontal forms of accountability (Bovens, 2010; Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). The 
exploration of such forms of accountability is thus deeply linked to the framework of 
bringing forth the voices of the poor and the marginalised, especially within the participatory 
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monitoring and evaluation approach within the broader rubric of participatory approaches to 
democracy (as discussed above).  
 
Traditionally, public administration literature has engaged with accountability in somewhat 
different terms. This literature has mostly focused on internal governmental mechanisms of 
accountability, such as audits, evaluation, institutionalised intra-government sanctioning 
powers – the proverbial checks and balances (Barton, 2006; Friedrich, 1940; Finer, 1941; 
O’Loughlin, 1990; Normanton, 1966). Broadly, most of these preoccupations could be 
understood within the term horizontal accountability where constitutionally, politically and 
institutionally mandated entities within a governmental structure exercise control over other 
elements within the same structure in ensuring that the overall functioning of the government 
is being carried out within the legal and procedural norms of the day (Caiden, 1988; Day and 
Klein, 1987; Romzek and Dubnick, 1987).  
 
However, the accountability conundrum has become more complex as actors apart from the 
state have been brought into this conceptual arena. How can individual citizens hold 
grassroots organisations, social movements, NGOs, intergovernmental organisations, 
international financial institutions, donor governments or multinational corporations to 
account (Newell and Wheeler, 2006)? In an attempt to provide a coherent framework that 
potentially includes all types of actors, Lindberg (2009) has developed a useful matrix 
premised upon three constitutive characteristics of any accountability relationship – the 
source of the relationship, the degree of control that the principal has over the agent, and the 
spatial direction of the relationship. Based on the interactions between these three, twelve 
sub-types of accountability relations emerge.  
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Table 1.1:  Sub-types of accountability 
 
Source:  Lindberg, 2009:12  
 
While analysing each of these sub-types is beyond the scope of this chapter, what can be 
stated is that ‘accountability’, like ‘democracy’, has quite rapidly acquired the characteristics 
of an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 1956), and in this sense, the debates surrounding 
it are not likely to abate in the near future.  
 
Good Governance and New Public Management  
 
In many ways, the conceptual and policy-orientated spaces where the debates highlighted 
above, viz. democratic deepening, participation and accountability converged were good 
governance and its close cousin, new public management. “Since the early 1980s, 
‘governance’ and increasingly ‘good governance’ have permeated development discourse and 
especially research agendas and other activities funded by public and private banks and 
bilateral donors” (Weiss, 2000: 796).38 Scholars have pointed out that the change in 
geopolitical realities after the end of the Cold War introduced a fundamental shift in the way 
the role of international aid was being imagined and managed (Doornbos, 2001; Jenkins, 
                                                 
38 For key documents on this theme arising from within the international aid community, see World Bank (1992) 
and UNDP (1997).  
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2002; Kiely, 1998; Weiss, 2000). If few questions were being asked earlier about how aid 
money was being spent so that countries could be kept ‘in the fold’, this changed dramatically 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall. What ensued was the development of new kinds of 
conditionalities attached to aid. These were no longer subtle (and not so subtle) pressures 
restricted to the domain of foreign policy while maintaining a strict ‘non-interference in 
internal affairs’ – the long-term staple of international foreign policy. These pressures had 
morphed into more aggressive conditionalities which sought to affect the internal political 
and institutional structures of countries which received aid (Barya, 1993; Burnell, 1997; 
Santiso 2001; Tjønneland, 1998). Now that the geopolitical compulsions of the Cold War had 
changed, attention could shift to exercise greater control over the inner workings of post-
colonial and authoritarian states to incorporate them into the logic of the liberal democratic 
way. 
 
‘Good governance’ thus provided a convenient conceptual framework and argument from 
which this project of reforming in-country political and administrative structures could be 
launched from. Needless to say, as the victor of the Cold War, liberal democracy was the 
dominant narrative within which good governance was located. In addition, as the concept 
was launched from within the international aid discourse, it was circumscribed within the 
context of the global south.39 The north, it was presumed, already had a large (to use a Cold 
War term) stockpile of good governance. The attractiveness of good governance also arose 
from the inherent vagueness of the term. It could be made to mean different things such as 
“particular policies or policy outcomes – stable macroeconomic policy, reduction of poverty, 
openness to trade, decentralisation, or efficient revenue collection, for example – or particular 
institutional forms and processes – democracy, widespread participation in development 
                                                 
39 Although Mkandawire (2007) has argued that the conceptual framing of ‘good governance’ in the African 
context arose from within the African scholarly community and was promoted by the World Bank only later.  
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decision-making, or strong legislatures, for example” (Grindle, 2007: 555). The types of 
changes thus being proposed varied from the public administration to the political domains. 
Governance, in that sense, provided the action-oriented as well as conceptual space for donor 
agencies as well as academics to negotiate the terrain between and across the administrative 
and the political, all in the service of the good and noble cause of the democratic ideal, which 
by now had acquired singular moral authority (Kiely, 1998; Santiso, 2001; UNDP, 1997; 
World Bank, 1992, 1997, 2002). One representative example of the conceptualisation of this 
term is given below.  
 
Figure 1.2:  Characteristics of good governance 
 
Source:  UNESCAP (undated)  
 
However, governance mechanisms in the north began to see widespread changes as well, but 
more through the lens of civil service and public sector reforms, a bundle of ideas which 
came to be known as ‘new public management’ (NPM). In brief, these included cutting costs 
and reducing the size of government, disaggregating bureaucratic organisations into smaller 
agencies (at times outsourcing functions to quasi-government agencies), privatisation of non-
core areas of government, decentralising authority within agencies, introducing business 
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principles in management, bringing in performance targets for employees, moving from 
permanent employment to contractual arrangements, and increasing the emphasis on the 
provision of ‘quality’ services (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1995). The efficiency principle informed 
these policy changes, with business practices providing the template for government to aspire 
to. As the ideas of NPM gained traction across the OECD countries, these principles were 
interwoven within the good governance agenda that was being introduced in the global south, 
not least through the logic of structural adjustment (Das, 1998; Hirschmann, 1999; Kaul, 
1997; Sundaram, 2004). In this context, NPM was held as an important element of the 
democratic deepening project, as it would address the problem of democratic deficits through 
the “running together of agendas for public service reforms, the decentralisation and 
devolution of government activities and budgets, and participatory development” (Corbridge 
et al, 2005: 1). 
 
The Indian Context 
 
India as an Unlikely Democracy 
 
Literature on democratic theory has commented regularly on the case of India as an unlikely 
democracy as it does not seem to fulfil many of the preconditions necessary for the 
establishment and eventual deepening of democracy (Dahl, 1989; Diamond et al, 1989; 
Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al, 2000). “India is not an industrialized, developed economy; 
Indian businessmen and middle classes do not fully control the country’s politics; India is 
anything but ethnically homogenous; and India would probably rank low on a number of 
attributes of “civic culture”” (Kohli, 2002a: 1). Deep fissures exist at a social level, 
particularly with respect to caste identities. Linguistic, religious and geographical diversities 
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on a continental scale and large variations in economic and social structures across regions 
only add to the litany of negatives which would be typically considered to hamper the 
establishment and evolution of a unified country within a democratic polity. Finally, the 
democratisation project post-independence did not follow the democratic elitism path of the 
West. Universal adult suffrage, regardless of economic, educational, gender or social status, 
was accorded to all adult citizens immediately upon the adoption of the Constitution in 1950.  
 
Given this, it is unsurprising that immediately after independence and until the early 1990s, 
scenarios heralding an imminent death of democracy in India continued to be written 
regularly. With wars being fought with Pakistan and China, violent secessionist movements 
taking place in several parts of the country, tensions around linguistic, religious or caste 
identities taking the form of frequent and often lethal riots, and an interregnum when 
Emergency was declared (1975-1977) suspending democratic processes and civil liberties, 
sceptics had enough reasons to suggest that India would disintegrate into several smaller 
countries, or see the establishment of a military regime, or worse, slide into a long-drawn out 
civil war which could continue for decades.  
 
None of this has happened. Since 1947, the year of independence, elections have been held 
regularly to elect representatives to the Parliament and state legislatures (with voting 
generally staying around the 60% mark for the parliamentary elections), the transfer of power 
to successive governments has been smooth, the military has throughout been under civilian 
control, and while secessionist movements exist even now (the most strident one being in the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir), many have either died down, or at the very least, their intensity 
has lowered. On the political front as well, the Congress party, which for several decades 
enjoyed complete control over the Parliament as well as most state legislatures, can no longer 
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claim to be the sole representative of the will of the people as expressed through election 
results. Other national and regional parties have grown in strength, with the Congress 
becoming practically a political non-entity in many states. Along with this, the media in India 
is quite independent and vocal, and freedoms of association and assembly are guaranteed, 
enabling significant political spaces for dissent and contestation against the state. In sum 
then, it does seem that in the six decades since independence, democracy, at least in the 
procedural sense, has been institutionalised and has taken root in India – a condition that is 
unlikely to change or be challenged in the foreseeable future.40 
 
This consolidation of a robust democratic framework has been duly noted in the media. When 
“the world’s largest democracy” goes to the polls, it is followed with avid interest globally. 
For the last national elections in the country in 2009, the global media descended in full 
force, despite the fact that the process was staggered over almost a month. A well-known 
media house hired a train to travel the length and breadth of the country covering the 
elections.41 Celebratory pieces appeared with unerring regularity in newspapers across the 
world, at times in awe of the sheer logistical exercise in holding free and fair elections across 
a vast geography, involving an electorate that would be the third largest population of the 
world if it was taken as a separate country.42 Innovations in the technologies of conducting 
elections are also being carried out, with electronic voting machines developed indigenously 
(with talks of these being exported) and deployed nationwide in 2009 to make the election 
process quicker, cheaper and cleaner.  
                                                 
40 Although the continued actions and influence of Maoist groups across large swathes of the country remain a 
matter of concern for the mainstream political and economic establishment.  
41 The “Indian Election Express” was train hired by the British Broadcasting Corporation which travelled around 
the country for 18 days covering 6,000 kilometres. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8000645.stm. 
Accessed 20 August 2010.  
42 The total electorate for the 2009 general election in India was 716,985,101 as per data from the Election 
Commission of India. This is more than the combined population of the United States and countries of the 
European Union. See http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/archiveofge2009/Stats/VOLI/05_StateWiseNumberOfElectors. 
pdf. Accessed 12 August 2010.  
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Academic literature, which has for long attempted to grapple with the anomaly of the Indian 
democratic experience in contrast with most other countries of the global south, is no longer 
debating whether or not democracy will survive in India. This existential question has now 
been replaced by two broad thematic trends in the study of Indian democracy. The first 
attempts to understand the reasons behind the consolidation of procedural democracy in 
India, both at the national and subnational levels, and the second engages with questions 
related to substantive aspects of democratic practice in India, primarily engaging with 
questions of democratic deepening.43 Even as there is a broad consensus on the idea that 
formal democratic institutions have now established deep roots in India, there is perhaps an 
even greater consensus (and concern) on the limitations of the practice of democracy in India, 
especially with respect to the forms and sites within which the masses engage (or are unable 
to do so) with democratic principles, structures, processes and outcomes more substantially. 
 
While dwelling in detail on the reasons behind the consolidation of procedural democracy in 
India is beyond the remit of this thesis, what I will attempt to do next is to provide a brief 
overview of the key events related to more substantive aspects of the same – the cherished 
vision of democratic deepening in India. This is important not only because it is a more 
current debate, but more so given the context of this thesis – where the evolution and usage of 
the RTI Act has been located squarely within the discourse of democratic deepening.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 To mention a few key authors, the work of Paul Brass (1990), Rajni Kothari (1970), Rudolph and Rudolph 
(1987), and Myron Weiner (1989) has largely focused on the former, while that of Pradeep Chhibber (1999), 
Stuart Corbridge (2000, 2002 and 2005), John Harriss (2000, 2006 and 2007), Barbara Harriss-White (2003), 
Atul Kohli (2002b, 2006a, 2006b and 2012) and Ashutosh Varshney (1998, 2000 and 2004) on the latter.  
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Democratic Deepening in India 
 
In many ways, the deepening of democracy in India is not a recent project. While the 
Constitution adopted in 1950 provides the bedrock of democratic polity in the country, it is 
also one of the most amended constitutions in the world. If nothing else, this does suggest 
that democracy in India continues to be work in progress. This has been commented upon in 
great detail in literature, and much of the analysis has also pointed to the accommodative 
nature of Indian politics which has contributed in no insignificant terms to keep the country 
together while extending the roots of democratic norms in the country (Brass, 1990; Lijphart, 
1996). Although universal suffrage was granted to all adult citizens in 1950 itself, the “idea 
of political equality and of democratic rights was rather alien amidst the age-old inequalities 
of a hierarchical rural society” (Kohli, 2002a: 14).44 In this sense, most literature suggests 
that social and political power in its more obvious forms remained the exclusive domain of 
the elite in the initial years post independence (Moore, 1966; Weiner, 1967; Kothari, 1970). 
The Congress dominated the political landscape, both at the centre and in the states, largely 
through widespread links with rural elites. Political ‘mobilisation’ in the early decades after 
independence broadly consisted of this typically high caste landed elite ensuring that those 
within their sphere of influence, the vast multitudes of the masses, voted for the Congress. 
The masses were themselves largely caught up in a patron-client relationship with the landed 
elite, which meant that acquiescence to the political direction given by traditional elites in 
village society was the norm. However, “the spread of commerce and the repeated practice of 
democracy... eroded the dependencies of social “inferiors” on their “superiors”, releasing 
numerous new actors for political mobilization” (Kohli, 2002a: 14). This form of democratic 
                                                 
44 It is instructive to note that Switzerland, the poster boy of decentralised democracy, granted franchise at the 
federal level to its women only in 1971. One of its cantons, Appenzell Innerrhoden, was forced by a Swiss 
Supreme Court judgement to do so as recently as 1990.  
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deepening premised on greater and regular participation in electoral processes led to a greater 
autonomy in political participation particularly for the rural low caste poor.  
 
The realisation of the political possibilities of appealing to vast numbers of the rural poor in 
part led to the emergence of political parties in opposition to the Congress in the 1960s, 
which, among others, led to a change in the political rhetoric which gained currency during 
and after that period. From Nehru’s appeals to nation building and a planned transition to 
modernity, the language of popular politics changed to address the concerns of the poor and 
the marginalised more directly. For example, Indira Gandhi’s recognition of the changing 
nature of the politicisation of the masses took the form of a call to eradicate poverty (garibi 
hatao) in the 1970s. In addition, affirmative action policies, which took the form of 
reservations in educational institutions, government jobs, and competitive electoral politics, 
began to incorporate the traditionally poor and marginalised low and middle caste groups into 
social and political arenas which had so far been out of bounds for them. Democratic 
deepening, in the sense of greater political consciousness and civic participation amongst the 
traditionally marginalised had begun to occur. The rise of regional, occupational and caste-
based parties from the 1970s through to the 1990s can in part be attributed to this growing 
politicisation of the masses.  
 
Democratic deepening in urban spaces has also evolved concurrently, albeit in different 
forms, particularly through organised labour and elected student associations, both of which 
are typically aligned along party lines. Cause-based groupings have also grown tremendously 
in the past decades, especially those related to women’s issues, environmental concerns, and 
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dalit and tribal movements.45 The engagement of most of these groups with the state largely 
remains within the democratic framework, with protests, contestation, rallies and sit-ins being 
the more typical forms of claim-making.  
 
It should be noted however, that (as would be expected in the context of India) democratic 
deepening is varied both in terms of the forms it takes and the degree of success in different 
states of the country for a great number of reasons. If Kerala is held up as arguably having the 
highest degree of democratic deepening (as well as social development indicators) in the 
country, this is attributed to a specific set of historical, institutional and political factors 
which allowed this to take place, particularly the wide and long term mobilisation of civil 
society (Heller, 2000). If the nature of democratic deepening in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh is 
premised primarily on the politics of caste and dignity, the explanations are specific to the 
political and social history of those areas. The narratives and status of democratic deepening 
in all the other states lie somewhere in between these extremities, and are hugely diverse and 
variegated.  
 
An important aspect of democratic deepening at the political level has been another, more 
structured and constitutionally sanctioned, process of decentralisation which has been taking 
place in India for the last several decades (in some evaluations going back to the late 19th 
century) culminating in the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution which granted a 
constitutional status to panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) at the district, block and village 
levels, as well as to municipal bodies.46 The roots of this evolving democratic 
decentralisation in the post-independence context can be traced to Gandhi’s vision of gram 
                                                 
45 Dalit refers to members of the lowest castes (or ‘outcastes’) within the complex and varied caste system as 
traditionally practiced across South Asia.  
46 Lord Ripon’s resolution of May, 1882 on the subject of local self-government covering the structure and 
establishment of local bodies, their functions, finances and powers, continues to have consequences on the urban 
governance infrastructure of India.  
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swaraj (village republics). “Every village will be a republic or panchayat having full powers” 
which would not “exclude dependence on and willing help from neighbours or the world” 
leading to “ever widening, never ascending circles.” (Gandhi, 1946: 8-10). However, the 
village panchayat as an integral part of the architecture of the Indian polity was omitted from 
the draft of the Constitution which was tabled on 4 November 1948. This led to vociferous 
protests by some leading members of the Constituent Assembly leading to a debate on the 
issue. Part of the reason for the omission in the first place was Nehru’s own ambiguous 
perspective on structures of governance that the newly formed nation should adopt, given the 
wide variations in political, social, cultural and economic landscapes across the country. He 
“preferred to maintain silence during this heated debate. Steeped in the history of India that 
he himself had authored, he seemed trapped between the ambiguities of western modernity, 
and the prospects embedded in a rich civilisational heritage” (Mukherji, 2007: 32). 
Eventually, a resolution was passed which added Article 31-A to the draft constitution, 
stating “The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such 
powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-
government” (Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1989: 520).  
 
However, this clause remained relegated to the directive principles of state policy within the 
Constitution, which were not justiciable.47 Despite this, Nehru’s interest in evolving some 
manner of local-self government structures remained. Several commissions were formed by 
successive governments under his leadership to make recommendations which would define 
and operationalise a decentralised governance structure in the spirit of the clause above. The 
Balwant Rai Mehta Commission was set up in 1957, which was followed by the K. 
                                                 
47 The directive principles of state policy in the Constitution of India are merely guidelines for the centre and 
state governments urging them to keep these in mind when developing any new law or policy. While these are 
not enforceable in court, they provide, in a sense, the moral underpinnings of the vision of the Constituent 
Assembly.  
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Santhanam Committee in 1963 (both during Nehru’s leadership). As a result, by the mid-
1960s, “all the States had passed the panchayat acts and... panchayats were established 
throughout India... (However) local administration resisted devolution of functions and 
powers, and regular elections were not taking place” (Kaushik, 2005: 80-81).  
 
Indira Gandhi was not quite a votary of decentralised governance, and hence there was a 
period of hiatus on this issue during her time at the helm of the central government.48 The late 
1970s saw the resurrection of the idea and again several Commissions were set up to improve 
local-self government structures. These included the Ashoka Mehta Committee (1978), the 
G.V.K. Rao Committee (1985) and the L.M. Singhvi Committee (1986), all of which 
proposed administrative and legislative changes to strengthen PRIs and their functioning. 
Finally, in 1993, the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution granted a constitutional status to 
PRIs at the district, block and village levels, and the gram sabha was recognised as a formal 
democratic body at the village level. Similar recognition was also extended to municipal 
bodies through the 74th Amendment.  
 
Much literature has emerged on the implementation and implications of the 73rd and 74th 
Amendments to the Constitution since then (Chaudhuri, 2006; Johnson, 2003; Kaushik, 2005; 
Mitra, 2002; Mohanty, 1995). While the jury is still out on the extent to which democratic 
deepening has taken place (both in procedural and substantive terms) as a result of these 
amendments, what cannot be denied is that these two amendments constitute perhaps the 
single most important focused legislative attempt since independence towards democratic 
decentralisation and deepening of the Indian polity. However, there is also a broad consensus 
                                                 
48 In fact, one of her first acts after assuming charge as Prime Minister in 1966 was to disband the Ministry of 
Community Development, Panchayati Raj and Cooperation. The functions of that ministry were delegated to the 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Irrigation. 
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that political decentralisation has been implemented to a greater degree than the 
decentralisation of fiscal and administrative functions of the state.  
 
Even as this process has been unfolding at the legislative level, various central government 
schemes have over the years attempted to institutionalise a deeper participation of 
beneficiaries and target communities in their implementation. Two well-known examples 
have been the establishment of village education committees (VEC) and joint forest 
management (JFM) mechanisms. In both of these cases, local communities have been 
mandated to be formally involved in the management of the educational infrastructure and 
forest resources respectively at the village level. Reporting lines and administrative 
hierarchies have been reformulated, with a professed goal to shift power relations in the 
direction of communities rather than government functionaries. While the degree of success 
of these attempts has been widely contested, these experiences have nevertheless highlighted 
deeper political issues of social hierarchy and control within a given community, and how 
these interact with the introduction of formal mechanisms of governance and resource 
management which are premised upon conceptualisations of empowerment and equity.49 
 
In sum, several attempts have been made since independence to deepen the practice of 
democracy in the country. But “it is important to underline both its incomplete and complex 
nature” (Kohli, 2002a: 14). Forms, spaces, and sites for dissent, negotiation and 
accommodation have increased, and there is much greater participation in such processes by 
those at the bottom of the social and economic hierarchies. Political mobilisation and 
participation has moved downwards significantly resulting in the establishment of inclusive 
politics as a sine qua non. In this sense, democratic deepening has indeed occurred across the 
                                                 
49 For an assessment of VECs, see Banerji et al (2008) and for assessments of JFM, see Corbridge and Kumar 
(2002) and Sundar (2000).  
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political, legislative and administrative realms, and many of the changes which can be seen in 
the socio-political landscape in the country over the last decades can be directly attributed to 
some of these efforts. However, despite the gains made in deepening democracy by 
expanding the spaces where democratic practice, particularly in its formal and procedural 
sense, is carried out, most political commentators agree that on many substantive aspects, 
much greater distance needs to be covered if Indian democracy is to be seen as being truly 
meaningful (Corbridge et al, 2005). The distance between the state and citizens continues to 
be large, an increase in political participation has not resulted in any significant redistribution 
of resources, high levels of social, political and economic inequity prevail (and may in fact be 
increasing), political participation remains limited in many instances to infrequent (if regular) 
events such as elections, local elections are extremely prone to elite capture, vertical 
accountability mechanisms remain patchy, and the voices of the poor and the vulnerable are 
heard usually in forms and at moments which are politically expedient, and that too, through 
mediators, and rarely directly. As a result, a ‘million mutinies’ continue to take place every 
day.  
 
It is in such a context that the Right to Information Act, to which we will turn next, came into 
force in 2005.  
 
Right to Information in India and Democratic Deepening 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Right to Information Act brings into sharp 
relief issues around civil society, deliberative democracy, participation, voice and 
accountability within the larger discourse of democratic deepening in India. A cursory glance 
at the opening statement of the Act itself is revealing. It states: 
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“Whereas the Constitution of India has established democratic Republic; 
 
And whereas democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of 
information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and 
to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed; 
 
And whereas revelation of information in actual practice is likely to conflict with 
other public interests including efficient operations of the Governments, optimum 
use of limited fiscal resources and the preservation of confidentiality of sensitive 
information; 
 
And whereas it is necessary to harmonise these conflicting interests while 
preserving the paramountcy of the democratic ideal; 
 
Now, therefore, it is expedient to provide for furnishing certain information to 
citizens who desire to have it.” (Government of India, 2005: 1-2, emphasis added) 
 
It is worth noting here that the primary rationale for the Act is phrased in terms of democracy 
and the achievement of its ideals. Thus the opening statement itself sets up the RTI Act 
squarely within the discourse of democracy and its deepening (the “democratic ideal”).50 In 
the popular and academic discourses around the RTI in India, the Act, its production, and its 
usage consistently invoke democracy almost in a virtual conflation of the two. Sample the 
following:  
 
“In the space of less than a decade, the burgeoning movement for the right to information in 
India has significantly sought to expand democratic space.” (Mander and Joshi, 1999: 1); 
“The demand (for an RTI Act) was not to do away with democracy but to create opportunities 
for more meaningful and appropriate democratic practice.” (Roy and Dey, 2002: 5); “It is 
being recognized globally that public participation in the democratic and governmental 
process is at its meaningful best when citizens have adequate access to official information.” 
(Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2005: 1); “The key to the successful functioning of any democratic 
polity is the ability of a citizen to observe and evaluate the functioning of elected 
                                                 
50 Interestingly, the word ‘democracy’ does not appear in the Constitution of India, and the word ‘democratic’ 
appears only once - in the Preamble. In comparison, we have three references to these words in the RTI Act 
2005. 
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representative [sic] and make an informed judgment of their performance. This evaluation is 
predicated on the easy availability of the necessary information for a citizen to arrive at an 
assessment.”51; “Right to information has been seen as the key to strengthening participatory 
democracy and ushering in people centred governance.” (Government of India, 2006: 1); “A 
working democracy demands public participation in decision-making. Greater transparency is 
not only necessary as a check on corruption, but essential for planning programmes that 
respond to people’s concerns” (Baviskar, 2007: 9). In addition, virtually no media report (of 
which there are plenty) speaks of the RTI without speaking about democracy. “A major tool 
of democracy is the right to information. It is a means of generating public participation in 
governance, which is at the heart of democracy. Elections are a means of doing it but 
democracy itself means public participation in governance. Once the elections are over and 
we get a government in power, then what do we do? Sit at home? No, we have to participate. 
How does one do that? We have the Right to Information Act.”52 
 
If we were to revisit the typology of democratic deficits discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
current popular discourse suggests that the RTI Act seems to cut across all four of them.53 By 
providing a legal mechanism for individuals to seek any information from the government, it 
provides a site where citizenship can be exercised on a daily basis, thus engaging directly 
with the notion of hollow citizenship. When a citizen seeks information about government 
decisions, the vertical accountability dimension of the relationship is, in principle, 
strengthened in her favour. Appellate mechanisms which have been devised as a part of the 
implementation architecture of the Act (such as Information Commissions) strengthen 
                                                 
51 From the Prime Minister’s intervention during the debate in the Lok Sabha on the RTI Act, 11 May 2005. 
From http://www.rtiindia.org/forum/85-prime-minister-lok-sabha-speech-right-information-bill.html. Accessed 
20 August 2010.  
52 Then Chief Information Commissioner Wajahat Habibullah in an interview to Frontline magazine, Volume 
27 - Issue 18, August 28-September 10, 2010. 
53 To reiterate, the four are hollow citizenship, lack of vertical accountability, weak horizontal accountability, 
and international accountability dilemmas.  
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horizontal accountability mechanisms, and the possibility of seeking information related to 
the agreements between the government and international organisations provide a (limited) 
measure of citizen control over transnational governance mechanisms. In addition, it is 
consistently suggested that almost all the forms of democratic deepening mentioned earlier, 
viz. civil society democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, intensification 
of citizenship, and of course, expanding the sites and increasing the instances of the exercise 
of accountability – are positively reinforced by the RTI Act. Thus the centrality of the RTI 
Act to the democratic deepening project is amply evident, at the very least in the discourse 
that it is produced and bounded by.  
 
Central to this thesis, however, is the dominant narrative of the process of production of the 
RTI, which suggests that it emanated from a grassroots struggle, moved upward and led to 
the growth of a national umbrella coalition which promoted and articulated what had by then 
become a popular demand for a national legislation, creating sufficient pressure for major 
political parties to take this on board their political agendas, which eventually led to the 
enactment of a strong legislation when a new government came to power in 2004. In the 
articulation of this narrative, then, the process is as important as its outcome, since the RTI 
Act was produced through a process which arose from below; which articulated the demand 
of vast multitudes of people who saw the link between access to information and their 
individual well-being; which was intrinsically and by design democratic and inclusive; which 
successfully staved off strong resistance from deeply established and powerful interest groups 
by sheer dint of the nature and depth of the demand; and which therefore must be seen as a 
great victory for democratic deepening in India.  
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If this is indeed so, then we could safely say that the RTI Act, both in its production, as well 
as its outcome, is deeply emblematic of large shifts taking place in the Indian polity. It is this 
contention that this thesis will investigate in the succeeding pages. The structure of the thesis 
is as follows. The next chapter provides the details of the methodology that informs this 
research effort, even as it highlights how the research experience itself points to key issues 
that in turn impact the larger research. The third chapter reviews the dominant narrative that 
explains the process that led to the enactment of the RTI Act in India. It then defines three 
major silences that seem to emerge prima facie within this narrative, which are individually 
discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Although the larger theoretical terrain within which this 
thesis is located has been reviewed in this chapter, relevant theoretical debates are invoked 
and examined throughout these chapters. Finally, the concluding chapter weaves together the 
various strands arising in this thesis on both the empirical and theoretical planes, and 
proposes some directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
A Question of Method 
 
“Ya tho jack ho, ya cheque ho...” (Roy and Dey, 2002: 79). This is a phrase that is used 
commonly amongst the rural poor in Rajasthan. Loosely translated, it means that to achieve 
anything beyond the usual pale, one must have either connections (someone to push you up, 
much like a vehicle is ‘jacked’ up) or money. It is a pithy insight which speaks volumes about 
the ways in which power is exercised and experienced in rural Rajasthan.  
 
I discovered a striking resonance with this statement in a radically different setting. Sitting 
across a large and imposing table (strangely devoid of any files or papers) in the office of the 
Director General of Police of one of the largest provinces of India, I described my research to 
him and his deputy. After having patiently heard a long-winded description of my interest in 
examining how and why ‘progressive’ legislations such as the RTI Act are made, the deputy, 
a tad wearily, remarked, “You know, there are two principles that make the world what it is. 
Might is right, and blood is thicker than water. Everything flows from a combination of 
these.”54 Clearly, his conception of the ‘world’ included decision-making in government, the 
role of different actors in the process, as well as larger questions around the practice of 
democracy. 
 
In essence, the deputy chief of police and the rural Rajasthani propose a similar world view. 
Strength flows from the possession of material resources, even as social links, networks and 
kinship are essential to access varied degrees and manifestations of power. Both, 
independently and in tandem, constitute what could be termed as the foundational 
                                                 
54 Field notes, 16 March 2009. Emphasis in expression.  
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characteristics of power - the power to make policy decisions on the one hand, as well as the 
ability to obtain, for example, a certificate proving one’s poverty on the other. Coming as 
they do from experiences that are rather distant from each other on the social spectrum - one 
from a senior functionary of the most obvious manifestation of the power of the state, the 
other from a humble peasant - the conflation of ideas is rather striking.  
 
Tantalisingly attractive in its simplicity and applicability as this ‘grand theory’ may be, I will 
not essentialise the argument of this thesis to it. However, what I will do at this stage is to 
provide details of the methodology and process that framed this research, the experience of 
which overlaps significantly with the worldview propounded above. In this chapter, I will 
carry out a reflexive analysis of the data collection process, and propose that the experience 
of the research process itself provides important insights when attempting to gain a more 
sophisticated understanding of the processes that led to the enactment of the RTI Act in India 
in 2005. The chapter will also raise some questions about the nature and theory of method in 
social science research, particularly of the inter-disciplinary kind. It is for these reasons that 
an exposition of the methodology and process of this research is being presented here.  
 
I am aware that dwelling on a first person account of the research process that constitutes this 
thesis can be fraught with risks. The primary danger is the shifting of focus, if temporarily, 
from the research to the researcher. Second, in describing details of the individual, personal 
experience of the process, some amount of sheen is ostensibly taken away from the much 
vaunted and desired ‘objectivity’ of the process. Identifying and locating the researcher in the 
research process could also result in a significant reduction of the distance between the 
observer and the phenomenon being observed.  
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However, when studying any individual, group or process, locating the point of observation 
can be critical in that where one looks from defines what one sees. When the specificity of 
the researcher’s perspective is clearly identified at the outset, the ensuing research makes a 
greater claim to a ‘truth’ - by expressly focusing attention on the limitations of any 
intellectual exercise that claims to establish the ‘truth’. Thus the exercise of identifying the 
researcher’s position in the research process performs at least two important functions. First, 
it provides a caveat to the research by identifying the unique contours of the perspective that 
intrinsically informs the research. Second, it reaffirms the philosophical limitation of any 
research of this kind - that absolute objectivity and neutrality can only exist in the Platonic 
realm. In the case of this thesis, as we will see, it also performs a third function - that of 
providing critical theoretical insights that this thesis will continue to engage with throughout 
the succeeding chapters. 
 
As an embarkation point for such a reflexive analysis, my motivation to conduct this research 
is articulated below.  
 
Research on the RTI Act: Not Only an Intellectual Curiosity 
 
On 13 September 2010, the fifth national RTI convention was held in New Delhi. Organised 
by the Central Information Commission of the Government of India, the theme of the 
convention was “RTI: Challenges and Opportunities”. This annual convention aims to bring 
together Information Commissioners, as well as NGO representatives, activists, researchers, 
academics, and the media from across the country to debate and discuss various aspects 
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related to the RTI Act.55 It is the largest and most high-profile RTI-related public event 
regularly organised by the government.  
 
The keynote address at this convention was given by Gopal Krishna Gandhi, who was until 
recently the Governor of the state of West Bengal.56 He is a former Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS) officer,57 and a batchmate58 of both Aruna Roy59 and Wajahat Habibullah, the 
first Chief Information Commissioner (now the Chairperson of the National Commission for 
Minorities) of the Government of India. Gandhi served as India’s ambassador to several 
countries, an oddity for an officer belonging to the IAS. He is also an alumnus of St. 
Stephen’s College, which is affiliated to Delhi University.60 In the event that such a 
‘pedigree’ was to be considered insufficient, he is also the grandson of Mahatma Gandhi on 
his paternal side, and of C. Rajagopalachari on his mother’s.61 In his address he said, “RTI 
mein ek bare aandolan kii fateh hui hai. Aur uskaa shreya sabse pahle jaataa hai Aruna Roy 
ko, jinhone Rajasthan mein RTI kii zaruurat mahsuus karii aur phir uske liye aandolan 
                                                 
55 Information Commissioners are the final appellate authority for matters related to the RTI Act. They exist at 
two parallel levels - at the state government level and the central government level with jurisdictions defined 
along the line ministries and departments at those levels.  
56 The Governor’s position in a state is akin to the post of the President of the republic at the central government 
level. It is largely ceremonial, although instances of an incumbent recommending the dissolution of a state 
legislative assembly to impose direct rule by the Centre have occurred on numerous occasions in the past.  
57 Tracing its genesis to the colonial Indian Civil Service, the IAS is the elite higher civil service of India. A 
detailed analysis of the IAS, the cultural and political implications of being in that service, and the impact this 
had on the process of the enactment of the RTI Act is provided in Chapters 4 and 5.  
58 The notion of a ‘batchmate’ is a critical one in IAS circles. In point of fact, it means that batchmates join the 
service in the same year and therefore spend a year together in training at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National 
Academy of Administration (LBSNAA) in Mussoorie. It also suggests close associations and deep knowledge 
of each others’ personal and professional histories. At the same time, there is also a relatively higher element of 
competition amongst batchmates as the number of years in service forms an important element in getting 
promoted in the service. Thus tremendous support arising from close associations, as well as a high degree of 
competitiveness, are both part of this complex relationship. 
59 Aruna Roy has been widely credited as one of the main forces behind the enactment of the RTI Act. The role 
of the commonly accepted leadership of the ‘movement’ is examined in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  
60 St. Stephen’s College is the preferred institution of higher education in the liberal arts amongst a specific elite, 
most notably senior civil servant families.  
61 C. Rajagopalachari was a hugely respected leader of the Indian National Congress and through that the 
freedom movement, and was the last Governor General of India before the country became a republic in 1950. 
He hailed from the southern state of Tamil Nadu, which, interestingly, was the state cadre allotted to Gopal 
Krishna Gandhi while he was in the IAS. Adding to this heady mix, one should also point out that Aruna Roy is 
Tamil by lineage.  
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shuruu kiyaa, aur uske liye logon kaa samarthan praapt kiyaa (In the context of the RTI, it is 
the victory of a movement. The credit for this goes primarily to Aruna Roy, who felt the need 
for the RTI in Rajasthan and started a movement for it, and gained the support of the people 
for it.)”.62  
 
For anyone attempting to investigate or enter the RTI space in India, it is impossible to not 
countenance certain names. As mentioned by the speaker above, and in line with the well-
established mainstream narrative of the evolution of the RTI Act, Aruna Roy is considered to 
be one of the main forces behind its enactment, representing the leadership of the grassroots-
based activist aspect of the ‘RTI movement’. The urbane, intellectual and research-oriented 
leadership of the ‘movement’ is located mainly in the person of Shekhar Singh. In a profile of 
the ‘RTI movement’, The Guardian newspaper described him thus: “He opens a bottle of 
Australian wine and sinks back into the sofa, just below a poster of Van Gogh’s Sunflowers 
in a Vase. Shekhar Singh is a bearded philosopher with a deep voice... [He] is something of 
an emblem and a great help in understanding the current upheaval in Indian society. A retired 
university teacher, he is a typical committed intellectual, campaigning for a wide range of 
causes, tirelessly attending forums. He is the kind of awareness-raiser Indian universities 
excel at producing, to the despair of political and business leaders, driven crazy by hordes of 
hair-splitters.”63 For any journalist or researcher (Delhi-based or visiting), Singh is often the 
first point of contact for anyone with an interest in the RTI Act. Singh and Roy were both 
founder-members of the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), an 
umbrella coalition that came into being in 1996 to advocate for an RTI Act. 
 
                                                 
62 See http://www.cic.gov.in/convention-2010/Speeches/GKGandhi.pdf. Accessed 22 January 2011.  
63 From “Indian campaigners gain ‘right to know’”, The Guardian newspaper, 11 December 2009. 
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My own interest in the RTI Act in India stemmed from following the work of both these 
individuals over a period of time. However, this interest did not arise only from an 
intellectual curiosity in their work. An important constitutive element of this interest was the 
fact that I share a social and cultural space with them.64Aruna Roy, who is now well-
established in the national imagination as one of the preeminent individuals who spearheaded 
the demand for the RTI Act, was a former colleague of my father. My father had joined the 
Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in 1966, while Roy joined the same two years later, only 
to resign after some years to pursue her work at the grassroots. Both of them belonged to 
what is now called the Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram and Union Territories (AGMU) 
cadre of the IAS.65  
 
In its most simple manifestation, the cadre-system allows the professional proximity of IAS 
officers within the same cadre to be much greater than with those belonging to other state 
cadres. This proximity also extends to the personal and social, as the recruitment and training 
process is designed to develop an esprit de corps that also results in IAS officers socialising 
with each other to a great extent. Other structured activities also take place regularly that 
deepen the personal links between the officers and their families. For example, bodies such as 
the ‘IAS Wives’ Association’ organise social events on a regular basis in a given city, 
especially state capitals where the number of officers present are larger.66 The head of the 
bureaucracy of a state typically hosts social events on a regular basis where officers and their 
families are invited. These regular social interactions also mean that most officers know each 
                                                 
64 Given that this sharing of space also exists with several other key actors, the ensuing discussion may well be 
extended to them in varying forms and degrees.  
65 All entrants to the elite civil service, the IAS, are assigned state cadres where they are expected to serve for 
much of their careers, especially in early years in the ‘field’. Higher level civil servants who serve at the central 
government are drawn from various state cadres of the IAS. Thus, there is no dedicated higher civil service 
cadre that exclusively serves the central government.  
66 Even as the nomenclature of this association can be problematic given that several IAS officers are women, it 
continues. Interestingly, IAS officers themselves cannot legally form any unions or associations.  
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others’ families well. The family links also tend to continue into the next generation as 
children of such officers are typically enrolled in the same schools.67 In sum, the density of 
social interaction within the higher civil service, particularly in-cadre, is quite high.68  
 
Aruna Roy’s work in rural Rajasthan with the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), an 
organisation she co-founded in 1990, was thus not merely a matter of academic curiosity for 
me, but also stemmed from my interest in the work of someone with whom a social and 
cultural space was shared. This interest also included an admiration (and oftentimes provided 
inspiration) for someone who was doing the kind of development work that ‘really mattered’ 
- in the grassroots, living in a rural area, having ‘sacrificed’ what would otherwise have been 
a privileged and powerful professional career as a bureaucrat - much in the Gandhian 
tradition.69 While intimate family links did not exist, this social overlap was reaffirmed in 
occasional social meetings and serendipitous encounters in public spaces that were 
commonly frequented. I would occasionally be in touch with her directly, updating her about 
my work and evolution first as a documentary filmmaker, and then as a functionary of an 
international development organisation, even as I followed the work of the MKSS in 
Rajasthan from a distance. Occasionally, we also met, not only in Delhi (my hometown, and 
also where Aruna Roy has a base), but also abroad, when we happened to overlap. Direct 
contact was thus irregular, but news of important events and movements would be shared 
through mutual friends, and the occasional email or meeting. 
 
                                                 
67 An amusing anecdote provides a succinct comment on these relationships. The Sanskriti School was set up in 
New Delhi by the Civil Services Society in 1998 primarily for the children of officers belonging to the higher 
civil and defence services. The Chairperson of the school is the spouse of the Cabinet Secretary, the head of the 
civil service in the country. The anecdote suggests that when two students meet for the first time, their 
conversation begins with the question, “Which batch?”, referring of course, to the batch of their parent(s)! 
68 This is only a very brief background of the social world of the IAS. A detailed description and analysis of the 
changes that have taken place in this context over the last several decades and its impact on the process leading 
to the enactment of the RTI Act is provided in Chapter 5.  
69 This idea of ‘sacrifice’ is explored in detail in Chapter 4.  
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Although I had known about Shekhar Singh’s involvement with the RTI movement, I did not 
know him directly when I commenced my research. However, I knew that his father had been 
a civil servant belonging to the IAS, and my father had served under him several decades ago. 
His family history thus formed a part of my peripheral knowledge embedded within the 
context of the ‘IAS network’. When I met him for the first time at his residence in Delhi in 
preparation for my fieldwork, these links were quickly established. Early on in the 
conversation, the fact that I had met him as a child when he had visited a remote part of India 
where my father had then been serving and hosted him was recounted. 
 
As my ruminations to conduct research into the RTI Act became more concrete, the 
attractiveness of the subject was informed by several factors. The first was a deeply felt sense 
of excitement and anticipation arising from the nature of the legislation itself. Breathless 
media reports aside, the very notion that ordinary citizens could potentially hold the all-
powerful state to account in so direct and quotidian a manner appealed deeply to the left-
liberal sensibility that one had (typically and predictably) found refuge in. The second factor 
was that the established leadership of this seemingly momentous national achievement lay in 
the hands of individuals who were not distant names in newspapers, but were people one had 
met and interacted with directly, and who inhabited one’s immediate social sphere (if a 
generation removed). This sense of proximity was attractive not just in an abstract sense. 
Brought down to the practical plane, this had implications on the levels of access one could 
possibly gain with ‘those that mattered’ in the ‘RTI world’, along with the candour one could 
presume would be forthcoming as a result of our shared social and political worldviews. In 
addition, given that the RTI Act was located in the context of government functioning, access 
to relevant government officials would also not be difficult through my family links with the 
senior bureaucracy, some of whom had been directly involved in the process that led to the 
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enactment of the RTI Act. ‘Studying up’ and gaining an authentic and objective ‘insider’s’ 
view at the ways in which social policies are drafted appeared to be a distinct possibility in 
this case.70  
 
“People’s Assessment of the RTI Act”: Observing the ‘RTI World’ 
 
Prior to embarking on my fieldwork, I had reviewed the existing (and dominant) narrative 
that has attempted to explain the process of the enactment of the RTI Act in India in 2005.71 
Armed with the broad contours of this narrative, the first person from within the established 
leadership that I made contact with was Shekhar Singh. The timing of my meeting with Singh 
in July 2008 was fortuitous. He had recently received a grant from the Google Foundation to 
conduct a nationwide assessment study on the usage and impact of the RTI Act in India. This 
study had been conceived of as a response to one being carried out by the government 
(‘outsourced’ to Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), a private consultancy firm, but 
nevertheless under the aegis of the government). Civil society actors feared that the 
government study would make recommendations that might lead to a dilution of the Act, and 
the idea to conduct a parallel ‘People’s Assessment’ had therefore been mooted to counter 
this possibility. 
 
For the ‘People’s Assessment’ study, a grant of USD 250,000 had been made by the Google 
Foundation to Shekhar Singh in his individual capacity. No formal entity was set up for the 
study, and it was being carried out by a loose coalition of individuals and ‘field’-based 
NGOs. The banner under which this study was carried out acquired the name ‘RAAG’, after 
“RTI Assessment and Analysis Group”. The study was designed and conceived in 
                                                 
70 After Laura Nader (1974). Although whether this would strictly qualify as part of her conception of ‘studying 
up’ is examined later in this chapter.  
71 Details of this narrative are provided in Chapter 3. 
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consultation with leaders of the MKSS group, including Aruna Roy.72 The leadership team 
consisted of Shekhar Singh and a few other individuals, many of whom came from ‘civil 
servant families’. The foot-soldiers - those who would actually conduct the surveys of users 
of the RTI Act, were rustled up through existing links with NGOs in various states.  
 
The RAAG study was to carry out hundreds of interviews of users of the RTI Act 
(information seekers) as well as government officials who had been mandated to service the 
Act (information providers). In addition, the design of the study also included an analysis of 
secondary data (including media reports and judgements of Information Commissioners), 
interviewing senior civil servants and Information Commissioners (the final appellate 
authority within the implementation framework of the Act with separate and parallel 
structures at the state and central government levels) on policy aspects, as well as senior 
officials of international organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations 
Development Programme.  
 
An important part of my responsibilities within this study was to conduct semi-structured 
interviews with senior civil servants across ten states in India. The reasons for this were not 
difficult to discern. Since I came from the family of a civil servant, a great deal of ‘insider’ 
knowledge of the higher bureaucracy would serve as an asset. In addition, a certain comfort-
level and confidence in interacting with senior civil servants was also presumed - since this 
had been a part of my ‘growing up’ experience. Finally, a high level of facility with the 
                                                 
72 It should be noted here that the overlap between the MKSS and the NCPRI, especially in terms of its 
membership and ideology, is tremendous. The institutional arrangements and relationships within the ‘RTI 
world’ will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters of this thesis.  
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English language, particularly in its spoken form, would be important, as the preferred 
working language of the higher civil service remains English.73 
 
It should be reiterated here that it is not as if the focus of the RAAG study was only senior 
bureaucrats. Hundreds of interviews of information seekers were also carried out, whose 
names were gathered by filing RTI applications seeking contact details of applicants. 
However, gaining access to ‘ordinary’ individuals (not surprisingly) is less difficult than 
interviewing typically inaccessible civil servants. The larger point I wish to highlight here 
relates to access to power centres and how this is actualised. I will continue to pursue this 
theme in this and later chapters as it has an important bearing on the process of the enactment 
of the RTI Act itself.  
 
Access, Access, Access 
 
As this study, along with my fieldwork, progressed, many of these assumptions were borne 
out in practice, not just on my part, but the manner in which the process evolved. For any 
researcher, it is notoriously difficult to gain access to senior civil servants. If the researcher 
happens to be associated with a government entity, the process is easier since requests for 
appointments and interviews are routed ‘through proper channels’ - which in practice could 
mean that introductory letters are sent by relevant government ministries - and are therefore 
taken seriously. The government-sponsored PWC study followed this path, which included 
several meetings and workshops organised in the offices of the Department of Personnel and 
Training of the central government, which is the nodal department in the Government of 
India for matters related to the RTI Act.  
                                                 
73 Knowledge and use of the English language continues to be an important factor when defining social class in 
the Indian context. The politics of this phenomenon and its relationship with the larger puzzle of the enactment 
of the RTI Act is explored in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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Under other circumstances, gaining similar access for a loose coalition such as RAAG would 
have been well-nigh impossible. However, several factors supported the process of gaining 
access. Aruna Roy had become a well-known name both through the media, as well as by 
being a member of the National Advisory Council, a body which was observed closely by 
those in government circles.74 In addition, the direct links that Shekhar Singh and Aruna Roy 
had with the higher bureaucracy of the country also proved to be indispensible. The fact that 
Aruna Roy was once in the IAS was well-known, and Aruna Roy’s ‘batchmates’ were by 
now in senior government positions across the country. Shekhar Singh had been part of the 
faculty at the Indian Institute of Public Administration, which is the apex government body in 
India that provides in-service training to civil servants. Thus, his former students were 
scattered across the country in various positions of influence within the state and central 
bureaucracies. Letters seeking appointments with senior civil servants would be signed by 
Aruna Roy and Shekhar Singh and these often yielded positive results. If a particular civil 
servant was unresponsive in the ordinary course of things, a phone call would be made to one 
of his/her colleagues known to someone in the RAAG team. This officer would then urge 
his/her otherwise reticent colleague to allow access. Where these strategies did not work, 
letters seeking appointments on RAAG’s behalf were sent by the Chief Information 
Commissioner (CIC), which provided a quasi-official endorsement to RAAG.75 Interestingly, 
the CIC himself was a batchmate of Aruna Roy when she was in the IAS. He was also an 
alumnus of the same institution in Delhi University, St. Stephen’s College, where Shekhar 
Singh had done his under- and postgraduate studies and had also taught in the past. In the 
end, over fifty senior bureaucrats of the country (including the very inaccessible Home and 
Foreign Secretaries) were interviewed, no mean feat for an entity which did not even 
formally exist. 
                                                 
74 The role of the NAC is analysed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  
75 The power of a request made on the letterhead of a senior government functionary cannot be underestimated.  
69 
 
Most of these interviews were carried out by three ‘senior’ members of the team, including 
myself. All of us came from ‘civil servant families’, though none of us had ever worked 
directly for the government, and all of us had completed our undergraduate degrees at St. 
Stephen’s College in Delhi University.76 Unsurprisingly, our social spheres had significant 
overlaps in terms of the people we knew in common, even as we shared a similar cultural 
sensibility. In some cases where interviews had been granted as a result of phone calls being 
made by someone from within the MKSS or the NCPRI leadership, the family background of 
the interviewer was already known to the interviewee. In others, the family background was 
established during the course of the interview. The purpose of the establishment of these 
‘credentials’, though unstated, was clear - that there was a shared and implicit ‘lived’ 
understanding of how the bureaucracy worked, with its privileges, challenges and constraints. 
Essentially, these markers were displayed to establish trust, as also to signify that the 
interview was being carried out amongst social equals, and therefore could be conducted 
without any rancour - indeed it took the form of a ‘pleasant chat’ more often than a formal 
interview. As a result, an unusual degree of candour was the dominant tone of many of these 
interviews.  
 
My involvement with the RAAG study thus proved to be very useful to this research in 
several ways. First, it allowed me to observe at very close quarters the texture, grammar, and 
dynamics of the ‘RTI world’, centred as it is in Delhi. Second, it introduced me to many of 
the actors (both in leadership positions, as well as the more ‘humble’ ones), who had been 
involved with the process prior to the enactment, as well as those involved in the usage and 
implementation phase after the enactment of the Act. Third, it provided me with significant 
                                                 
76 By ‘civil servant families’ I mean that each of us had at least one parent who belonged to one of the All India 
Services, which include the Indian Foreign Service, the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police 
Service, and which are considered to be the crème-de-la-crème amongst the civil services.  
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clues towards identifying the dissonant voices that contested the dominant narrative of the 
history of the RTI Act.  
 
Methodology and Process 
 
Querying the ‘Movement’ 
 
Entering this ‘RTI world’ through the RAAG study also fitted well into the research design I 
had developed prior to commencing my fieldwork. The design took as its point of 
embarkation the dominant narrative of the history of the RTI Act in India (reviewed in detail 
in the following chapter). The plan was to systematically interview all the key figures that 
had found pride of place in the narrative, and follow a snowballing method whereby other 
names that emerged during this primary set of interviews would be interviewed at a later 
stage. Critical and silent voices that had been directly involved in the process at various 
stages, but did not find mention in the dominant narrative were identified through these 
interviews as well as through the examination of documents sourced from both governmental 
and non-governmental sources. Once some of these individuals had been identified, a 
snowballing method was used in this context as well to glean names of other such individuals 
who could potentially provide alternate perspectives. All interviews were semi-structured, 
and follow-up interviews were conducted where necessary and possible. The initial line of 
questioning revolved around the role of the individual (and where applicable, the organisation 
she represented) in the process of the enactment of the RTI Act. As the research progressed, 
this broadened to incorporate issues related to networks and alliances, critiques of the 
dominant narrative (where applicable), and questions on larger national and international 
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political events that may have influenced the process leading to the enactment of the RTI Act 
in India.  
 
Concurrently, as the work of the MKSS had been identified in the dominant narrative as a 
key force in the evolution of the RTI Act, I made several trips to Rajasthan and spent a 
considerable amount of time with the group observing what it did, and how it was done 
(including attending a jan sunwai conducted by MKSS members), apart from interviewing 
several of its lesser-known members and associates.77 Trips were also made to other parts of 
the country where RTI-related events were held.  
 
Documentary Analysis 
 
In terms of unearthing documentary evidence, my strategy was two-pronged. First, I sought 
and was given access to the papers related to the evolution of the RTI Act that were in 
possession of two key figures in the process, Aruna Roy and Shekhar Singh. These primarily 
related to the work of the MKSS and the NCPRI respectively, although with significant 
overlaps given that Aruna Roy was herself a founder-member of the NCPRI. In the process, I 
also discovered that several critical (many of them classified as ‘secret’) government 
documents formed a part of these collections. That these had been in the possession of the 
MKSS and NCPRI leadership prior to the enactment of the Act (suggesting that they could 
have received copies only through their links within the government and not by using the RTI 
Act) is itself an important indicator of the considerable access that the MKSS and NCPRI 
leadership had (and continues to have) to higher government circles. Second, I filed 
applications for information under the RTI Act to the Department of Personnel and Training 
                                                 
77 Jan sunwais (public hearings) were a specific mode of a public investigation of the implementation of 
government schemes that was developed and used by the MKSS in Rajasthan. Further details are provided in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
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(DoPT) to access all government papers related to the process.78 Since the number of relevant 
files was voluminous, I was asked to come and ‘inspect’ them at the designated departmental 
office in consonance with the procedures laid out in the RTI Act. This ‘inspection’ was 
carried out over several weeks and eventually the copies of the papers that I had identified 
were provided to me. Interestingly, on the day I came to collect the papers, I discovered that 
department officials had made an alternate set of the documents that I had requested! Apart 
from it being quite wasteful, it points to a continued tendency on the part of government 
officials to protect themselves from any subsequent criticism.  
 
All of these documents, regardless of the source, provided invaluable and rich information 
about the process, a detailed analysis of which will be undertaken in later chapters of this 
thesis. The process of accessing these documents itself pointed to the abysmal state of record-
keeping across government offices in the country. In several instances, pages in voluminous 
files were not numbered, and I had to do the numbering (in pencil) myself prior to identifying 
the specific documents that I needed copies of. Only a semblance of order seemed to exist in 
the organisation of the papers within each file, with significant levels of duplication. Several 
documents also appeared to be missing, and given that references to such documents 
suggested that they were quite ‘harmless’, this was perhaps due to the limitations in the 
record-keeping process rather than a conscious act of censorship. Considering that I was 
seeking documents from a department at the central government, it can be safely assumed 
that the record-keeping situation would be much worse in state and district level offices, thus 
pointing to a structural limitation of the effectiveness of the RTI Act itself, at least in the 
short to medium term.  
 
                                                 
78 The DoPT is the nodal department within the central government for all matters related to the RTI Act.  
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Interviewing Civil Servants 
 
When trawling through the overwhelming reams of papers acquired from the government and 
other sources, names of certain senior government functionaries cropped up with great 
regularity. Obtaining the government perspective on the process required that interviews be 
conducted with some, if not all of them. This would have ordinarily proved to be a significant 
hurdle, made more complicated by the fact that many of them had either been transferred to 
other positions, or had retired. This is when my own family links with the bureaucracy played 
a key role in facilitating access. Many of the relevant civil servants knew my father directly, 
having been colleagues in the past (my father had retired by this time). However, contacting 
senior government official implies getting through the gatekeepers - the support staff - who 
control access to the official, as well as to information about them. While telephone numbers 
of senior officials are available in the public domain, actual access is controlled through a 
well-established code. Typically, a call made to the office of a senior servant is responded to 
by his/her Private Secretary. Requests to be put through to the official concerned are not 
entertained, unless the caller’s credentials are established. These credentials take the form of 
the name and institutional affiliation, but these may not be considered sufficient. For 
example, a call from X, a researcher at the LSE, would ordinarily require further 
qualification. The typical question seeking clarification would be a version of “What is this 
regarding?”. After providing a background, the caller would immediately be told that the 
official was not available at the moment (“Sir/madam is in a meeting” being the preferred 
reason), and to leave a contact number. Alternately, the caller would be put on hold, and the 
Private Secretary would then check with the official if s/he would like to speak to the person 
concerned. In cases where the official would consider the credentials to be important enough, 
the caller would be put through. In most cases, the Private Secretary would come back on the 
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line to suggest that the caller leave a contact number since the official was ‘busy’. In such 
cases, rarely, if ever, would the call be returned.  
 
A more effective strategy to gain access would be to provide a reference when attempting to 
make contact. This reference would typically be another senior government official, or 
someone known directly to the official being contacted. However, in both cases, merely 
providing a name would ordinarily not be enough. The ‘referee’ should ideally have spoken 
to the official concerned (or his/her support staff) before hand, priming him/her for the call 
that would come later. In such an event, the call would be accepted, and if required, an 
appointment granted.  
  
If, however, the caller had any direct links (current or former) with the government, then the 
entire process, including the attitude of the support staff, would be quite different. For 
example, if a call was made by a former Secretary to the government, no further ‘vetting’ 
would be required. Questions would not be asked regarding the purpose of the call, as 
protocol dictates that support staff must not question a senior officer, retired as s/he may be. 
The caller would then be put on hold while the Private Secretary would inform the official 
about the call. In most cases, the official would accept the call. In case the official was not 
available at the time the call was made, the Private Secretary would take down the contact 
details of the caller, and the official would typically respond to the call later. Often enough, 
the caller could also press upon the Private Secretary to provide the mobile phone number of 
the official concerned, and if the credentials were sufficiently weighty, this would be given. 
The caller would then be able to contact the official directly without having to go through any 
gatekeepers. Whether seeking appointments, or tracing government officials who may have 
retired or been transferred, an effective strategy would broadly follow a similar pattern.  
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This is not to say that senior government officials never entertain calls from unknown 
entities. However, instances of this occurring are few and far between, and require 
tremendous amounts of perseverance and tenacity on the part of the person seeking contact. 
Contact could, of course, also be sought by physically going to the offices of a civil servant. 
However, there is an inverse relationship between the seniority of the officer and the 
possibility of gaining an audience simply by visiting the office.  
 
In my case, that my father had himself been a senior civil servant meant that getting access 
to, or information about relevant government officials was not very difficult, and a few calls 
later, contact would be established and a rendezvous arranged. The ‘IAS network’ kicked in, 
much in the way it had in the context of the RAAG study, and for similar reasons, access and 
candour were assured in most of the cases. At the risk of repetition, the importance of such 
access cannot be emphasised enough. The tales of frustrated researchers running from pillar 
to post to finally obtain an interview with senior bureaucrats, only to face hostility, 
obfuscation or opacity are too numerous to be recounted here.  
 
Respondents: Who, How Many, When? 
 
Following the strategy outlined above, I conducted a total of 59 interviews (including one 
over email, indicated where quoted) with 49 individuals (in some instances, I conducted 
several interviews with the same individual) between September 2008 and July 2012. These 
individuals spanned several functional spaces, including the leadership of the NCPRI and the 
MKSS, civil society activists who were directly or indirectly involved with these 
organisations, ‘foot soldiers’ within the RTI movement space, NGO and INGO professionals, 
civil servants (both serving and retired), journalists, lawyers, former judges, academics, and 
76 
 
politicians. Needless to say, some of the respondents could be classified as belonging to more 
than one such category. Interviews were recorded where possible. Where this was not, I took 
detailed notes during and immediately after the interview.  
 
In most instances, the anonymity of the respondent had to be assured. For reasons of 
confidentiality (for example, civil servants who would otherwise not have spoken freely), or 
the political dynamics of the activist and NGO worlds, most respondents (unless otherwise 
stated) have therefore been assigned random numbers when quoted in this thesis.79 In 
addition, I have typically not indicated the functional space that an anonymous respondent 
inhabited when quoting her. The Delhi- and Rajasthan-based ‘RTI world’ is quite small, 
which means that in some cases, despite the absence of a name, an individual could be 
identified by such clues. For example, if a person identified merely as a rural activist was to 
be quoted about a specific event related to the enactment of the RTI Act, they could be 
identified by those ‘in the know’. I have chosen to err on the side of caution and in such 
cases, no information on the respondent apart from the assigned random number and the date 
of the interview has been provided. Politics, it appears, does not seem to intrinsically support 
a fearless and open articulation of the ‘truth’, even in the context of transparency. In the 
instances where anonymity had not been requested, the name, date and place of interview, 
and other relevant details of the respondent have been indicated.  
 
‘Studying Up’? 80 
 
Almost four decades ago, Laura Nader “appealed for a critical repatriated anthropology that 
would, in studying the cultures of the powerful as well as the powerless, throw new light on 
                                                 
79 Where necessary, quotes have been translated into English without giving details of the language the 
interview was originally held in to further protect identities. 
80 After Nader (1974).  
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processes of domination” (Gusterson, 1997: 114). Following on from this, several 
methodological challenges were identified in the study of elites, which included the inverted 
power relationship between the researcher and the subject(s) of the study, the problems of 
access, and the larger philosophical conundrum of ensuring that the process of research 
would not result in the strengthening of an already dominant perspective, given that a 
defining characteristic of elites is their ability to define the contours of a given discourse 
(Hertz and Imber, 1993; Ostrander 1993; Rice, 2010), even as the power dynamic is reversed, 
in that the researcher is likely to be subservient to the respondent (McDowell, 1998; 
Richards, 1996).81 
 
In the case of this research, I remain uncertain whether it falls within the tradition of 
‘studying up’ or not. Given that this research involved the examination of the process 
underlying a specific national legislation, it necessarily involved (amongst others) the study 
of ‘policy elites’, which included civil society leaders (albeit belonging to a specific social 
elite), high-level civil servants, academics, and other ‘influential’ people. In the nature of its 
‘subjects’, this research therefore does appear to fall within the tradition of ‘studying up’. 
However, in the context of the constraints that such an exercise would typically need to 
overcome, my experience does not quite fit the mould. For example, access to and the 
constraints of time of respondents were not hurdles that I faced to any significant degree 
during this research. As discussed above, this was largely due to the shared social space that 
exists between the ‘subjects’ and myself. At the same time, other factors were also at play. 
First, several of the civil servants who had been directly involved with the enactment process 
had retired by the time I commenced my interviews. Once a relationship of trust had been 
                                                 
81 A recent work that exemplifies the challenges and rewards of ‘studying up’ is Ho (2009) in which the author 
joined an investment bank to ethnographically examine the workings of ‘Wall Street’. To conduct her research, 
Ho “leveraged [her] socioeconomic background and connections with elite universities - the only sites from 
which Wall Street banks recruit and hire” (Ho, 2009: 13).  
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established (which was effected in part though my specific positionality), most of the retired 
civil servants I interviewed were willing to speak at length and with great candour (Chavez, 
2008; Merriam et al, 2001; Mikecz, 2012).  
 
A second factor is related to the relationship between civil society and the researcher. For 
several sections of civil society, influencing academic research is an important element 
within their own quest for legitimacy. This is an existential concern due to the very nature of 
such entities. The more a non-state entity can orient the public discourse (which includes 
academic research), the more relevant, influential and effective it can be in conducting its 
activities on a daily basis. This of course does not mean that all researchers would therefore 
be able to gain equal access to high-profile leaders of social movements. Social profiles and 
institutional affiliations of researchers also play an important part in defining who will be 
‘allowed in’ and to what extent. However, the larger point remains. In the context of studying 
‘policy elites’, civil society leaders need the researcher as much as the researcher needs her 
‘subjects’. In this specific sense, the limitations of ‘studying up’ perhaps do not need to be as 
intractable as they may seem at first.  
 
In the case of this study, it could thus be proposed that although the subject of the study does 
lie within a broad framework of ‘studying up’ (in the sense of focusing on elites rather than 
the masses), the specificities of the positionalities of the respondents as well as the researcher 
meant that the relationship was more ‘sideways’ than vertical (Plesner, 2011). However, as 
the researcher in this process, I still needed to confront a singular challenge - that of ensuring 
that the study would not result in merely reinforcing the dominant narrative.  
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The Problem of Circularity 
 
Given that my entry point into the research was the established leadership of the ‘movement’ 
for an RTI Act in India, which was, at least in part, responsible for the production of the 
popular narrative as the dominant one, there was a very strong possibility of my research 
itself reinforcing that narrative - a risk particularly associated with ‘studying up’ (Harvey, 
2011; Mikecz, 2012; Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987). In the context of qualitative research, 
proximity and access to those in leadership positions is indeed a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, these could simply serve to reinforce preeminent voices. On the other, these could 
also result in greater candour in expression in interviews and interactions. As my research 
progressed, there were several strategies I adopted in terms of mitigating the potential bias 
that the former could have engendered.  
 
There was of course, the primary ‘problem’ of identifying individuals who may have played a 
role in the process leading up to the enactment, but do not find mention in the dominant 
narrative due to a variety of reasons (not least because they raised dissonant notes). This was 
overcome by seeking clues through the primary interviews, by seeking out and interviewing 
many of the foot-soldiers in the larger ‘RTI world’, identifying critical voices in RTI-related 
conventions and meetings, as well as by scouring the documents that I had gained access to 
through the approach outlined above. Several individuals who did not necessarily reinforce 
the dominant narrative were thus identified, many of whom were subsequently interviewed. 
During these interviews, other critical voices were identified and subsequently interviewed 
(the snowballing method, in this case in the context of dissonant or absent voices). Several of 
these documents and interviews provided information that in some cases allowed me to 
triangulate the dominate narrative, and in others provided alternative perspectives to the 
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same. In this context, parsing relevant government documents was of critical importance to 
this research as they provided a perspective that had hitherto been all but ignored in the 
dominant narrative.  
 
An important factor that played a key role in the strategies mentioned above was the 
predominance of a singular narrative in the first instance.82 The sheer absence of any 
significant publicly available alternate narratives meant that once this dominant narrative had 
been reviewed, data and data sources could largely be classified as belonging to this category 
or not. In this context, I have examined the data that falls outside of the category of the 
dominant narrative with greater attention throughout the thesis. This is not to question the 
factual veracity of the dominant narrative itself (unless pointed out as such), but to proffer a 
more nuanced analysis than the one proposed within it. In any event, as I made progress with 
the research, establishing the authenticity of the dominant narrative was gradually relegated 
to the background, even as questions related to power, networks, and the political reasons 
underlying the production and predominance of such a narrative began to take on a life of 
their own.  
 
At the same time, a peculiar situation emerged as the research progressed. In some instances, 
respondents that could typically be classified as one of the ‘authors of the dominant narrative’ 
provided perspectives that contradicted the same narrative that they had participated in the 
production of. Some individuals at least, appeared to have taken one position in the public 
articulations that constituted the dominant narrative, and a contradictory one in private 
interviews where their anonymity was guaranteed. Although I did not confront any 
respondent with these incongruities, in my assessment they can be explained by two factors. 
                                                 
82 This is reviewed in the following chapter.  
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The first pertains to the direct relationship between anonymity and candour, thus pointing to 
the political compulsions that have a bearing on actors of all hues within this space. By 
extension, this also lends credence to the assertion that the production of any narrative is an 
inherently political act as it privileges certain perspectives over others. The second reason, at 
least in some instances, could also have been that the perspective of respondents may have 
changed with the benefit of hindsight. However, as I analysed the details of such 
contradictory positions, it appears that the second factor was at play only in very few cases. 
Needless to say, I have not pointed out such cases of contradictions between public 
articulations and private conversations in this thesis to maintain the anonymity of 
respondents.  
 
The Research Experience as Data 
 
The characteristics and dynamics of the ‘RTI world’, along with the process of data 
collection, brings us back to the Rajasthani peasant’s pithy homily mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter - knowing people in high places helps. This is hardly an original 
notion. However, when one looks at the social profiles of the people at the apex of the ‘RTI 
world’, an astonishing degree of homogeneity begins to appear.83 Practically all those in 
leadership positions have either direct or family links with the government at the higher 
levels, particularly through the civil service, and many of them have had a certain kind of 
education, as represented by an association with a specific higher education institution. As 
experienced at the personal level while conducting my research, as well as through the 
RAAG study, possessing such a profile tremendously facilitates access to centres of 
bureaucratic (and in some instances, political) power, at least in the context of carrying out 
                                                 
83 This is examined in detail in Chapter 4.  
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‘neutral’ research. Could this experience perhaps be extended to look at the process of 
enactment of the RTI Act afresh, possibly through the lens of ‘elite networks’ and the 
vocabulary of their engagement with spaces where the power of the state resides? If so, what 
are the precise contours of these ‘elite networks’? Who inhabits them? Who can inhabit 
them? Is the involvement of such ‘elite networks’ a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
development of social policies, and by extension, democratic deepening? 
 
Of course, it could be plausibly argued that since the RTI Act has been imagined as a key 
instrument of governance reform, routed as it is through the concepts of transparency and 
accountability, it is to be expected that the process of its evolution would involve those 
associated with the higher echelons of government or those close to it. In addition, it has also 
been observed that processes of social change are often led by the elite, or at least by a 
specific fraction of it. However, making such an argument in this case poses its own set of 
questions. If indeed a particular elite invested and linked in with the state apparatus came to 
occupy a position of immense influence over changes to national policy, then why and how 
did this particular elite succeed, and at the time that it did? At any given moment in time, 
there are several ideas and elite fractions that represent them jostling for supremacy in the 
political and social arenas. How did it come to be that one particular (admittedly ‘powerful’) 
group ‘won’ even as others, therefore lost? Did the constituting characteristics of the ‘RTI 
world’ play a definitive role in this victory? Or were other political processes at work, both 
nationally as well as globally, that privileged some ideas and individuals (part of an elite as 
they may have been) over others?  
 
Even as these questions will be taken up for study in the latter part of the thesis, it may be of 
some value to briefly articulate some reflexive concerns on the method followed during my 
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fieldwork experience. As has been mentioned earlier, the significant sharing of the social and 
the cultural spheres with several key informants and other interviewees allowed me a 
privileged and unique perspective on the Delhi-centred ‘RTI world’ in India. In other words, 
in the ethnographic universe, I was researching ‘my own’ within ‘my own’. To put it 
anachronistically (or in a ‘charmingly’ old-fashioned way), I was studying my own tribe. 
This clearly had its advantages. I could instinctively ‘decode’ clues (language, accents, 
clothes, expressions, objects, spaces et al) that would have been meaningless artefacts to 
someone from without. Greater candour in the interactions was also presumed. At the same 
time, this also meant that the nature of interactions, including the interviews, was impacted 
not just by the proximity inherited from the social, but also by the presumption of continued 
professional and social engagement in the future, along with its own set of dilemmas 
(Labaree, 2002; Taylor, 2011). 
 
In this context, whether a researcher from ‘outside’ would have had a similar experience, or 
gathered the same data, or interpreted it in the same way is a moot question, just as whether a 
greater claim to truth can be made by someone from the ‘inside’ or the ‘outside’ also remains 
unresolved (Labaree, 2002; Merriam et al, 2001; Oriola and Haggerty, 2012).84 What can be 
claimed however, is that the research process, regardless of perspective, even as it is limited 
by it, can perhaps provide a version of the truth, which hopefully will be questioned, debated 
and contested, and through this process, offer a richer, more layered, more complex, and 
more nuanced version of the truth. With some luck, this continued layering of meaning will 
remain an unending process. 
                                                 
84 Labaree captures this succinctly by suggesting (after Griffith, 1998) that “the researcher’s social location and 
knowledges are ‘always located somewhere’, yet continuously moving back and forth between the positional 
boundaries of insiderness and outsiderness” (2002: 102).  
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Chapter 3 
The Dominant Narrative 
 
“Just the place for a Snark!” the Bellman cried, 
As he landed his crew with care; 
Supporting each man on the top of the tide 
By a finger entwined in his hair. 
 
“Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice: 
That alone should encourage the crew. 
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice: 
What I tell you three times is true.” 
- From “The Hunting of the Snark: An Agony in Eight Fits” by Lewis Carroll 
 
 
“When you repeat what you consider to be the truth, then it ceases to be the truth... 
Repetition has no value; it merely dulls the mind, and you can only repeat a lie. You cannot 
repeat truth, because truth is never constant. Truth is a state of experiencing, and what you 
can repeat is a static state; therefore it is not the truth.” 
- Jiddu Krishnamurti, 10th public talk, 14 March 1948, Bombay 
 
Admittedly, there is some incongruity in juxtaposing the assertion of a fictional character of a 
classic piece of ‘nonsense verse’ with the ruminations of a renowned thinker and philosopher 
on how ‘truth’ is made.85 However, the two diametrically opposite positions quoted above 
mark out the boundaries of the space within which this chapter specifically, and this research 
generally, is located. The Bellman’s position on truth-making resonates with the flattened 
(arising not least from repetition) nature of the dominant narrative that explains the evolution 
of the RTI Act in India. On the other hand, this research attempts to examine this narrative in 
a more nuanced manner, and in that proposes a different experiencing of the ‘truth’ of the 
evolution of the RTI Act.86  
                                                 
85 Interestingly, the two are temporally quite proximate. Carroll’s poem (and therefore the birth of the Bellman) 
was first published in 1876 and Krishnamurti was born just under two decades later in 1895.  
86 Continuing with Krishnamurti’s perspective, this research does not pretend to provide the truth about the RTI 
Act, but merely attempts to enlarge existing perspectives on it. What this research seeks to achieve is discussed 
in greater detail in the concluding chapter.  
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In this chapter, I focus on the Bellman’s perspective on truth-making by reviewing the 
existing dominant narrative on the enactment of the RTI Act in India in 2005. Explanations 
for the enactment of the RTI Act have been proffered by researchers, academics, activists, 
NGO representatives, journalists, and a plethora of internet-based sources. However, despite 
the fact that noisy and often acrimonious public debates surround almost all development-
related issues in India (not least giving further credence to Amartya Sen’s vision of ‘the 
argumentative Indian’), these explanations seem to run along a highly consistent and 
mutually reinforcing course. The history of the evolution of the RTI Act in India thus appears 
to have an overwhelmingly singular narrative. This chapter reviews this narrative and 
identifies three conspicuous silences within it. In subsequent chapters of this thesis, these 
silences are explored as spaces from within which other (more ‘Krishnamurtian’) ‘truths’ 
emerge.  
 
At this point, it may be necessary to point out that the aim of this chapter is not to question 
whether or not the narrative of the evolution of the RTI Act in India as produced in the public 
(including academic) domain is a ‘truthful’ one or not. What is being emphasised here (as 
was mentioned in the opening chapter as well), is that there appears to be a flattening of the 
discourse that explains the evolution of the RTI Act in India. It is this aspect of flattening that 
will be explored further in this thesis, even as it will be argued that this has a critical 
relationship with its organising questions that relate to the politics of the processes that led to 
the enactment of the RTI Act in 2005.  
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What Constitutes the Dominant Narrative? 
 
As this chapter is primarily concerned with delineating the contours of the existing dominant 
narrative, it becomes critical to identify the sources for conducting this exercise.87 In terms of 
published scholarly work (in established peer-reviewed journals or edited volumes), the 
number is not vast. Jenkins and Goetz (1999), Goetz and Jenkins (2005), Jenkins (2006), 
Baviskar (2007), Singh (2007 and 2011), Srivastava (2009), Webb (2010b) and Roberts 
(2010) form the core of this body. If one were to include academic and quasi-academic 
journals and publications which are not necessarily peer-reviewed (including the important, 
especially in the academic context related to social science research on India, Economic and 
Political Weekly), this number swells appreciably. Priya (1996), Roy (1996) and (1997b), 
Dogra (1997), Bakshi (1998), Noronha (2001), Roy and Dey (2002), Bhaduri (2005), 
Niranjan (2005), Kulkarni (2008), and Saxena (2009) focus on different aspects of the RTI 
Act in India, each referring at least in part to its evolution. In addition, an issue of the journal 
Seminar titled “Speaking Truth to Power: A Symposium on People’s Right to Information” 
was published in July 2005 that comprised of several articles, primarily authored by the better 
known advocates of the Act. A special issue of the Indian Journal of Public Administration 
titled “Right to Information: Present Status and Issues” was also published in September 
2009.88 Each of these maintains the contours of the established narrative.  
 
In the context of grey literature, including those published by international organisations, or 
papers presented at international conferences, a plethora of works that contribute substantially 
to the establishment of the dominant narrative exist. Within these, Mander and Joshi (1999), 
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (2001), Goetz and Jenkins (2001 and 2002), Mishra (2003), 
                                                 
87 By ‘dominant narrative’, I mean the repetitive threads that reappear (and are reinforced) consistently through 
all the public artefacts that speak of the RTI ‘story’ in India.  
88 See Goel (2009).  
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Sharma (2004), Kidambi (2008) and Puddephatt (2009) could be considered as key in this 
category of literature for two reasons. First, these have been cited numerously in the relevant 
literature, and second, these have been published by relatively influential and well-known 
organisations including the World Bank and UNDP. Another major source that I have 
accessed for reviewing the dominant narrative has been reportage in the mainstream English-
language national newspapers published in India. These include, but are not limited to The 
Indian Express, The Hindu and The Times of India.89 The basic contours of the narrative that 
underpin all of the above have been reproduced widely on the internet as well.90 The corpus 
of resources mentioned above consistently refers to the role played by a well-defined set of 
principal actors within the dominant narrative.91 Interviews that I conducted with these actors 
form the sixth type of material in the review of this narrative, which typically reinforce the 
dominant narrative while adding richness of detail to the same.  
 
The Genesis and Evolution of the RTI Act in India: The Dominant Narrative92 
 
When attempting to trace the history of the demand for citizens to have a legally enforceable 
right to access government-held information in India, three major strands emerge in the 
dominant narrative.93 The first highlights progressive judgements made by the Supreme Court 
of India in this context; the second finds its roots in the environmental movement in India, 
                                                 
89 For example, see “A tale of two movements”, Times of India newspaper, 6 September 2011.  
90 An emblematic example being the “History and Background” of the RTI Act in India on the website of the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), an international NGO working on the RTI Act in India. See 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/india/history.htm. Accessed 10 May 2011.  
91 Although these are present only superficially in the dominant narrative, I have weaved in biographical details 
of the principal actors as they appear within it. The implications of their profiles on the process will be discussed 
in later chapters.  
92 This subheading borrows heavily from the title of Singh (2011), “The genesis and evolution of the Right to 
Information Regime in India”. This is by design, as in many ways the paper is an emblematic example of the 
existing dominant narrative.  
93 These themes, with a significant bias towards the third, are common to almost all of the sources mentioned in 
the chapter above. However, Mander and Joshi (1999) also provide a detailed account of the development of 
constitutional and administrative law in support of an RTI Act. Although a few key judgements of the Supreme 
Court in this context do find mention in all the sources that produce the dominant narrative, these are typically 
mentioned only briefly. 
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particularly around the issue of hazardous industries in urban areas, with the judicial strand 
intertwined within it; and the third is the grassroots movement in rural Rajasthan which began 
as a struggle to force the government to grant minimum wages to labourers working on 
government schemes in accordance with its own rules.  
 
Judicial Pronouncements 
 
Perhaps the first clearly articulated comment on the issue of right of the people to know about 
the functioning of the government from a senior functionary of the state was made by Justice 
K.K. Mathew in his Supreme Court ruling in the case of State of UP vs Raj Narain in 1975 
where he said, “In a government…where all the agents of the public must be responsible for 
their conduct, there can be but few secrets. The people…have a right to know every public 
act, everything that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries… The responsibility 
of officials to explain or to justify their acts is the chief safeguard against oppression and 
corruption.” (Quoted in Mander and Joshi, 1999). The Supreme Court reinforced the idea of 
freedom of information through another judgement in 1982 which related to the matter of 
transfer of judges. In this case, S.P. Gupta & others vs The President of India & others, it 
held that “The concept of open government is the direct emanation from the right to know 
which seems implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 
19(1)(a). Therefore, disclosures of information in regard to the functioning of government 
must be the rule, and secrecy an exception justified only where the strictest requirements of 
public interest so demands.”94 
 
 
                                                 
94 State of U.P. vs. Raj Narain, (1975) (4) SCC 428, 24 January 1975.  
89 
 
The Environmental Movement 
 
Apart from this judgement, the 1980s could be seen as the period when the idea of freedom of 
information as a right began to take an embryonic form as a result of other events that were 
taking place in the socio-political sphere, most notably, in the field of environmental 
activism.95 In 1984, after the horrific gas leak from the Union Carbide factory in Bhopal 
caused the death of thousands of people, a spate of public interest litigations came out of 
dormancy.96 The case filed against the Sriram Food and Fertiliser Industry by lawyer M.C. 
Mehta some years previously was one such case. Mehta argued that this company dealt with 
hazardous chemicals and was located in a very densely populated part of Delhi which posed a 
grave human risk, and hence the industry must be shut down. Even as the case moved from 
the High to the Supreme Court, gas actually leaked from this plant in the first week of 
December 1985. While the impact of the leaks did not cause any deaths, this resulted in the 
Supreme Court bringing the case up for a quicker hearing during which it was discovered that 
an internal government study had been undertaken several months earlier, the results of 
which were not made known either to the company in question or to the public at large. This 
led the then Chief Justice of India, who was heading the bench that was hearing the case, to 
remark that he wished that someone would take up the issue of ‘Right to Know’. In response 
to this, Kalpavriksh, an NGO that had been working on environmental issues and was also 
involved with the case, filed an affidavit seeking the Court’s intervention to pronounce the 
Right to Know as a fundamental right, albeit in the context of the location of hazardous 
industries in densely populated areas. The affidavit was filed “for the limited purpose of 
                                                 
95 Much of these details were gleaned over a series of interviews with key informants, particularly Shekhar 
Singh in the context of the environmental movement.  
96 Public interest litigation in the Indian context “originated in the late 1970s when the judiciary, aiming to 
recapture popular support after its complicity in Indira Gandhi’s declaration of emergency rule, encouraged 
litigation concerning the interests of the poor and marginalized, and to do so loosened rules and traditions 
related to standing, case filing, the adversarial process, and judicial remedies” (Gauri, 2009: 71-72). 
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bringing on record and submitting the various facts and issues concerning the Right to Know” 
by Shekhar Singh (on behalf of Kalpavriksh), who was at that time a faculty member at the 
Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi.97  
 
Born into a civil servant family in 1950 (his father was in the IAS), Singh is an academic who 
had done his graduate and postgraduate studies at St. Stephen’s College, Delhi with English 
literature and Philosophy as subjects. He then went on to teach there for some years before 
moving to the then newly established North Eastern Hill University in Shillong (capital of the 
north-eastern state of Meghalaya) in 1974 where he spent seven years. From 1980 to 2002, he 
was faculty at the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), the apex government 
institution for in-service training of civil servants, where he set up the Environmental Studies 
Division.98 During his time at the IIPA, he also served in several government positions and 
committees, including Advisor (for Environment and Forests) to the Planning Commission of 
the Government of India in 1990-91. In 2002, he took voluntary retirement from the IIPA and 
then set up an NGO, Centre for Equity Studies. Since then, he has also been an independent 
consultant primarily in the areas of environment and access to information, and has worked 
for various international organisations such as the World Bank, the Global Environment 
Facility (funded by the World Bank), International Development Research Centre (IDRC), 
Canada, UNDP and FAO. He is regularly invited to all manner of national and international 
conferences on access to information and transparency (amongst other themes), and is also 
regularly consulted by government officials (including Information Commissioners) and 
NGOs on the RTI Act. Widely considered to be an authority on the Indian RTI Act, his name 
                                                 
97 While the Supreme Court did not pass any specific orders regarding this intervention, it did highlight some of 
these issues in the comments it made during the hearing and the eventual judgement.  
98 Many of the research staff working in the Environmental Studies Division of the IIPA were also core group 
members of Kalpavriksh. 
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also did the rounds in government circles for the position of Chief Information Commissioner 
(CIC) of the Government of India upon the retirement of the then incumbent.99  
 
The second landmark case within the environmental strand was a writ petition filed by the 
Bombay Environmental Action Group (BEAG) in the then Bombay High Court in 1986. 
BEAG had requested the Poona (now Pune) Cantonment Board to inspect relevant building 
plans and documents as it was interested in finding out if some construction activity was 
being carried out in violation of existing building bylaws. With no information forthcoming, 
BEAG filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking an inspection of these documents. The 
High Court upheld its claim and granted it access to the same. Eventually, the Supreme 
Court, while rejecting the writ petition, opined that “any person residing within the area of a 
local authority or any social action group shall be entitled to take inspection of any sanction 
granted, or plan approved, by any such local authority in construction of buildings along with 
the related papers and documents, if such individual or social action group or interest group 
or pressure group wishes to take such inspection, except of course in cases where in the 
interest of security, such inspections cannot be permitted”.100 
 
Struggle at the Grassroots: The MKSS, Social Audits and the Right to Information 
 
Meanwhile, in rural Rajasthan, the first stirrings of a grassroots-based struggle around the 
issues of land redistribution and minimum wages were beginning to take shape in the late 
                                                 
99 “PM to meet Advani, Moily on Friday, to finalise new CIC”, The Indian Express newspaper, 19 November 
2009. Eventually, he was not appointed as the CIC, and the position was filled by the Information 
Commissioner who was next in line in terms of seniority.  
100 Order of the Supreme Court, October 11, 1986, as quoted in the BEAG booklet on the case, Bombay 
Environmental Action Group v. Pune Cantonment Board, SLP (Civil) No. 11291 of 1986.  
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1980s.101 The genesis of the process in this part of the country lay in the coming together of 
three individuals, Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey and Shankar Singh, who met at the Social Work 
Research Centre (SWRC), an NGO based in Tilonia in the Ajmer district of Rajasthan, in the 
mid-1980s.  
 
Aruna Roy née Jayaram was a former bureaucrat, and had been born in 1946 into a Brahmin 
family from the southern state of Tamil Nadu. Her grandparents on both sides were highly-
educated and included a magistrate, an engineer, and a lawyer who had studied law in 
England. Her father’s family included several social activists, and he himself had participated 
in the independence movement. Eventually, he became a civil servant and retired as the legal 
adviser to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. Roy was educated in Chennai 
(then Madras), Pondicherry and Delhi in progressive schools with a primarily upper-middle 
class clientele and character, and then at the University of Delhi where she did graduate and 
post-graduate studies in English literature. She joined the Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS) in 1968, one of ten women in a batch of one hundred in that year. In 1970, she married 
Sanjit Roy (better known as Bunker Roy), who was a contemporary during her post-graduate 
student days.102 In 1974, Roy resigned from the IAS and joined her husband Bunker in 
Tilonia, where he had started SWRC in 1972.  
 
Nikhil Dey was born in the southern city of Bangalore in 1963. His father was an officer in 
the Indian Air Force, and over the years the family had had to move around India since it was 
                                                 
101 Much of the details in this section come from a series of interviews with members of the MKSS, including 
Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey, Shankar Singh and Lal Singh.  
102 A schoolmate of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at Doon School, Bunker Roy had studied at St. 
Stephen’s College in Delhi. Both of his grandfathers had been in the Indian Civil Service (ICS), the British-era 
progenitor of the IAS, and one of them had been the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization. 
In addition, an uncle of his had been the first Indian Chief of Air Staff of the Indian Air Force. 
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a transferable job.103 Dey was therefore sent to an elite boarding school in the south of India, 
The Lawrence School in Lovedale, close to Udhagamandalam (Ooty) in Tamil Nadu.104 With 
a deep interest in politics from a very young age, Dey closely followed the events around the 
declaration of Emergency by Indira Gandhi in 1975. Related on his father’s side to George 
Fernandes, a well-known socialist leader, he was able to observe the post-Emergency high-
level political landscape from very close quarters. He also received tremendous exposure to 
the trade union movement through Fernandes. It was around this time that Dey’s father was 
transferred to the United States as the Air Attaché in the Indian Embassy and the family 
moved to Washington DC. Soon after, Dey enrolled for a BA at the George Mason 
University. However, he became restive with the consumerist aspects of life in the United 
States within a couple of years, and returned to India without completing his degree.105 Over 
the next years, Dey visited several sites of local struggles in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and 
Rajasthan, and observed that in some cases movements had become ‘NGO-ised’ and in 
others, the leaders of ostensibly local movements came from elite backgrounds and their 
behaviour maintained the elite-underclass relationship. He had met Aruna Roy and Shankar 
Singh in Tilonia briefly during his travels, and they had both left an impression on him, but 
the SWRC-style of work had not seemed attractive. However, the three met often in this 
period, and “by early 1984, we had become close friends, and the idea that we could work 
together began to be formed.”106 
 
                                                 
103 Dey’s father retired as Vice Chief of Air Staff.  
104 Dey referred to it as an “elitist school”. Interview with Nikhil Dey, 22 February 2009, Devdoongri, 
Rajasthan.  
105 Many years later he completed BA and Law degrees in India through distance learning.  
106 Interview with Nikhil Dey, 22 February 2009, Devdoongri, Rajasthan.  
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Shankar Singh was born into an OBC family in 1955 in a village around 250 kilometres from 
Jaipur, the capital of Rajasthan.107 He studied at the local village school until the age of 14, 
when his father died. An only child, he then migrated to Ajmer, a town close by, to look for a 
salaried job. Ajmer was well-known in the region for poultry farms, and he found a job in one 
of them, but only after he pretended to have had studied less than he actually had. Seeking a 
better life, he completed a BA degree from a private college during the time he spent at the 
poultry farm doing odd jobs.108 “There is no point in even talking about the kind of education 
we had. There is no link between labour and education. I worked in a factory making savoury 
snacks, sold street food, did 16-17 labour type of jobs.”109 Soon after, he left the poultry farm 
to find a better job, and subsequently found a job as a volunteer with the National Service 
Scheme, a government programme under which volunteers visited various villages to raise 
awareness about development issues. “But the money was so little that I couldn’t even eat 
and I got tired of this.”110 Singh then heard about SWRC from an acquaintance, and also that 
it was looking to hire people. “I asked, what does it do, and the answer was ‘social service’. I 
asked what that was, and the answer was that you go to villages and do meetings, and you get 
paid for it. I thought that was great - go to villages, do meetings, get paid, even the food is 
given in the mess. This was a good job.”111 Singh then joined SWRC and eventually became 
a social communicator, where his talents lay in ample measure. Singh worked in the rural 
communication unit at SWRC for several years, until the idea of working with Roy and Dey 
                                                 
107 ‘OBC’ implies Other Backward Classes, which “are those castes/communities that are notified as socially 
and educationally Backward Classes by the State Governments or those that may be notified as such by the 
Central Government from time to time” (from http://socialjustice.nic.in/aboutdivision4.php, the official website 
of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment; Accessed 10 May 2012) but do not include communities 
listed as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as defined by articles 341 and 342 respectively of the 
Constitution of India.  
108 A private college is one which is not necessarily affiliated to any major university, and in this context means 
a virtually unknown and academically hollow institution.  
109 Interview with Shankar Singh, 22 February 2009, Devdoongri, Rajasthan. 
110 Ibid.  
111 Ibid.  
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began to take shape. In the intervening years, Singh had also gotten married, and had had 
three children.  
 
Roy, Dey and Singh had met at SWRC, and through discussions and conversations, a 
commonality was discovered, which included a desire to experiment with notions of social 
change different from the framework within which SWRC functioned, which required 
institutional donor funds. To understand the problems of peasants and farmers in this 
inhospitable and demanding geography, the three of them (along with Singh’s wife and 
children) decided to live in a village as ‘villagers’ (of the three, only Shankar Singh had a 
rural background). Serendipitously, one of Shankar Singh’s relatives had some household 
land to spare in a village called Devdoongri, which was a couple of hours by road from 
Tilonia, and 8 kilometres from the highway town of Bhim, the largest town in the area. In 
1987, the group moved to Devdoongri, a small hamlet with houses dispersed over a relatively 
large area, which then became a crucible for processes of social change that this group 
wanted to experiment with.  
 
Perhaps the first struggle that this group participated in which accessing government-held 
information played a key, if understated role, was one over land belonging to the village 
commons in the village of Sohangarh, 12 kilometres from Bhim, much of which was 
controlled by a powerful land owner of the area. With the help of a sympathetic patwari (the 
local revenue official), the group managed to access the official land records of the area, 
mobilised local inhabitants, and petitioned the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to intervene. 
Eventually, the land owner had to cede control over a 60-acre piece of common land. Around 
the same time, the group launched a parallel struggle over the payment of minimum wages in 
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Dadi Rapat, which was a worksite of the state irrigation department,112 and on May Day 
1990, the group formed their organisation, the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) as a 
“non-party political organisation”.  
 
Over the next couple of years, a few villagers from the area joined the MKSS and subsequent 
experiences provided it with insights into how the pilfering of state funds worked. Local 
officials would bill the state for works done, and muster rolls would be filled with ghost 
entries showing that wages had been paid to local villagers for labour.113 In some cases, no 
works were carried out at all, existing only on paper. It was in this period that the importance 
of accessing government records began to dawn on the group. Each time a demand was made 
to get their entitlement, workers would be stonewalled by the authorities who claimed that 
their names were not on the muster rolls. If a demand was made to have a look at the same, 
this would be refused citing that they were secret government records.114 Soon enough, the 
MKSS group began to deliberate on the idea of instituting a jan sunwai (public hearing) as a 
mode to bring such blatantly illegal activities into the public domain.  
 
Jan Sunwais 
 
Over the next years, the MKSS developed and fine-tuned jan sunwais as an critical tool in its 
arsenal of holding local officials to account. MKSS activists, supporters and people from the 
area would petition the local government official (typically the BDO) to issue an order which 
would give them the right to inspect (and in some cases, get copies of) government records 
dealing with development works in a particular area. Where successful, these records would 
                                                 
112 For more details, see Mishra (2003).  
113 “A “muster roll” is essentially a labour attendance register, pertaining to a particular worksite and a particular 
period (e.g. two weeks). It is also used as a receipt, to claim funds from the [government] for the payment of 
wages” (Dreze et al, 2007:1).  
114 For details, see Mishra, 2003: 8-9.  
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be read out at a jan sunwai, after which the statements of people who testified against what 
the documents said would be recorded, and an FIR would be lodged as per the findings of the 
process.115 Typically, such meetings would be presided over by a well-known and 
disinterested party (such as a popular poet, or an NGO worker) which would ensure that a 
modicum of neutrality was established and maintained throughout the process. 
 
As resistance to releasing information related to development works amongst the local 
officialdom grew, a mass meeting was organised by MKSS activists in Beawar, a town in the 
region with over 100,000 people, on 25 September 1995. More than 2,000 people were 
mobilised to attend the meeting from all over the state, and the extensive links that the leaders 
of the MKSS had with urban intelligentsia (not limited to Rajasthan) played an important role 
as representatives of the media, doctors, intellectuals, trade unionists, sympathetic 
bureaucrats and elected representatives participated and spoke at the meeting.  
 
Linking the Local with the National 
 
The links that the MKSS, especially Aruna Roy, had with the government and intelligentsia 
of the country were playing themselves out in other forms and other locations at the same 
time. In October 1995, a workshop on the Right to Information was organised at the Lal 
Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA) in Mussoorie “where for 
the first time the principles of the RTI Act were enunciated... All the major actors of the 
whole thing were there.”116 The meeting had been organised by Naresh Chandra Saxena, who 
was then the Director of the LBSNAA. Born in 1942, Saxena had joined the IAS in 1964 and 
was assigned the Uttar Pradesh cadre. After working for eight years in the state, he became 
                                                 
115 A First Information Report (FIR) is the first step in the initiation of criminal proceedings in the Indian legal-
administrative system. 
116 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi.  
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the Deputy Director of the LBSNAA in Mussoorie. Over the next decades, he mostly served 
at the federal level, and also completed a doctorate from the University of Oxford. In 1993, 
he returned to Mussoorie as the Director of the LBSNAA. He was also the Secretary to the 
Ministry of Rural Development, and finally retired as the Secretary to the Planning 
Commission, Government of India. During his career as a civil servant, as well as after 
retiring, he has worked or consulted for practically all the ‘big name’ international 
development organisations, including the World Bank, the British Department for 
International Development (DfID), the Danish, Swedish and Canadian International 
Development Agencies (DANIDA, SIDA and CIDA), UNDP, UNICEF, and the ADB. In 
addition, he continues to serve on several high-powered committees of the Government of 
India.  
 
The Deputy Director of the LBSNAA at the time of this meeting was Harsh Mander, whose 
involvement in the enactment of the RTI Act peppers the dominant narrative consistently.117 
Mander was born in 1956 in Shillong, in the north-eastern state of Meghalaya. His father was 
in the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). An alumnus of St. Stephen’s College, Delhi, he 
himself joined the IAS in 1980 and was allotted the Madhya Pradesh cadre. Later, he was 
moved to the Chhatisgarh cadre when the new state was carved out of Madhya Pradesh in 
2000. He left the IAS in 2002 “after he visited Gujarat and saw the unprecedented violence, 
the inexcusable apathy and bias on the part of the police and administration.”118 While he was 
still a serving civil servant, “Mander’s most important intervention was as Commissioner of 
                                                 
117 In a different account, Mander is credited to having organised this seminal gathering. “In 1993, Mander spent 
the winter with MKSS and saw their social audit work at first hand... At that time, Mander was posted at the Lal 
Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration in Mussoorie, the premier training institute of the 
government. Encouraged by Dr N. C. Saxena, the then Director, Mander organized a national workshop on the 
right to information at the Academy, bringing Aruna Roy and others together with government officials, which 
was a key step in the decision to draft a national law and form the NCPRI for that purpose.” (Baviskar, 2007: 
14). 
118 Interview with Harsh Mander in the Outlook Magazine, 15 April 2002.  
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Bilaspur division in MP in 1996. As with the Public Distribution System in Delhi, Bilaspur 
too had a flourishing black market in foodgrains, with subsidized rice supplied to the ration 
shops being diverted to the open market, denying the intended beneficiaries their due. 
Mander passed the first set of orders around the RTI, making it mandatory for the 
administration to provide copies of the ‘distribution registers’ recording the allotments made 
to each ration shop” (Baviskar, 2007: 14).  
 
Rajasthan: The Government Responds 
 
Meanwhile in Rajasthan, on 6 April 1996, the MKSS began an indefinite dharna in Beawar 
demanding legislation on the Right to Information. The government responded quickly and 
issued an order that allowed citizens to inspect the records related to development works of 
the panchayat bodies in the state. However, the order stopped short at the inspection level 
itself - it did not give permission to citizens to have photocopies made. With the experience 
of the jan sunwais behind them, MKSS activists knew that this was only a pyrrhic victory - 
without copies of the records, the authenticity of public exposure would be suspect. Hence, 
the dharna continued. With senior journalists from other parts of the country being invited to 
visit the dharna site, the demands being made started to find mention in the national press. 
The issue began to catch the imagination of people, especially in the context that the middle 
classes too saw their own interests being met through the demands of the agitation. With 
money laundering scams fresh in public memory, an agitation, even if being held in a 
nondescript part of the country, resonated with the privileged classes in big cities, for 
corruption was an issue that had touched most people.  
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A month after the dharna was launched, a parallel one was initiated outside the state 
government secretariat in Jaipur, the state capital. With public pressure mounting, the 
government finally announced the setting up of the Arun Kumar Committee to make 
recommendations on the issue. With this announcement, the dharna was lifted on 16 May 
1996, 40 days after its launch in Beawar. The committee submitted its report to the 
government on 31 August 1996, but ironically, the report was kept secret. However, MKSS 
activists managed to get a copy of the report, the contents of which were very supportive of 
the demands that had been made during the agitation.  
 
The Birth of the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) 
 
Even as the MKSS carried out their agitations in Beawar and then Jaipur, a different kind of 
organisational activity was beginning to take shape at the national level. As a result of 
effective networking on the part of MKSS activists, particularly Aruna Roy, the Press 
Council of India (PCI) got involved in the process. The Press Council of India was first set up 
in the year 1966 by the Parliament on the recommendations of the First Press Commission 
with the objective of preserving the freedom of the press and of maintaining and improving 
the standards of the press in India. It is a statutory, quasi-judicial body which acts as a 
watchdog of the press and adjudicates the complaints against and by the press for violation of 
ethics and for violation of the freedom of the press respectively. The then Chairman of the 
Council was Justice P.B. Sawant, a former judge of the Supreme Court. Some weeks after the 
Beawar and Jaipur dharnas, the MKSS built on the attention received in the national press to 
jointly organise, along with the PCI, a meeting in Jaipur over 20-21 July 1996. The meeting 
was organised to discuss conceptual and operational issues related to putting in place a Right 
to Information regime. Representatives of NGOs, independent professionals and the 
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government, including the Chief Minister, participated in this meeting. The first day saw 
some acrimonious and confrontational exchanges take place between the government 
representatives and the activist groups. Day two was devoted to discussing the details of the 
draft which had been developed by the group which had met at the LBSNAA in Mussoorie 
the previous year. The objective was to improve the draft and submit it to the government at 
the centre for legislation on the Right to Information to be enacted.  
 
An immediate follow up to this meeting was provided by the Press Council organising a 
larger gathering in Delhi over 31 July and 1 August 1996. This meeting had a much higher 
profile, with the participation of former Prime Ministers V.P. Singh and Chandrashekhar, 
then Union Minister George Fernandes, as well as many Members of Parliament. The then 
leader of the opposition, Atal Behari Vajpayee, also sent a letter in support of the demand to 
enact a Right to Information law. It should be noted that the government of the day had 
recently been sworn in on 1 June 1996, after the electorate had delivered a deeply fractured 
verdict resulting in a government being formed by the United Front coalition led by the 
Janata Dal with support of the Congress and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
(CPI(M)) from outside. This minority government, which was headed by H.D. Deve Gowda, 
had announced that it would introduce a freedom of information bill in the Parliament as a 
part of its common minimum programme. 
 
Towards the end of August, another meeting was organised under the aegis of the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), India at the Gandhi Peace Foundation in New Delhi. It was at 
this meeting - where several intellectuals, academics, journalists, activists, and professionals 
had foregathered - that the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) 
was formed. The objective of the NCPRI at that point was to develop a draft legislation, as 
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well as lobby the government to enact a Right to Information Act. Its founding members were 
Ajit Bhattacharjea, Prashant Bhushan, Nikhil Dey, Bharat Dogra, Prabhash Joshi, K.G. 
Kannabiran, Renuka Mishra, M.P. Parameswaran, Aruna Roy, S.R. Sankaran and Shekhar 
Singh, brief profiles of whom are provided in the table below (excluding those already 
profiled above).  
 
Table 3.1:  Brief profiles of founding members of the NCPRI 
Name  Profile 
Ajit 
Bhattacharjea 
English language Journalist; Alumnus of St. Stephen’s College, Delhi; 
Served as correspondent in leading Indian English language dailies in 
India and the US; Edited Everyman, Ram Nath Goenka’s newspaper 
brought out in support of Jai Prakash Narain; Former editor of Indian 
Express and The Times of India; Former Director of the Press Institute of 
India.  
Prashant 
Bhushan 
Leading civil rights lawyer at the Supreme Court; Grandfather was a 
public prosecutor in the Allahabad High Court; Father is Shanti 
Bhushan, leading lawyer of the Supreme Court and former Minister for 
Law and Justice in the Morarji Desai government;119 Studied at the 
Indian Institute of Technology, Chennai, and Princeton and Allahabad 
Universities; Been involved in the Bhopal gas leak and Narmada Bachao 
Andolan cases.  
Bharat Dogra Independent journalist 
Prabhash Joshi One of the most respected figures of Hindi journalism in India; Former 
editor of Prajaniti, the Hindi version of Everyman; Founder editor of 
Jansatta, a leading Hindi language daily of the Indian Express Group; 
Known to be highly connected to the political class.  
K.G. Kannabiran Lawyer and Human Rights Activist; Former President of the People’s 
Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL).  
Renuka Mishra Activist; Wife of R.K. Mishra, former Editor of The Patriot, a now 
defunct newspaper then funded by the Ambanis and known to be a 
mouthpiece of the Congress party.120  
M.P. 
Parameswaran 
Former civil servant - Scientist at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre; 
Involved with the Kerala Sahitya Shastra Parishad (KSSP) for several 
decades; Was part of the CPI(M).  
S.R. Sankaran Former civil servant belonging to the IAS; Mentor of Aruna Roy while 
she was still in government service; Former Secretary, Ministry of Rural 
Development, Government of India.  
                                                 
119 Shanti Bhushan had gained fame by representing Raj Narain in his case against the State of Uttar Pradesh in 
the Allahabad High Court, the judgement on which rendered Indira Gandhi’s election null and void, eventually 
leading to the proclamation of Emergency in the country in 1975. 
120 The Ambanis are the leading business family of India. Founded by Dhirubhai Ambani, the Reliance Group 
split into Reliance Industries and Reliance Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group after his death. To give a sense of the 
financial clout of the companies, just the former had revenues of USD 58.8 billion in 2010.  
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The NCPRI and the Press Council submitted a draft legislation to the government by the end 
of the year. In response, the government constituted a “Working Group on Right to 
Information and Promotion of Open and Transparent Government” on 2 January 1997. H.D. 
Shourie, a renowned consumer rights activist was nominated as the Chairman of the working 
group, which eventually submitted its report on 31 May 1997.  
 
Rajasthan: The Struggle Continues 
 
Meanwhile, in Rajasthan, despite the recommendations of the Arun Kumar Committee 
(which remained secret), no signs of implementation were to be seen. Despite assurances 
given in different fora by the Chief Minister that orders which catered to the demands of the 
agitators would soon be passed, no such thing happened. The MKSS decided to launch a 
fresh agitation to continue to put pressure on the government to yield to the demand of 
providing a framework within which citizens could get copies of government records. This 
time, the state capital Jaipur was chosen as the venue. On 26 May 1997, another dharna was 
launched, which eventually turned out to be the longest one lasting 53 days. The NCPRI 
made representations to the state government representatives in Delhi in tandem with the 
dharna to keep up the pressure in various quarters and to mobilise public opinion at the 
centre. The end of the dharna came amidst high drama. On 14 July 1997, the Deputy Chief 
Minister of Rajasthan pulled out a copy of the Rajasthan Gazette dated 30 December 1996 at 
a press conference. It notified the Panchayati Raj Act rules which gave citizens the right to 
inspect and get copies of government records dealing with development works implemented 
by Panchayati Raj Institutions. As a gazette notification, its legal sanctity was greater than if 
104 
 
it had been an executive order of the government.121 The inexplicable nature of this event - 
that even while the government had notified these new rules six months before, no one 
seemed to know about them, provided the backdrop against which a major victory had been 
won. With this Gazette notification being made public, the dharna was duly called off.  
 
With this notification in place, the character of the jan sunwais subsequently organised by 
MKSS changed significantly. Armed now with the right to access government records, a 
necessary precondition of holding a successful jan sunwai, MKSS activists could be more 
self-assured. Meanwhile, awareness about accessing government records and changes in the 
Panchayati Raj rules had increased, resulting in greater participation of people in jan sunwais. 
The panel of observers took on a higher profile, including former Prime Minister V.P. Singh, 
serving senior bureaucrats of the Indian Administrative Service, lawyers at the Rajasthan 
High Court, District Collectors and Superintendents of Police. Sarpanches (heads of 
panchayats) and officials being obliged to participate as respondents in these hearings was 
another key difference in comparison to the earlier phase of public hearings.  
 
High Drama 
 
A dramatic event with far-reaching consequences took place in the last quarter of 1998, 
which brought the debate back to the fore. In his address at the “National Seminar on Safer 
Cities” held in New Delhi on 5 October 1998, Ram Jethmalani, the then Minister for Urban 
Affairs and Employment in the coalition government led by the BJP, announced his intention 
to introduce a system in his ministry through which the general public would be able to pay a 
                                                 
121 The Government of Rajasthan eventually passed a state level RTI Act on 11 May 2000, which came into 
force on 26 January 2001. Interestingly, nine states had state-level RTI laws in place before the national Right to 
Information Act, 2005 was enacted. While it is beyond the remit of this thesis to investigate the genesis of state-
level laws, a brief background is provided in Annexure II. 
105 
 
fee and get access to government records.122 Jethmalani followed this up with an office 
memorandum detailing the process to be followed to facilitate file inspection and 
photocopying. File notings were not to be exempt from requests, and applicants were to be 
provided copies within seven days.123 The minister gave instructions that the memorandum 
was to be issued immediately and released to the public. However, the senior bureaucracy in 
the ministry engaged the support of the Cabinet Secretariat to stonewall his directions. The 
workings of the top bureaucracy on the Prime Minister had its effect and within a week a 
communiqué from the Cabinet Secretary closed the matter for the moment. “The matter 
regarding the ambit and scope of items where supply of information shall be mandatory, and 
the areas of items in respect of which a citizen would have the right to seek and get 
information, is presently under consideration of the Group of Ministers constituted to 
consider the proposed legislation on Freedom of Information. It is, therefore, necessary that 
the implications of the instructions dated 10th October, 1998 of Minister for UA&E are first 
carefully considered by the GOM. Prime Minister has therefore, directed not to give effect to 
the instructions dated 10th October, 1998 issued by the Minister for UA&E and to refer the 
matter to the GOM for consideration.”124  
 
As an immediate outcome of this episode, the Centre for Public Interest Litigation (through 
its Secretary Ashok Panda), the NCPRI (through its Convenor, Ajit Bhattacharjea) and 
Manushi (through its editor Madhu Kishwar) filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court. The 
counsel for the petitioners, Prashant Bhushan, had been involved with the NCPRI for several 
                                                 
122 The I.K. Gujral government fell on 28 November 1997. The new government was formed by the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), with Atal Behari Vajpayee being sworn in 
as the Prime Minister on 19 March 1998. 
123 Office memorandum dated 10 October 1998, Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment. In the context of 
government papers, ‘file notings’ refer to that section of a government file on which the executive records its 
opinions and the rationale for the same. 
124 D.O.No.681/1/6/98-CA.III dated 16 October 1998 from Prabhat Kumar, Cabinet Secretary to S.S. 
Chattopadhyay, Special Secretary, Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment. Emphasis in original. GOM 
implies Group of Ministers.  
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years. The petitioners pegged their writ on a request made to the Ministry of Urban Affairs 
and Employment through which they had sought copies of documents related to the contract 
of appointment of a consultant for the Metro Rail Project in Delhi, and the other related to 
documents pertaining to the entire office memorandum controversy. Even as the petition was 
filed, the Group of Ministers met several times and finally agreed to recommend to the 
Cabinet that a Freedom of Information bill be passed. A draft bill, modelled on the Shourie 
Committee Report, was sent to the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee 
on Home Affairs. The Committee sought depositions from civil society actors, including the 
MKSS and the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) on the draft, and finally 
submitted its report to the government in July 2001. The Bill was subsequently passed by the 
Parliament and received the assent of the President on 6 January 2003 as the Freedom of 
Information Act 2002. However, the date of the operationalisation of the Act was not defined 
in the official gazette, with the result that it did not come into force. In effect, even as the first 
national law related to access to information had been enacted by the Parliament, there still 
remained a procedural loophole which prevented it from being implemented and used by 
citizens.  
 
From Freedom of Information to Right to Information 
 
On the civil society front, this prompted a period of intense activity even as the issue had 
been granted a huge fillip as a result of Aruna Roy receiving the Magsaysay Award for 2000 
for Community Leadership. The media reported this announcement with great gusto, and in 
the process the issue of access to information also received tremendous publicity at the 
national level. Meanwhile, Parliamentary elections took place in the country in 2004, with no 
single party emerging as a clear winner. A post-poll grouping, the United Progressive 
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Alliance (UPA), came to power in 2004. The alliance was led by the Congress, with the Left 
parties providing it critical support from outside the government. High drama was witnessed 
with the leader of the Congress, Sonia Gandhi, declining to become the Prime Minister, and 
instead nominating Manmohan Singh, a Member of Parliament from the upper house, as the 
Prime Minister of the new government, who was duly sworn in on 13 May 2004. NCPRI 
members meanwhile had continued to be in touch with Congress leaders in the period leading 
up to the elections. They had been particularly active in their interactions with the Congress, 
almost providing tacit support to the party in the areas where they worked, particularly 
Rajasthan, within a larger context of preventing the BJP-led NDA from coming back to 
power as a response to the incidents in Godhra in Gujarat in 2002.125 Aruna Roy was 
contacted by representatives of the Congress in the period leading up to the development of 
their party manifesto seeking input on the issue of access to information. Possibly as a result 
of these interactions, the Congress party manifesto made a specific reference to the Right to 
Information. It stated that “The Right to Information Act at the centre will be made more 
progressive, meaningful and useful to the public. The monitoring and implementation of the 
Act will be made more participatory and the penalty clauses regarding delays, illegal denials 
and other inadequacies relating to the supply of information to the public will be 
operationalised soon. Protection will be extended to all “whistleblowers” through statutory 
means, if necessary”.126 Once the UPA came to power, the Congress along with its allies 
developed a Common Minimum Programme (CMP) document that reflected the party 
manifesto in stating that “The Right to Information Act will be made more progressive, 
participatory and meaningful”. It is interesting to note that in both the party manifesto as well 
as the CMP document, the concept was formulated in terms of a Right to Information as 
                                                 
125 On 27 February 2002, a train in Godhra, Gujarat “was attacked by a Muslim mob killing 59 people, mainly 
Hindu pilgrims… The attack led to some of the worst riots seen in India and left more than 1,000 people, mainly 
Muslims, dead” (BBC News, 22 February 2011). The Chief Minister of the BJP-ruled state, Narendra Modi, was 
accused of abusing the state machinery in allowing this violence against Muslims to take place.  
126 Congress Party manifesto 2004.  
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opposed to Freedom of Information, as referred to in the Act already passed by the former 
government. This particular terminology was to play a key role in all subsequent lobbying 
efforts of civil society, as well as communications within the government regarding the issue. 
 
Wild Card: The National Advisory Council 
 
Within a few months, an event of critical importance took place that was to play a defining 
role in the eventual enactment of the RTI Act in 2005. On 31 May 2004, within a few weeks 
of the new government headed by Manmohan Singh being in place, the government 
announced the establishment of the National Advisory Council (NAC) with Sonia Gandhi as 
its Chairperson. Its mandate was “a) To monitor the progress of implementation of the 
Common Minimum Programme; b) To provide inputs into the formulation of policy by the 
Government and to provide support to the government in its legislative business”.127 Serviced 
by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the NAC would “engage services of such experts and 
academics, as required, to assist in its work. The Council may invites [sic] such person or 
persons, as it may deem fit, to participate in its deliberations”.128 
 
The Council was a peculiar entity with no constitutional precedence, and was critiqued as 
being a body created to accommodate Sonia Gandhi so that she could have a say in 
government policy. Critically, members appointed to the NAC included Aruna Roy, Jean 
Dreze and N.C. Saxena, all of whom had been involved with the Right to Information 
movement and campaign in varying degrees (one of them being a founding member of the 
NCPRI, and another deeply involved with the process through the meeting at the LBSNAA in 
Mussoorie). Suddenly, civil society representatives appeared to be in a position of 
                                                 
127 Cabinet Secretariat Order No. 631/2/1/2004-Cab, dated 31 May 2004. 
128 Ibid.  
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unprecedented power when it came to affecting policy. Sonia Gandhi being the Chairperson 
and the undisputed leader of the Congress party which was now in power lent the NAC a 
stature that could not be ignored. “That a number of activists and scholars of the highest 
calibre were members of the NAC did not dilute the identity of the council as Sonia Gandhi’s 
body” (Editorial, 2008b: 7). As a result, it was a body that was perceived in government 
circles as being all-powerful. Given this background, the NAC came to acquire immense 
clout, and the fact that key figures of the Right to Information movement were members of 
the Council, and therefore ‘had her ear’, played no small role in ensuring that the RTI Act 
was placed high on the government agenda.  
 
On 16 August 2004, Sonia Gandhi, as the Chairperson of the NAC, dispatched a letter on the 
Right to Information to the government urging it to introduce an amended Freedom of 
Information Act in the Parliament at the earliest. The NAC had already sent “A copy of the 
draft amendment [sic], a tabulation of the original Act and proposed amendments and a Note 
on the proposed amendments... to the Government”.129 All of these drafts, tabulated 
comparisons, and notes had been prepared by NCPRI members, who were of course, privy to 
the discussions within the NAC through the presence of their own members there. The 
momentum was building. Not only were recommendations being made to the government by 
the NAC, but separate communications were also being initiated by the Chairperson of the 
NAC to the Prime Minister. The importance being attached to the issue by Sonia Gandhi 
could not be ignored.  
 
                                                 
129 Letter from Sonia Gandhi, Chairperson, NAC, to the Prime Minister, dated 16 August 2009. 
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Strategies and Counter Strategies 
 
Despite Sonia Gandhi’s obvious interest in the RTI legislation, sources in the government 
informed NCPRI members that resistance within the bureaucracy was mounting, and that the 
government might not table the bill in Parliament that year. Owing to the Parliament being in 
session, civil society groups were unable to meet with the Prime Minister to discuss the issue. 
Following an appeal to V.P. Singh by NCPRI members, a meeting with the Prime Minister 
was arranged on 5 December 2004, a Sunday, and attended by V.P. Singh, accompanied by 
Aruna Roy, Shekhar Singh, Jean Dreze and Prabhat Patnaik (the latter two to discuss the 
Employment Guarantee Act). Although several of them had met the Prime Minister on other 
occasions, this, as it turned out, was going to be a critical meeting. “Aruna and I had gone to 
talk about the RTI, of course both of us also talked about the NREGA, but basically we had 
gone to talk about the RTI. Towards the end of the meeting, he [Manmohan Singh] said that I 
am under great pressure, so it will be introduced in Parliament this time... We thanked V.P. 
Singh profusely, and came back very cheerful, that he has committed so it will go to 
Parliament. And on the 18th [of December 2004] the bill was introduced.”130 
 
However, even as the process began to move towards it final dénouement, further twists 
began to develop in the story. NCPRI members discovered that the bill sent by the NAC to 
the government had been altered before being tabled in the Parliament to the effect that the 
Act, if passed, would be applicable only to the central government and not to any of the state 
governments. Four members of the NAC, Aruna Roy, Jean Dreze, N.C. Saxena and A.K. 
Shiva Kumar sent a letter to Sonia Gandhi protesting against this.131 The larger NCPRI 
network, comprising by now of hundreds of people, was mobilised through email, urging 
                                                 
130 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi.  
131 “4 NAC members send protest to Sonia: Info Bill keeps states out”, The Indian Express newspaper, dated 25 
December 2004.  
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them to write to the Prime Minister protesting this move. The government argued that the 
Right to Information came under general administration, which was a state matter, and 
therefore the centre could not legislate on it. In response, the NCPRI requested Shanti 
Bhushan, former law minister, to give a legal opinion on it, wherein he suggested that the 
Right to Information was a residual subject, which meant that both the state and the centre 
could legislate on it. This opinion suited the aims of NCPRI activists, as it would achieve 
both their goals, namely to have a central legislation that covered both the states and the 
centre, as well as maintain the sanctity of legislation that had already been passed in several 
states.  
 
Even as this debate was underway, the bill was sent to the Department-Related Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice to deliberate on and 
provide recommendations. NCPRI members continued to lobby the members of the 
Committee, including its Chairperson, E. Sudarsana Natchiappan. “Nikhil [Dey] and I went 
and we had a long chat with him and explained all our concerns to him, and then we formally 
appeared before the committee [and] put down the whole thing in writing.”132 The other 
notable civil society group that was invited to depose before the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee was the CHRI. The Parliamentary Standing Committee submitted its report to the 
government, which was largely in favour of the arguments made by the NCPRI. The bill, 
along with the recommendations of the Standing Committee, was then sent to a Group of 
Ministers which was chaired by Sharad Pawar, Minister for Food and Agriculture, whose 
Nationalist Congress Party was part of the UPA government.  
 
                                                 
132 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi.  
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NCPRI activists who had links in various ministries got wind that the Group of Ministers was 
not inclined to extend the law to all states. A meeting with Sonia Gandhi was requested by 
NCPRI members, and granted, and “Aruna, Nikhil, Jean and I went to see Mrs. Gandhi. I 
didn’t go in [to the room], only Aruna and Jean went in, I think. I and Nikhil sat outside, at 
her home itself, and they then briefed her, and they came out and they were slightly depressed 
because Mrs. Gandhi also seemed a little troubled, that what should I do, if the Group of 
Ministers also gives a negative report then what can I do?”133 The matter was of some 
concern for if the Group of Ministers rejected the idea of applicability to the states it would 
be very difficult to convince the Parliament to think otherwise. Further, NCPRI members 
were convinced that a law that did not extend to the states would be meaningless, since the 
concerns of a common citizen are located more in the subjects that state governments deal 
with, such as education, public distribution systems, etc, than those dealt with by the centre.  
 
Having exhausted all lobbying possibilities, NCPRI members were a dejected lot. However, a 
final twist in the tale was yet to play itself out. “Rumour has it that she [Sonia Gandhi] did 
something unprecedented. She said that [she] would like to meet the Group of Ministers. 
Why unprecedented? Because she was not in the Government, and in fact the Chair of the 
Group of Ministers was not even in the Congress. Something happened between our meeting 
and the next day, because the Group of Ministers’ report which came out was totally 
favourable and supportive.”134 Once the potential hurdle from the Group of Ministers had 
been surmounted, the bill largely sailed through since the UPA had the numbers in the 
Parliament. Finally, on 10 May 2005, the RTI Amendment Bill 2005 was tabled in the Lok 
Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. The Bill was passed very quickly - it was approved by 
the Lok Sabha on 11 May 2005 and by the Rajya Sabha on 12 May. On 15 June 2005, the 
                                                 
133 Ibid.  
134 Ibid.  
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President gave his assent to the national Right to Information Act 2005. The Central and State 
Governments were given 120 days to implement the provisions of the Bill in its entirety and 
the Act came into force formally on 12 October 2005. 
 
In Conclusion 
 
The dominant narrative of the evolution of the process that led to the enactment of the RTI 
Act suggests that it came about as a result of a specific concatenation of events. Limited 
references to early judicial interventions, particularly in the context of the environmental 
movement are made in this narrative, with the Supreme Court interpreting the Constitution in 
a way that linked transparency to democracy. However, the primary explanatory framework 
that the narrative privileges is premised on the thesis of the state responding to pressures from 
below. The work of the MKSS in Rajasthan had successfully forged the link between issues 
of livelihood and basic survival needs in rural areas to access government-held information. 
The narrative also suggests that this pressure from below gained weight as it was 
strengthened through a particularly inclusive process, which included building alliances with 
the intelligentsia, the media, sympathetic bureaucrats, NGOs, and grassroots organisations of 
all hues. With urban, national media giving it considerable publicity, support for the idea 
grew in urban centres as well, not least because of the nature of the RTI Act itself, as it 
conflated the interests of different socio-economic and geographical dichotomies - urban-
rural, middle class-working class, elite-masses, and so on.  
 
The dominant narrative also highlights the intense resistance that the movement for an RTI 
Act had to overcome, particularly from an entrenched bureaucracy which was loath to be 
subjected to public scrutiny. Success in overcoming such strong resistance was ensured 
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through effective lobbying that resulted in high-level political support. This support was 
extended partly due to the specific political configuration that existed at that time and the 
change in government in 2004 had presented a window of opportunity. The new UPA 
government needed to prove its pro-poor agenda, which was being promoted in opposition to 
the previous NDA government’s “India Shining” campaign which was widely perceived to 
have an urban middle class bias. The critical mechanism that allowed these changes to be 
pushed through was the establishment of the National Advisory Council, and the presence 
and participation of leading RTI activists in it. As a key respondent summed it, “The most 
important things, if [they] have to be identified, were Aruna Roy’s influence with Sonia 
Gandhi, and Sonia Gandhi’s support for [the RTI Act]”.135  
 
In terms of the outcomes and implications of this process, the narrative claims that the 
enactment of the RTI Act can be seen as a hard-won victory of ordinary people over a 
trenchant state. This is particularly valuable, as an important defining aspect of the process 
was the articulation of the demand by the rural poor, which led to the Act itself being more 
pro-poor and inclusive in its contours. The narrative also celebrates the outcome of this 
process, the actual Act itself, by highlighting its potential to fundamentally alter the citizen-
state relationship in favour of the former.  
 
Theoretically speaking, Jenkins and Goetz (1999) provide perhaps the most clearly 
articulated statement on the implications of the movement for an RTI Act in India. They 
suggest that this experience contributes primarily to three concurrent debates within the larger 
framework of governance - that of human rights, participatory development and anti-
corruption. In the context of the first, they suggest that the RTI movement in India has 
                                                 
135 Interview with YDS558, 9 October 2011.  
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brought attention to the fact that “the nature and utility of rights are linked to the process by 
which they are obtained, and that the meaning of established democratic concepts can be 
transformed through political practice” (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999: 610). In the context of 
participatory development, they suggest that current thinking on this issue is largely 
apolitical, and the mode of resistance that the MKSS pioneered in the context of the demand 
for an RTI Act, the jan sunwai, brings politics back into the theory and practice of 
participatory development. Finally, in the context of anti-corruption, the authors suggest that 
the “the genuinely grassroots foundations and character” of the movement challenges the 
literature on anti-corruption which is largely limited to “(1) an overemphasis on the state as 
cause and remedy; (2) a failure to recognise the role of social movements in highlighting the 
existence of different forms of corruption; and (3) a limited conception of the relationship 
between information and accountability” (Jenkins and Goetz, 1999: 615-616). The dominant 
narrative thus largely celebrates the process as well as the outcome of the movement for an 
RTI Act in India, and the message that comes through in very clear terms is that a momentous 
opportunity has been created - to make citizenship more meaningful, and through that, to 
deepen democracy substantially.  
 
However, even as the facts of this narrative (the theoretical implications will be taken up for 
discussion later in the thesis) cannot be doubted, three conspicuous silences emerge in it. 
First, the narrative does not discuss in any detail the impact the social profiles of the principal 
actors - the leadership of the movement - had on the process and the outcome. This is 
important to highlight as the presence of well-placed individuals in the leadership of the 
movement appears to be inordinately high, especially for a process that is defined within a 
vocabulary of grassroots movements. As a related concern, social profile also has defining 
implications on the range of ideas, actions and strategies available for actors engaging in an 
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oppositional and confrontational duel with the state, and in this sense, a more nuanced 
understanding of the process seems necessary. This silence begs further examination.  
 
The second silence that emerges in this narrative is related to the role of the state in the 
process. The narrative appears to suggest that the role of the state at various stages in the 
process was relegated either to sporadic and uncoordinated actions of individual functionaries 
in support of the idea of a right to information, or a coordinated and intense resistance to the 
demand for an RTI Act as it gained momentum. In either case, the role of the state in the 
process is not examined or discussed with much sophistication in the narrative. This is 
particularly odd as at any given moment in time, the state in India is subject to a spectacularly 
diverse set of demands being made on it. Why was it that the demand for an RTI Act found 
acceptability and success at the cost of other, more basic and longer-standing demands related 
to food security, education, livelihoods, ownership over natural resources, and land reforms? 
Exploring questions such as these could also bring forth deeper insights into the nature of the 
state, a line of inquiry that cannot be ignored when examining any process that claims to 
substantially alter the citizen-state relationship.  
 
The third silence in the narrative is the striking absence of the international context. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the Indian RTI Act falls squarely within a larger global process that 
has seen a spectacular upsurge in freedom of information legislation across the world. That 
this context is mentioned only cursorily (at best to define the Indian experience as being 
separate, different and unrelated) begs further examination, both in terms of the claimed lack 
of impact of global processes, as well the reasons behind this unexplained silence.  
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In the following chapters of this thesis, I will attempt to fill these silences by examining the 
evidence that lies outside the pale of the dominant narrative reviewed above. In doing so, it is 
hoped that the Bellman’s model of truth-making will be sufficiently problematised, even as 
no other ‘absolute truth’ will be proposed as a substitute to the existing one. Truth, in this 
sense, will hopefully be unshackled from the tyranny of repetition by expanding the 
perspectives that produce it.  
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Chapter 4 
Digging Up the Grassroots 
 
“Truth is like a globe. One person will never get the full perspective.” 
- Former RTI advocate, now social worker who occasionally uses the RTI Act136 
 
In Sanskrit, the word for ‘sound’ is naad. The word possesses connotations of violence, for 
sound can be produced only when a degree of violence, however infinitesimal, is carried out. 
The laws of physics bear out this philosophical insight. Even the ‘sound’ of a feather floating 
through air is produced only due to the existence of friction between the two. The equilibrium 
that existed during the state of silence must be violated if any sound is to be produced. 
Violence, in this sense, becomes a necessary prerequisite for silence to be broken.  
 
In Chapter 3, three primary silences were identified in the dominant narrative around the RTI 
Act in India: the nature of the leadership of the ‘movement’, the role of the state in the 
process, and the influence of international forces on the same. If these silences are to be filled 
even partially, then it becomes necessary to cause some degree of violence, which in much 
gentler academic parlance could be termed as ‘problematising’ the dominant narrative. In this 
and the following two chapters, I will attempt to jolt the equilibrium of the dominant 
narrative primarily by prising out elements of the undocumented history of the RTI Act as 
seen through dissenting voices (including both former and existing collaborators of the 
individuals and entities that form the commonly accepted leadership of the RTI movement), 
as well as other individuals, who, while being deeply involved in different ways, are absent 
(either out of disinterest or inability) in the same discursive spaces that have produced the 
narrative of the enactment of the RTI Act. These voices span several social, functional and 
                                                 
136 Interview with FMD382, 1 November 2009.  
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geographical categories, including senior civil servants, Delhi-based intelligentsia, NGO 
workers, officials in international organisations, activists (both rural and urban), academics, 
journalists, and lawyers - all of whom are or were directly related to the enactment process of 
the RTI Act in one way or the other. While most of the names have been changed to codes 
the reasons for which were discussed in Chapter 2, an insightful comment made by a key 
informant helps illustrate the point further. “It takes a lot of guts to oppose powerful people 
like Aruna [Roy] and Nikhil [Dey], especially because nobody doubts their credentials, and 
nobody doubts their sincerity. [But] there are also wounded people in this movement, who 
don’t speak out, people who feel that they played a much larger role than they are being 
acknowledged for.”137 The perspectives of several of these ‘wounded people’ will hopefully 
enrich this thesis significantly.  
 
This exercise of bringing forth alternate voices to the dominant narrative will perform two 
functions. First, it will provide greater dimensionality to the flattened mainstream narrative of 
the history of the RTI Act and therefore prevent this research from merely reasserting a 
largely self-reinforcing discourse. Second, it will allow this research to engage with larger 
analytical frameworks of truth-making, their relationship to power structures, and their 
implications on processes of social change in a democratic context. Throughout this chapter 
(and the following ones), I will lay emphasis on ‘process’ as a central organising principle. 
This will provide structural continuity and coherence with respect to the claims made by the 
dominant narrative as well as the silences embedded therein, as highlighted in Chapter 3.  
 
In this chapter, I will take up the first major silence identified in Chapter 3, viz. the social 
profile of the leadership of the movement for an RTI Act in India as defined in the dominant 
                                                 
137 Interview with YDS558, 13 January 2009. By “oppose”, the respondent does not necessarily mean 
confrontation. S/he is suggesting that truth-making is an inherently political process in which local and 
contextualised power dynamics play a definitive role.  
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narrative, and its relationship with the process leading to the passage of the Act. The key 
concerns that emerge, primarily from the testimonies of otherwise silent voices, question the 
centrality of a ‘grassroots’ movement in the process, and in doing so re-examine the claims 
that the process was premised upon a popular demand, and was widespread, inclusive, 
participatory and an emblematic example of the state responding positively to pressures from 
below. This alternate version of events locates its concerns primarily around the social 
background of the established leadership of the movement and critically examines the 
implications this had on the process. Critical voices suggest that the contribution of the 
grassroots has been exaggerated, but this may have been done for strategic reasons. These 
concerns also call into question the implications this has for democratic processes in India. If 
processes that are ostensibly premised on democratic principles reinforce existing social 
hierarchies, then to what extent can successful democratic deepening be claimed by such 
processes?  
 
I realise that any discussion on social background must inevitably lead to an engagement with 
the conceptual categories of ‘class’, ‘elite’, and other related terminology. In the first instance 
however, the chapter will use these terms in a loose and ambiguous fashion, following its 
usage by several respondents. While these definitions could have been articulated more 
precisely at this stage itself, this would have created a tension between the evidence 
(especially in the form of interviews) and the process of analysis of the same. The chapter 
will therefore take an inductive approach and engage with relevant theoretical approaches 
after revisiting the process through dissonant perspectives. It will propose the usage of a 
specific definition of the social class of the leadership, and examine its implications in the 
production and consumption of the demand for an RTI Act. The chapter will then widen the 
discussion to question the nature of political action seeking social change, and propose that 
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the experience of the RTI Act propels us to redefine the categorisation of civil and political 
societies by focusing on the nature of the demands being made, rather than on the process and 
composition of political events.  
 
The ‘Grassroots’ in the Process 
 
The established narrative of the RTI Act in India consistently invokes the centrality of the 
contribution of the Rajasthan-based grassroots movement in the process leading to its 
enactment. Sample the following: “The MKSS is a grassroots organisation based in 
Rajasthan’s centrally located Rajsamand district... The MKSS’s interest in the right to 
information arose from its work in the late 1980s and early 1990s on livelihood issues 
(Jenkins and Goetz, 1999: 603-604); “What accounts for the remarkable success of a 
campaign that started barely fifteen years ago in a cluster of villages in rural Rajasthan and 
managed to bring about a major piece of legislation at the national level?” (Baviskar, 2007: 
15); “Perhaps the most critical component of the Indian journey toward operationalizing 
people’s right to information has been the grassroots struggles for transparency” (Singh, 
2006: 24). In other instances, the titles of the articles themselves reinforce a similar idea. 
“People’s Knowledge, People’s Power: Campaign for Citizens’ Right to Information” (Priya, 
1996); “Right to Information: Profile of a Grass Roots Struggle” (Roy, 1996); “Where Does 
All the Money Go? People’s Struggle for Information” (Roy, 1997a); and “Grassroots Anti-
Corruption Initiatives and the Right to Information Movement in India” (Goetz and Jenkins, 
2002) are emblematic examples.  
 
However, the preponderance of this perspective is deeply contested in conversations with the 
“wounded people”. Taking issue with the consistent invocation of the ‘grassroots’ in the 
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process, dissonant voices frequently juxtapose the social profile of the leadership of the RTI 
movement, as represented by the founding members of the NCPRI as well as the leadership 
of the MKSS, against the claimed centrality of the participation of ‘the people’ in the 
process.138 The concerns raised primarily revolve around the fact that the leadership of the 
movement is embedded in a specific elite fraction of the larger social structure, which gave it 
‘natural’ (and unparalleled) access to the necessary resources, tools, knowledge, and spaces 
of influence and power, for it to be able to be as effective as it was.139 The strategies that the 
‘movement’ therefore used belong to the domain of privilege rather than penury. The role of 
‘the people’ or the ‘grassroots’ in the process was at best limited, and has been exaggerated 
for strategic and instrumental reasons. In some cases, this critique goes on to question 
whether there was any ‘movement’ for an RTI Act at all. These ‘alternate’ versions of events 
give rise to a tension between the claim of the RTI movement being a grassroots struggle, and 
the ‘truth’ of it being led by an urban, upper-caste, upper-class leadership that is highly 
networked with the ruling elite. This tension is further extended to the larger concern around 
the nature of the democratic process in India, especially within the discourse of democratic 
deepening, routed through the RTI Act in this context. At the same time, these contestations 
are complex, and a grudging appreciation of the contribution of this leadership does come 
through, although circumscribed by the larger concerns mentioned above.  
 
In distilling the critiques articulated by the dissonant voices, the main theme to emerge 
revolves around the resources that the established leadership possessed prior to the launch of 
the ‘struggle’, and the impact this had on the process. Resources, in this context, include both 
the material as well as the non-material, such as an inherent set of skills and competences, 
                                                 
138 Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey of the MKSS were also founder members of the NCPRI, indicating important 
overlaps between the two. 
139 I will discuss the definitional characteristics of this elite fraction later in the chapter.  
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and the intricately woven networked access the leadership had to the ruling elite. I will take 
up each of these for discussion next.  
 
Material Resources 
 
Local Support Versus the ‘Foreign Hand’: Financing a ‘People’s’ Movement 
 
An issue that arose consistently in the critiques of the mainstream narrative of the RTI 
movement is the resources needed to finance such campaigns.140 The stated position of the 
MKSS on funds and their usage revolves around the two principles of not accepting any 
funds from any institutional sources, foreign or Indian, and providing full-time members (and 
not employees) with only the statutory minimum wage.141 The MKSS also differentiates itself 
from NGOs and other non-state development actors by referring to itself as a “People’s 
Organisation and part of the growing non-party political process in India” (MKSS, 2010: 1). 
The underlying principles of this approach highlight two concerns - first, that any campaign 
for social legislation must be financed by ‘the people’ themselves to ensure complete 
independence, and second, those involved directly in the process must live with the same 
resource constraints as the people they mean to serve. In the context of the NCPRI, the 
approach to funding is similar. Conceived as a membership-based organisation (as the name 
suggests, it is a “campaign”), the NCPRI is funded through individual contributions and also 
does not accept institutional funding. Employees are minimal in number and are paid a wage 
commensurate with similar professional positions in Delhi.  
                                                 
140 Some scholars who have investigated the issue of the financing of social movements include Jenkins (1983), 
Tarrow (1994) and Tilly and Tarrow (2007), albeit in the larger context of the different types of resources 
required by social movements.  
141 See MKSS (2010: 5-6).  
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Critics acknowledge the importance of these principles and constraints, but also point to a 
discrepancy between these stated principles and the real-world daily practices of the MKSS 
and the NCPRI. One particular discomfort (with special reference to the former) arises from 
the perceived relationship between the MKSS and the Social Work Research Centre (SWRC) 
in Tilonia, Rajasthan. The MKSS-SWRC relationship is a complex and multi-layered one. 
SWRC was set up in Tilonia by Aruna Roy’s husband Bunker Roy in the early 1970s. Aruna 
Roy began her grassroots work after she moved there; Shankar Singh was an employee of 
SWRC prior to forming the MKSS with Dey and Roy; and Dey himself met Singh and Roy at 
SWRC. Although SWRC and the MKSS are physically, institutionally and financially 
separate from each other, material and other support (for example, logistics) does indeed flow 
from the former to the latter. “Resources become a very big impediment. You might say 
MKSS does not have resources, but MKSS derives so much support from [SWRC] Tilonia. If 
a jeep has to bring them to Delhi, and then take them around Delhi, it’s nothing. It may not be 
acknowledged, but even now during the Bhilwara campaign, I personally know that the 
Tilonia network’s resources were being dipped into and developed, because it is a command 
performance and it has to be done. There is a very large invisible subsidising force over there 
which has to be reckoned with, which none of these others have.”142 “We don’t take foreign 
funds will be the constant refrain. You take a Magsaysay Award, you take this indirect 
assistance from [SWRC] Tilonia, where does this money come from?”143  
 
                                                 
142 Interview with JQT839, 16 October 2009. The Bhilwara campaign was organised in early October 2009 by 
the MKSS and the Rozgar Evum Suchna ka Adhikar Abhiyan (Campaign for Right to Work and Information, a 
group with large overlaps with the MKSS). During the campaign, “135 teams of social auditors went to 1,000 
villages in 381 panchayats to find out how NREGA was being implemented” (Civil Society magazine, 
November 2009). By “others”, the respondent means lesser known rural groups with leaders from modest and 
local backgrounds. In his/her taxonomy, these constitute ‘real’ grassroots groups.  
143 Ibid. The Magsaysay Award has a cash component of approximately USD 50,000. Zindabad Trust, set up by 
author Arundhati Roy with her Booker Prize award money, was also pointed out as another source of ‘foreign’ 
funds. A major tranche of funds to the tune of INR 2 million (~USD 40,000) was given by Arundhati Roy to the 
MKSS in 2004 towards the setting up of a “School for Democracy”.  
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SWRC is managed like a typical NGO, with a large part of its operating budget coming from 
foreign donors. Of its 2008-09 annual budget of approximately USD 2.5 million, 54% is from 
foreign sources, almost 40% from “own sources” and just over 6% from the government.144 
The roots of the setting up of SWRC in Tilonia are also highlighted by critics in this context. 
“In 1972, forty-five acres of Government land and an abandoned Tuberculosis Sanatorium 
(consisting of 21 buildings) was leased from the Government at Re.1 a month, to serve as a 
campus.”145 Bunker Roy’s family links with the senior government bureaucracy was central 
to the leasing (though not ownership) of this campus for the purpose of establishing SWRC. 
“That whole huge thing in Rajasthan they’ve got, what are the terms from government? It’s 
like a gift... Because of the connections, Bunker Roy knew whoever it was at that time, and 
he had good ideas, and he [the government official] placed this huge property at his 
[Bunker’s] disposal.”146 Even as Roy has been celebrated as a visionary in the context of 
development, these historical roots of the establishment of SWRC are well-known in the 
‘activist-development circles’ in Delhi and Rajasthan and do come in for criticism.147 “The 
germ itself is patronage.”148 This criticism takes on a sharpness of edge when spoken of in the 
context of the RTI Act, one of the stated claims of which is to reduce government 
arbitrariness, which often manifests itself in the distribution of public goods as largesse. In 
this case however, the ‘arbitrary’ act of ‘patronage’ was not carried out for any private gain, 
but resulted in the creation of a different type of public good. At the same time, social 
                                                 
144 From the SWRC website. http://www.barefootcollege.org/financial_status.asp. Accessed 12 May 2011.  
145 From the SWRC website. http://www.barefootcollege.org. Accessed 12 May 2011. 
146 Interview with NFZ045, 21 October 2009. This assertion is borne out by other sources. “[Bunker Roy] had 
found an old tuberculosis hospital that had been built by the British: a series of one-storey buildings with high 
ceilings and shaded verandas at the end of a road just outside Tilonia. The buildings were owned by the 
government and used as warehouses. Roy brought to bear the benefits of his upbringing: he spoke to a friend 
who was now a senior government figure in Delhi who agreed that Roy could rent the warehouses.” From 
“Disrupting poverty: How Barefoot College is empowering women through peer-to-peer learning and 
technology”, Wired magazine, April 2011.  
147 Roy was named one of the 100 most influential people in the world in Time magazine’s issue of 29 April, 
2010.  
148 Interview with CVW435, 30 October 2009. 
126 
 
background played a definitive role in the process, for the offering of such a ‘gift’ would 
have been very difficult without Roy’s connections.  
 
Given this context, the fluidity in the relationship between the MKSS and the SWRC attracts 
sharp criticism, especially given the strong public stand that the MKSS (and the NCPRI) has 
taken on the issue of the source of funds. “When CHRI was taking up RTI, they were trying 
to do a lot of legal advocacy. As I see it, they were qualified to do it because it’s a bunch of 
lawyers. But the way in which they [CHRI] were treated in those meetings [of the NCPRI], it 
was like [they were] outcastes, all because CHRI has foreign funding.”149 At the same time, 
“Tilonia is very foreign funded. The whole thing [is] too murky. How do you identify the 
colour of money, what is foreign and what is domestic? After passing through how many 
conduits does it become domestic?”150 The fact that the MKSS and the NCPRI take 
individual donations from people of all hues, including those working for foreign 
development (or other) organisations was also commented upon to highlight this ambiguity. 
 
Such critiques essentially point to an important legitimising principle within social movement 
politics in India - the lesser is the perceived distance between the sources of funds and ‘the 
people’, the greater is the moral authority and legitimacy that can be claimed by an entity 
located within the ‘movement’ space.151 The MKSS and the NCPRI have consistently sought 
part of their legitimacy within this framework (which has been reaffirmed by the dominant 
narrative), and this is precisely what is being contested by critical voices. In this case, critics 
                                                 
149 Ibid. CHRI refers to the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, “an independent, non-partisan, 
international non-governmental organisation, mandated to ensure the practical realisation of human rights in the 
countries of the Commonwealth” (from the official website of the CHRI, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=29, accessed 20 April 2011). The CHRI has 
been deeply involved with the development and implementation of the RTI Act in India. Details of its role in the 
process are discussed in Chapter 6.  
150 Interview with CVW435, 30 October 2009.  
151 Expectedly, this also means that the closer a ‘movement’ is to this ideal, the lesser the resources it is likely to 
possess - as indirectly pointed out by JQT839 at footnote 142.  
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are not merely referring to the nature or sources of funding itself, but to the disconnect 
between a stated position and the ambiguity in practice, especially given instances of strong 
public positions being taken on this issue. In this version of the ‘truth’ then, greater 
legitimacy - to protest, to represent, and to lead - cannot be claimed if public positions are not 
borne out in practice. Further, this critique is extended to the discourse around the 
‘grassroots’ aspect of the struggle. If raising funds from ‘the people’ is a foundational 
principle of a ‘people’s movement’, then critical voices reject this claim of the dominant 
narrative on this very basis itself.  
 
Whether absolute coherence between public principles and individual action can exist in the 
world of politics and protest remains open to debate. What cannot be denied however is that 
the MKSS and the NCPRI were able to access material and logistical support from a wide 
network of individuals and institutions because of the personal connections of their 
leadership. This took various forms, for example receiving support from public institutions, 
which offered its physical infrastructure (halls, hostels etc.) for the hosting of meetings, 
conventions, workshops and conferences on the RTI.152 For example, Delhi University gave 
permission to the NCPRI to “use the Convocation Hall in the Arts Faculty from Octber [sic] 8 
to 10, 2004 for holding the national convention on the right to information”.153 At the 
symbolic plane, this performs an important function, as the physical location of a gathering 
adds a subtle layer of credibility to an event. A convention held within a university campus 
lends it gravitas that would be absent if the same was to be held, say, in a non-publicly owned 
                                                 
152 Personal networks played a role in the choice and availability of spaces as well. For example, the Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library (NMML) premises in New Delhi was a favourite venue during the term of its 
previous Director, who was known to be close to several individuals in the leadership of the NCPRI and the 
MKSS. Since a change in its Directorship in 2011, no meetings organised by the NCPRI or the MKSS have 
taken place at NMML. This is not to say that there is anything ‘irregular’ about a public institution providing 
support for a public cause. However, which causes it chooses to support and for what reasons can often be traced 
to ‘connections’.  
153 Email message from Dr. Atindra Sen, Registrar, Delhi University to Jean Dreze, then member of the 
Working Group of the NCPRI, dated 17 September, 2004. Copy of message in NCPRI files.  
128 
 
space. At the same time, private spaces were also made available and were utilised. For 
events that required a smaller group to confabulate, private and well-placed individuals 
extended their support in similar forms.154 Such support, either at the institutional or the 
individual level, would typically not have been extended to movements with a humbler 
leadership. However, it is not as if this support was available in such plentiful measures 
throughout the history of the MKSS and the NCPRI. Roy being awarded the Magsaysay 
Award certainly helped in bringing many new and well-connected (in their own right) 
supporters on board. “These are people who move around with others of their kind, and 
derive their social capital from this, from being seen with the right activists. Earlier it was 
Medha ji, then it was Aruna ji. Because it doesn’t take much to do these things, when such 
meetings need to be held, you make available your home or your premises for them.”155 This 
widening of the orbits, which has also been called “alliance-building”, added to the ‘bling’ 
around the RTI.  
 
The Currency of ‘Sacrifice’ 
 
In practically each of the accounts of the ‘grassroots struggle for an RTI Act’, its leaders are 
described in an almost ritualised fashion. Typical examples run along the lines of ‘Aruna 
Roy, who quit the IAS to work at the grassroots’, or ‘Nikhil Dey, a young man who 
abandoned his studies in the USA in search of meaningful rural social activism’. The notion 
of giving up the comfortable, desirable and the predictable for the want and vagaries of rural 
                                                 
154 For example, O.P. Jain’s Sanskriti Foundation. “Established in 1978, Sanskriti Pratishthan is a non-profit 
organization, based in New Delhi, India. Sanskriti perceives its role as that of a catalyst, in revitalizing cultural 
sensitivity in contemporary times.” From http://www.sanskritifoundation.org/about_sanskriti.htm. Accessed 10 
May 2011. Sanskriti Foundation has a sprawling campus on the outskirts of Delhi, where several RTI-related 
meetings organised by the NCPRI/MKSS have been held. Interestingly, A.K. Shiva Kumar, who is Roy’s 
fellow-NAC member and N.C Saxena’s colleague at UNICEF, New Delhi, is on the Board of Directors of the 
Foundation. 
155 Interview with CVW435, 30 October 2009. “Medha ji” refers to Medha Patkar, one of the better-known 
leaders of the Narmada Bachao Andolan.  
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India perhaps seeks to evoke deferential emotions in the consumers of this discourse, adding 
greater legitimacy to the cause and its leadership.156 In public debates, workshops or 
conferences (which typically take place in metropolitan centres) this also serves as an 
important element to assert legitimacy. In some quarters though, this hyphenation between 
the cause and its stated foundations in rural India raises hackles. “MKSS is not interested in 
the larger picture, their whole thing is that spiel about the rural poor. Imagine, you stand up 
and say that “I live in rural India”. It’s not a big deal. It’s your desire, you chose to do it, it’s 
your work. Why should it be such a big thing, wearing it on your sleeve the whole time?”157 
 
It is not as if the leadership (and membership) of the MKSS is unaware of the tensions that lie 
within these conceptual categories of privilege, sacrifice and leadership, and the way these 
are projected in the context of the MKSS. “The world looks at people like us, meaning like 
Aruna and like me, and they feel that these people left everything and did this. But whether it 
may be Shankar, Lal Singh ji, Babu, Ram Singh, Mohan ji, Chunni Bhai, for them if they did 
not earn for a day, what they would eat was a real question...158 For people like us, it may 
even be like an indulgence. If I fall ill, 50 people will come and make some arrangements for 
me. I don’t even need the 3000 rupees [that I earn with the MKSS]... For me, lifestyle is 
important, and how much I spend, that is important... For them earning 3000 is an important 
issue. If they could earn 5-6000, this would make a big difference... People like us are also 
more impressed by the people from the middle or richer class [who ‘give up’], but I feel that 
the real giving to a society, and with such great ease, this has come from a class which has 
                                                 
156 Mahatma Gandhi was of course past master at using this strategy, though he traced its conceptual roots to a 
pronounced sense of personal morality. The public images of two other individuals related to the RTI movement 
have also been produced in similar terms. Sonia Gandhi, who gave up her chance of becoming Prime Minister in 
2004 (and 2009) and Harsh Mander, who ‘quit’ the IAS (although there was a controversy over whether he 
resigned or took voluntary retirement, both of which have very different administrative implications), to work 
for the vulnerable and the marginalised.  
157 Interview with FMD382, 21 November 2009.  
158 All rural members of the MKSS. At any given time, the MKSS has only had around 15 full-time ‘salaried’ 
members.  
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not been recognised. [Perhaps] recognised in terms of ‘the toiling masses have done a lot’, 
but not as individuals.”159 In response, a rural member of the MKSS stated, “We have selfish 
reasons, the struggle is for us. We are not doing a favour to the village, we are fighting for 
ourselves. But the world appreciates people like you because you had no problems [in your 
lives]. The only problem you had was that someone else was unhappy. We are ourselves 
unhappy, so we have to stand up in any case.”160  
 
These diverse articulations around the idea of sacrifice are very complex, even as the process 
they point to is quite peculiar. In this discourse, the act of ‘giving up’ resources and privileges 
at the individual level accords the legitimacy (from both above and below one’s typical social 
orbit) for the same credibility and legitimacy to be sought at the institutional (cause-
orientated) level. In simpler terms, one must have more to begin with, give it up, and only 
then could one possibly seek even more (Hirsch, 1986; Jasper, 1997). This raises a difficult 
conundrum in the context of democratic movements. To what extent can movements be 
democratic if pre-existing resources and privileges of their leadership become essential 
prerequisites for their success, not only in material terms, but also at the symbolic plane? If 
the entry barriers are high, as it appears to be in this particular process, then the cherished 
value of participation is likely to be irreparably compromised. This also points to a rather 
obvious, if (and perhaps therefore) rarely articulated social phenomenon. ‘Downward’ access 
is easier to gain than ‘upward’ access. The former requires ‘giving up’, while the latter 
requires the acquisition of attributes that more often than not takes generations to garner. 
Gravity it seems, appears to have an inescapable effect on movement politics as well. 
 
 
                                                 
159 Interview with Nikhil Dey, 22 February 2009, Devdoongri, Rajasthan.  
160 Interview with Lal Singh, MKSS member, 22 February 2009, Devdoongri, Rajasthan.  
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Non-Material Resources 
 
“It’s all a game of English.” 
 
The critique around resources (arising from the social background) is not relegated only to 
the world of the material. That much of the leadership was from a specific elite fraction also 
meant that they could draw upon other non-material resources, such as an impeccable 
command over English, which is the dominant language of the ruling elite in India, a deep 
understanding of how the state functions, particularly at the higher levels (for example in 
terms of knowing who holds what information) of government, and the self-confidence and 
social skills necessary to interact with and negotiate this landscape. 
 
The “MKSS has been able to elevate [the RTI] to a level of consciousness like no other 
[organisation]. How? Language, English. This is an English-speaking articulate group that 
has spearheaded this struggle with tremendous linkages in places that matter, whether it’s the 
media, whether it’s the government, whether it’s some political elements... Language helps in 
all of that, doors open very easily to certain kinds of people... When I’m talking about the 
media, we’re talking about the English media, we’re not talking about the vernacular. All 
your policy documents, all the preparatory work, it’s all done in English. It calls for a very 
very high ability in the language... Who are the ones who are visible today in any sphere? It’s 
people who have these privileges, of language, of a secure financial base, of connections, of 
knowing how to make the system work for them through these connections. This is the group 
that dominates everywhere. It’s a very very incestuous circle. There is mutual back-slapping. 
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Also the connectivity. Other people are not so connected, or have not used their 
connections.”161  
 
Collaborators who do not belong to the same social background are keenly aware of these 
structures, and the fact that the level and type of participation in such political processes, is at 
least partly defined by this aspect of identity. “We are called upon when there is a need to 
show to the world that there is wide participation, but when the important meetings are held 
in Delhi, we are not the ones who participate. It’s all a game of English.”162 ‘English’, in this 
sense, becomes a catch-all symbol of the divide that exists between the leadership and others 
who are collaborators in the service of a cause. This divide, and its implications on who is 
able to, and allowed to participate in what types of spaces, is premised not upon the usual 
suspects of caste, religion, gender or geography, but social class (as defined by the possession 
of certain specific social skills and competences).163 The political importance of this 
competence, the knowledge of the language of the ruling elite, is well-understood by the 
leadership of the movement. Dey recounted that the elite boarding school that he studied in 
also had a “group [of students] which were Government of India scholars, who were poor but 
very bright...164 But they came there without knowing any English, and were very timid. It 
would take a long time for them to gain confidence in life.”165  
 
In practice, such ‘confidence’ is typically manifested by the possession of highly specialised 
knowledge and a very sophisticated set of skills. These reside almost exclusively within the 
                                                 
161 Interview with JQT839, 16 October 2009. 
162 Interview with GSD167, 30 November 2009. 
163 However, the relationship between social class, caste and knowledge of the English language has been 
recognised, an example of which is the efforts of a dalit community to build “a temple in Banka village in the 
northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh to worship the Goddess of the English language, which they believe will 
help them climb up the social and economic ladder”. BBC News, 15 February 2011. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/world-south-asia-12355740. Accessed 10 August 2011.  
164 ‘Government of India scholars’ in this context means students with a scholarship from the central 
government.  
165 Interview with Nikhil Dey, 22 February 2009, Devdoongri, Rajasthan.  
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same elite fraction. One such manifestation is the possession of a thorough understanding of 
existing laws and the ability to draft a new one. To a large extent, these skills were brought 
on board by Prashant Bhushan, one of the founder members of the NCPRI. Bhushan’s role 
was not just limited to providing the legal input in the process of drafting the Act. He was 
also instrumental in the lobbying efforts that the NCPRI made with the political class.166 
When the bill was to be presented in the Parliament, “I got a call from [Suresh] Pachauri, the 
Minister [of the nodal ministry responsible for presenting the Bill, saying] that we have to 
present this bill in Parliament, so please brief us, tell us what we should say, what 
justification we should give, as he also had to introduce the amendments for the states. So 
Prashant and I went, Prashant as the lawyer, and briefed him in great detail, that what you 
have to do in Parliament.”167 
 
Influencing the Public Discourse 
 
The English-Language ‘National’ Media 
 
English, particularly in the Indian context, is also the language of the national media and 
academia. That the leadership had this tool in its arsenal also meant that it could conduct a 
direct dialogue with both these constituencies - journalists as well as academics - which are 
                                                 
166 His father, Shanti Bhushan, also made an important contribution. The NCPRI leadership wanted the Act to 
be extended to the state governments as well, while ensuring that the national law would not supersede the 
existing state level laws as some state-level activists were quite content with their state-level laws, and did not 
want to lose a law that they already had and were comfortable with. “We got Shanti Bhushan to give an opinion, 
[and he held] that RTI is a residual matter, so it will come under the Centre, so the Centre can legislate on it, but 
many of the subjects on which it is applicable are state subjects, so the State can also legislate at that level.” 
Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi. Shanti Bhushan himself had been the Minister for 
Law and Justice of the Government of India in the post-Emergency Morarji Desai cabinet. He gained fame by 
representing Raj Narain in his case against the State of Uttar Pradesh in the Allahabad High Court, the 
judgement on which rendered Indira Gandhi’s election null and void, eventually leading to the proclamation of 
Emergency in the country in 1975. He is a successful Supreme Court lawyer, representing large corporations in 
the main. He has also been very active in politics, and has been with the Congress (O), Janata, and Bharatiya 
Janata parties at different times in the past decades, apart from being a Member of Parliament in the Rajya 
Sabha between 1977 and 1980. 
167 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi.  
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central to the production of consensus around any idea. Ajit Bhattacharjea, a senior journalist 
and founder-member of the NCPRI, first met Aruna Roy “in some meeting or conference” in 
the early 1990s. “I was then Director of the Press Institute of India, and she suggested that it 
[the struggle in Rajasthan] was not getting enough national media coverage...168 I agreed that 
it was much bigger than a local Rajasthan thing, that it merited national attention. But getting 
national coverage in a situation when most people are rather cynical about such a process, 
especially anything starting from the rural areas and not starting in Delhi, is difficult to 
organise. However, I managed to persuade some interested reporters to come to Beawar... 
Mostly [from] English language dailies... National coverage now really is English, otherwise 
it’s local. It got a certain amount of coverage, not very much. I don’t think editors were very 
impressed. It takes some time for people to accept this as a live possibility... I wrote about it 
quite a bit myself, and tried to project it as a grassroots movement unlike any other such 
[related to RTI] movement ever anywhere... The organisers kept up the pace, and it was 
covered more widely... The idea caught on.”169  
 
The ability of the leadership of the MKSS and the NCPRI to garner the support of the media 
was of tremendous importance in the process. “I think both of them [Roy and Dey] are very 
good at networking, exceptionally good, which includes networking with the media. I don’t 
think they do it for their personal promotion. Of course it’s inevitable that if you’re involved, 
your name will come up, and I don’t think it’s sensible to even fight it too much, but I think 
                                                 
168 “Founded in 1963, the Press Institute of India is an independent, non-profit trust, established to create and 
sustain the high and responsible standards of journalism required by a developing country committed to 
democratic functioning… The Press Institute has long-standing media-related collaborations with organizations 
such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), Press Foundation of Asia and the Ford Foundation… PII has actively supported the ‘Right to 
Information’ campaign’ started by the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan in Rajasthan by bringing out a 
publication called ‘Transparency’. Subsequently its leader, Aruna Roy, won the Ramon Magasaysay [sic] [recte 
Magsaysay] Award, culminating in the enactment of a law on ‘Freedom of Journalism’ [sic] [recte Right to 
Information].” See http://www.pressinstitute.in/profile.html. Accessed 13 May 2011.  
169 Interview with Ajit Bhattacharjea, 27 November 2009, New Delhi.  
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they’ve done it well. That really helped in some senses. It was a very important thing, and if 
MKSS had not come into the RTI movement, this [the networking] would not have happened. 
And it’s difficult to network with the media unless your own credibility is strong. Media is 
very savvy of being used for promotion of personalities, so they will not respond to your 
requests, unless they feel reasonably confident that you are not in it for your own 
publicity.”170 Apart from the media reporting on the movement, the leadership, particularly 
Roy and Dey, were able to regularly access space in national newspapers to describe the work 
of the MKSS in Rajasthan, linking it to larger issues of governance and accountability. The 
media attention was to give a larger-than-life image to both the movement, as well as its 
leadership in opinion-making circles. “If 50 people are shouting, with media, their sound gets 
amplified to 500 voices. It may have been happening in one village in Rajasthan, but because 
it would appear in the national newspapers, an impression gets created that this is a big 
thing.”171 That Aruna Roy received the Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership in 
2000 also gave the movement, associated as it was with her, a great fillip vis-à-vis the media. 
“The Magsaysay helped as it made her known. At the media level it made a difference.”172 
Possibly understanding the implications, Bhattacharjea had supported Roy’s nomination for 
the award. “They write to various people asking for nominations. I promoted her for the 
Magsaysay, and she was very upset... She refuses to project herself. Even when she got it she 
said I will not take it personally, but will take it for the entire group... [The RTI Act is a] 
fantastic achievement of our times, one woman with a small group of people...”173 
 
                                                 
170 Interview with YDS558, 13 January 2009. It could be argued that the media’s interest in Roy and Dey arose 
only after the MKSS and the RTI began to be noticed. Perhaps the best way to understand this process would be 
that a ‘virtuous cycle’ emerged from a combination of articulate, passionate and committed individuals, who 
were advocating an ‘attractive’ cause, and who had the skills and links to gain (and retain) the attention of the 
national media. The reasons behind this cause becoming more attractive to the media than others will be 
discussed in later chapters.  
171 Ibid.  
172 Interview with Ajit Bhattacharjea, 27 November 2009, New Delhi. 
173 Ibid. 
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As echoed in Bhattacharjea’s statement, for all practical purposes the MKSS and its efforts 
for an RTI Act have come to be associated with Roy (and to a lesser extent Dey) in popular 
perception. The familiar spectre of the social background and language again makes its 
reappearance. “Why in all the literature will you only see Aruna and Nikhil’s name? Why 
will you not see Shankar Singh’s name anywhere? Who is the one who did all the grassroots 
mobilisation? Who for 25-30 years has been doing all those street plays, the puppet shows, 
the communication, who’s been handling that? That is at the cutting edge of mobilisation. 
Why is his name not anywhere? He can’t speak that language.”174  
 
Academic Spaces 
 
The leadership of the MKSS and the NCPRI also possessed a formidable command over and 
access to academic language and spaces. Numerous workshops, conventions and seminars 
were held in the period leading to the enactment of the RTI Act, often hosted by universities 
and research institutions (such as the Indian Institute of Public Administration), with senior 
academics participating and lending support to the cause. Some respondents also commented 
upon the class composition of such spaces. “There were these typical middle-class kind of 
processes, of conventions, conferences, workshops, and all that, in which you’re there, you’re 
part of the glitterati, part of the talking clubs, and that probably in that section, which was 
also keen to have [an RTI Act], it created a greater opportunity that this is a good time to 
push it.”175 As detailed earlier in this chapter, academic journals such as the Economic and 
Political Weekly and Seminar also provided substantial space not only to the issue of the RTI 
Act, but also directly to the leadership of the MKSS and the NCPRI to propose and further 
their arguments. However, dissonant voices critiqued academia for having bought into this 
                                                 
174 Interview with JQT839, 16 October 2009. 
175 Interview with WKI942, 1 December 2009.  
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narrative, falling prey to “the glamour that was brought in by Aruna and her group. I have 
definitely travelled to far more places, and spent much more time ‘out there’. But there was 
no glamour attached to my work, the glamour which came with Aruna Roy, Prabhash Joshi, 
Harsh Mander, B.G. Verghese, this lot being associated with a grassroots thing...”176  
 
However, a more subtle explanation for the peculiar consistency in the academic literature 
investigating the RTI story could be that in the larger literature around democratic deepening, 
there has been tremendous excitement around the possibility of ordinary people devising new 
modes of exercising accountability on an errant and wilful state, a rubric within which the 
work of the MKSS and social audits falls very neatly. That the movement was led by urbane, 
accessible, theoretically inclined and supremely (and possibly refreshingly) articulate 
individuals may have made the job of an investigating academic much easier. ‘Translators’, 
in the widest sense of the term, were not needed in examining this project at least. In addition 
(and this is true particularly of Indians who have written on the subject), academics 
themselves have significant social overlaps with the leadership, and focusing even 
tangentially on the subject of power premised on social background in this context could have 
been an uncomfortable, and potentially self-damaging proposition.177 But perhaps more 
substantively, the sheer intellectual pleasure derived from observing (and celebrating) a 
movement where ‘ordinary people’ were challenging existing political structures (for 
example, in the much talked-about dharnas and jan sunwais) may have meant that the focus 
remained on the spectacle and its mechanics, rather than on the play of power underlying the 
process.  
 
                                                 
176 Interview with FMD382, 21 November 2009. B.G. Verghese is another senior English language journalist. 
He was the Editor of The Hindustan Times and The Indian Express newspapers, and was also a winner of the 
Magsaysay Award in 1975. The other names mentioned in this quote were profiled in Chapter 3.  
177 For example, see Chibber (2006).  
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Protest, Privilege and Protection 
 
Even as it is all but absent in the established narrative, many respondents spoke at length 
about the ways in which power is exercised and experienced in processes of claim-making, 
and how social background affects such processes. In particular, respondents focused on the 
certain assured degree of protection the leadership had as a result of their links with the ruling 
elite. “RTI is a movement that puts you straightway in conflict with the local bureaucracy. 
Most people who work at the grassroots level cannot afford that. That same information, if 
you sit and eat with the tehsildar, drink with him, or generally have good relations with him, 
you will get it. If you file an RTI, they will make you go around in circles. And most people 
who genuinely work on the ground know that. Only in very extreme situations must you use 
the language of rights and confrontation. Otherwise you know the right is there, but you don’t 
ever exercise it. You don’t take the litigation route, nor the language of rights, if you have to 
survive in that area. Your team lives there, your people live there. If they catch you and beat 
you up in the middle of the road, Aruna Roy will not come to save you. Why did that guy in 
Jharkhand get bumped off?178 It’s Jharkhand, contractors run the NREGS.179 Don’t you know 
that if you go there and say something and try to do a social audit they’ll come and beat the 
living daylights out of you?”180 Things occasionally did get violent in the context of the work 
that the MKSS carried out at the grassroots in Rajasthan, including dharnas and social audits, 
but no one was ever grievously injured or killed, in part because the leadership belonged to 
an influential class.181 “You gather around you the cream of the media, the bureaucrats, you 
                                                 
178 This is a reference to the killing of Lalit Mehta on the 14th of May 2008 in Daltonganj district, Jharkhand, 
allegedly by the local mafia involved in siphoning government funds. At the time of his killing, Mehta was 
involved in accessing expenditure records related to the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) 
for researchers, including Jean Dreze, for later verification of official records against field data. 
179 NREGS here is a reference to the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, which is often used 
interchangeably with NREGA.  
180 Interview with CVW435, 30 October 2009. 
181 As recounted by Shankar Singh and other MKSS members in several conversations.  
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yourself retain your profile as an ex-bureaucrat, and you move in that team, and nothing 
really happens to you. That’s what the other groups said [about the MKSS], “Have they ever 
been bashed up by the police? Have they ever been locked up in jail? We’ve even been jailed 
for the RTI.””182 The argument was also extended to the efficacy of jan sunwais and the RTI 
Act itself. “Look at the scale of the country. How many MKSSs are you going to require to 
act as watchdogs, and this [the watchdog role] can happen [effectively] only when you have 
strong groups like [the MKSS].”183 Critical voices thus differentiate between ‘real’ grassroots 
work, where local actors must constantly temper and negotiate oppositional processes, 
embedded as they are within a specific social and political geography, and the political 
practices of a protected external elite that raises Cain premised on a discourse of entitlements 
and rights without having to take into consideration local politics and social structures to the 
same degree. 
 
At the same time, local politics is also deeply impacted by which political party is at the helm 
of affairs at the state level, and the relationship the instigating group has with the same. That 
the MKSS had a particularly oppositional relationship with the state government when the 
Bharatiya Janata Party was in power is repeated often, just as there is a clear perception that 
they have a much better working relationship with the government when the Congress is in 
power in the state. “That they have the Chief Minister’s ear in Rajasthan is undeniable... They 
have been clearly anti-BJP, and they have therefore assiduously cultivated the Congress, and 
the Congress has assiduously cultivated them... More or less everyone knows they are 
Congress-wallahs. Congress and its leaders will keep them happy. They choose to interact 
with them, because they are one kind of lobby, and it’s good to keep them in a certain 
                                                 
182 Interview with FMD382, 21 November 2009. 
183 Interview with JQT839, 16 October 2009. 
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humour, and use them as they can. That they have made a contribution to RTI cannot be 
denied, but it [the RTI space] is not their fiefdom.”184  
 
However, the larger point still stands - that the state machinery responds differently to groups 
that are known to be influential (such as through links with the IAS, or for that matter, a well-
known entity such as the MKSS or the Social Work Research Centre in Tilonia). A phone 
call to the right person, or appeal made to the right official, written in English and 
demonstrating a thorough knowledge of the law and administrative procedures, signed by 
‘well-known’ persons, does have an impact on the way the state machinery responds.185 A 
similar appeal by an ‘ordinary’ person, limited by his ‘ordinary’ language and knowledge, 
using an ‘ordinary’ route of communication, will be responded to differently.186 The 
differential nature of the interaction between the state and those contesting it can be extended 
to the strategies and mechanisms championed by the MKSS to hold the state to account, 
especially jan sunwais. When a former Prime Minister attends a public social audit, even if in 
a less accessible rural area, it is unlikely that the state machinery will allow any kind of 
violent disruption to take place.187 
                                                 
184 Interview with CVW435, 30 October 2009. 
185 For example, a letter from the MKSS to C.K. Mathew, Secretary to the Chief Minister, Rajasthan, dated 19 
March 2003, enclosed an “application addressed to the MKSS” sent by a small NGO working in Chittorgarh 
district “on the denial of their right to information” and registration of “false cases against those members of the 
Bhil community who asked for information”. The letter urged Mr. Mathew to “issue directions to the Collector 
to provide the requisite information and ensure that the investigation by the police on the complaints… is fair, 
and no false cases are registered against the tribals”. In response, Mr. Mathew sent a letter on 21 March 2003 to 
the District Collector, Chittorgarh, urging him to “ensure that the desired information is immediately made 
available to the applicants. As regards the alleged false cases, you may kindly look into the matter and send your 
report to the undersigned within a weeks [sic] time”. Letter reference number PS/SCM-I/2003/17773, Chief 
Minister’s Secretariat, Government of Rajasthan.  
186 The same principles operate in the more prosaic context of seeking interviews with high-level government 
officials, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
187 Former Prime Minister V.P. Singh attended the jan sunwai held at Surajpura, Jawaja, District Ajmer, 
Rajasthan, organised by the MKSS on 19 January 1998. This is not to say that all jan sunwais organised by the 
MKSS had such a high-profile participation. However, the presence of eminent individuals on the panel of 
observers was an important aspect of the strategy, both for its stated objective of ensuring neutrality, as well as 
for the perhaps unstated advantages of gaining legitimacy and providing a certain degree of cover against any 
potential violence. However, to be able to successfully solicit the participation of eminent people in such an 
event is again related to the issue of social profile and access. For example, JQT839 recounted that similar 
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The established ‘truth’ that the RTI Act in India was enacted primarily as a result of pressures 
from below in the form of a grassroots movement in Rajasthan is thus nuanced by critics that 
point out that the established leadership of the movement belonged to a highly privileged 
social class with a large reservoir of material and non-material resources to draw from. 
Further, the tools and strategies that were used are available only to those who are privileged 
in the first instance. In doing so, these critical voices bring forth a tension between the 
dominant image of a ‘people’s movement’ in the established narrative, and the reality of both 
the leadership and the strategies it used not quite belonging to the domain of the ‘masses’. 
This tension is acknowledged by the established leadership, and is explained through the 
imperatives of realpolitik - a statement that asserts that ‘this is the way of the world’. “This is 
true the world over... It’s a well known sociological fact that it is the middle, upper middle 
class, which provide leadership to social movements by and large. Medha [Patkar] comes 
from the middle class, Baba Amte, Gandhiji came from the middle class.188 There are rare 
occasions when peasantry starts leading the peasantry. By and large the leadership comes 
from middle classes, because first they have the time, then they have the self-confidence, 
they’ve also got honed-in skills. In fact there could be brilliant people in the movements 
who’ve come from the lower classes, but will never get the breakthroughs. If someone has to 
be called for a meeting with the CIC [Chief Information Commissioner], then X of NGO A, 
or Y in NGO B, might be actually far more brilliant, but they don’t have the social graces to 
be able to... This happens all the time, and in all countries.”189 
                                                                                                                                                        
efforts to hold jan sunwais by a small NGO that works in Uttarakhand were relatively unsuccessful at least in 
part because it was unable to attract a similar level of support from ‘eminent’ individuals.  
188 Medha Patkar is the well-known leader of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), a social movement against 
large dams. Although she does come from the middle-class, her ‘pedigree’ is not quite the same as some of the 
leaders of the RTI movement. Her mother retired as a Post Master, and her father was a social worker. Baba 
Amte was a social worker perhaps best known for his work to rehabilitate leprosy patients. Amte definitely 
came from an elite background. His father was a wealthy landowner and was an official of the British colonial 
government responsible for the administration of his district. However, Amte is not known as the leader of any 
specific ‘social movement’, although he did join the NBA at a later stage.  
189 Interview with YDS558, 25 October 2009. X and Y refer to names of activists who come from a different 
social background, but have been removed for obvious reasons. NGO A and NGO B are two NGOs working in 
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Networks and Access 
 
The Higher Bureaucracy 
 
Apart from the ‘honed-in’ skills that the respondent speaks of above, another consistent 
theme that arose in conversations with respondents was that of the networked access that the 
leadership of the MKSS and the NCPRI had to the ruling elite (linked as it is to their social 
and professional backgrounds), and the impact this had on the process. The links that Shekhar 
Singh had developed with the senior bureaucracy during his time at the IIPA played an 
important role. “I found IIPA to be a wonderful place... [A] great advantage was that it gave 
you a very unique access to the bureaucracy. Even today, half the Chief Information 
Commissioners, Information Commissioners, are trainees of mine whom I taught one thing or 
the other. And that makes a rapport, gives access, and a much better understanding, because 
over the years when you’ve talked to thousands of civil servants, you also get to know some 
things.”190 Such connections played an important role in the process, especially in terms of 
providing critical information to the leadership at appropriate moments. Singh brought other 
former linkages to bear on the process as well. Singh’s time at the Planning Commission also 
brought him in proximity to another bureaucrat who was to later become one of the founding 
members of the NCPRI, S.R. Sankaran.191 As the Secretary to the Ministry of Rural 
Development at that time, Sankaran interacted regularly with senior officials at the Planning 
Commission. Singh also had old links with another figure who played an important role - 
                                                                                                                                                        
Delhi. ‘Social graces’ in this context strongly resonates with Bourdieu’s notion of ‘cultural capital’, which is 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.  
190 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 22 October 2009, New Delhi.  
191 Aruna Roy also credits Sankaran as being one of the few civil servants she had great respect for. “There 
were, however, two people whom she admired as model civil servants. One was S. R. Shankeran [sic] [recte 
Sankaran], a bachelor who was secretary of Rural Development to the Government of India. More than his 
professionalism, it was his courage to speak out and the simplicity of his lifestyle that Aruna admired. He lived 
on a modest budget and donated the rest of his salary to children who needed help with their schooling.” From 
Roy’s profile on the Magsaysay Award website. See http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Biography/Biography 
RoyAru.htm. Accessed 10 June 2011.  
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Harsh Mander - especially during the years leading up to the formation of the NCPRI. 
Mander and Singh knew each other from St. Stephen’s College, Delhi, when Singh taught 
there. In addition, Mander’s father succeeded Singh’s father (albeit not immediately) as the 
Chief Commissioner of the Union Territory of the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Singh, in 
fact, indirectly traces the origins of the formation of the NCPRI to Mander. “Actually this 
story [of the NCPRI] goes a little further back than 1996. I don’t remember the exact years, 
but it was around 1993 or 94. Harsh Mander, who was at that time in the civil service, had 
been transferred to the [Lal Bahadur Shastri National] Academy [of Administration]. He 
wanted to set up a group which we used to laughingly describe as ‘Harsh’s friends and 
admirers’. But essentially he had a wide network of people who thought very well of him - 
some from the civil services, some from the academia, and activists. He wanted to set up a 
group which would in some senses intervene into promoting better governance... This group 
had two or three meetings. The first meeting incidentally was in a village in Andhra Pradesh 
in Chittoor district, because there was one Narendranath and his wife Uma, they had a farm 
there, a genuine farm. They came from a big agricultural family. Many people came... Harsh 
[Mander] was there, N.C. Saxena, Santosh Matthew...192 Aruna and Nikhil were supposed to 
come and then something happened, their train got cancelled or something, and they weren’t 
able to turn up.”193 As the Deputy Director at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of 
                                                 
192 Santosh Mathew was an IAS officer of the Bihar cadre who was on deputation to the LBSNAA at that time.  
193 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi. Gorrepati Narendranath (along with his wife 
Uma Shankari) “had dedicated himself to the cause of People's Movements, the quest for alternatives, especially 
organic farming, promoting biodiversity and organising farm workers for the last 25 years after he resigned his 
comfortable bank job… Though the son of an IAS officer he chose to live the life of an ordinary farmer in his 
village Venkataramapuram (Dist. Chittoor).” Excerpt from Narendranath’s obituary on the website of the 
National Alliance for People’s Movements (NAPM). http://napm-india.org/node/52. Accessed 13 May 2011. 
Aruna Roy is a permanent invitee to the National Convening Team of the NAPM. Harsh Mander wrote another 
obituary of Narendranath who “was in university in Delhi with me, a few years my senior. He joined as an 
officer in the State Bank of Hyderabad, but was restless from the start. He resigned in five years, and initially 
worked for Lokayan in Delhi in 1980, at half his bank salary.” From “What I learnt from Naren”, The Hindu 
newspaper, 29 September 2009. Note the recurrence of the IAS / government service and the ‘sacrifice’ themes 
above. To further illustrate this web of networks, Rajni Kothari (whose links with V.P. Singh and Shekhar Singh 
will be detailed later) was involved in the setting up of Lokayan; and a US-based philanthropic organisation, 
AID India, has provided funds to several prominent NGOs and individuals that are a part of the NAPM, 
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Administration (LBSNAA), Mander was instrumental in organising the ‘Mussoorie Meeting’ 
in 1996 - an event that finds pride of place in almost all existing documentation related to the 
history of the RTI Act in India (as mentioned in Chapter 3).  
 
The Director of the LBSNAA at this time was Naresh Chandra Saxena, who had begun to 
work more closely with what eventually evolved into the NCPRI leadership in the early 
1990s. “It was in 1992-93, when the whole thing had started... I had known [Aruna Roy] and 
Shekhar Singh who were involved with all this. They were not sure how to deal with these 
issues, so I said why don’t you come to Mussoorie - by that time I’d joined as the Director [of 
LBSNAA] - and we’ll discuss all these issues. One of these issues was which information 
should be given [to citizens]. I told her its simple, whatever information you give to MLAs 
and MPs, you give to the common person.”194 This clause, which equated the citizen with her 
elected representative in the context of the RTI Act, is celebrated as an important conceptual 
breakthrough in the drafting process by the NCPRI leadership.195 Saxena also promoted the 
idea through some of his writings. “I wrote a paper on RTI which was published in a journal 
that Smitu Kothari used to edit”.196 Saxena’s support in his capacity as a member of the first 
NAC also played an important role in pushing the RTI Act through.  
 
Apart from Saxena and Mander, Shekhar Singh’s old association with another colleague from 
St. Stephen’s College also played an important, if lesser known role. “My class fellow, a man 
called Pulok Chatterjee, he is an IAS officer, he’s now Secretary to both Manmohan Singh 
                                                                                                                                                        
including Narendranath. Aid India also funded a lecture tour of MKSS leaders to the USA in 2010. See footnote 
196 for further links.  
194 Interview with N.C. Saxena, 15 October 2010, New Delhi. An MLA is a Member of the Legislative 
Assembly, the lower house at the state level.  
195 Both Aruna Roy and Shekhar Singh mention this intervention in rich detail when speaking of the history of 
the RTI Act.  
196 Interview with N.C. Saxena, 15 October 2010, New Delhi. The journal was Lokayan Bulletin. Interestingly, 
Smitu Kothari (who died in 2009) was Rajni Kothari’s son. His brother Ashish Kothari was one of the founders 
of Kalpavriksh, the environmental NGO that Shekhar Singh had helped found during his time at the IIPA.  
145 
 
and Sonia Gandhi. He’s considered to be the most powerful bureaucrat in India today because 
he’s Secretary to both. I know him reasonably well.”197 Access to a person like Chatterjee 
allowed the NCPRI leadership to be privy to the thinking within both the government as well 
as the political leadership at the highest levels, which in turn had a significant impact on the 
formulation of its strategies.  
 
Access to powerful figures also had important ripple effects in the process, especially in 
terms of the perceived power of people who possess such access. This played an important, if 
not an obvious role, especially towards the dénouement of the process leading to the 
enactment of the RTI. “The information system is fantastic in the bureaucracy. Even before I 
went to meet Sonia Gandhi, everyone would get to know that Shekhar is coming to meet 
Sonia Gandhi today. And the moment I’d come and meet her, everyone would know that I’ve 
met her, that I spent 43 minutes with her. It was quite amazing, because I’d have people 
ringing me up whom I hardly knew, and wanted to meet me, so I figured that he’s got to 
know that I’d met Mrs. Gandhi. People therefore assumed that I must be very powerful. 
Because in India to be able to meet Mrs. Gandhi is a big thing, and to be able to spend 45 
minutes with her, not once but 4-5 times, and then Pulok Chatterjee is in attendance... And 
then people also got to know that he’s my class fellow, and they thought that maybe that’s the 
source of my influence.”198  
                                                 
197 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 25 October 2009, New Delhi. A 1974 batch IAS officer of the Uttar Pradesh 
cadre, Pulok Chatterjee’s proximity to the Nehru-Gandhi clan can be traced to his appointment as the District 
Magistrate of Sultanpur in the 1980s, under which the Gandhi ‘family constituency’ Amethi falls. “After stints 
in Rajiv [Gandhi]’s PMO, in the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation and as [Officer on Special Duty] OSD to Sonia 
Gandhi when she was leader of the Opposition, he is now in the PMO - the link between PM Manmohan Singh 
and UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi” (from “Pulok Chatterjee”, Outlook magazine, 23 April 2007). After a stint 
at the World Bank as an Executive Director, Chatterjee has recently been elevated as the Principal Secretary to 
the Prime Minister, and by some accounts, is “India’s second most powerful person” (from The New Indian 
Express newspaper, 22 January 2012). Incidentally, Chatterjee is the brother-in-law of Shekhar Dutt, a retired 
IAS officer of the 1969 batch (Madhya Pradesh cadre), who was formerly the Defence Secretary, and is 
currently the Governor of Chhatisgarh state. 
198 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi. In this context, Singh stated that his access to 
Sonia Gandhi was affected through Aruna Roy.  
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In addition, Aruna Roy’s previous avatar as an IAS officer was commented upon specifically 
and numerously in the context of this ‘connectivity’. Roy and her colleagues had access to the 
higher echelons of the government “because Aruna Roy is an ex-IAS officer, and her batch is 
at the helm of things right now. All the senior officers in any department are all in the 
proximity of her batch. I think that is very crucial. The fraternity is very strong, don’t 
underestimate the fraternity. You don’t have to know everybody, but it helps to know a good 
few. It’s a very well-networked group. And if they had had any say in moving the 
government to a revolutionary legislation, it’s because of their proximity. [But] I doubt if 
they really could have been big mind-changers from scratch.”199  
 
The Political Class 
 
It was not just the understanding of and embedded links with senior civil servants that 
contributed significantly to the process. Access to influential journalists as well as leaders in 
various political parties was negotiated by bringing on board key individuals who could 
mediate such processes. The support of Prabhash Joshi, another senior journalist was enlisted 
early on, and he was to become a founder-member of the NCPRI.200 Roy and Dey often 
recount how Joshi was ‘waylaid’ into observing part of the forty-day Beawar dharna in 1996. 
He returned to Delhi to write what the established leadership considers to be a seminal piece 
on the struggle entitled “Hum janenge, hum jiyenge” (We will know, we will live) in the 
widely read Hindi daily Jansatta. Joshi soon became a mentor for the leadership of the 
                                                 
199 Interview with XPR034, 9 November 2009.  
200 Prabhash Joshi is considered to be a towering figure in Hindi language journalism, although he wrote 
regularly in English language news magazines and newspapers as well. In the 1970s, he met Jayaprakash 
Narayan, who in turn introduced him to Ramnath Goenka, the then owner of the Indian Express group of 
publications. Prior to the declaration of the Emergency in 1975, Joshi edited Prajaniti, the Hindi version of 
Everyman (which was being edited by Ajit Bhattacharjea, another founder-member of the NCPRI). In 1983 he 
became the founder-editor of the Hindi daily Jansatta (owned by the Indian Express Group) until his retirement 
in 1995, and was its editorial advisor until 2008. He passed away in 2009.  
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movement and it was he who encouraged Roy towards dialogue in the political context. “He 
told me, ab rajniti mein utrey ho to samvad to karna padega (Now that you have entered 
politics, you will have to enter into dialogues).”201 Not only was Joshi a very well-respected 
journalist, he also had very high-level links with the political class across party-lines, which 
were used to great effect in the lobbying efforts of the NCPRI and the MKSS. “Prabhash ji 
had a very varied personality. He was not only a journalist. What he wrote was noticed... His 
writing, columns were very widespread... The number of people he influenced was very big... 
Although he had such a wide range of interests, I can’t say he was a consistent supporter...202 
But right to the end, he was very close to Aruna. Every major thing she did, he was involved. 
He knew a fantastic range of people. People of all kinds, academics, MPs, legislators, 
ministers... When the legislation was being pushed, he talked to many key people in various 
parties... He knew people in all the parties... [He was] on good terms with them... He was 
very useful. There was a list of people to be met before the bill was to be debated in 
Parliament, and he was key to meeting various people. He met them himself. This was very 
important, this personal touch he had with varied people. That was his big contribution.”203 
 
In addition, former Prime Minister V.P. Singh played a key role as a mediator between the 
NCPRI group and the government in 2004 (as described in Chapter 3). Although Joshi and 
V.P. Singh knew each other, and this would no doubt have added another layer of credibility 
to the NCPRI / MKSS leadership vis-à-vis V.P. Singh, Shekhar Singh’s stint at the Planning 
Commission meant that he had interacted closely with V.P. Singh earlier. Shekhar Singh’s 
appointment as Adviser to the Planning Commission came primarily as a result of his past 
association with Rajni Kothari, one of India’s best known political scientists, “who was at 
                                                 
201 Interview with Aruna Roy, 4 May 2009, Tilonia, Rajasthan.  
202 For example, he was not in favour of Roy joining the NAC. Interview with Aruna Roy, 4 May 2009, Tilonia, 
Rajasthan.  
203 Interview with Ajit Bhattacharjea, 27 November 2009, New Delhi. 
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various times associated with powerful political figures from Indira Gandhi to Jayaprakash 
Narayan”.204 “Before [the 1989 elections], a small group had been formed in which some of 
us were involved in which there was L.C. Jain, Rajni Kothari, V.P. Singh, [Ramakrishna] 
Hegde, and we used to have occasional meetings and used to talk about the world in general 
and the country and so on and so forth. Then these elections happened, and V.P. Singh 
became the Prime Minister. Rajni Kothari and L.C. Jain were very close to V.P. Singh and 
they caught me also, and took me to the Planning Commission. At that time, V.P. Singh took 
that initiative, [which] was also in their manifesto [to bring in an access to information 
legislation].”205 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure on next page]
                                                 
204 From “Life Is A Telephone Directory”, Outlook Magazine, 10 June 2002. 
205 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi. L.C. Jain received the Magsaysay Award for 
Public Service in 1989 and also served as India’s High Commissioner to South Africa, a political appointment 
made by the I.K. Gujral government in 1997-98. Jain was a very vocal supporter of the MKSS and the NCPRI, 
as well as the RTI. 
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Figure 4.1: Diagrammatic representation of key individuals associated with the NCPRI and the MKSS206 
 
                                                 
206 The names in the figure have been ordered alphabetically within each section, and include the founding members of the MKSS and the NCPRI, as well as collaborators / 
advocates who find pride of place in the dominant narrative. Two names in the figure have not appeared in the thesis so far - Maja Daruwala and Charmaine Rodrigues. Both 
are / were associated with the CHRI, and their roles will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. In addition, while Daruwala, Habibullah and Rodrigues cannot be 
considered to be ‘upper-caste’ within the Hindu tradition, they belong to a similar social milieu as the figure suggests. 
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A Small, Intimate, Dense Network 
 
Thus, if one was to cast even a cursory glance at the leadership of the MKSS and the NCPRI 
(as well as their well-known collaborators and supporters), stark patterns seem to emerge. 
Most of the founding members of the NCPRI and the MKSS have direct links to the higher 
civil service (manifested emblematically through the IAS), either by having been a part of it, 
and/or through birth in a ‘civil service family’.207 The ones that do not, have other kinds of 
high-level government (armed forces, political, judicial) or media lineages. The ‘group’ also 
has a privileged urban background, with an education in elite institutions, both in India and 
abroad.208 All the founding members of the NCPRI belong to upper castes. This homogeneity 
is not only limited to the socio-economic and class-based profiles of the ‘group’ outlined 
above. The personal, social and professional linkages between them are also intricate and 
dense. Ajit Bhattacharjea, Shekhar Singh, Harsh Mander, and Bunker Roy are all alumni of 
St. Stephen’s College. Saxena, Mander, Sankaran and Aruna Roy belonged to the same elite 
government service, the IAS, which is a cadre-oriented service with a high degree of social 
and professional overlaps (in the case of some of these individuals this meant working 
directly with each other). Joshi and Bhattacharjea were close associates through the ‘JP 
movement’. Extending these networks to the larger RTI-related world also reveals impressive 
overlapping orbits. For example, the first Chief Information Commissioner of the 
Government of India (the office is the highest appellate authority at the federal level within 
the framework of the RTI Act 2005) was Wajahat Habibullah, who was a batchmate of Aruna 
Roy in the IAS, as well as an alumnus of St. Stephen’s College, Delhi. Then there are the 
                                                 
207 The importance of being born into such a family is perhaps best expressed by the phrase ‘uska baap IAS hai’, 
which translates into ‘his father is an IAS’. This phrase came up often enough in my conversations, and 
becomes interesting because what is essentially an acronym of a type of civil service is being used almost as an 
honorific title denoting power, prestige and grandeur.  
208 The only exception being Shankar Singh, who incidentally, does not figure as a founder-member of the 
NCPRI, and for that matter does not have a presence on any government bodies. In fact, he is the only ‘outlier’ 
in the larger group, on account of his educational profile as well as his modest, rural, OBC background.  
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acknowledged “friendships” between Ram Jethmalani and Prashant Bhushan209, and between 
Justice P.B. Sawant (who, as Chairperson of the Press Council of India, provided strong 
individual and institutional support to the leadership of the RTI movement) and Ajit 
Bhattacharjea.210 
 
This group also has deep linkages with senior members of the political class. Singh had links 
with V.P. Singh; Bhushan’s father used to be a minister at the federal level; Dey is related to 
at least one well-known national level political leader; and Joshi had legendary access to 
politicians of all hues. Even as several other personal overlaps can be documented, the 
specific social profiles of this ‘group’ allowed it to have a unique understanding of the ways 
in which the government functioned, as well as deep links through their social backgrounds 
to senior government functionaries, legal luminaries, sympathetic politicians, and mainstream 
national media, each of which played a key role in mobilising public opinion on the issue of 
Right to Information.211 Critics are keenly aware of these linkages but grudgingly appreciate 
their importance in the process.212 “They’ve used every platform that one could think of. 
                                                 
209 Shekhar Singh in fact suggested that Jethmalani may have passed the executive order to give out information 
related to his Ministry (as described in Chapter 3) at the instigation of Bhushan. “This is the time we had that 
hotchpotch government, and Ram Jethmalani was the minister for Urban Affairs. Now what inspired him? I 
suspect that it was Prashant Bhushan as he is his friend.” Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New 
Delhi.  
210“There was a meeting at the Press Council. We had a very sympathetic Chairman, Justice Sawant, who is a 
good friend of mine. He organised a big two-day meeting, and very senior politicians came for the first time, 
and made it appear that already something was happening. [The politicians came] because of a certain amount 
of media coverage and a realisation by some of them that something was really happening... And if they backed 
it, it would be helpful to them.” Interview with Ajit Bhattacharjea, 27 November 2009, New Delhi. 
Bhattacharjea, Sawant and Prabhash Joshi were also members of the Nikhil Chakravartty Memorial Foundation. 
Incidentally, Nikhil Chakravartty himself lent strong support to the MKSS. “On April 10, 1996, the highly 
respected journalist Nikhil Chakravarty, or Nikhilda as he was known, travelled from New Delhi to the town of 
Beawar in central Rajasthan to lend his support to an unusual dharna for the people’s right to information.” 
From “The Right to No Secrets” by Nikhil Dey and Aruna Roy. Tehelka Magazine, Vol 6, Issue 39, October 3, 
2009. 
211 As described in the mainstream narrative in Chapter 3.  
212 In interviews conducted with critics, one could discern a strong undercurrent of resentment against the 
established leadership on this issue. Where critics themselves belonged to the privileged elite, this resentment 
arose from a sense of ‘I have connections too, but have not used them. Where I have, I do not claim otherwise’. 
In the case where critics belonged to a lower social class, the source of resentment arose from a feeling of ‘All 
they have done is to use their connections, but have taken all the credit. We are the ones who do the ‘real’ work, 
but are never given the credit’.  
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Bureaucracy, media, activism, political clout... Which is good, otherwise this law would not 
have come in 25 years, in whatever form.”213  
 
Of Inclusion, Participation and a ‘National’ Demand 
 
Apart from the focus on the role of the grassroots in the process (that has been questioned 
above), the dominant narrative also suggests that the demand for such an Act was a national 
one, even as the process was inclusive and participatory. “Besides state and national-level 
meetings and conventions, the Campaign organized yatras (journeys), a caravan of activists, 
ordinary villagers and students travelling from place to place with the RTI message, 
communicated through songs, skits and speeches... The NCPRI built a broad constituency for 
the Act by approaching groups working in different sectors: education, health, maternal and 
child welfare, environment, and holding workshops where they would discuss the issues 
specific to each sector and the particular information needs that were a constraint on effective 
action in that sector” (Baviskar, 2007: 14-15). Part of this strategy of alliance-building was to 
invite groups and individuals working in the social sector in other parts of the country to 
Rajasthan to observe the strategies of the MKSS. However, “some of them returned and said, 
“What’s new, we’ve been doing this for so long, it’s just old wine in new bottles. We’ve been 
talking about unearthing facts, and discovering defalcation cases.” These groups were using 
RTI to a certain extent, but they felt that too much was being made of RTI, in the sense that it 
was held out as this panacea for all ills and problems, which it wasn’t and it isn’t. Because 
finally you need people with these same abilities, the language abilities, an understanding of 
the system, to really take it through. They weren’t inspired to either join, or not join, this so-
called movement. There was an almost kind of resentful feeling towards a group [the MKSS] 
                                                 
213 Interview with FMD382, 21 November 2009.  
153 
 
that was basically doing what they’d been doing all along but had already captured a certain 
space and level of attention in the public.”214  
 
Other experiences counter the idea of inclusiveness that permeates the narrative around 
building a wide alliance and constituency to push for a demand for an RTI Act. “In fact, 
many of these groups consciously didn’t want to be a part of NCPRI, which was surprising. 
[The attempt was] to bring people together, to get things to a critical mass, in any case even if 
you get something passed due to your own influence, ultimately the more people know about 
it, the more it is going to get used. But a lot people didn’t seem to take to [the NCPRI], 
because their whole thing was come to our meeting, adopt our ways, sing our praises, and 
many people did not take to that. Everybody is busy with their own work. Everyone is doing 
work, and everyone’s work has value... One of them [an NCPRI member] said, “You have to 
be very careful, we should screen people whom we will allow [to join the NCPRI]”. First you 
say let’s develop a membership, then you say you will screen, you will make them sign a 
letter. So this is transparency. What transparency and democracy are you talking about if 
you’re going to screen people to join NCPRI? And who are you anyway? What is it that 
makes you call yourself ‘national’? And they were all Delhi people. There were no national 
people.”215 “The idea was to interface with a lot of groups. But none of these groups picked it 
up, no one joined that larger collaboration, the umbrella group. This lot only interacted with 
other small splinter maverick groups who worked on RTI, they would talk only with each 
other, and every time a state passed a law, they would jump up and down and say “We did 
it”. This could have been happening for other reasons too. There was just no 
acknowledgement of that.”216 
                                                 
214 Interview with JQT839, 16 October 2009. 
215 Interview with FMD382, 21 November 2009. Emphasis in expression. 
216 Interview with CVW435, 30 October 2009. These ‘other reasons’ will be examined in later chapters of this 
thesis.  
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The ‘Grassroots’ in the Movement: A Conscious Strategy? 
 
While critics have contested the claim of inclusiveness and participation, the received ‘truth’ 
of the ‘grassroots’ nature of the movement is questioned on matters of scale, geography, type 
of leadership, and level of participation. “It’s very romantic to say that this was a grassroots 
movement, but I think that’s overstated very often because I feel that we didn’t have the sort 
of national or even regional level upheaval that would have affected people in India, in Delhi, 
like a rally of 200,000 people. There was nothing like that. Because even if you look at the 
grassroots component, it was in a small part of one state, and to argue that politicians felt that 
this would become a problem, I don’t think so. I’m not saying that it does not contribute 
anything, but I don’t think that it was either a necessary or a sufficient factor [for the 
enactment of the RTI Act].”217 However, the experience of the MKSS of ‘working at the 
grassroots’, even if at a very small scale, may have played an important role in the larger 
argument for an RTI Act, both in terms of the added legitimacy, as well as the actual content 
of the legislation. “It’s very important that people like Aruna [Roy] got the stature they got, 
because that stature then later on could help the RTI movement. They would not have got 
[this stature if] they did not have the grassroots movement behind them. [In addition,] a 
certain amount of innovativeness came in. When the law was being drafted, keeping in mind 
a person in rural Rajasthan actually did make the Act such that it would facilitate the poor 
person so that he could use it. Because many other countries where the whole movement is 
based amongst lawyers, or journalists or academics, that perspective does not come through, 
and then it becomes a self-satisfying prophecy that poor people won’t use it.”218 
 
                                                 
217 Interview with YDS558, 13 January 2009.  
218 Ibid.  
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Further, the regular invocation of the grassroots experience may indeed have been a part of 
the strategy to strengthen the demand for an RTI Act, and leaders of the movement 
acknowledge its importance. “In India, and it is as it should be, that you may work as much 
as you want to, but unless you have a grassroots linkage, you are not going to get the halo 
that is required. MKSS channelized the energies, and that I think led to a lot of legitimacy. A 
lot of people of the sorts who might not have gotten enthused if it didn’t deal with grassroots 
issues, got enthused because it dealt with grassroots issues. Someone like V.P. Singh for 
example, if you only spoke from an academic or professional perspective, might not have had 
that enthusiasm about the RTI movement as he did.”219  
 
At the same time, a different interpretation of the grassroots mobilisation work of the MKSS 
also exists. “Theirs is a different kind of grassroots work. They had a unique kind of 
organising which was organising campaigns; creating a groundswell of public opinion, in 
which the state also was an actor, and others. You create a groundswell of public opinion, and 
use that groundswell as a pressure, to be able to extract some concessions from the 
government. They followed a different brand of organising without much of grassroots work. 
[They raised] issues that were topical but important at that point of time, like wages during 
drought. Drought has such a large kind of clientele, you can trigger it up, which one would 
call a movement, but it’s somewhere in that grey area where collective self-interest is not 
necessarily a movement. But even very wide, large mobilisations, based on collective self-
interest, are not sustainable without politicisation. I don’t know to what extent they have that 
kind of politicised mass base. But they have a certain dedicated group of people, maybe 500, 
who will put aside others tasks, and will come to the gatherings.”220 
 
                                                 
219 Ibid. Emphasis in expression. As the reader will recall, Ajit Bhattacharjea was also highly impressed by the 
grassroots aspect of the work of the MKSS.  
220 Interview with WKI942, 1 December 2009.  
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Stronger critiques suggest that the centrality of the ‘grassroots’ in the narrative is essentially a 
consciously manufactured myth. “It’s not a demand that came from people. It was a demand 
that was made to look like it was coming out of the people and it was articulated on behalf of 
them. And then came this whole ability to articulate, which was certainly what [these] people 
were able to do. [They are] well-meaning at some level. The problem comes in projecting it 
as something it isn’t. It is not something that has come out of this large people’s movement 
and demand. This ability to, in a way, make a mountain out of a molehill is actually quite 
fascinating. The process is being made out to be something very very widespread, and bottom 
up. I think this has been a fantastic exercise in communication.”221 That the MKSS has 
worked regularly and directly in approximately only 30 villages in Rajasthan appears to bear 
out this concern around scale.  
 
Even as such criticisms surfaced often, a more nuanced understanding of such strategies was 
proposed by another respondent. “You have to keep in mind that most of the people who are 
questioning the existing system and are trying to bring about reform and changes, are facing 
very very serious opposition, both from legitimate sources, and from vested interests. There 
are some groups which are opposing them for genuine reasons of concern, at their methods or 
at the principle itself, whereas there are certain others who are opposing because of either 
political or financial interest. Inherent in that kind of a conflict situation is strategic response 
of exaggeration - in the sense that these small institutions have to exaggerate a particular 
problem or have to take a particularly belligerent line aggressively, sometimes adopt means, 
which by pure standards can be questionable, just to make an impact on much larger systems 
that are opposing them. The vested interest system is as large, if not larger, than the formal 
structures that are functioning legitimately... Therefore, if ultimately public interest is going 
                                                 
221 Interview with JQT839, 16 October 2009. Emphasis in expression. 
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to be served by something which is a little questionable, or there could have been a more 
patient way of dealing with it, or a smoother transitional phase could have been initiated, we 
have to look at that aspect with a little bit of sympathy.”222 
 
Examining such strategies used by the leadership in conjunction with the image of vast 
swathes of humanity pouring into the dusty weather-beaten paths of rural India vociferously 
demanding a right to see government-held records does appear to cause a significant degree 
of rupture to one of the foundational aspects of the established narrative. This disjuncture - 
that a densely networked elite urban group came to represent a publicly proclaimed 
grassroots struggle - is not lost on the rural collaborators of the established leadership. They 
are cognisant of the impact of social class on processes of change, and the differentiation in 
roles between the leadership and the ‘led’. In a conversation held with Shankar Singh, he 
affirmed that this was the larger structural context they worked within. “We all work with it, 
live with it. We all know that this is the truth.” 223 However, he did not have any individual 
conflict with either Roy or Dey, and as far as he was concerned, they were all equals, and 
treated each other as such. At the same time he was cognisant that had Roy and Dey not been 
at the forefront of the movement, it would not have taken on the proportions that it did. The 
MKSS and the NCPRI were able to ratchet up the demand and take it to the national level 
“because they already have such potent seeds of power. They’re not just nobodies who’ve 
become powerful, they are not the Mayawatis of the world. They’re already pedigreed. 
They’ve used that pedigree for a good thing, and I’m glad it happened.”224 
 
                                                 
222 Interview with NXW937, 20 November 2009.  
223 Field notes, 23 February 2009.  
224 Interview with FMD382, 21 November 2009. Mayawati is the leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party, and is 
perhaps the best known dalit leader in the country. Born into a very humble family (her father was a post office 
employee), she rose to become the first dalit woman Chief Minister of any state (Uttar Pradesh) in India in 
1995. Since then, she has been returned to that office on three occasions.  
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The leadership of the RTI movement as defined in the mainstream and established narrative 
of the history of the enactment of the RTI Act thus belongs to a very specific elite fraction of 
urban upper-middle class Indian society. The main characteristics of this fraction are high-
levels of education (not first generation) received in elite liberal cosmopolitan institutions 
both in India and abroad, a family background embedded in the higher ranks of government 
(there is no one from a business family in this group), primarily urban (no landed rural elite 
either, for that matter), with a bias towards a large number of years spent in Delhi, a 
tremendous command and facility with the English language, a left-liberal ideology, and 
intricate social, professional and individual ties with the higher echelons of the civil service, 
judiciary, mainstream media, academia, and some sections of the political class (who 
themselves possess a similar socio-economic profile).225 Layering these characteristics, along 
with the strategies used upon the dominant narrative thus problematises several of its 
foundational elements - that the RTI Act was enacted primarily as a result of pressure 
exercised on the state by a grassroots movement in rural Rajasthan, that the process was an 
inclusive and participatory one, and that the demand for an RTI Act had a widespread, 
national character. This ‘alternative’ narrative summarily rejects these assertions by locating 
the leadership of the movement in a world not only quite distant from the ‘grassroots’ 
periphery, but embedded in the ruling elite at the centre. While gentler versions of the 
critique acknowledge that the grassroots ‘struggle’ may have played an important, if 
exaggerated role in the process, more strident versions reject this altogether, and suggest that 
the grassroots ‘struggle’ has been consciously amplified to take on mythical proportions to 
claim credibility and legitimacy by a precious few - no doubt for the creation of a ‘public 
good’ - but which calls into question the credibility and legitimacy of the larger process itself. 
However, whether or not the process was legitimate and credible, what cannot be denied is 
                                                 
225 In political terms, this could also be loosely stated as being in greater alignment with the ‘Congress scheme 
of things’. This aspect of the ideology came through in all conversations and interviews I held.  
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that the outcome was spectacularly successful, and a strong and popular RTI Act did get 
enacted. It is here that a more difficult question arises. Are elite leadership (whether 
legitimised within a discourse of ‘sacrifice’) and the participation (even if in a produced, 
strategic sense) of the ‘grassroots’ sufficient conditions to ensure the success of any process 
that makes claims on the state? This cannot be said to be true. For example, a significant 
section of the same leadership, using similar strategies, has been lobbying for a national 
legislation on food security for some time now, with little success.226 What other variables 
could have been at play that granted the RTI movement such spectacular and widely 
celebrated success? Perhaps some clues towards answering this question may lie in 
examining the relevant theoretical landscape.  
 
Looking for Anhad Naad in Theory227 
 
While there is no doubt that organised protest and claim-making activities did take place 
during the 1990s and early 2000s in rural Rajasthan, which included the participation of a 
wide cross-section of local residents, that the process was led and mediated by individuals 
who belonged to the urban middle-class is also borne out by facts. Therefore, when Jenkins 
and Goetz state that “the nature and utility of rights are linked to the process by which they 
are obtained, and that the meaning of established democratic concepts can be transformed 
through political practice” (1999: 610, emphasis added), it becomes important to consider the 
impact that the social background of the leadership has on the process. At this juncture 
therefore, it becomes necessary to define the nature of the class that the leadership of the 
                                                 
226 Key actors on this issue include Aruna Roy, N.C. Saxena and Harsh Mander, all of whom are part of the 
second avatar of the NAC during the current term of the UPA government.  
227 ‘Anhad naad’ means the eternal, internal resonance that all beings have with the cosmos. Seeking it in 
‘theory’ is no doubt a difficult task. However, theories often work (or fall) at the plane of resonances, and it is in 
this sense that I am using this metaphor.  
160 
 
movement belongs to, and by extension the political practices it was able to and did use in the 
process.  
 
Making a tentative beginning towards this, what cannot be debated is that the leadership of 
the movement belonged to the middle-class - in that none of them (apart from Shankar Singh) 
belonged either to the working or the landed or the capitalist classes.228 While several 
attempts have been made to define the middle-class in India, ranging from empirical 
approaches such as income levels, consumption patterns, educational levels, participation in 
the formal economy, sectoral composition, to sociological categories such as occupational 
characteristics, caste, and so on, perhaps the definition which resonates the most with this 
research is the one advocated by Satish Deshpande.229 In a paper on middle-class activism in 
Indian cities, John Harriss expands upon this definition, and it is perhaps worth quoting it 
here in full.  
 
“The middle class is the class that articulates the hegemony of the ruling bloc - in 
the senses both of “giving voice to” and of linking or connecting (here especially 
the relations between the ruling bloc and the rest of society); it is the class that is 
most dependent on cultural capital; and it is an increasingly differentiated class - 
its elite fraction specializing in the production of ideologies and its mass fraction 
engaging in “the exemplary consumption of these ideologies, thus investing them 
with social legitimacy.” In this essay I mean to refer (descriptively) to those 
disposing of significant cultural capital - which may consist of particular types of 
identities (in terms of caste, community, or region) and competences 
(educational, linguistic, or other social skills - usually including a facility in 
English) - and who have some property or relatively well paid salaried or 
professional employment, and who are consequently generally somewhat better 
off than the majority of people in Indian society.” (Harriss, 2006: 447) 
 
                                                 
228 Here, my definition of the ‘leadership’ is quite specific - the founder-members of the MKSS and the NCPRI 
(as well as those present in figure 4.1). Shankar Singh and Shekhar Singh should not be confused with each 
other. The former is one of the founding members of the MKSS, the only rural collaborator amongst them, while 
the latter is an academic and one of the founding members of the NCPRI.  
229 For a good review in the context of India, see Sridharan (2004).  
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Juxtaposing the acknowledged leadership of the movement against this definition is an 
instructive exercise. In the first instance, the ‘linking’ function between the ruling bloc and 
the rest of society was indeed performed by the leadership of the MKSS and the NCPRI. In 
practically each act of representing the voice of the rural and the marginalised, whether 
directly in meetings with politicians, parliamentarians, bureaucrats, journalists, legal 
luminaries and academics, or indirectly by articulating their concerns and lobbying for an 
RTI Act through the public media, workshops, seminars, and other spaces for public debate, 
it was this specific leadership that participated - legitimised by and on behalf of the ‘rest of 
society’.230 In the process, was this leadership engaged in ‘articulating the hegemony of the 
ruling bloc’? At this juncture this does not appear to be true as one of the central stated aims 
of the movement was to fundamentally alter the citizen-state relationship through the demand 
for an enabling legislation such as the RTI Act.231 In addition, the more celebrated forms of 
protest and claim-making in the process (such as dharnas and especially jan sunwais), for all 
the criticism above, were also deeply oppositional to existing structures of governance and 
the daily practices of the state. The leadership therefore appears to fall only partially within 
this aspect of Deshpande’s definition of the middle class. While it did indeed perform a 
linking function, it seemingly did so in the ‘upward’ direction, rather than a ‘downward’ one.  
 
That the leadership relied heavily on its ‘cultural capital’ to achieve its goals is perhaps a 
more straightforward proposition. The intense individual, social and professional relations 
that the leadership had not only within itself (which is unsurprising given the large degree of 
homogeneity observed in the family and social backgrounds of this leadership), but also in 
influential spaces within the government, the media, and academia, peopled as they are by 
others of their ilk, has been elaborated in detail earlier in this chapter. Some manifestations of 
                                                 
230 This also brings to the fore another much debated question - to what extent and in what forms can the ‘rest of 
society’ actually speak for itself in spaces of influence. See Spivak (1988) for the classic argument on this issue.  
231 The unquestioned truth of such an assertion will be examined later in the thesis. 
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the constitutive elements of the ‘cultural capital’ that the leadership possessed - such as its 
knowledge of English, its intricate social links with the powerful and the influential, the 
ingrained abilities to network with them, the ease with which it negotiated what would 
otherwise have been considered as daunting spaces and interactions, and the self-confidence 
to be able to do all of the above - point to the embodied (including linguistic) cultural capital 
that the leadership shared inter se as well as with relevant members of the ruling elite.232 In 
terms of institutionalised cultural capital, the educational and professional background (such 
as being alumni of elite educational institutions, or being a part of the IAS) of the leadership 
again points to a shared (and well-formed) habitus with each other as well as the ruling 
elite.233 In this sense then, the leadership falls squarely within Deshpande’s definition of the 
middle class, as many of the actions that were key to the process, as delineated both in 
Chapter 3 as well as above, could not have been carried out had it not possessed this reservoir 
of cultural capital to draw upon.  
 
Given that the established leadership was central to the production and public articulation of 
the demand for an RTI Act, it could also be proposed that it was indeed a part of the ‘elite 
fraction specializing in the production of ideologies’ within the differentiated strata of the 
middle class. The corresponding role of the ‘mass fraction’ in consuming these ideologies 
and providing social legitimacy also appears to hold true in this case, particularly in the role 
that the media played in the process. Mainstream media, especially English-language media, 
with its primary audience and consumers being the urban middle classes, came out in strong 
support of the demand, positioning it as an important tool to fight corruption. The leadership 
and its demands thus gained tremendous social legitimacy amongst the ‘mass fraction’ of the 
middle class through this process, which in turn gave it greater leverage in terms of its 
                                                 
232 After Bourdieu.  
233 The shared cultural capital also extends itself to the social capital of this leadership, especially in terms of the 
‘mutual back-slapping’ and ‘incestuous circles’ referred to earlier in the chapter. 
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negotiations with the government. In part, this process also allowed the dominant narrative to 
be produced, consumed and established within the framework and experience of a grassroots 
struggle. In many ways, this experience also reinforces the fact that political power 
essentially resides with that fraction of the social continuum which can, and does produce 
knowledge.234 
 
Deshpande’s insight into the defining characteristics of the middle class thus appears to 
provide a useful framework for the purposes of this thesis. It suggests that the process leading 
to the enactment of the RTI Act in India was profoundly shaped by an elite fraction of the 
middle class, and the enactment was not merely the result of the government responding to 
pressures from below. However, such an observation by itself does not quite whet the 
intellectual appetite, and at least two obvious questions arise.235 First, if an elite fraction of 
the middle class, defined as it is by its function (‘linking’ and ‘giving voice’), its resources 
(‘cultural capital’) and its specific typology (‘elite’ and not ‘mass’) substantially informs a 
given political process, what are the implications of this, both on the process, and in this case, 
on the larger concerns around democratic deepening? Perhaps the most obvious implication is 
that the range of resources, spaces and actions that are available to and used by an elite 
fraction of the middle class are not the same as those available either to its mass fraction, or 
to lower classes. For example, the ability to access individuals and spaces of influence was 
possible for the elite fraction (which in part makes it the elite fraction) while this is not 
possible for a landless peasant in rural Rajasthan. At the same time, the leadership of the 
movement consistently argued that an RTI Act reduces the arbitrary exercise of power as 
                                                 
234 This resonates well with Bourdieu’s contention that the “theory of knowledge is a dimension of political 
theory because the specifically symbolic power to impose the principles of the construction of reality - in 
particular, social reality - is a major dimension of political power” (Bourdieu, 1977: 165).  
235 Perhaps most importantly, these questions also point to the fact that existing analytical approaches do not 
adequately engage with class analytics as an explanatory framework in the context of social movements 
specifically, and ‘civil society’ generally, particularly in the Indian context. This phenomenon has been 
discussed in detail in Chhibber (2008). 
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exemplified by the phrase “Ya tho jack ho, ya cheque ho...” (Roy and Dey, 2002: 79). The 
phrase means that to achieve anything beyond the usual pale, one must have either 
connections (someone to push you up, much like a vehicle is ‘jacked’ up) or money. 
Although no critique suggests that the latter was used by the leadership of the RTI 
‘movement’,236 that they possessed and used ‘jack’ for pushing for the enactment of the RTI 
Act has been consistently articulated earlier in this chapter. In a profoundly ironical way then, 
the strategies employed by the leadership, by virtue of their belonging to an elite fraction, 
thus appear to strengthen those very structural inequities that the movement purported to 
subvert. A recent unpublished doctoral thesis also speaks of a similar disjuncture in the 
context of transparency activism in Delhi. “Activist campaigns to get transparency and 
accountability legislation passed rely in part on the personal connections to the highest levels 
of government of activists from India’s social elite... Social and cultural capital, space, class 
and gender distinctions emerge as significant factors in the everyday practice of activism, in 
turn reproducing existing social hierarchies in activist organisations” (Webb, 2010a: 3). This 
leads us to another difficult question. Can the use of strategies, spaces and actions available 
exclusively to an elite fraction of society, therefore making the process inherently 
undemocratic, bring in meaningful democratic deepening? Judging by the responses of the 
leadership to this vexed question (as mentioned earlier in this chapter), an awareness of this 
irony exists, even as it is explained by the imperatives of realpolitik and the necessity for 
strategic action. Had these ‘undemocratic’ strategies not been adopted, perhaps an RTI Act 
would not have been enacted at all. To extrapolate from Bourdieu, the ‘rules of the game’ 
have to be first understood (and played with) before they can be broken. The instrumental 
impulse thus appears to have won in the end.  
 
                                                 
236 Although their resource constraints were relatively low, as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
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Second, elites as agents of change is a well-documented social phenomenon. Should the 
‘discovery’ of the involvement of an elite fraction of the middle class in the RTI narrative 
therefore be considered surprising at all? ‘Successful’ social movements, both in India and 
elsewhere, have more often than not been led by middle-class activists, not least because of 
the access they have to sources of power, but also because they possess the resources, tools 
and technologies necessary to be heard and influence processes of social change.237 In this 
sense, Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between civil and political society finds relevance here. 
Chatterjee proposes that the politics of protest and claim-making in the Indian context 
displays two distinct forms. Civil society is populated and managed by the privileged. Its 
members use strategies and actions that exist within the domain of formal institutions and 
legality, and the language of its discourse is premised upon individual rights and 
entitlements.238 Civil society interacts with the state directly, and in turn the state recognises 
it as a legitimate and legal political actor. In terms of outcomes, it does not (and by its very 
nature, it cannot) significantly alter existing social patterns. NGOs, associations, lobby 
groups, all fall within this category. Civil society is thus defined as “those characteristic 
institutions of modern associational life originating in Western societies that are based on 
equality, autonomy, freedom of entry and exit, contract, [and] deliberative procedures of 
decision making” (Chatterjee (1998: 234) quoted in Corbridge et al (2013, forthcoming)). 
Political society on the other hand, is mainly comprised of the poor, the vulnerable and the 
marginalised, exists on the peripheries of legality, is confrontational, needs brokers or 
mediators to represent it to the state, and articulates its demands primarily within the 
framework of group identity (such as caste, slum dwellers et al). It is this group identity that 
gives it its strength, even as it defines the strategies and actions available to it.  
                                                 
237 For specific examples, see Grindle (2007), Harriss (2006) and Chapter 11 in Corbridge et al (2013, 
forthcoming).  
238 In many ways, and with a special reference to legality as a distinction between the two, Chandhoke’s (2003) 
proposition that the contours of civil society are in the end defined and drawn by the state (and therefore cannot 
be seen as existentially oppositional to the state), serves as a precursor to Chatterjee’s framework. 
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The mainstream narrative of the enactment of the RTI Act suggests that the process primarily 
belonged to the latter category. By being in confrontation with the state, by seeking to 
fundamentally alter the citizen-state relationship, and by using ‘popular’ forms of protest, the 
‘grassroots’ waged a political struggle and scored a resounding victory over a recalcitrant 
state. However, the ‘alternate’ narrative above suggests the converse. The centrality of the 
involvement of an elite, the recognition (in fact support, through the NAC) accorded by the 
state to the ‘movement’,239 and the legal nature not only of the process, but also the fact that 
the demand was, after all, for another law - all suggest that the process was as ‘civil’ as it 
could possibly be. To add to the Janus-like nature of this example, we could again argue that 
although the leadership belonged to an elite fraction of the middle class, and thus naturally 
exuded ‘civility’, the strategies it used were premised on its own ascriptive identity based on 
the specificity (and homogeneity) of its social class. In this sense, the leadership displayed a 
characteristic typically associated with political society - that of finding its strength and 
support as a direct consequence of its own form of group identity.240 
 
In the case of the RTI Act, one could continue to point out instances where civil and political 
society leach into each other, and this could lead us to debunk Chatterjee’s thesis and argue, 
as several others have done, that the civil and political society distinction is a false one.241 But 
perhaps a more challenging question would be why this particular movement succeeded, 
regardless of whether it belonged to the realm of civil or political society. Would a similarly 
‘powerful’ group, with the involvement and support of individuals from similar elite 
                                                 
239 For example, through the direct participation of the ‘movement’ in the law-making process, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.  
240 Of course, the benefits of the demand being made in this case - an RTI Act - seemingly do not accrue only to 
this group, as would be expected in the case of demands premised on the accepted notion of identity politics. I 
am commenting here specifically on the fact that it is not as if identity politics do not play a role in ‘civil 
society’; it simply takes on different forms, and exists at a different level of sophistication. In any event, that the 
RTI Act benefits all of society equally will be reexamined later in the thesis.  
241 See Corbridge et al (2005), Jeffrey (2010), and Lemanski and Lama-Rewal (2012) for some critiques.  
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backgrounds, and with the support of some (or even large) sections of the grassroots, be as 
successful in pushing for other, perhaps more contentious demands such as ownership over 
natural resources? We know from other examples, such as the Narmada Bachao Andolan, 
that this may not always be the case.242 Perhaps most damningly, a significant part of the 
leadership of the RTI movement has also been lobbying for progressive legislation on food 
security and land acquisition amongst other issues, with much lower levels of success.243 
How can these differences in levels of success be explained? Do these differences arise from 
the nature of the demand itself? Could it therefore be proposed that the civil and political 
society distinction is best understood when it is limited to the nature of the demand, and not 
by focusing on the process, the composition, or the strategies employed?  
 
A pithy insight from a respondent appears to support this direction of thinking. “This [the 
RTI] is the one Act that [has] captured not just national imagination, but the international 
imagination, because it is of such a wide and general nature, an all-encompassing nature. 
Let’s say that there is some pro-poor legislation vis-à-vis Special Economic Zones, it’s never 
going to capture the imagination of the general public. NREGA is not there in the 
consciousness of the average person who reads the newspapers. The media is not really going 
to chase it the way it has chased RTI.”244 The idea of the RTI then is an inherently ‘civil’ one. 
It resonates deeply with notions of citizenship, of rights-based approaches and entitlements, 
of the accountability of the state, and of democratic deepening. It suggests a picture of an 
accountable, responsive, responsible state - an irresistible image that popular media produces, 
and is eagerly consumed (and supported) by the middle classes. At the same time, the same 
degree of acceptability and celebration has not been accorded to legislations such as the 
NREGA, the proposed Food Security Act, or the laws related to land acquisition by the state. 
                                                 
242 See Baviskar (1995).  
243 These include Jean Dreze, Aruna Roy, Harsh Mander, and N.C. Saxena, in a large part through the NAC.  
244 Interview with JQT839, 16 October 2009. 
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Such concerns, especially in comparison with the RTI Act, have been highly contentious and 
continue to engender acrimonious public debates. In this sense, these could be seen as 
examples of demands that belong to the realm of ‘political’ society. 
 
Thus, we could perhaps approach the civil and political society distinction in a more tenable 
fashion by suggesting that if the nature of a demand seeks to fundamentally alter the location 
of power, influence and privilege, it could be considered to belong to the realm of political 
society, regardless of where and in what form the demand is being made. As a consequence, 
such demands, by definition, would not be acceptable to the ruling elite and would therefore 
be contested vigorously. If however, a demand does not seek to reconfigure the status quo, it 
would be acceptable to many (especially the ruling elite), and therefore any action towards 
realising such a demand belongs to the realm of civil society.245 One could extend this by 
proposing that since civil and political societies cannot be hermetically separate entities, a 
better distinction to use might be civil and political ideas (which may or may not develop into 
demands), rather than societies.246 
 
However, if this theoretical proposition was to be applied to the case of the RTI Act, a 
seemingly intractable conundrum emerges. The RTI Act has been produced and celebrated as 
a seminal piece of legislation primarily because it claims to alter the status quo - by 
recalibrating the citizen-state relationship. And yet it appears to have gained tremendous 
acceptability across the social spectrum, including amongst significant sections of the ruling 
elite. In this case, how can the demand for it belong to both the civil and political realms? 
                                                 
245 In this sense, this ties in with Deshpande’s definition of the elite fraction of the middle class - that it is deeply 
embedded within the ruling elite and is engaged in the production of ideologies.  
246 Returning to an earlier example for purposes of illustration, The Indian Express newspaper supported the 
NAC and its membership in its first stint while its attention was limited to ‘civil’ ideas such as the RTI Act. In 
recent times, as the NAC has begun to deliberate upon more ‘political’ ideas such as land acquisition, it is being 
consistently attacked by the same newspaper, which now questions its legality and legitimacy.  
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Perhaps it is here that a critical clue lies in the development of this research. Could it be that 
the RTI Act is not as radical, and as questioning of existing power structures as is being 
claimed? If an idea is accepted (and in some ways even celebrated) by the ruling elite, can it 
be an existential threat to existing power structures at the same time?  
 
One possible way to examine this mutually exclusive contention would be to take a closer 
look at the changing nature and composition of the state and the ruling elite in India. It is to 
this concern that this thesis will turn in the following chapter, using the second major silence 
identified in the dominant narrative - the role of the state - as its entry point.  
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Chapter 5 
Opening Up the Government 
 
“The days of the so-called mai-baap sarkar are over.”247 
- Hamid Ansari, Vice-President of India 
 
 
“Sonia jiski mummy hai, woh sarkar nikammi hai; 
Manmohan jiska tau hai, woh sarkar bikau hai; 
Anna sabka baap hai, rishwat lena paap hai!” 
 
(Useless is the government whose mother is Sonia Gandhi; 
Up for sale is the government whose uncle is Manmohan Singh; 
Anna (Hazare) is father to all, taking bribes is a sin.)248 
 
Any observer of politics in India has to lock horns with the word sarkar quite expeditiously. 
The word derives from Persian, and can be broken down to sar, which means ‘head’, and kār, 
which means ‘agent’ or ‘doer’. In the days of the Mughal kings, the word meant ‘province’ or 
‘district’. Centuries later, contemporary democratic times have anointed it as the primary 
Hindi word to denote ‘government’. For example, the ‘Government of India’ is known in 
Hindi as ‘Bharat Sarkar’. However, the word sarkar exudes deeply feudal connotations, 
carried over perhaps from the Mughal days. Apart from ‘government’, the word is also used 
in the sense of ‘lord’ or ‘master’, and where greater obsequiousness is required, it may imply 
‘lord and master’. The lead character of a recent eponymous film was a Mumbai-based mafia 
overlord, a paternal figure of admirable (if illegal) morality, dispensing justice quickly and 
                                                 
247 In a lecture on ‘Governance and Public Service’ organised by the Union Public Service Commission, New 
Delhi, 3 May 2011. From “Days of So-Called ‘Mai-Baap Sarkar’ are Over: Ansari”, Outlook magazine, 3 May 
2011. Mai-baap literally means ‘mother-father’, and in this instance denotes a paternalistic, intensely controlling 
state.  
248 Slogans from the Anna Hazare-led movement against corruption in Ramlila Maidan, New Delhi, August 
2011. The Hindi word for uncle used in the slogan is tau, the eldest brother of the father, which implies being 
the head of the extended family. Famously, former Deputy Prime Minister and Haryana politician Devi Lal was 
referred to as tau as an honorific.  
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fairly in support of the oppressed and the vulnerable.249 In some ways, the choice of this 
word, sarkar, to denote ‘government’, over perhaps more staid and ‘classical’ alternatives 
such as shasan, prashasan, rajya, and tantra is revealing.250 ‘Government’ then, has been 
reified as an entity that has a deeply paternalistic and feudal relationship with the people it 
governs. The primary responsibility to ‘act’, and thus the strongest agency lies with the 
government, and the citizen is essentially a vassal.  
 
The quotes above also introduce another relational framework into the mix - that of the 
family. The primacy of the family in the structuring of the Indian social fabric is well-
established.251 Within the family structure, authority figures are well-defined, starting with 
the parents, particularly the father, and reaching into the extended family structure. When this 
mode of relationship is extended to the realm of leadership and government then “the ideal 
leader is a kind of benevolent patriarch who acts in a nurturing way so that his followers 
either anticipate his wishes or accept them without questioning... [He is] authoritative but not 
autocratic, sometimes despotic perhaps, but generally benevolent” (Kakar and Kakar, 2007: 
16-17, 21).  
 
When the Vice-President says that the days of mai-baap sarkar are over, he is suggesting that 
imagining such a family-based mode of relationship between the government and the 
                                                 
249 Directed by Ram Gopal Varma, the film Sarkar was released in 2005. Its plot and treatment had 
unmistakable overtones of the classic 1972 film The Godfather.  
250 Of these, shasan and prashasan have been used in the larger context of government, but specifically in the 
sense of ‘administration’. For example, the government of Delhi used to be referred to as Delhi Administration, 
or Dilli Prashasan, when the city was governed directly by the central government. This changed to 
‘Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi’, or Dilli Sarkar once Delhi acquired its legislative 
assembly in 1991. Democratisation, it would appear, brings in a feudal element into the equation. Further, the 
Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is known as the Bharatiya Prashasanik Seva in Hindi. Rajya is the word 
used for ‘state’, but more in the sense of a politico-geographical entity, such as the ‘state of Punjab’. Perhaps the 
most complex of these terms is tantra which could mean ‘system’, or ‘doctrine’, even as it is better known in the 
context of an esoteric Hindu tradition aimed at achieving liberation.  
251 Not to mention the body-politic as well. Dynastic politics continue to be an important concern in the public 
discourse related to politicians.  
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governed is no longer tenable.252 At the same time, the slogans from the Anna Hazare 
agitation appear to reinforce the familial trope within this discourse. On the face of it, these 
two interpretations of a defining characteristic of ‘government’ appear to be mutually 
exclusive. However, a closer reading reveals that the two may not be as contradictory as they 
might seem at first glance. Sonia Gandhi is the mother of the government, not of the 
governed, and Manmohan Singh is the tau of the sarkar, not of the people (and the same 
government is being given a verbal lashing for being incompetent and corrupt).253 Anna 
Hazare meanwhile, is given the mantle of the father figure, much on the lines of the ‘father of 
the nation’, Mahatma Gandhi. Between these two examples (the vice-president’s assertion 
and the slogans) it could be proposed that even as the familial relationship between the 
government and ‘the people’ lies in tatters, a similar relationship between the political class 
and the government appears to be blossoming, and a ‘popular’ non-political leader is anointed 
as the head of the family, in this case, of ‘the people’.  
 
If the nature of society and institutions is to be understood primarily within a framework of 
relationships, these seemingly unrelated utterances raise some significant questions. What is 
the nature of the relationship between the government and the governed in contemporary 
India? Has this relationship changed very dramatically in the recent decades? Further, what is 
the relationship between the political class (including the political executive) and the 
‘government’, and perhaps more importantly, how is each constituted, and has their 
composition also changed?254 Are these changes reflective of the much analysed, much 
desired, and much vaunted processes of ‘democratic deepening’? The lens I will use to 
                                                 
252 In academic terms, it suggests a move from clientelism to citizenship.  
253 This is an interesting contrast to Indira Gandhi, who was has on many an occasion been invoked as ‘Mother 
India’. It would appear that the daughter-in-law has been less successful on the ‘motherhood’ scale, managing to 
bear only the government so far.  
254 It must be noted here that the term ‘state’ has not appeared in the chapter yet. This is not an act of omission. 
There is no comparable word for ‘state’ (in the political, not merely geographical sense) in Hindi, which itself is 
worthy of further enquiry.  
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explore these and other related questions is the second silence identified in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, viz. the role of the state in the process leading to the enactment of the RTI Act in India 
in 2005. By examining in detail the production of this specific legislation, it is hoped that a 
more nuanced understanding of the contemporary state in India itself will be developed. 
 
Data for this chapter have been culled primarily from two sources - interviews with senior 
bureaucrats (serving and retired) typically belonging to the IAS, who have dealt directly with 
the process of the enactment of the RTI Act at different historical points, and the examination 
of vast reams of internal government papers (including archival research) related to the 
enactment of the RTI Act in India. In the case of the former, most names have been changed, 
and have been indicated as such. The reasons for doing so are unsurprising. Most civil 
servants, whether serving or retired, are far more candid when their anonymity is guaranteed. 
To ensure the same, I have only provided pseudonyms and the date of the interview. Any 
other information, such as the designation or name of an associated government department 
that could potentially identify the person has been consciously omitted. Internal government 
papers were accessed by filing applications for information using the RTI Act 2005 itself. 
The concerned nodal department at the central government level was the Department of 
Personnel and Training (DoPT), under the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and 
Pensions.255 
 
                                                 
255 Details of this process were discussed in Chapter 2.  
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The Role of the State256 
 
It is not as if the dominant narrative around the enactment of the RTI Act is completely silent 
on the role of the state in the process. The narrative does acknowledge its role, but almost 
exclusively in negative terms, particularly with reference to the bureaucratic arm of the 
state.257 Typical examples run along the lines of the following: the permanent executive “has 
guarded information through red tape and a classification regime fine-tuned over a period” 
(Niranjan, 2005: 4870); A “factor that fundamentally threatens the process of bringing 
information into the public domain is the authorities’ apparent lack of intent that it should 
prosper” (Roy and Dey, 2002: 89); “Its [the RTI Act’s] many powerful detractors have fought 
a determined game of subterfuge and sabotage to hold onto a regime of exclusive control. 
The passage of this law marks for them a severe setback in the legal battle. This loss was not 
due to any lack of effort.”;258 “Sonia Gandhi together with NAC members who were 
associated with the NCPRI ensured that the RTI was finally presented in parliament to 
become a national law despite the quiet resistance of the bureaucracy” (Baviskar, 2007: 19); 
and perhaps most succinctly, “The law was passed despite the bureaucracy” (Kidambi, 2008: 
21). In effect, the narrative asserts that the enactment of the RTI Act in 2005 is primarily a 
victory of the people over an obdurate state, particularly a bureaucracy loath to cede its 
untrammelled hold over information, and that this experience is an inspiring example of 
successfully bringing “peaceful democratic agitational pressure on the authorities” (Mander 
and Joshi, 1999: 14-15). In addition, the dominant narrative is premised upon the assumption 
                                                 
256 I use the term ‘state’ largely in its classical Weberian sense. It includes the permanent bureaucracy, the 
government (including the political executive) at a given point in time, and the Parliament. Although the 
judiciary no doubt is an important element of the state apparatus, the role of the courts in promoting the ‘right to 
know’ is not dwelt upon in great detail in this chapter as this was discussed in Chapter 3. 
257 The dominant narrative does privilege the role of the political class in the process, though in the specific 
individual actions of Sonia Gandhi as the head of the Congress party and Chairperson of the National Advisory 
Council (NAC), as detailed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
258 From “The Problem” authored by the MKSS Collective in “Speaking Truth to Power: A Symposium on 
People’s Right to Information”, Seminar magazine, Issue 551, July 2005.  
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that the role of the state was primarily reactionary, in that it considered and acted upon 
(essentially by resisting) the proposal of greater transparency only in response to demands 
from the ‘outside’.  
 
Much of this appears to be in the ‘natural order’ of things, and cannot be overtly contested. 
However, several layers of complexity are added to this perspective from other quarters. 
Apart from civil servants who proffer alternate perspectives, government papers also seem to 
suggest that the state played a more complex role in the enactment process than of being 
merely a spoiler. The contestation with the dominant narrative primarily revolves around two 
broad themes. First, it questions the assumption that the impetus that eventually led to the 
enactment of the RTI Act in 2005 came largely from the sphere of activists and citizens’ 
groups. This perspective thus refutes a foundational characteristic of the existing explanatory 
discourse - that of the RTI Act as an example of a reform carried out in response to pressures 
from below. The second point of contestation lies with the assertion of the dominant narrative 
that the role of the government, especially the permanent bureaucracy, was primarily one of 
resistance. Although some accounts from within the government do support this assertion 
(albeit on specific aspects and from specific quarters), others dismiss it, even as a closer 
examination of the evidence brings forth several complexities. For example, was the 
resistance of an all-encompassing nature, rejecting the very idea of freedom of information, 
or were there subtle (and critical) distinctions being made in terms of what could or could not 
be disclosed? Who stood to gain (or lose) from these distinctions? If bureaucratic ‘resistance’ 
did indeed exist, on what counts did the bureaucracy succeed in ‘resisting’, and on what 
others did it fail, and why? To what extent did other political events taking place in the 
country impact the nature of the resistance?  
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In the following section of this chapter, I will take up these two themes for detailed 
discussion in an attempt to examine the nature of the role of the state in the process leading to 
the enactment of the RTI Act in 2005.  
 
Transparency-Related Reforms in Post-Independence India: A Top-Down or a Bottom-
Up Process? 
 
The Early Phase (1947-1989): Some Talk but No Action 
 
In the context of the RTI Act, existing accounts suggest that apart from judicial 
pronouncements (mentioned in Chapter 3), the impetus for enacting a legislation related to 
freedom of information came largely from the environmental movement in the 1980s, and the 
‘people’s movement’ in Rajasthan from 1990 onwards, while the government, particularly 
the bureaucracy, essentially acted in response to pressures from without. However, there is 
other evidence to suggest that sporadic, if unsuccessful, efforts from within different organs 
of the state to increase government transparency had indeed been made in previous decades. 
Such efforts rallied primarily around the need to amend the much reviled Official Secrets Act 
of 1923. A brief chronology of these efforts is provided in the table below.259  
 
                                                 
259 These do not include judicial pronouncements as this chapter concerns itself primarily with the role of the 
permanent bureaucracy, even as these were described in Chapter 3. 
177 
 
Table 5.1:  Key events supporting greater government transparency, 1947-1989 
Date Event Outcome 
5 January 
1966 
First Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) 
set up under the leadership of Morarji Desai.260 
 
February 
1968 
The Deshmukh Study Team submits its report to the 
ARC; Critiques certain clauses within the Official 
Secrets Act (OSA), the Civil Service Conduct 
Rules, as well as the Manual of Office Procedure 
that prevent civil servants from sharing information; 
Recommends “an information policy of providing 
maximum information relevant to a particular 
request rather than the prevailing practice of 
furnishing the minimum possible information, and 
very often less than that” (Srivastava, 2009: 114).  
Recommendation not 
included in the report of 
the ARC.  
1977 Post-Emergency, the Janata Party-led government 
sets up a working group of secretaries to examine 
whether the OSA of 1923 could be modified to 
enable greater dissemination of official information 
to the public. 
Working group concludes 
that there is no need to 
amend the Act as the 
sharing of ‘legitimate’ 
information is not 
impacted by it.  
1980 The Indian Institute of Public Administration 
(IIPA)261 publishes a volume titled Secrecy in 
Government, a collection of papers on the subject in 
different countries across the world, including the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The volume 
was edited by T.N. Chaturvedi, a senior IAS officer 
(and later Governor of Karnataka).262 
 
1981 The IIPA publishes another volume, authored by 
Prof. S.R. Maheshwari, titled Open Government in 
India, perhaps the first publication to address this 
issue in the Indian context in such detail. The OSA, 
its history, and the need to amend it formed a major 
part of the book. 
No changes made to the 
OSA. 
1982 The Press Council of India conducts a series of 
studies on various legal topics including the OSA, 
1923 and forwards its recommendations to the 
Government of India. This includes a study carried 
out by the Indian Law Institute which is highly 
critical of Section 5 of the OSA.263  
No changes made to the 
OSA.  
                                                 
260 A Member of Parliament from the Congress party at that time, Desai went on to become the first non-
Congress party Prime Minister of India in 1977.  
261 The IIPA is the apex government body tasked with conducting training and research on administrative 
reforms. Shekhar Singh had joined the IIPA as faculty in the same year.  
262 In an interview, Chaturvedi recounted that this was a time when “some people found out that there are 
legislations like the right to information. Simultaneously there was talk of an ombudsman. How can they be 
effective, unless there is more information? That’s why I decided that we should have an issue on secrecy in 
government. [Towards this,] we wrote to several embassies, we tried to get whatever information that could be 
collected.” Interview with T.N. Chaturvedi, 23 November 2009, Noida, Uttar Pradesh. 
263 Section 5 of the OSA stated that “if any person having in his possession any document or information which 
has been entrusted to him in confidence by any government official, or which he has obtained as an official, 
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Interestingly, the discourse within which these efforts were located was the constitutional 
guarantees related to freedom of speech and expression, rather than concerns around 
corruption or livelihoods. This is unsurprising as the judicial pronouncements that peppered 
this period were premised on similar lines: “What is not a matter of opinion is the citizen’s 
right to know. Information is not a gift in the bounty of the state. It is in fulfilment of the duty 
which the regime of the day owes to the people. The right to know is an integral, 
indispensable part of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression which is the 
very basis of democratic government. Of what avail is the right to speak if information is 
withheld or suppressed?” (Noorani, 1985: 1416). Yet, despite such lofty exhortations as well 
as the efforts highlighted above, precious little changed in practice. The OSA continued to 
remain unapologetically in place.  
 
The Middle Years (1989-1996): A Push and a Pause 
 
Immediately in the aftermath of the Bofors scandal, a more focused, high-level government 
initiative related to freedom of information came about when a coalition government headed 
by V.P. Singh came to power at the Centre in 1989.264 This was perhaps the first instance 
where the perspective on government transparency was not merely articulated in negative 
terms in relation to the OSA, but in positive terms towards the development of an access to 
information regime, including the introduction of new legislation on the same. In its election 
manifesto, the (later victorious) National Front coalition under the sub-heading “Open 
Government” stated that “The National Front commits itself to full freedom of the media, 
                                                                                                                                                        
communicates it to any person, other than a person to whom he is authorised to communicate it, he shall be 
guilty of an offence… It proceeds further still. Any person who receives such document or information 
“knowing or having reason to believe” that it is being communicated in breach of the Act is also guilty of the 
offence” (Noorani, 1982: 1859). 
264 The Bofors scandal refers to the allegations of kickbacks received by senior Congress party leaders, 
including Rajiv Gandhi, in the purchase of artillery guns by the Indian Army manufactured by the Swedish 
company Bofors AB in the 1980s.  
179 
 
autonomous corporations for television and radio and elimination of practices that lead to 
direct and indirect arm-twisting of the Press. People’s right to information shall be guaranteed 
through Constitutional Provisions” (National Front Party Manifesto, 1989, in Agrawal and 
Aggarwal, 1990: 69).265 Once the National Front government was in place, this was 
elaborated to specifically mention a Freedom of Information Act. “Both the speech of the 
Prime Minister on 3 December 1989 on assuming office and the President’s Address to 
Parliament on 20 December 1989 contained specific policy announcements on open 
government” (Centre for Policy Research, 1990: Foreword). Some months later, in his 
inaugural address to the Twentieth Conference of Ministers of Information and 
Cinematography in New Delhi on 18 April 1990, V.P. Singh proclaimed that “An open 
system of governance is an essential prerequisite for the fullest flowering of democracy. Free 
flow of information from the Government to the people will not only create an enlightened 
and informed public opinion but also render those in authority accountable… In tune with our 
firm commitment for transparent functioning of our Government, we propose to suitably 
amend the Official Secrets Act so that the people have increased access to information”.266  
 
The permanent bureaucracy’s response to this push from the highest echelons of the political 
executive was not overtly adversarial. At the behest of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the 
Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi organised a workshop on “Freedom of Information 
and Official Secrecy” in March 1990. The forty participants in the workshop included 
representatives from academia, political parties, the voluntary sector, autonomous bodies, the 
armed forces, and senior government officials from, amongst others, the Ministries of 
Information and Broadcasting, Personnel (Administrative Reforms), Home Affairs, Law, and 
                                                 
265 As described in Chapter 4, Shekhar Singh had been a part of the network of informal advisors to V.P. Singh, 
and this may indeed have had an impact on the importance being accorded to the right to information in the 
manifesto of the National Front. 
266 “Open Government Through Free Flow of Information”, speech of the Prime Minister, Vishwanath Pratap 
Singh, New Delhi, 18 April 1990.  
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External Affairs.267 In the end, the conclave was largely in favour of greater transparency, 
even as a cautionary note was raised. “Few countries, maybe no more than ten, have as yet 
adopted Freedom of Information Acts and no developing society... The country is embarking 
on an uncharted sea and the issues involved, first, conceptualising freedom of information 
and unravelling its complexities, and then formulating appropriate procedures and structures, 
need to be approached with great care and circumspection” (Centre for Policy Research, 
1990: 3).268 The participants were well aware that no low-income country had introduced an 
access to information law till date, and recommended wide national debate, possibly initiated 
through a discussion paper introduced in the Parliament that could highlight “foreign 
experience and survey the current states of the information regime and then go on to spell out 
the options and proposed amendments” (Centre for Policy Research, 1990: 40).  
 
The Ministry of Home Affairs also constituted an Inter-Ministerial Task Force to develop a 
draft bill on the right to information, which was also tasked inter alia to conduct a survey of 
the ‘foreign experience’.269 “It was a Joint Secretary level committee, only officials [and no 
political figures]. That committee went to a few countries and thereafter it gave its report in 
two volumes. Somehow that report came into my hands, one volume only, and I requested the 
Home Ministry to give me the other volume, and give me the files on which this committee 
was constituted, the recommendations they made, and what was the decision of the Home 
Ministry on those recommendations. They said they have no papers on the subject. I didn’t 
get anything except one volume, in which they only had copies of the legislations which they 
                                                 
267 Interestingly, none of the ‘usual suspects’ that find pride of place within the dominant narrative were a part of 
this workshop. The MKSS would be founded some months later, while the NCPRI was still six years away from 
being formed. Other pioneers like T.N. Chaturvedi however, participated in this workshop.  
268 At this point, only the following fourteen countries had any kind of access to information laws (in 
chronological order) - Sweden, Colombia, Finland, United States, Denmark, Norway, France, Netherlands, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Greece, Austria and Italy. 
269 Efforts to access their report were unsuccessful, not least because the “Ministry of Home Affairs have [sic] 
not been able to trace out even a single copy of the report given by the task force.” Note from Rakesh Malhotra, 
Under Secretary in the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) to Harinder Singh, Joint Secretary, 
Establishment, DoPT, 31 January 2001. File reference 34011/1(s)/97-Estt. B. 
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had collected from other countries.”270 Whether the ‘disappearance’ of the second volume 
was by design or simply a result of poor record management, the familiar trope of the 
political executive being stymied by the bureaucracy reappears here.271 “In conversations 
many years later, [V.P.] Singh revealed that though he had tried to get a suitable act drafted 
and introduced in Parliament, the bureaucracy had frustrated him at every step” (Singh, 2007: 
43). Eventually, V.P. Singh’s abilities to outmanoeuvre the bureaucracy on this issue 
remained untested, as his government did not last long enough. Eleven months after assuming 
power, the National Front government fell in November 1990 when its ally, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party, withdrew its support.  
 
After this initial attempt of the V.P. Singh government, the idea of developing an access to 
information regime lay relatively dormant within government circles for some years.272 
Interestingly, there is an almost complete overlap between these ‘quiet years’ (1990-1995) 
and a stable coalition government which ran its full term at the centre (1991-1996), which 
itself was an anomaly in that period of India’s political history.273 Clearly, access to 
information was not a political priority for this government, although the Congress party 
manifesto for 1991 stated that “Freedom of information is another precious right. The 
                                                 
270 Interview with BHJ644, civil servant, 3 December 2009.  
271 Although the preceding quote seems to suggest that a fair amount of obfuscation takes place within the 
bureaucracy as well.  
272 However, during this period, from 1990 to 1995, there was activity on the civil society front, as detailed in 
Chapter 3. An important development during this period, which is typically glossed over if mentioned at all in 
the dominant narrative, was the drafting and subsequent circulation of what could be termed as the first draft of 
an access to information legislation for India by the Consumer Education and Research Centre (CERC), a 
consumer rights NGO based in Ahmedabad. An analysis of the key clauses of this, as well as other drafts (and 
the implications this has on our understanding of the process), will be taken up for discussion later in this 
chapter. Other evidence about the role of the CERC in the evolution of the RTI Act in India also exists. 
However, the dominant narrative focuses its attention mostly on the MKSS-led activities in Rajasthan during 
this period.  
273 With P.V. Narasimha Rao as the Prime Minister, the minority Congress-led government ran its full term with 
support from the Left parties. This period also saw the launch of the economic liberalisation project in 1991, the 
links of which with the RTI will be explored in this chapter as well as in the following one.  
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Congress will make a law in this behalf”.274 This period of hiatus (within government circles) 
was broken in October 1995 when a workshop on the right to information was held at the Lal 
Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA) in Mussoorie.275 N.C. 
Saxena, who as the Director of LBSNAA had called the meeting, was a serving bureaucrat, as 
was his deputy, Harsh Mander. However, participants included individuals who were not 
government representatives.276 The document, which provides the “preliminary set of 
readings” for the workshop, contains papers by Nikhil Dey, Aruna Roy, Shankar Singh and 
Kavita Srivastava (all associated with the MKSS), Harsh Mander, Shekhar Singh (who was 
then at the IIPA), A. Santhosh Mathew (an IAS officer of the 1985 batch of the Bihar cadre, 
then on deputation to the LBSNAA as faculty), as well as a paper on reforms for the IAS with 
LBSNAA as an institutional author.277 Given the composition of the group, whether this 
workshop should be considered a government initiative or a civil society one is an unresolved 
question.278 What cannot be contested is that the workshop was held under the aegis of a 
weighty government institution, with its active participation. This in itself added significant 
legitimacy to the subsequent production of this event as a key moment in the evolution of the 
RTI Act. 
 
                                                 
274 In fact, it had pledged to legislate on freedom of information within the first two years of forming the 
government! Manifesto, Indian National Congress, 1991. See http://www.congresssandesh.com/manifesto/ 
1991/manifesto91_7.html and http://www.congresssandesh.com/manifesto/1991/manifesto91_13.html. 
Accessed 10 October 2010.  
275 As described in Chapters 3 and 4. This meeting finds pride of place in the dominant narrative as well.  
276 The relationships between the participants in this workshop were examined in detail in the preceding chapter.  
277 See LBSNAA (1995). The paper by LBSNAA in the volume titled “Reforms for the Indian Administrative 
Service” makes a succinct recommendation: “Review the Official Secrets Act, and replace it by a Right to 
Information Act.” Pp. 64.  
278 This also resonated with the discussion in the preceding chapter on the complex and close relationships 
between government institutions and several individuals who form the acknowledged leadership within civil 
society.  
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The ‘High-Growth’ Phase (1996-2005): Legislating on the RTI 
 
Some months later, in June 1996, a new government formed by the United Front coalition 
(with H.D. Deve Gowda as the Prime Minister) was formed. Soon after the new government 
had assumed power, the NCPRI was formed, and “we set up a group to draft the RTI Act, and 
we went and discussed [this draft] with Justice [P.B.] Sawant, who was the head of the Press 
Council of India. They felt that this needed to be supplemented further, so they set up their 
own committee, in which some of us participated as members, and the Press Council draft 
came out.279 Justice Sawant being a former judge of the Supreme Court, boosted it up 
legally.”280 It should be noted that the Press Council of India occupies an important 
institutional space within the extended family of statutory institutions, especially in the 
context of providing the regulatory framework for press freedoms. That it had taken the RTI 
on board meant another layer of state involvement had now been introduced into the 
configuration of forces. The drafting committee set up by the Press Council of India with 
Justice Sawant in the lead finalised its draft bill by the end of September 1996, just under two 
months after the formation of the NCPRI.281  
 
Meanwhile, the new coalition government in its Common Minimum Programme had stated 
its intention to introduce a freedom of information bill in the Parliament.282 It would appear 
that publicly articulated political support for freedom of information had by now become de 
rigeur, at least within the universe of pre-election party manifestos, as well as post-election 
                                                 
279 The Press Council drafting committee included, amongst others, Justice Sawant, Prashant Bhushan and 
Shekhar Singh, of which the latter two were founder-members of the NCPRI.  
280 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi. As discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
Press Council of India had in fact jointly organised a meeting with the MKSS in Jaipur in July 1996 on the RTI. 
Further, Ajit Bhattacharjea, an early journalist supporter of the MKSS (and later founding member of the 
NCPRI) and Justice Sawant were ‘good friends’.  
281 As per a letter dated 23 September 1996 from G.K. Batra, Secretary, Press Council of India, to Shekhar 
Singh, enclosing a copy of the final draft of the bill on the Right to Information. File no. 25/9/96-PCI.  
282 Interestingly, this government also set up the Disinvestment Commission.  
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pledges. Possibly as a response, a statement of “Operative Recommendations” arising from 
the national conference of Chief Secretaries283 held on 29 November 1996 stated that “It is 
necessary to introduce greater transparency and openness in the functioning of Government 
and public bodies. This would cover, for example, movement towards a Right to Information 
Act”.284 Soon after, on 2 January 1997, the Department of Personnel and Training constituted 
a “Working Group on Right to Information and Promotion of Open and Transparent 
Government” with H.D. Shourie, a leading consumer rights activist, as its Chair.  
 
The constitution of the Shourie Committee is a critical inflection point in the process leading 
to the eventual enactment of the RTI Act in 2005 for several reasons. First, with the setting 
up of this Committee, the process took on a momentum of its own, which grew virtually 
uninterrupted until the RTI Act was eventually enacted in 2005. Second, the report of this 
Working Group became the de facto point of embarkation for all subsequent discussions 
within the government on this issue.285 And finally, it is with the constitution of the Shourie 
Committee that significant schisms begin to appear between the dominant narrative and 
government perspectives allowing the exploration of the political dynamic of this apparent 
tussle over the process of truth-making.286 
 
                                                 
283 The Chief Secretary of a state is the head of the bureaucracy at the state government level.  
284 From “Operative Recommendations of the Conference”, National Conference of Chief Secretaries, New 
Delhi, 29 November 1996.  
285 As will be explored later in the chapter, this also meant that the contours of all subsequent discussions were 
in effect defined by the recommendations made in this report, including the proposed draft bill. 
286 As described above, although the years preceding the constitution of the Shourie Committee had seen several 
government initiatives to promote greater transparency and information sharing, none of these had amounted to 
anything concrete, and in that, the dominant narrative can at most be held guilty of omission.  
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The H.D. Shourie Committee287 
 
The attribution of causality in the setting up of this Working Group is contested terrain, and 
provides an example of the tension that exists between the dominant narrative and other 
accounts from within the government. The former suggests that the NCPRI “sent this much 
debated and widely supported bill [drafted by Justice Sawant, along with members of the 
NCPRI] to the Government of India... In response, the Government of India set up a 
committee, known as the Shourie Committee... The Shourie Committee was given the 
responsibility of examining the draft right to information bill and making recommendations 
that would help the government to institutionalise transparency” (Singh, 2011: 56).  
 
However, such claims are rejected by perspectives from within the government. “The issue 
relating to amendment of Official Secrets Act, 1923 has been under consideration in this 
Ministry [of Home Affairs] since 1989. This issue was discussed by the Committee of 
Secretaries at the meeting held on 31.7.1995.”288 Later, the MHA “held a meeting in 
December 1996. There were only officials in that meeting, and it was decided that the 
government should have a transparency act. There, a decision was taken that it should be 
handled by the Ministry of Personnel. The note from the MHA only gave a recommendation 
that let’s have a transparency law. How to go about it was left to DoPT. So it was decided to 
constitute a working group.”289 Within a few days of the conference and this meeting, an 
internal note outlining the contours of this working group was sent from the DoPT to the 
                                                 
287 Although the official name of this group was “Working Group on Right to Information and Promotion of 
Open and Transparent Government”, it came to be better known as the “Shourie Committee”. I have used this 
moniker or “Working Group” interchangeably.  
288 “Draft Cabinet Note for Consideration of the Group of Ministers” dated 26 December 1997. F. No. 
II/21011/49/97-IS (US D.II), Ministry of Home Affairs.  
289 Interview with BHJ644, civil servant, 3 December 2009.  
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Cabinet Secretary.290 The rationale for setting up such a working group was premised on the 
following arguments: 
 
 Endorsement of the conference of Chief Secretaries to “make public services more 
responsive to customers’ needs”; 
 “In the Central Govt., 60% of the civil service is actually engaged in providing basic 
service functions like Postal Services, Telecommunications, Railways, and issue of 
Passports. There is basically no reason as to why these departments should withhold 
information especially when they are not generally dealing with any secret matters”;  
 “Responsive administration would not only require Right to Information, but also lead to 
reduction in corruption”; 
 “This has been emphasised in the manifesto of the UF [United Front] government also”; 
 In India “courts are increasingly disinclined to allow withholding of information on 
matters like tender procedures or harassment by police etc. and are not taking the view 
that merely because a Govt. department claims public interest as a reason for disallowing 
information is no ground for allowing such relief”. 
 There is a “worldwide trend towards more open and transparent govt. where citizens are 
able to get information about all except the most sensitive matters related connected to 
security and defence of the country”; 291 and 
 Brief reviews of transparency mechanisms existing or being introduced in New Zealand, 
Canada, UK, USA and Malaysia, including FoI laws where they existed at that time.  
                                                 
290 Note to T.S.R. Subramaniam, Cabinet Secretary, from Harinder Singh, Joint Secretary (Establishment), 
DoPT, through Additional Secretary, (Administrative Reforms) P.S.A. Sundaram, and Arvind Varma, Secretary 
(Personnel), dated 4 December 1996. File reference No. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt (B). It must be emphasised here that 
this note was written for internal purposes only. At that time, the concerned officials may not have imagined that 
these very files would be open to public scrutiny within a decade. One can therefore assume that this note (and 
others that significantly predate the RTI Act 2005) were written with genuine intent, and not with a ‘response 
bias’ as it were.  
291 Ibid.  
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Further, the final terms of reference of the Working Group did not mention the examination 
of any draft bill, and in addition, did not even require the Working Group to propose a draft 
legislation.292 Evidence from within the government thus suggests that the rationale for 
proposing greater transparency was premised on an ongoing bureaucratic impulse to carry out 
reforms, a push from the political executive, judicial pronouncements and global trends.293  
 
Bringing in the ‘Outside’ Perspective 
 
Although by this time the efforts of the MKSS and the NCPRI were relatively well-known, 
there is no mention of civil society activism or grassroots experiences as significant 
contributing factors. There is also no overt reference to the review of any existing draft bill 
(such as the Press Council draft). “This was essentially an administrative reform for reducing 
the extent of corruption and there was an understandable driving force within the 
government. Nobody from outside had to say anything. It was not something that was forced 
upon us. At the same time these new ideas float in society, government also picks on them, 
that is also true.”294 In this context, even as KLD416 negates the role of any pressure from 
below, he appears to be euphemistically acknowledging the possible influence of other actors 
in the process. This (if indirect) reference to outside influences thus requires further 
examination if the opposing claims of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes are to be 
reconciled in any meaningful way.  
 
                                                 
292 See Annexure III for the terms of reference of the Working Group.  
293 The note also suggests that the argument within the government for developing a freedom of information 
regime was made within the framework of ‘citizens as customers’, rather than rights-bearing individuals who 
have a political relationship with the state. This fits in with the New Public Management thinking which was 
current at that time, a theme to which we will return later in this chapter and the next.  
294 Interview with KLD416, former civil servant. 16 December 2009. 
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The aforementioned internal government note proposed the setting up of an inter-ministerial 
working group on the RTI, which was to include representatives from different ministries of 
the government, as well as “some outsiders like representative of consumer interest group, 
say Shri H.D. Shourie.”295 Including ‘outsiders’ within such committees would allow “views 
from sources external to the system to also come in. That is one way of enriching the content, 
making it acceptable from all sides”.296 The choice of Shourie was made on the basis that “he 
was a great one for public causes, [and was] doing an extraordinary job with Common Cause. 
He had a background of being a civil servant, and he was very much into the life of the 
common man.”297 In response, the Cabinet Secretary suggested that “perhaps one or two 
more non-officials with background / knowledge / experience would be useful. Sri N.N. 
Vohra?”298 The Secretary (Personnel) responded by proposing the inclusion of Justice P.B. 
Sawant in the Working Group, and also suggested that Shourie be made its Chair.299 
However, as “Justice Sawant expressed his inclination to stay out of the Working Group in 
view of his firm ideas on the subject... it is submitted that Shri Soli Sorabjee, eminent lawyer, 
may be considered as a non-official member of the Group apart from Shri Shourie”.300  
                                                 
295 Note to T.S.R. Subramaniam, Cabinet Secretary, from Harinder Singh, Joint Secretary (Establishment), 
DoPT, through Additional Secretary, (Administrative Reforms) P.S.A. Sundaram, and Arvind Varma, Secretary 
(Personnel), dated 4 December 1996. File reference No. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt (B). The choice of an advocate of 
consumer rights to lead this Working Group reiterates the fact that access to information was being imagined 
within a framework of citizens as consumers.  
296 Interview with KLD416, former civil servant. 16 December 2009. 
297 Interview with the then Secretary (Personnel), Arvind Varma, 16 December 2009, New Delhi. H.D. Shourie, 
who died in 2005, was arguably India’s best known advocate for consumer rights. Common Cause was an NGO 
he founded in 1980. One of his children, Arun Shourie, is former Editor of the Indian Express newspaper, as 
well as a former minister in A.B. Vajpayee’s cabinet (1999-2004).  
298 N.N. Vohra was a 1959 batch IAS officer and at that time had retired from the government. He is currently 
the Governor of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.  
299 Clearly, the bureaucracy was aware of Justice Sawant’s involvement in developing a draft FoI bill. By 
extension, and civil servants at that level are usually quite aware of such details, the Secretary would have 
known about the work of the MKSS as well as the NCPRI.  
300 Note from P.S.A. Sundaram, Additional Secretary (Administrative Reforms and Training) to Arvind Varma, 
Secretary (Personnel) dated 26 December 1996. File reference No. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt (B). The Secretary added 
the information that Soli Sorabjee was the Attorney General of India in 1989-90 before ‘putting up’ the file to 
the Cabinet Secretary. This proposal was approved by the Cabinet Secretary. Justice Sawant’s ‘firm ideas’ were 
“that all institutions whether public, private, co-operative etc. whose activities have a bearing on public interest 
have to be included in the RTI Act. The government as well as the bodies which were influencing the 
government decisions were not inclined to include [them] within the definition of the authorities from which the 
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This note thus suggests that the government appeared to be proactively soliciting opinion 
from the ‘outside’. In this context, who (from the vast multitudes on the ‘outside’, including 
those working at the ‘grassroots’), is chosen to serve on such committees and for what 
reasons become critical questions.301 “Usually not much discussion takes place on this issue. 
Take law. You require somebody from the law for such a legislation. There are usually only a 
few names who are making the news. Mr. Soli Sorabjee was very much in the news, he had a 
very good track record. There are persons who are totally open, you can expect that they will 
give you a sound, balanced judgement, without fear or favour, not playing to the gallery.”302 
In the context of the RTI, having on board a ‘balanced’ and acceptable voice was critical as 
“we were breaking new ground, [and] there was understandably a view that we should 
proceed slowly and cautiously. That was the predominant mood.”303 Mr. Sorabjee did indeed 
have a cautious view on the subject. As the then Attorney General of India, he had delivered 
the annual lecture at the Media Foundation in New Delhi on 27 March 1990 on “The Right to 
Know and Official Secrecy”. In this lecture, even as he asserted that the “administrative 
process is surrounded by needless and excessive secrecy, sometimes bordering on the 
farcical”, he also stated that “there can be no unrestricted right to information, [and] secrecy 
cannot be banished altogether… the right to know cannot always be extended to the internal 
deliberations of government… In the memorable words of Lord Reid… “no government 
could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the government machine being 
exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticise without adequate knowledge of the background 
                                                                                                                                                        
information could be accessed… Hence I was not inclined to join the group.” Email message from Justice P.B. 
Sawant, 29 July 2012.  
301 Examining these questions may also provide clues to the peculiarity of the fact that no one associated with 
the NCPRI or the MKSS was at any point considered as a potential member of this Working Group, although 
they were ‘in the news’ as well.  
302 Interview with BHJ644, civil servant, 3 December 2009. 
303 Interview with KLD416, former civil servant. 16 December 2009. The question of ‘acceptability’ is a 
defining element of such a process, and a similar logic may have been at work in the constitution of the National 
Advisory Council in 2004.  
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and perhaps with some axe to grind””.304 It thus appears that even as spaces for ‘outside’ 
perspectives to formally, directly and publicly influence government policy are created, in 
practice these appear to primarily have an instrumental function - that of according greater 
credibility and legitimacy to the government. ‘New ideas’ could thus be ‘new’ only inasmuch 
as they resonated with existing thinking to a significant degree.305 
 
Subsequently, the “Working Group on Right to Information and Promotion of Open and 
Transparent Government” consisting of nine members was set up through an office 
memorandum dated 2 January 1997 with Shourie as the Chair, Sorabjee as the other ‘outside’ 
member, and civil servant representatives from the Ministries (or Department as the case may 
have been) of Information and Broadcasting, Home Affairs, Legal Affairs, Railways, Posts, 
Telecom, and Personnel and Training. The Working Group held six meetings between 10 
January and 25 April 1997306 during which it reviewed the existing FoI regimes in other 
countries, and also examined the Press Council draft bill because “You’ve got to start 
somewhere, and therefore we took the bill drafted by Justice P.B. Sawant as a base and 
started developing it”.307 Although examining the ‘feasibility’ and ‘need’ for legislation on 
freedom of information was central to its terms of reference, at no point did the Working 
Group question the necessity of enacting such a law - by now this was considered to be a sine 
qua non in the context of strengthening democratic polity. Clearly, the acceptability of 
                                                 
304 Indian Express newspaper, 6 May 1990. The reference to Lord Reid is in the context of the decision of the 
House of Lords in 1968 in the case of Conway vs. Rimmer. The applicability of any access to information 
legislation to the internal deliberations of the government is an important question that continues to engender 
intense debate. In the Indian context, this remains an acrimonious point of disagreement (and confrontation) 
between some activists and the government, and will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.  
305 By extension, it could be said that the positions of the MKSS and the NCPRI, at least at this point in time, 
were not within the pale of ‘acceptability’. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next part of this 
chapter.  
306 On 21 April 1997, H.D. Deve Gowda had to make way for I.K. Gujral as the Prime Minister due to 
differences that had cropped up between Gowda and the Congress party on whose support the United Front 
coalition government depended.  
307 Interview with BHJ644, civil servant, 3 December 2009. A “Draft “Freedom of Information Bill, 1997” 
proposed by Shri H.D. Shourie, based on the “Right to Information Bill, 1996,” prepared by Justice P.B. 
Sawant, with a few modifications” was circulated within the Working Group on 16 January 1997, two days 
before the second meeting of the Group. 
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freedom of information as a political necessity had increased manifold in the intervening 
decades when compared to even in “the heyday of the Janata era, its Minister of State for 
Home Affairs, Dhanik Lal Mandal, blandly denied, in the Lok Sabha on August 30, 1978, 
that Indian law prevented legitimate access to official documents” (Noorani, 1982: 1859).  
 
Eventually, the Working Group submitted its report to the government on 21 May 1997 
(including a draft legislation), in which it proposed the enactment of a ‘Freedom of 
Information’ Act and not a ‘Right to Information’ Act as ““right” has connotations which 
might make legislation susceptible to avoidable litigation. Freedom of Information would be 
a broader and a more positive concept”.308 This was argued on the basis that “the right to 
information has already received judicial recognition as part of the fundamental right to free 
speech and expression and the purpose in enacting the Freedom of Information Act is mainly 
to provide a statutory framework for this right. Therefore, in our opinion, the expression 
“freedom of information” fully reflects the spirit and intent in the proposed legislation” 
(Government of India, 1997b: 6).  
 
The submission of the Shourie Committee report marks a watershed in the process that 
eventually led to the enactment of the RTI Act in 2005. From this moment onwards, the 
wheels of the government machinery began to move inexorably towards the eventual 
enactment of the RTI Act in 2005. Albeit punctuated by several changes in government, an 
examination of relevant government files reveal that this period (1997-2005) saw the process 
evolve largely uninterrupted at the bureaucratic as well as political levels. Details of 
important events that punctuated this process are provided in the table below. 
 
                                                 
308 Suggestion by H.D. Shourie from the proceedings of the first meeting of the Working Group held on 10 
January 1997. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt. (B), DoPT, dated 16 January 1997.  
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Table 5.2: Chronology of government-related events culminating in the enactment of the 
RTI Act, 1997-2005309 
 
Date Event 
2 January 1997 Constitution of “Working Group on Right to Information and Promotion 
of Open and Transparent Government” with H.D. Shourie as Chair  
16 January 1997 Approach paper to the Ninth Plan (1997-2002) lays emphasis on bringing 
“institutional changes to bring in transparency in implementation and 
operation of programmes. For this purpose, avoidable barriers to full flow 
of information must be removed.”310 
21 May 1997 Shourie Committee submits report to government 
24 May 1997 Report shared at Chief Ministers’ Conference in New Delhi; Conference 
endorses need for early legislation on FoI by the central government 
3 June 1997 Report sent to all Ministries and Departments of the central government 
for comments and suggestions 
11 June 1997 Report sent to all state governments and union territories for comments 
and suggestions 
29 July 1997 Committee of Secretaries (CoS) meets to discuss DoPT note on FoI bill 
15 August 1997 Prime Minister I.K. Gujral in his Independence Day speech makes a 
statement assuring that FoI bill will be introduced in the Parliament in the 
Winter Session 
21 August 1997 Second meeting of the CoS 
3-4 September 
1997 
“National Workshop on Right to Information” is organised by the National 
Institute of Rural Development (NIRD), Hyderabad. Participants include 
government functionaries, civil society representatives, academics and 
media personnel. Draft FoI bill (the NIRD draft) recommended, which is 
in sync with the Press Council draft rather than the Shourie Committee 
draft.311 
23 September 
1997 
Third meeting of the CoS 
27 September 
1997 
George Fernandes introduces the NIRD draft bill as a private member’s 
bill in the Lok Sabha 
17 October 
1997 
DoPT sends a Cabinet Note to the Cabinet Secretariat incorporating 
suggestions of the CoS, as well as a draft FoI bill, for obtaining the 
Cabinet’s approval to introduce the FoI bill in the Parliament.312 The 
Cabinet Note has concurrence of the Ministry of Law and Justice, as well 
as the Department of Legislative Affairs.  
                                                 
309 Grey bands and bold italic type indicate a change in government.  
310 See Government of India, 1997a: 123.  
311 The differences between these drafts will be taken up for discussion in the next section of this chapter.  
312 A ‘Cabinet Note’ is an essential element in the decision-making process of the Government of India. 
Typically, it is sent by the Ministry that owns the proposal being sent to the Cabinet for its consideration. “The 
decisions taken by the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees are fundamental to the governance of the country. 
Various matters of national and international importance impacting different facets of governance get flagged 
and placed before the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees. The notes for their consideration are, therefore, central 
to policy making and to successful execution of different programmes… The proposals that are placed before 
the Cabinet and Cabinet Committees are often the culmination of a series of steps. These include consultations 
with the stakeholders within the Central Government and outside, consultations with the State Governments, 
inter-ministerial consultations and in many cases, appraisal by designated bodies or financial institutions” 
(Government of India, 2011: 1). 
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20 October 
1997 
Cabinet considers the proposal; Decides to set up a Group of Ministers to 
examine the proposal in detail.  
23 October 
1997 
Group of Ministers (GoM) constituted. The Ministers include Indrajit 
Gupta, Minister of Home Affairs; Janeshwar Mishra, Minister of 
Petroleum and Natural Gas; Murasoli Maran, Minister of Industry; and 
Ramakant Khalap, Minister of State in the Ministry of Law and Justice.  
28 October 
1997 
First meeting of the GoM 
29 November 
1997 
Congress withdraws support to the United Front coalition; I.K. Gujral 
resigns as Prime Minister; President K.R. Narayanan asks Gujral to stay as 
care-taker Prime Minister until fresh elections are held in February-March 
1998.  
17 December 
1997 
Second meeting of the GoM 
5 January 1998 Third meeting of the GoM 
12 February 
1998 
Draft bill finalised by GoM sent to Ministry of Law and Justice for 
concurrence, and subsequent submission to the Cabinet 
1 March 1998 Ninth Five Year Plan document says that the “Enactment of the Right to 
Information Act and making the findings of evaluation studies accessible 
to the public and media are also required to bring about accountability and 
transparency in development administration”( Government of India, 1998: 
198). 
6 March 1998 Ministry of Law gives its concurrence to the draft FoI bill 
19 March 1998 New government of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
sworn in; A.B. Vajpayee is the Prime Minister.  
1 April 1998 Draft Cabinet Note on FoI sent to Prime Minister’s Office 
27 April 1998 New Group of Ministers (GoM) constituted to examine the legislative 
proposal afresh. GoM consists of L.K. Advani, Minister of Home Affairs; 
George Fernandes, Minister of Defence; M. Thambi Durai, Minister of 
Law, Justice and Company Affairs; Sushma Swaraj, Minister of 
Information and Broadcasting; Vasundhara Raje, Minister of State in the 
Ministry of External Affairs; and K.R. Janarthanan, Minister of State in 
the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions.  
14 May 1998 First meeting of the GoM 
25 June 1998 CoS meeting 
10 October 
1998 
Ram Jethmalani, then Minister for Urban Development, orders that all 
files within his Ministry be made public; A few days later, his order is 
quashed through an intervention from the Cabinet Secretary through the 
Prime Minister’s Office.  
18 December 
1998 
Second meeting of the GoM 
17 April 1999 NDA government falls due to withdrawal of support by AIADMK; Fresh 
elections called; Vajpayee stays as care-taker Prime Minister; Ministers 
from AIADMK resign, including M. Thambi Durai and K.R. Janarthanan 
who were in the GoM. 
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19 July 1999 New GoM constituted with Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs; 
Ram Jethmalani, Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs as new 
additions; and Pramod Mahajan, Minister of Information and Broadcasting 
replacing Sushma Swaraj.  
13 October 
1999 
NDA returns to power; Vajpayee returns as Prime Minister.  
29 October 
1999 
New GoM constituted keeping the previous members (some of whose 
portfolios have been changed) while adding Arun Jaitley, Minister for 
Information and Broadcasting to the group.  
22 November 
1999 
First meeting of the GoM  
10 December 
1999 
Composition of GoM revised; Arun Shourie, Minister of State in the 
Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances joins the 
GoM.  
7 January 2000 Second meeting of the GoM 
2 February 2000 Third meeting of the GoM 
8 May 2000 Draft bill and Cabinet Note approved by Ministry of Law, Justice and 
Company Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Prime Minister’s Office for 
placing before the Cabinet towards introduction in the Parliament.  
13 May 2000 Cabinet approves draft bill and its introduction in the Parliament 
25 July 2000 “Freedom of Information Bill 2000” introduced in the Lok Sabha by 
Vasundhara Raje, Minister of State for Personnel, Public Grievances and 
Pensions 
14 September 
2000 
FoI bill referred to the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Home Affairs (PSC-HA); Pranab Mukherji is Chair of the 
Committee.  
23 October 
2000 
First meeting of the PSC-HA 
24 January 2001 Second meeting of the PSC-HA; Includes depositions by Commonwealth 
Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) (Maja Daruwala, Abha S. Joshi, Bimal 
Arora, Deepika Mogilishetty), Dr. Madhav Godbole, Former Secretary, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, A.G. Noorani, Lawyer, and Prof. Manubhai 
Shah of the Consumer Education Research Centre (CERC), Ahmedabad.  
8 February 2001 Third meeting of the PSC-HA; Includes depositions by the MKSS (Kavita 
Srivastava, Nikhil Dey, Prabhash Joshi, Neelabh Mishra, Jharna Jhaveri, 
Anuraj Singh) and Justice P.B. Sawant on behalf of the Press Council of 
India.  
25 June 2001 Fourth meeting of the PSC-HA 
10 July 2001 Fifth meeting of the PSC-HA 
25 July 2001 PSC-HA presents its report to both Houses of Parliament 
3 December 
2002 
Bill taken into consideration clause-by-clause by the Lok Sabha and 
passed by the House. 
16 December 
2002 
Bill passed by the Rajya Sabha 
21 December 
2002 
Tenth Plan document (2002-2007) observes that “The Right to 
Information Act must be enacted expeditiously and implemented in letter 
and in spirit” (Government of India, 2002: 182). 
6 January 2003 Freedom of Information Bill 2002 receives Presidential assent 
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7 January 2003 Freedom of Information Act 2002 published in the Government of India 
Gazette; Date at which it will come into force not defined.  
22 May 2004 New government formed by the UPA; Manmohan Singh is sworn-in as 
Prime Minister 
31 May 2004 NAC constituted to monitor the implementation of the Common Minimum 
Programme of the UPA coalition 
17 July 2004 First meeting of the NAC 
31 July 2004 Second meeting of the NAC 
14 August 2004 Third meeting of the NAC; Recommendations sent to the government 
including a draft RTI bill.  
18 September 
2004 
Press release from the government says that it will “introduce in the 
Winter Session of Parliament a bill to seek amendments to the Right to 
Information Act, based on suggestions put forth by the NAC.”313 
13 December 
2004 
Note sent to the Cabinet by DoPT 
15 December 
2004 
Cabinet Meeting held; Bill approved; Recommends the setting up of a 
GoM 
23 December 
2004 
Bill introduced in the Lok Sabha 
31 December 
2004 
Bill referred to the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee 
on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (PSC-PG) 
5 January 2005 GoM constituted comprising of Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of Defence; 
Sharad Pawar, Minister of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs; Shivraj 
Patil, Minister of Home Affairs; S. Jaipal Reddy, Minister of Information 
and Broadcasting and Minister of Culture; P. Chidambaram, Minister of 
Finance; H.R. Bharadwaj, Minister of Law and Justice; Dayanidhi Maran, 
Minister of Communication and Information Technology; and Suresh 
Pachouri, Minister of State in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances 
and Pensions.  
1 February 2005 First meeting of the PSC-PG 
14 February 
2005 
Second meeting of the PSC-PG; Includes depositions by Aruna Roy, 
Nikhil Dey, Prashant Bhushan, Jean Dreze, Angela Rangad, Harsh 
Mander, Anna Hazare, Prakash Kardaley, Shekhar Singh, Shailesh Gandhi 
(all MKSS/NCPRI); Maja Daruwala, Charmaine Rodrigues, Venkatesh 
Nayak (all CHRI), Jayaprakash Narayan and Shanti Bhushan. 
16 February 
2005 
Third meeting of the PSC-PG 
1 March 2005 Fourth meeting of the PSC-PG 
2 March 2005 Fifth meeting of the PSC-PG 
21 March 2005 PSC-PG submits its report to both houses of the Parliament  
26 April 2005 First meeting of the GoM 
30 April 2005 Second meeting of the GoM 
4 May 2005 Cabinet approves amendments made to Bill based on inputs from the PSC-
PG and the GoM; Includes repeal of FoI Act 2002.  
11 May 2005 Clause-by-clause discussion in the Lok Sabha; Amendments and bill 
passed.  
12 May 2005 Rajya Sabha passes the bill.  
                                                 
313 Press Information Bureau, 18 September 2004. http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=3908. 
Accessed 10 December 2011.  
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15 June 2005 Presidential assent received; RTI Act comes into existence.  
12 October 
2005 
RTI Act comes into force.  
 
 
Analysing the events that took place from 1966 onwards provides revealing insights into the 
process. First, there is clear evidence to suggest that indeed “the thinking in the government 
did not come through any pressure groups... Not a small number [of bureaucrats] obviously 
realised that knowledge is power, and therefore if we share knowledge, we share power, 
which is what we should be all about... A fairly large number of civil servants were 
supportive, and this built up over the years, they began to realise that without sharing info 
you can’t have an inclusive government, and you can’t really stimulate civil society to get 
more active and participate in governance because government in those days virtually had 
become a part of the problem - till 1991... And we found that the OSA 1923 came in the way. 
And this was a holy cow which couldn’t be slain easily.”314 At the same time, the 
bureaucracy was a divided house and significant elements within it did not subscribe to such 
an approach. “And then you had of course the secrecy-wallahs who were dead against all of 
this. [However,] the prime mover continued to be the government.”315  
 
Thus, whether causality is attributed to nudges from the judiciary or from the political 
executive, it is clear that a significant cohort of reformist bureaucrats within the government 
had been proactively pushing the agenda for greater transparency since at least the early 
1990s, if not earlier.316 In this sense, at least some credit could be attributed to the actions of 
                                                 
314 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant, 24 November 2009.  
315 Ibid.  
316 Of course, the mere setting up of committees does not necessarily mean that the bureaucracy specifically or 
the government generally, is in support of a policy proposal. In most cases, these could be seen as the classic 
bureaucratic response to defuse pressure. However, the tone and content of government reports and papers 
pertaining to this period suggest that there was support to the larger idea of government transparency, even as 
the specifics of such a legislation was a contested terrain. These specifics are examined later in the chapter. 
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‘reform champions’ within the government. However, that the dominant narrative does not 
recognise this role is pointed out with some rancour by civil servants. “When I went to an 
Information Commissioners’ conference, one speaker also said that there was this movement 
in Rajasthan... There may have been a movement in Rajasthan, but we went ahead with the 
process independently. You might have seen our files, did you see anywhere that we 
proceeded in response to the movement in Rajasthan? We set up the Shourie Committee after 
all.”317 While this is borne out by documentary evidence (as highlighted above), it is 
interesting to observe that the position of other ‘official’ accounts seems to have shifted over 
the years to align substantially with the dominant narrative. The report of the Department-
Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice 
which had been tasked with examining amendments being proposed to the FoI Act of 2002 
proposes that the “campaign started by some prominent social groups like Mazdoor Kisan 
Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and the National Campaign for the People’s Right to Information, 
took concrete shape when in January, 1997 the Government set up a Working Group on 
“Right to Information and Transparency” under the chairmanship of Shri H.D. Shourie to 
examine the feasibility and need for a full-fledged law” (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2005: 3). 
However, the earlier, more temporally proximate Department-Related Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Home Affairs which had examined the FoI bill in 2000 had not 
attributed any such causality despite the MKSS having deposed before it. Clearly, the 
intervening years had allowed the civil society perspective to become the accepted truth.318 
How, and why did this change occur? 
 
A part explanation may lie in an insight offered by a respondent. “In fact, it [was] the 
government all along. Have you ever seen in the files, that the government was trying to 
                                                 
317 Interview with BHJ644, civil servant, 3 December 2009. Emphasis in expression.  
318 The reasons for this change are an important concern and will be taken up for discussion later in the thesis. 
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block [the RTI Act]? If you look at the files, you will see that all along there was some 
activity going on. Some activities are accomplished in a very short period of time. Some take 
a longer time. It is not that the government had gone into a slumber. We are dependent on the 
GoM, we are dependent on the Parliamentary Standing Committee. We have to find time 
with each of the members. And by the time we fix everything, the government changes... The 
government has been working all along. The only thing is that we don’t shout from the 
rooftops, “Look, today we got an appointment with minister X.” We work silently. We are 
the unseen face of government. We cannot go outside and clarify our positions. We don’t try 
to create an image for ourselves... If they make claims, want to take credit for all of that, it’s 
up to them, we don’t mind. We have done our work, and we are satisfied. We do our job, 
forget it, and move on.”319 Even as BHJ644 points to the possibility of a counter-intuitive 
phenomenon viz. that in the context of claiming credit for ‘pro-people’ policy reforms, ‘civil 
society’ appears to have a greater voice than the government, a more sophisticated analysis is 
offered by another civil servant. “Maybe the record can be set straight. Why is [the role of the 
government] not recognised? Because the government speaks in many voices, and the 
collective voice is one which favours natural regression, which means secrecy. You come 
back to the norm, which is opacity, secrecy, security. In a sense, it’s like going back to the 
mother, that’s where you were born, you were raised - it’s a comfort zone. Regression can 
and does take place in quite a few areas where there has been reform, unless civil society and 
others accept the reform.”320 This perspective was reiterated by other senior civil servants as 
well. “The view that [the RTI Act came about] because of [civil society] is absolutely 
preposterous. This started in the beginning because of a need for good governance. The NDA 
government had come after some time, they wanted to show results. [Many] initiatives started 
                                                 
319 Interview with BHJ644, civil servant, 3 December 2009. 
320 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant, 24 November 2009. Emphasis added. 
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then. All these initiatives were in the way of making government more accountable...321 
Subsequently, it is quite possible that civil society might have joined the bandwagon. 
Because quite often civil society may not start a thing, but joins the bandwagon.”322 Here, 
FSQ974 and EFD094 are proposing that these reforms were successful not because the idea 
‘emanated’ from the ‘people’, but because society at large was ready and willing to support 
an idea that had in effect originated from progressive sections within the government, 
according necessary legitimacy to government efforts in the process. In doing so, they are 
proposing a complete inversion of the existing explanation of government transparency-
related reforms in India.  
 
Thus, the question of transparency reforms being a ‘top-down’ or a ‘bottom-up’ process 
becomes more of a question of truth-making than one of examining ‘facts’. As far as 
evidence goes, there is enough to suggest that the process was not simply one where 
sustained pressure from below led to an eventual government response. At the same time, it 
cannot also be said that the push came exclusively from within a reformist section of the 
bureaucracy or the political executive. On balance, it could perhaps be proposed that in 
essence “the climate was right”.323 Even though the dominant narrative privileges the 
‘pressure from below’ thesis, several other factors were at play. Judicial pronouncements had 
laid the groundwork, reformist elements within the bureaucracy had been wrestling internally 
with government opacity; individuals who straddled both the government as well as the 
advocacy spheres had managed to bring the attention of an alternative political executive (viz. 
the National and United Front governments) to this issue; political interest in access to 
information had become the norm across parties, even as the political class was being 
                                                 
321 This is an important insight, as it locates the RTI within the thinking on New Public Management that was 
current at that time, an issue to which we will return in the following chapter.  
322 Interview with EFD094, former civil servant, 24 November 2009.  
323 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant. 24 November 2009. 
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influenced by actors from outside the government (for example, through the depositions 
made to the Parliamentary Standing Committees); and significant sections within the higher 
civil service were pushing the boundaries (at times with the support of ‘outsiders’, for 
example at the LBSNAA), even as others were attempting to engage in obfuscatory tactics 
(for example, by giving proposals an ‘acceptable’ tone). Meanwhile, the relatively lower 
level of the central government bureaucracy continued to grapple with the mundane 
procedural details of drafting a legislation, and of course, within this melange of factors, a 
‘grassroots movement’ (with the caveats proposed in the preceding chapter) was also 
evolving in Rajasthan.  
 
However, suggesting that a variety of factors were at work does not quite answer the political 
questions lurking just beneath the surface of this process. If “the climate was right” for the 
RTI Act to come about, what were the constituting elements of this climate, and by extension, 
what had changed within the ‘elements’ so that it had become ‘right’? Further, how did it 
come to be that despite ample evidence to the contrary, over a period of time the political 
class itself began to endorse the assertion that the RTI Act was indeed an example of the 
government responding to pressures from below? Could it be that by the time the RTI Act 
was enacted, it had become politically expedient to attribute credit to forces ‘outside’ the 
government? If so, why? Some clues to this question could be provided by examining the 
nature of the resistance that the bureaucracy purportedly brought to bear on the process. It is 
to this infamous ‘resistance’ that we turn next.  
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Bureaucratic Resistance Revisited 
 
To assess the nature of the bureaucratic resistance to FoI, it is instructive to return to the 
deliberations of the H.D. Shourie Committee as a point of embarkation. These discussions 
were prescient in that the concerns that engendered the most debate recur consistently in all 
subsequent discussions around the RTI Act, whether within the government, or in the context 
of the demands made by activists and lobby groups, including the NCPRI.324 The contentious 
discussions can be distilled into four themes.325 
 
a. Review and appellate mechanisms in the cases of denial of information;  
b. The nature of sanctions on officials that wilfully deny information; 
c. The nature and extent of exemptions to the law, especially whether internal deliberations 
of the government should be publicly accessible; and 
d. The definition of a ‘public authority’, and whether such a law should be applicable to 
private entities as well. 
 
Examining the evolution of the positions, not just of the government, but also of non-
government actors on each of these themes is an instructive exercise, and I will take this up 
for discussion in detail next.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
324 It should be noted that the progression of this debate and the (changing) positions of various actors over the 
following years provide critical clues in unravelling the puzzle of the enactment of the RTI Act in 2005. This 
will be examined in detail later in this chapter. 
325 These themes have been distilled from a detailed examination of the minutes of all the meetings of the 
Working Group.  
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a. Review and Appellate Mechanisms 
 
On this issue, Justice Sawant’s draft (and the later NIRD draft), with the endorsement of the 
NCPRI and CHRI amongst others, had proposed that in case of denial of information, an 
appeal could be made to the “District Judge or the Principal Civil Judge of the City Civil 
Court as the case may be” within fifteen days, with the proviso that the judge was to dispose 
of the case within thirty days.326 The rationale behind this was “to ensure easy access for 
citizens to the appellate forum”.327 Although it discussed several other options (such as 
Information Commissions and Ombudsmen that existed in other countries), eventually the 
Shourie Committee proposed a two step appeal process - first, an internal departmental 
review to be decided upon by the Head of the Department, thus keeping it within the 
governmental machinery, and second, the utilisation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), 
1986 to appeal against the decision of the reviewing authority, in part because the “courts are 
already suffering under a heavy burden of arrears and therefore would not perhaps be in a 
position to deliver justice to the citizens or to public authorities in time”.328 However, using 
the CPA would have implied following “the process of appeals under that Act i.e. an appeal 
from the District Forum to the State Forum and thereafter to the National Commission and 
finally to the Supreme Court. The remedy provided is thus dilatory and expensive.”329 
Sections of the bureaucracy were also not in favour of using the CPA as “First, the 
performance of these forums in redressal of complaints itself leaves much to be desired as 
they seem to suffer from endemic shortages in terms of manpower and material resources... 
Secondly, in some cases, the decision to withhold information may have to be taken at very 
                                                 
326 Government of India, 1997c: 9. Details of the National Institute for Rural Development (NIRD) draft were 
provided in Table 5.2.  
327 Proceedings of the 5th Meeting of Working Group on Right to Information and promotion of open and 
transparent Government, 12 April 1997. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt. B, DoPT.  
328 Ibid.  
329 Note from Justice Sawant to P.S.A. Sundaram, Additional Secretary, Department of Administrative Reforms 
and Public Grievances, 28 July 1997.  
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high level in the Government and it may not be appropriate to vest District Forums with 
appellate powers over such decisions”.330  
 
However, these concerns around the utilisation of the CPA were essentially a red herring. The 
CoS eventually did away with this platform as well and proposed “a two-tier appellate 
remedy of a purely departmental character... with no recourse to courts. However, any person 
dissatisfied with the outcome of a departmental appeal would still have recourse to the writ 
jurisdiction of the High Courts”.331 The argument was premised on serving the interests of the 
citizens as “the ultimate objective from a citizen’s point of view was to secure a locally 
accessible, convenient and least costly forum for appeal against rejection of the request for 
information”, which no doubt a purely departmental appeal process would have been able to 
provide! The CoS’ views prevailed, and the GoM endorsed this stand in its first meeting on 
28 October 1997.332 This perspective continued to hold sway practically unchallenged 
(through the different avatars of the GoM, as well as other high-level committees) until the 
enactment of the RTI Act in 2005.333 The earlier Freedom of Information Act of 2002 also 
reflected this position under sections 12 (1) to 12 (4).334 In depositions before the 
Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, all external 
invitees expressed concern that the independence of the appellate mechanism in the 
dispensation proposed in the FoI bill was suspect. Yet the Committee did not yield and 
endorsed the position of the government.335 
 
                                                 
330 Agenda paper dated 25 July 1997 for the CoS meeting held on 29 July 1997. File reference no. 
34011/1(s)/97-Estt. B, DoPT.  
331 “Note for the Group of Ministers” dated 27 October 1997. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt. B, DoPT.  
332 Minutes of the meeting of Group of Ministers held on October 28, 1997 at 10.30 am in the Chamber of the 
Minister of Home Affairs, dated 5 November 1997, file reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt. B, DoPT.  
333 See Table 5.2 for details.  
334 See Annexure IV for the Freedom of Information Act, 2002.  
335 External witnesses who commented specifically on the limitations of the appellate mechanisms included the 
CHRI, CERC, the MKSS, former civil servants Madhav Godbole and B.G. Deshmukh, and Supreme Court 
lawyer A.G. Noorani.  
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This appellate mechanism was eventually revised completely in the draft bill (in the form of 
proposed amendments to the FoI Act of 2002) sent by the NAC to the Prime Minister in 
August 2004. It allowed for a first level departmental review, and proposed the creation of an 
independent appeal structure in the form of Information Commissions at the state as well as 
central government levels to which second appeals would be directed. Although the 
bureaucracy did offer some resistance to these proposals (for example, highlighting the 
financial implications of setting up Information Commissions across the country), these were 
quickly and effectively quashed by the political executive.  
 
In some perspectives, the creation of such an appellate structure was in fact a critical ploy to 
defang any resistance from the higher bureaucracy by coopting it. “One could debate it, [but] 
I think the fact that the RTI Act gave employment to a large number of retired IAS officers 
also played an important role, because everyone thought, ‘As I am retiring...’ This [thought] 
must have been there, that ‘I’ll get a job’. In fact, I’d invited Aruna [Roy] to Mussoorie to 
speak on the RTI and while introducing her to the class I said that Aruna’s greatest 
contribution to the RTI Act has been that she gave employment to many of her batchmates 
because she’s from the 1968 batch, and that’s the time [around 2005] they were retiring... 
More so, the first [Chief Information] Commissioner was from the 1968 batch.”336 Such 
‘post-retirement benefits’ are highly coveted amongst the soon-to-be-retiring IAS officers as 
it lengthens their time of service by five years (including the continuation of a full salary, as 
opposed to a relatively meagre pension), while continuing to provide perks such as hugely 
subsidised government housing in pampered and prestigious locations, and the use of official 
                                                 
336 Interview with N.C. Saxena, 15 October 2009, New Delhi. The first Chief Information Commissioner was 
Wajahat Habibullah. Interestingly, the Secretary of the DoPT at the time of the enactment of the RTI Act in 
2005 was A.N. Tiwari, who was himself nominated as one of the first Central Information Commissioners.  
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vehicles, both important markers of status.337 The enactment of the RTI Act meant that 
potentially over 300 such positions would need to be filled across the State and Central 
Information Commissions.338 Given this, it is hardly surprising that “In 2012 two-thirds 
(66%) of the 83 Information Commissioners (including Chief Information Commissioners) at 
the Central and State level are retired civil servants” (CHRI, 2012: 3). 
 
b. Sanctions on Erring Officials 
 
The Press Council / NIRD draft bill had taken a strong position against public officials who 
did not provide complete information and/or on time. Section 8 / Section 10 of the respective 
drafts envisaged that officials were to be fined personally for delays and denial of 
information. However, such personal sanctions were questioned by members of the 
bureaucracy within the Shourie Committee. “Given the nature of Government procedures and 
the large number of functionaries associated with its function, such a provision needs a 
review, particularly because determining the liability with reference to the gravity of the 
fault of any person would pose serious problems in practice.”339 Shourie put up a defence of 
sorts by suggesting that personal penalties “would be attracted only in respect of a person 
who is under an obligation to supply information under the provisions of the Act. It would 
not be attracted in respect of other functionaries.”340 In the third meeting of the Working 
Group, “it was pointed out by some members that these provisions appeared draconian. Most 
often the person who was vested with the responsibility to provide information would not 
                                                 
337 The usual obligatory retirement age is 60 years, and such positions typically allow the incumbent to hold the 
position till the age of 65. For an impressive list of top-level reappointments of retired bureaucrats, see “Former, 
not ex: How retd babus never retire”, Indian Express newspaper, 9 July 2012.  
338 The Act allows for up to eleven Information Commissioners for each State Information Commission, and a 
similar number for the Central Information Commission.  
339 “Comments on the Draft Bill on ‘Freedom of Information’ proposed by Shri H.D. Shourie”, dated 11 
February 1997 by S. Prakash, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs. File reference no. D.O. No. 
II/21011/54/96-IS/US.D.II, Ministry of Home Affairs. Emphasis in original.  
340 “Observations of Shri H.D. Shourie on Shri Prakash’s Comments on the Draft Bill”, dated 17 February 1997. 
File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, DoPT.  
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himself be possessing or controlling it, and would have to obtain it from his superiors, 
colleagues or subordinates. In such a situation it would be undesirable to subject him, to the 
liability of punishment.”341 This view was subsequently reflected in the draft proposed by the 
Shourie Committee, which had no penalty provisions for errant officials.342 However, this 
lacuna was criticised in the media (including public critiques by Justice Sawant) which was 
discussed in the Committee of Secretaries meeting held on the 29 July 1997. Unsurprisingly, 
the CoS maintained the stance, arguing that penal provisions “may generate resistance and 
resentment among the employees thereby adversely affecting implementation of the law”.343 
This issue did not even arise in subsequent meetings of different Groups of Ministers, 
although it did come up for debate in the proceedings of the Department-Related 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs in 2001. However, the government took 
the position that “After the “Freedom of Information Bill” introduced by the Central 
Government becomes an Act, the CCS [Central Civil Services] (Conduct) Rules, in all India 
Services, State Services, Local Bodies etc. are proposed to be amended requiring a 
Government servant to give information which is asked for by an institution or an individual 
under the Acts. Any officer who deliberately withholds information or deliberately gives 
false information, shall be liable to action under the relevant disciplinary rules and it is 
considered that a departmental penalty would be sufficient in such cases” (Rajya Sabha 
Secretariat, 2001: 61-62). This view prevailed and the Freedom of Information Act, 2002 did 
not contain any penalty provisions.  
 
                                                 
341 Minutes of the third meeting of the Working Group held on 19 February 1997, dated 27 February 1997. File 
reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, DoPT.  
342 In fact, greater protection was provided to officials under section 17, which said that “No suit, prosecution or 
other legal proceedings shall lie against any public authority or any individual, for anything which is in good 
faith done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder”. 
343 “Minutes of the meeting taken by the Cabinet Secretary at 4.30 pm on 29 July 1997 in the Committee Room 
of the Cabinet Secretariat” dated 8 August 1997. File reference no. 1/97/3/97-CA.V, Cabinet Secretariat.  
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The NAC draft bill resurrected the issue of penalty provisions in 2004, proposing the 
imposition of personal fines and/or imprisonment of officials who denied or delayed the 
provision of information by the relevant Information Commission. The bureaucracy made a 
spirited resistance to this proposal. Suggesting the dropping of the penalty clauses, it 
proposed that “The progress of implementation may be watched for some time. If after two 
years of implementation of the provisions of the proposed Act, it is found that the desired 
success is not coming, the suggestion may be considered at that time to include a penalty 
provision.”344 Further, the Department of Legal Affairs was of the view that “such nature of 
power to punish may not be desirable to be vested in Information Commissioners. The 
punishment of imprisonment can be imposed under the criminal law by the Courts only.”345 
The Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice concurred. “Empowering the [Information] 
Commission to investigate and punish officers is impermissible in law. The investigator 
cannot be a judge also. Judiciary alone can impose penalty after a fair trial... This provision is 
likely to frustrate the whole purpose and demoralise the system.”346  
 
The tussle continued over the next months with the bureaucracy, under pressure from the 
political executive, eventually making peace with the financial penalty provisions, but 
digging in its heels over the possibility of imprisonment being meted out by the Information 
Commissions. By some accounts, the Prime Minister was also not in favour of the clauses 
related to imprisonment. “In the meeting, Manmohan Singh said, “They make loads of 
mistakes in the private sector, but no one says anything. You want to hang government 
                                                 
344 Note dated 20 September 2004 from Pratibha Mohan, Director (E.II), DoPT to the Prime Minister via Joint 
Secretary, Establishment, and Secretary, Personnel, as a part of the process to develop a Cabinet Note. File 
notings in file no. 34011/6(s)/2004-Estt.(B).  
345 Note dated 9 December 2004 from R. Koli, Joint Secretary and Legal Adviser, Department of Legislative 
Affairs to the Law Secretary, as a part of the process to prepare the Cabinet Note. File notings in file no. 
34011/6(s)/2004-Estt.(B). 
346 Note dated 10 December 2004 from Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice to Secretary, Department of 
Legislative Affairs, as a part of the process to prepare the Cabinet Note. File notings in file no. 34011/6(s)/2004-
Estt.(B). 
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officials for making just one mistake?””347 By the time the bill passed through the 
Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, 
Law and Justice, the draft bill proposed that the powers of the Information Commissions 
would be “restricted to authorize an officer of the Central Government to file a complaint 
against the defaulting Public Information Officer before a Judicial Magistrate of First Class”, 
which could lead to imprisonment, albeit imposed by the judiciary.348 However, this clause 
was subsequently dropped by the GoM and finally the Information Commissioners retained 
only the authority to impose financial penalties, with the possibility of recommending 
departmental disciplinary action in cases of persistent wrongdoing by concerned officials.  
 
c. Exemptions 
 
“The heart of the legislation is the exemption clause.”349 It therefore comes as no surprise that 
the issue of what types of information would be exempt from disclosure engendered a great 
deal of debate throughout the process of the evolution of the legislation (and even after the 
Act came into force). The essential point of contention in the process revolved around the 
issue of whether internal government deliberations would be exempt from disclosure or not. 
Such deliberations typically include ‘file notings’, which in the context of government papers 
means that section of a government file on which the executive records its opinions and 
provides the rationale for the same. Considerable energies were expended on this concern - 
whether the decision-making process within government could be made public or not. In the 
first instance, the Press Council / NIRD drafts had proposed that the exemption of disclosure 
would be limited only to matters pertaining to national security, individual privacy and trade 
and commercial secrets, with the caveat that “that information which cannot be denied to 
                                                 
347 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi.  
348 Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2005: 30.  
349 Interview with BHJ644, civil servant, 3 December 2009. 
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Parliament or State legislature shall not be denied to any citizen”, thus including internal 
deliberations within the purview disclosure.350 The Shourie Committee considered this issue, 
and as early as in its second meeting, “a view was expressed that it was necessary to provide 
for safeguards against premature disclosures. It was noted that both, the Freedom of 
Information Act in the U.S. and the code of Practice on Access to Govt. Information in the 
U.K., provided for safeguards against disclosures of internal communications of the Govt. 
such as inter departmental memoranda etc... It was accordingly decided that an attempt would 
be made to draft a Sub Clause... to protect such categories of information.”351 The argument 
made in support of these exemptions was pegged on the need to ensure the “objectivity of 
advice that civil servants were required to bring into decision-making processes and to 
protect candour and frankness of expression in discussions”.352 Although some debate did 
take place on whether such information could be disclosed after a decision had been made, 
this eventually did not make its way into the draft legislation proposed by the Committee, 
which specifically mentioned “information in the nature of Cabinet papers, including papers 
prepared for submission to Cabinet or submitted to Cabinet, other than the documents 
whereby such decisions are published” and “information in the nature of internal working 
papers such as inter-departmental / intra-departmental notes and correspondence, papers 
containing advice, opinions, recommendations or minutes for the purposes of deliberative 
processes in a public authority” as exempt from disclosure.353  
 
                                                 
350 Section 4 of the Press Council draft and section 5 of the NIRD draft.  
351 Minutes of the second meeting of the Working Group held on 18 January1997, dated 27 January 1997. File 
reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, DoPT. The 
relevant exemption clauses of the FoI laws of Australia and Canada were also examined in the context of this 
discussion.  
352 Minutes of the third meeting of the Working Group held on 19 February 1997, dated 27 February 1997. File 
reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, DoPT. 
353 Clauses 9(iii) and 9(iv) of the Shourie Committee draft bill. Interestingly, sections 9 and 10, which provide 
the exemption regime, are the longest sections in the draft bill.  
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The concerns of the bureaucracy on this issue continued to hold sway over the following 
years, and in a later meeting of the Group of Ministers, it was decided to expand the 
definition of Cabinet papers to also include the “deliberations of the Committee of Secretaries 
since these often formed an inextricable part of the Cabinet’s decision-making process”.354 
The perspective on such exemptions was premised on the view that “the minutes of the 
records of advice etc., during the decision making process prior to the executive decision or 
policy formulation shall be exempt from disclosure”.355 The bureaucracy doggedly stuck to 
this stand even in the face of criticism levelled against these exemption clauses during the 
examination of the proposal by the Department-Related Standing Committee on Home 
Affairs in 2001. The argument made in favour of keeping internal deliberations exempt was 
specious at best. “According to the UK Government white paper presented to Parliament in 
1997 in connection with the legislation of the FOI Act, the internal discussions and advice is 
exempted from disclosure in Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Netherlands, the USA, France 
and Canada. All these countries, while recognising that the public has a Right to Know the 
decisions of the Government, have considered it fit to exclude the deliberative processes from 
disclosure. In India also, the Government is keen to encourage free and frank expression of 
views on the part of various officers. A conscious view has therefore been taken that the 
deliberative process in coming to a decision should not be made available to the public” 
(Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2001: 47). Eventually, the Parliamentary Standing Committee 
allowed the exemption clauses to go through unchanged. With only a token debate taking 
place on this aspect of the law in the Parliament, the FoI Act of 2002 retained this view.356  
                                                 
354 Minutes of the meeting of Group of Ministers held on 28 October 1997, dated 5 November 1997. File 
reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, DoPT.  
355 Letter from T.K. Viswanathan, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, dated 
11 January 2000 to the Group of Ministers set up to examine the legislative proposal for Freedom of 
Information. Reference No. 1(57)/97-Leg.I, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs.  
356 Clauses 8(1)(d) and (e) of the FoI Act 2002 exempted the following information from disclosure: “Cabinet 
papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers” and 
“minutes or records of advice including legal advice, opinions or recommendations made by any officer of a 
public authority during the decision making process prior to the executive decision or policy formulation”.  
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The draft bill sent to the Prime Minister’s Office by the NAC on 16 August 2004 
significantly changed the contours of this debate. First, it overtly mentioned “file notings” 
under the definition of “information” that was open to disclosure.357 Second, it did not 
mention any exemption of internal deliberations, and third, while it allowed for the 
exemption of “cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, 
Secretaries and other officers” from disclosure, it added a critical caveat to this clause by 
proposing that such information would be exempt, “Provided that the decisions of Council of 
Ministers, the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken 
shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or 
over”.358 It further proposed that no exemptions would apply to any information older than 
twenty-five years.359 The RTI Act that was eventually passed by the Parliament in 2005 
retained this perspective.360 
 
However, the issue of internal deliberations, particularly whether ‘file notings’ would be 
exempt from disclosure, continued to simmer. When the Parliament sent the bill to the 
President for his signature, the then President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam raised a cautionary note on 
the possibility of the disclosure of file notings as this “would harm the process of decision 
making as officials would be more cautious in or even refrain from rendering objective, frank 
and written advice on file.”361 In his response, the Prime Minister agreed and stated that, “in 
                                                 
357 Section 2(e) of the NAC draft defines information as “information means any material in any form, including 
records, documents, file notings, memos, emails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, 
contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data, material held in any electronic form and any information 
relating to a private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any law”. The overt reference to 
‘file notings’ in this clause was absent in the final bill passed by the Parliament. 
358 Section 8(1)(i) of the NAC draft bill, which was eventually retained in the RTI Act 2005.  
359 At the behest of the Group of Ministers set up to examine the bill, the relevant clause was later amended to 
provide “security related information and Cabinet papers… an all time exemption from disclosure”. Minutes of 
the meeting of Group of Ministers held on 26 April 2005, dated 3 May 2005. File reference no. 
34012/1(s)/2005-Estt.(B), Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, DoPT. 
360 Albeit the number of years was reduced to twenty.  
361 Letter from the President of India to the Prime Minister dated 15 June 2005. File reference no. 
34012/10(s)/2005-Estt.B, DoPT.  
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case it is noticed that file notings are in danger of exposure under this Act, we will consider 
amending the Act suitably at the appropriate time”.362 Perhaps encouraged by this exchange, 
the bureaucracy maintained its stand that these were not open to disclosure as “In the Right to 
Information Bill, 2004, as suggested by the National Advisory Council, the expression 
“information” [included] records, documents, file notings, memos, e-mail, etc. The provisions 
of the NAC Bill were subsequently discussed with Chairperson, NAC by MOS (PP)363, 
wherein a conscious decision was taken to exclude the “file notings” from disclosure... 
following which the expression “file notings” was deleted from the above definition. The RTI 
Bill, with the definition as revised above, was introduced in the Lok Sabha... [and] was later 
examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee, as also the Group of Ministers, and 
considering that the Committee/GOM did not recommend any changes to the definition, the 
obvious inference is that Government had taken a decision that “file notings” would not be 
open to disclosure under the legislation”.364 The Prime Minister’s Office endorsed this 
position and directed that the “rules under the Act may be appropriately amended”365 to 
reflect this position. Statements from the PMO also suggested the possibility of amendments 
being made to the Act itself to strengthen this exemption. At the same time, some sections 
within the bureaucracy did not necessarily support this position. “[When] the government 
supported the withholding of note sheets, a large number of us were up in arms, because we 
said who are you trying to protect? If you’re trying to protect the honest civil servant, for 
God’s sake don’t try and protect us because we’d be the happiest people if our note sheets 
entered the public domain. And it’s a lot of bull if you think that civil servants need this kind 
                                                 
362 Letter from the Prime Minister to the President dated 26 July 2005.  
363 MOS (PP) refers to Minister of State, Personnel and Pensions, the junior minister. The Personnel portfolio at 
this point had been retained by the Prime Minister.  
364 Note from Rakesh Malhotra, Under Secretary, DoPT, dated 10 October 2005 to Secretary (Personnel). File 
reference no. 34012/15(s)/2005-Estt.B. Emphasis in original.  
365 Note from Rakesh Malhotra, Under Secretary, DoPT, dated 20 October 2005 to Secretary (Personnel). File 
reference no. 34012/15(s)/2005-Estt.B. 
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of protection. It is the crooks that need it.”366 Eventually, faced by an onslaught of protest 
from activists and the media, as well as interpretations of the legislation by the now 
functioning Central Information Commission that ordered the disclosure of ‘file notings’ in 
several cases, the government had to abandon this position.  
 
d. Applicability to the Private Sector 
 
The fourth theme that attracted much debate in the process that eventually led to the 
enactment of the RTI Act in 2005 centred on the applicability of the law, especially whether 
it would include private entities within its purview. In the early articulations of the 
legislation, the private sector was firmly envisaged within its ambit. The CERC draft had 
proposed that a ‘public body’ would include “any other body which provides public services 
such as but not limited to energy, transport communication, banking, insurance, finance 
health, medical and the like”.367 It also had provisions to allow citizens to inspect the 
premises of hazardous industries to check if adequate safety measures were in place.368 The 
Press Council draft provided a more generic applicability. It defined a public authority as 
including “a company, corporation, trust, firm, society or a cooperative society, whether 
owned or controlled by private individuals and institutions whose activities affect the public 
interest”.369 Further, the draft (under Section 9) specifically placed the culpability of offences 
under the Act upon the senior management of private companies. Critically, no draft 
proposed at any point (and certainly not the RTI Act of 2005) expressly included political 
                                                 
366 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant, 24 November 2009. 
367 Section 2(q)(xi), draft Access to Information Act 1996 proposed by Consumer Education and Research 
Centre (CERC), Ahmedabad.  
368 See Chapter X of the CERC draft on the “Community’s Right to Know”.  
369 Section Sec 2(c)(ii), draft Right to Information Act authored by the Press Council of India. The later NIRD 
draft went further and dropped the public interest clause as well. Section 2(c)(iii) defines a public authority to 
include “a company, corporation, trust, firm society, a cooperative society, or associations whether owned or 
controlled by the Government or by private individuals and institutions”.  
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parties or the media within the purview of the Act, although the definitions in the Press 
Council and NIRD drafts could arguably have been interpreted to include them as well.  
 
In many ways, the deliberations of the Shourie Committee on this issue defined the contours 
of the discussion that was to ensue over the following years. On 11 February 1997, a few 
days prior to its third meeting, S. Prakash, who was then Joint Secretary in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs and a member of the Committee, circulated his comments on the draft bill 
amongst the other members. He highlighted the issue of the applicability of the draft bill on 
private entities, arguing that “companies, corporations are engaged in commercial activities 
and their rights and privileges flow from several other statutes… Any curb on the rights and 
privileges flowing to these bodies from the other Act [sic] would make it liable for being 
challenged in the Law Courts… In addition, inclusion of these bodies within the definition of 
public body… would also pose problems in their identification as only those bodies are 
supposed to be covered whose activities affect public interest.”370 Clearly, the license-quota-
permit raj thinking was on the wane, as it was a bureaucrat who was raising concerns about 
the rights and privileges of corporate bodies.  
 
Shourie defended the stance by stating that “the provisions of Clause 4(c) of the Bill already 
protect trade and commercial secrets from disclosure. Outside the area of trade or commercial 
secrets, there would be a large area of information, the disclosure of which would be 
necessary in consumers’ interest - without necessarily affecting the legitimate interests of a 
firm as regards its competitiveness in the market”.371 However, Shourie’s argument was 
quashed in the third meeting when the Group “felt that… that the legislation should 
                                                 
370 “Comments on the Draft Bill on ‘Freedom of Information’ proposed by Shri H.D. Shourie”, dated 11 
February 1997 by S. Prakash, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs. File reference no. D.O. No. 
II/21011/54/96-IS/US.D.II, Ministry of Home Affairs.  
371 “Observations of Shri H.D. Shourie on Shri Prakash’s Comments on the Draft Bill”, circulated within the 
Working Group on 17 February 1997. File reference No. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B).  
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preferably cover only governmental organisations. The right to information in most countries 
was vis-a-vis the State. While the citizen, as a taxpayer, had the right to have access to 
information held by the Government, he did not stand in a similar relationship to a private 
firm. Besides, the implications of such a right on business activities, which generally should 
be left to the market forces, were another aspect to be considered… On balance of 
considerations, it was decided that the definition of public bodies may be amended to include 
only organisations substantially funded/controlled by the Government.”372 The draft bill 
proposed by the Shourie Committee in May 1997 maintained this perspective.373  
 
The exclusion of the private sector from within the purview of the proposed legislation came 
in for strident criticism from some quarters, especially from Justice Sawant, who had led the 
Press Council effort in conjunction with some members of the NCPRI. “If the object of the 
Act is to give access to all institutions whose activities affect the interests and welfare of the 
people, it is immaterial whether the interests are affected by the private or public 
institutions... With liberalisation, free market economy and globalisation, private bodies are 
bound to play an increasingly important role correspondingly reducing the role of the 
government and public authorities... To keep such major sources of information out of the 
access to information, is to make a mockery of the right to information.”374  
 
Based on similar concerns around the changing economic climate, criticism also came from 
sections within the government. For example, the “Insurance sector is nationalised and 
                                                 
372 “Proceedings of the third Meeting of the Working Group held on Feb 19, 1997”, circulated within the Group 
on 27 February 1997. File reference No. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B).  
373 Section 2(g) defined a public authority as “(i) The government of India, the Government of each of the 
States/Union Territories, local bodies and other bodies owned or substantially controlled or funded by the 
Government of India or Government of a State/Union Territory and the administrative offices of the Supreme 
Court, High Courts, subordinate Courts and of Parliament and State Legislatures; (ii) A company, corporation, 
trust, firm society or a cooperative society substantially funded or controlled by the Government”.  
374 Comments of Justice P.B. Sawant, Chairman, Press Council of India, on the “Central Working Group Bill on 
Right to Information” sent to Dr. P.S.A. Sundaram, Additional Secretary, Administrative Reform and Training, 
Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances, on 28 July 1997. 
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private companies are not allowed to conduct insurance business in India. However, as per 
the announcement made by the Finance Minister in his Budget Speech, a segment of 
insurance business will be thrown open to the private sector. The Bill, in its present form, will 
be applicable only to the public sector companies and not to the private companies. It is 
apprehended that if the private sector companies are not covered under the above Bill, 
nationalised companies will be placed at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis private 
companies because while on the one hand public sector companies will be required to part 
with certain information, such binding will not be on the part of private companies. This may 
not ensure a level field playing [sic] between the public and private companies.”375 Such 
concerns were responded to by modifying the exemption clauses “to specifically exempt from 
disclosure information which might prejudicially affect the competitive position of a public 
authority”.376  
 
Perhaps the most detailed argument of the government to not include private entities within 
the ambit of the FoI (or later RTI) law was articulated in the background note (Cabinet Note) 
sent by the DoPT to the Cabinet in January 1998.  
 
“As regards the private sector, the view of the Shourie Working Group was that 
the legislation should not apply to it. The Committee of Secretaries also endorsed 
this view. While extension of the proposed legislation to private sector may have 
an emotive appeal, it is necessary to consider it with caution and circumspection... 
Corporate governance is a different area altogether and the appropriate vehicle to 
bring about improvement in it cannot be the freedom of information legislation. It 
was [sic] apt to be regarded as an excessive intrusion into the freedom and 
management of private sector. There is also the danger that it may become a tool 
for competitive strategy with deleterious consequences for the industry which are 
too obvious to require elaboration. Such a step would also be fraught with grave 
                                                 
375 ‘Comments of Insurance Division on Freedom of Information Bill, 1997’ sent to DoPT. File reference no. 
15(29)-B(R)/97, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Budget Division), 6 August 1997.  
376 Minutes of the meeting of the Group of Ministers held on 28 October 1997, dated 5 November 1997. File 
reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), DoPT.  
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implications for the national economy as it would affect the investment climate at 
a time when we are liberalising and opening the economy.”377 
 
This argument was accorded wide and longstanding support by the political executive.378 The 
first Group of Ministers to examine the proposal reiterated that “The objective of the laws 
providing the right or freedom to access information was essentially to promote open, 
transparent and accountable government and this consideration could not be wholly 
applicable to private bodies which could not be said to “govern””.379 This perspective 
continued to hold sway throughout the subsequent meetings of different Groups of Ministers 
under different governments over the next several years. The question arose again several 
years later during the examination of the proposal by the Department-Related Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Home Affairs (PSC-HA) in 2001. Amongst others, the MKSS and 
the CHRI were invited to depose before the Committee, and both suggested that the private 
sector be included within the ambit of the bill. However, the government held its ground, and 
the report of the PSC-HA repeated the argument almost verbatim. “Any attempt to bring the 
private sector under the proposed legislation is apt to be regarded as an excessive intrusion 
into the freedom and management of private sector not to mention that there would be 
implementation difficulties too in expanding the scope of FOI Bill to private bodies. There is 
also the danger that it may become a tool for competitive strategy with deleterious 
consequences for the industry which are too obvious to require elaboration... It is noteworthy 
that none of the advanced democracies such as USA, Australia and Canada, has thought it fit 
to widen its laws to this extent to cover the private sector” (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2001: 
34-36). 
                                                 
377 Note for the Cabinet dated - January 1998, sent by DoPT. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), DoPT. 
Emphasis added.  
378 This was pointed out by Justice Sawant as well. “It is obvious that [the government] was under the influence 
of private sector and their strong lobbies in the government and the parliament.” Email communication from 
Justice Sawant, 29 July 2012. 
379 Minutes of the Meeting of Group of Ministers held on 17 December 1997. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-
Estt.(B), DoPT.  
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Even as wider international experience was used to buttress the argument to exclude the 
private sector, it is not as if other models had not been made available for comparison. The 
South African Constitution that had been enacted in 1996 guaranteed that “Everyone has the 
right of access to a) any information that is held by the state; and b) any information that is 
held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights”.380 
This was duly noted and highlighted by some elements within the government around the 
same time.381 In September 2001, the Prime Minister’s Office had sent a ‘Consultation Paper 
on Probity in Governance’ drafted by the National Commission to Review the Working of the 
Constitution to the DoPT for its comments. The paper enclosed “a copy of the recently 
enacted South African Freedom of Information Act... which covers both the public and 
private bodies. It can indeed serve as a model enactment for any country committed to 
concept of freedom of information [sic]”.382 
 
Despite the existence of this alternate viewpoint, the Department-Related Parliamentary 
Standing Committee was not swayed by the South African example and the bill was returned 
unchanged (on this issue) to the Parliament. In the parliamentary debates however, the issue 
rose again, when Prithviraj Chavan (an MP belonging to the Congress Party in the Rajya 
Sabha, and later Minister in the UPA government) observed that the “right to get information 
from the private sector should also find a place here in this bill. The Government may say 
that the Consumers’ law provides such a right, but it is not full enough. So, a separate 
provision should also be provided in this regard”.383 But this intervention was unsuccessful 
                                                 
380 Section 32 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa.  
381 As also by the CHRI in its deposition before the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee in 
2004.  
382 “Consultation Paper on Probity in Governance”, National Commission to Review the Working of the 
Constitution, Government of India, September 2001, enclosed with a note from K.V. Eapen, Director 
(Vigilance), DoPT, to Pratibha Mohan, Director (E.II), DoPT. File reference no. 4366/Dir(E-II)/01, DoPT.  
383 Rajya Sabha debate on the Freedom of Information bill, 16 December 2002. Interestingly, Chavan was 
Minister of State in the Ministry of Personnel from 6 April 2008 to 10 November 2010, a period during which 
he remained rather silent on this issue.  
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and the FoI bill finally enacted by the Parliament in 2002 did not include the private sector 
within its ambit.  
 
Judging by the pattern emerging from the previous three themes discussed above, the next 
and final stage in the evolution of this element within the legislative framework should have 
seen the unequivocal inclusion of the private sector within the ambit of the Act in the draft 
bill (more precisely, a list of amendments to the FoI Act 2002) sent by the NAC to the 
government in August 2004. However, this did not happen. The NAC draft did not redefine 
the definition of public authorities to expressly include private entities. This is especially 
peculiar as up to this point, the lead actors associated with the NCPRI and the MKSS (who 
were now quite influential through their linkages with the NAC) had consistently maintained 
that any private entity performing a public function must fall directly within the ambit of the 
Act.384 What the NCPRI/NAC draft did do (in this context) however, was to redefine 
‘information’ to include “any information relating to a private body which can be accessed by 
a public authority under any law”.385 The dilution of their stand could possibly be attributed 
to the fact that “most of those who were agitating for including directly the private sector in 
the Act were of the opinion that let at least the Act proposed by the government see the light 
                                                 
384 For example, in a letter (unaddressed, but presumably) to Members of Parliament dated 23 July 1998, the 
NCPRI had stated that it was “distressed that the [FoI] bill excludes from its purview the private sector and 
NGOs, whose activities affect public interest... because increasingly, large corporations are taking decisions that 
impinge significantly on the lives of ordinary people...”. Later, in its deposition before the PSC-HA in 2001, the 
MKSS had proposed that the definition of a public authority “must be expanded to include... a company, 
corporation, trust, firm, society, cooperative society, or associations whether owned or controlled by the 
Government or by private individuals and institutions” (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2001: 34). In its deposition 
before the PSC in 2004, no such arguments were proposed.  
385 Section 2(e) of the draft Right to Information bill sent by the NAC to the PMO in 16 August 2004. This 
phrase was eventually redrafted as “any information relating to a private body which can be accessed by a 
public authority under any other law for the time being in force” under Section 2(f) in the RTI Act, 2005. This 
clause has not been used much, and in cases where information has been sought from private entities or entities 
which are Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), information has been denied and the matter taken to court. One 
recent example relates to Mumbai International Airport Limited, a PPP entity. For media reportage on the case, 
see “Why not sell the Taj, when we can do it with Mumbai airport?”, Firstpost, 12 July 2012 and “Drop The 
Iron Curtain”, Outlook Business magazine, 26 November 2011.  
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of the day, and we could push our agenda for inclusion of the private sector at a later 
stage”.386 
 
Subsequently, a brief discussion did take place on this matter during the examination of the 
bill by the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public 
Grievances, Law and Justice in 2004. This was initiated by the deposition made by the CHRI, 
which was the only organisation that had maintained its position on the issue through the 
years (amongst those who had deposed before both the Parliamentary Standing Committees 
in 2001 and 2004). In its written submission to the Committee in 2004, the CHRI had 
proposed to “Broaden the right to information to allow access to information held by private 
bodies - ideally wherever access is needed “for the exercise or protection of any right”, but at 
least “where the functions of the body are of a public nature; where the body provides 
services under a contract with a public authority; where the body is owned, controlled or 
receives aid directly or indirectly from the Government; or where the body’s office bearers 
are appointed by the Government”” (CHRI, 2004: 2). However, the Standing Committee 
remained unconvinced and the relevant clauses that had been proposed in the NAC draft bill 
were largely retained in the RTI Act enacted in 2005.  
 
In sum, if the four themes discussed above are to be looked at from the perspective of 
bureaucratic resistance, a peculiar pattern seems to emerge. In the cases where the power of 
the bureaucracy was being curtailed significantly, viz. the nature of appellate mechanisms, 
individual sanctions on erring officials, and the exemption of internal deliberations from 
disclosure, sections of the bureaucracy did indeed offer resistance, but eventually had to 
capitulate. However, on the one issue which does not appear to affect the bureaucracy 
                                                 
386 Email communication from Justice P.B. Sawant, 29 July 2012.  
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directly, that of the inclusion of the private sector within the ambit of the RTI Act, the views 
of the bureaucracy won the day. In addition, even as the ‘successful’ activists and the 
‘resistant’ section of the bureaucracy appeared to be at loggerheads on the first three issues, a 
rapprochement of sorts seems to have occurred on the fourth.387  
 
Changes in the ‘Climate’ 
 
Apart from this differentiated alignment of forces, stark differences also emerge when the 
procedure followed in the policy-making process that led to the enactment of the FoI Act in 
2002 is compared with the one followed in the case of the RTI Act in 2005. In the case of the 
former, the role of the bureaucracy remained significant (with a correspondingly greater 
success at ‘resistance’), while in the latter, the involvement of the bureaucracy in the process 
appears to be vastly diminished. For example, the CoS played an important role in the 
process until the enactment of the FoI Act in 2002. Once the UPA government came to power 
in 2004, the policy-making procedure was effectively redefined, with practically no 
involvement of the CoS in the process.388 
 
The observations above call for greater analysis. What are the implications of the difference 
in the role that the bureaucracy played in the enactment of the FoI Act in 2002 vis-à-vis the 
RTI Act in 2005? How did it come to be that one of the most constitutionally protected 
bureaucracies of the world could not stand its ground on matters central to its continued hold 
over power, even as it supported the cause of an interest group that it previously sought to 
contain (or selectively ally with through rent-seeking)? Was the bureaucracy no longer 
capable of effective resistance (and perhaps was this a part of the ‘right climate’)? Or is this 
                                                 
387 By the more ‘successful’ activists, I mean those associated with the MKSS and the NCPRI, whose proposals 
have a clear imprint on the draft bill sent by the NAC to the government. 
388 See Table 5.2 for details.  
222 
 
an example of the realignment of the interests of the bureaucracy in the larger battle between 
the state and the market? Indeed, what does this say about the conception of these categories 
as different and separate from each other? And how does this relate to the question of ‘the 
right climate’ mentioned in the preceding section? To understand these questions better, it 
may be instructive to examine the changing institutional nature of the higher bureaucracy in 
the socio-political landscape of India over the past two decades.  
 
W(h)ither the Steel Frame? 
 
For all the importance that is routinely accorded to the higher bureaucracy, particularly the 
IAS, in the institutional infrastructure of the state in post-independence India, surprisingly 
little systematic, large-scale, longitudinal research exists on it.389 This is in part due to the 
preoccupation of most scholarly research with the ‘everyday state’ and the experiencing of it 
by the vast multitudes of the country. Important as such pursuits are, this has led to a large 
gap in developing a sophisticated understanding of the way the state functions at the higher 
echelons.390 David Potter’s (1986) masterful study on the traditions of the Indian Civil 
Service (ICS) and its post-independence successor the IAS, is possibly the best-known 
exception to this phenomenon (although it was published prior to the reforms introduced in 
1991). The theoretical framework proposed in Potter’s work is useful when examining the 
question of bureaucratic resistance as indicated in the questions above. Potter proposes that 
the continuation of administrative traditions and its attendant influence is a function of three 
factors. “The first is political support for the structures, behaviour patterns, norms and values 
                                                 
389 Research that tentatively approaches this direction includes Radin (2007), Krishna (2010) and Saxena (2010). 
Subramaniam (1971) and Potter (1986) perhaps remain the most thorough of studies in this context. Most 
research has focused on the ‘everyday state’ and its interface with citizens, or questions around the effectiveness 
of the state, including issues of service delivery. A major area of interest has been the ‘worm-eye’ view 
approach, while the political dynamics of the higher echelons of the state remain woefully under-researched.  
390 This in turn, is no doubt affected by the problem of access. The ‘ordinary’ world is far more accessible and 
visible than the ‘exclusive’ one. 
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of the tradition... [This includes] the agency of power exercised by administrators within the 
state... The other is the broad structure of the state and class power in which the bureaucracy 
is located. The second process is obtaining similar successors on a continuing basis. This 
involves the steady replacement of retiring administrators by younger recruits similar in 
educational and class background... The third process is shaping successors to the tradition... 
The most significant period when this occurs is during the first few years of service in a 
particular administrative group - during initial training...” (Potter, 1986: 4, emphasis in 
original). Amongst these however, “political support stands out as of fundamental 
importance” not least because it “does not depend on the other two processes” (Potter, 1986: 
25), while the converse holds largely true. For reasons of coherence, I will first take up the 
latter two factors for discussion and will return to the issue of political support subsequently.  
 
Obtaining and Shaping Similar Successors 
 
Resonating with Potter’s concern around ‘obtaining similar successors’, several senior and 
former civil servants spoke of the changing social profile of recruits into the higher civil 
services, particularly the IAS. An early study, one of the very few that has attempted to 
analyse longitudinal trends in the social composition of the higher civil services, showed that 
for the period 1947-1963, entrants into these services were primarily children of the salaried 
and professional middle class, including high-level civil servants (Subramaniam, 1971). The 
study concluded by asserting that the higher civil services of the country was a “middle class 
monopoly” (Subramaniam, 1971: 124). However, the intervening decades have seen 
“dramatic changes. Earlier on, the services were considered an upper middle class 
occupation. Not anymore. The social base of the service has increased which means that 
Group A officers’ kids do not go into the services. They [the entrants] do not come from 
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affluent families. They are mainly the sons of grade three employees, and small shopkeepers, 
and some fairly poor families. There [has been] a general social levelling down. It is a much 
wider base than ever before.”391 “A very large number of people are from the middle-sized 
towns, not from Delhi, even less from metros. Their class background is very different. Many 
of them are not even very fluent in English.”392 Affirmative action policies since the 1950s 
and the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report in the early 1990s have meant that 
recruitment process has indeed widened the social base to increase the proportion of SCs, STs 
and OBCs into the civil service. “During the 20 years from 1971 to 1991, the representation 
of the Scheduled Castes in the higher levels of the federal government public service moved 
from 2.6% to 9.1% while the Scheduled Tribes increased from 0.4% to 2.5%” (Radin, 2007: 
1533).393 Other reports suggest that much larger shifts have taken place. “Less than 2 in 10 
entrants [to the higher civil services] were from a metro or a state capital in ’04; More than 5 
were born in a tehsil or district town in ’04;394 One out of four are kids of fathers who have 
not studied beyond matriculation; 12 of top 50 rank-holders in the 2006 civil services exam 
are OBCs; 32.5 % of IAS officers inducted in the last five years [2001-2006] are OBCs”.395 
Clearly, the democratisation impulse since independence has resulted in a sea-change in the 
process to ‘obtain similar successors’.  
 
Apart from shifts in the recruitment policy, the recruitment process itself has also undergone 
significant changes in consonance with this democratisation impulse. “Earlier on, in the 50s 
and early 60s, the interview was given a lot of importance, and that changed. Now the 
                                                 
391 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant, 10 November 2010.  
392 Interview with N.C. Saxena, former civil servant, 15 January 2009, New Delhi. It should be noted that the 
familiar specter of the importance of the knowledge of English in spaces of influence, as detailed in the 
preceding chapter, raises its head again. ‘Metros’ refers to metropolitan cities, which in the Indian context 
include Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai.  
393 Radin (2007) also reports that “A trend analysis of IAS recruits from the 1987 to the 1991 batches indicated 
that increasingly they were from a lower socio-economic status”.  
394 ‘Tehsil’ in this context implies a sub-district town, not the district headquarter.  
395 Report based on data from the Union Public Services Commission. Outlook magazine, 6 August 2007. 
‘Matriculation’ here means the final year of high school.  
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interview is only one small factor in the selection process. This was to remove the urban and 
elitist biases. Then the pressure came to increase the age limit - again arguing that there needs 
to be a rural emphasis and a more inclusive agenda for recruitment”.396 “The age limit for 
eligibility has been progressively extended to 30 years (with concessions for reserved 
categories), while it was only 24 during the two decades following Independence” 
(Benbabaali, 2008). “When the OBC reservation came in the wake of the Mandal report, they 
also got a couple of extra years, and the SC and the ST kids got an extra couple of years. The 
number of attempts [allowed to take the entrance examination] were increased... They could 
enter at about 33 or 34, and then many, definitely north Indians, fudge a couple of years, so 
by the time they get in they are about 35.”397 These changes have cumulatively meant that the 
average age of entry into the higher civil services stood at more than 27 years in 2004.398  
 
One implication of this increase in age resonates with the second of Potter’s concerns, that of 
‘shaping successors’, which would necessarily entail initiation and moulding at a more 
impressionable age.399 “Today’s [entrants] are much older, many of them are married, with 
children of their own even before they enter the service, so their value systems have [already] 
been formed.”400 Layering Potter’s framework proposed in the context of the IAS to  
C. Wright Mills’ (1956) singular treatise on the relationship between social background, the 
membership of institutions, and their relationship to the relative influence of the same, it 
could be proposed that consequent to the democratisation of the higher civil service in India, 
at least some attrition has occurred in its influence in the larger socio-political space. This 
also resonates well with an aspect of Potter’s first principle (as mentioned above) correlating 
                                                 
396 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant, 10 November 2010. 
397 Ibid.  
398 Puri (2004).  
399 Something which could also be seen as indoctrination in less flattering parlance.  
400 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant, 10 November 2010. 
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the importance of the location of the bureaucracy within a given class structure to the degree 
of influence it wields.  
 
‘Political Support’ 
 
Another important shift in the ‘political support’ accorded to the higher bureaucracy is related 
to the agency it is able to and does exercise. This too, appears to have changed significantly, 
especially when observed within the framework of institutional relations between the political 
class generally, the political executive specifically, and the permanent executive as 
manifested by the higher civil service. “It started with the Emergency. For the civil servants it 
was said that when they were required to bend, they crawled. That showed that we were in 
one sense puppets of the political executive. The politicians [now] understood that they had 
the power and not the civil servants, and that the civil servants could be forced to bend to 
their will or pack up and sent to nondescript jobs. The political executive never really looked 
back after that.”401 Apart from using transfers as a stick, the political executive also 
discovered an Achilles’ heel of the civil servants. “There are incentives for being weak - you 
get good postings and promotions.”402 This would typically require “latching on to politicians 
to try and become Home Secretary, or Finance Secretary, and so on”.403 That such practices 
have become more the norm than the anomaly, whereby the much-vaunted ‘neutrality’ has 
made way for ‘commitment’ to a specific political dispensation, has meant that “if we start 
acting independently, then certainly we’ll find a colleague who will be more pliable, and the 
work can be done. The esprit de corps gets eroded when the bureaucracy aligns itself to 
                                                 
401 Ibid.  
402 Interview with NXW937, former civil servant, 17 December 2009. 
403 Interview with N.C. Saxena, former civil servant, 15 January 2009, New Delhi. Such positions are much 
more desired than say, Secretary to the Department of Animal Husbandry.  
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political power”.404 ‘Political power’, in this context, is not necessarily restricted to actions of 
the political class. “When someone comes to [the Department of] Education they think, ‘I’ll 
go abroad, I’ll get a job in WHO, UNESCO, UNICEF. Or if there is a seminar abroad, I’ll go 
there’. So you tend to take a viewpoint that is slightly populistic, that is slightly pro-people so 
that you appear to be acceptable in larger international fora. So these are the fellows who may 
have been very very cussed at the state government level. They come to Government of India 
and they become different in their own personal interest. They feel, let’s take this line, let’s 
talk about people’s participation, the rhetoric changes.”405 The question of ‘acceptability’, 
whether to the political class, or to the larger popular discourse, therefore defines the 
boundaries within which ‘resistance’ can be asserted.  
 
In the case of the higher civil service, it is not as if their agency, or their ability to resist, has 
only been voluntarily ceded. Over the last decades, several institutional changes have been 
introduced by the political executive to wrest greater control over the policy-making process. 
In this context, the institutionalisation of the ‘group of ministers’ is an important example. 
Such an entity did not exist within the Government of India’s ‘Transaction of Business Rules’ 
until the 1990s. It was brought in as an “effort to bypass the standard method of bureaucracy. 
What was happening is that the Secretaries and the bureaucracy were very powerful. Their 
arguments were very logical, as is expected to be, because they would go into the matter in 
great depth, and ministers sometimes found it very difficult to overrule them... [Then] this 
intermediary 3-4 member group of ministers comes in, that starts saying, “No no, what the 
ministry is saying is not suitable, the executive decision at the political executive level is B, 
and not A.” It has always been a matter of how the political executive can take the real 
power, because otherwise, the concept of a sort of partnership between the bureaucratic 
                                                 
404 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant, 10 November 2010. Rudolph and Rudolph speak of the 
‘neutrality’ versus ‘commitment’ dichotomy in some detail (1987: 78-82). 
405 Interview with HFA533, former civil servant, 15 October 2009.  
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executive and the political executive, this was breaking down. As the bureaucracy tended to 
be a little higher because of their own professional inputs, it had become very difficult for 
single ministers to overrule [it].”406  
 
In the context of the enactment of the RTI Act, the implications of such institutional changes 
are starkly visible, if only to show the extent to which the influence of the permanent 
bureaucracy on the policy-making process has been reimagined over the last couple of 
decades. If until the enactment of the FoI Act in 2002, the Committee of Secretaries (as an 
emblematic example of bureaucratic power) had jousted with successive Groups of Ministers 
(with some success), once the UPA government came to power in 2004, the CoS played 
virtually no role in the process as the draft RTI legislation was sent by the NAC to the PMO, 
which in turn sent it to the nodal ministry, which was expected to merely go through the 
procedural paces.407  
                                                 
406 Interview with NXW937, former civil servant, 17 December 2009.  
407 The choice of the PMO over the Cabinet Secretary’s office is itself a telling example of the shift in relative 
power between the political executive as represented by the former, and the head of the permanent executive as 
represented by the latter. It is also not surprising therefore that if the most powerful bureaucrat in the country 
used to be the Cabinet Secretary, now it is considered to be the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, a post 
currently held by Pulok Chatterjee (who finds mention in Chapter 4 as well). “Earlier this week, a committee of 
secretaries was set up under Chatterjee - not Cabinet Secretary Ajit Kumar Seth, as is the norm - to chalk out a 
time-bound action plan on coal and gas shortage, cheap imported coal, hike in power tariffs and for unleashing 
the second generation of power reforms. Chatterjee is also coordinating with crucial ministries, a job usually 
assigned to the Cabinet Secretary. Though Seth and Chatterjee are from the same Uttar Pradesh IAS cadre, it is 
increasingly becoming clear that it would be the Principal Secretary and not the Cabinet Secretary who will call 
the shots on the economy and derailment of economic reforms.” From “India’s second most powerful person”, 
The New Indian Express, 22 January 2012. Another example of the ways in which the political executive, 
supported by ‘compliant’ bureaucrats, has sought to further disempower the permanent executive is by 
instructing that “A copy of the draft [cabinet] note should necessarily be forwarded to the Prime Minister’s 
Office at the time when notes are sent for inter-ministerial consultations… The fact that a copy of the note was 
forwarded to PMO and their comments, if received, were taken into account while finalizing the note for the 
Cabinet/Cabinet Committee may be indicated in the forwarding communication sent to the Cabinet Secretariat, 
but the details of the views of PMO should not be made in the body of the note for consideration of the 
Cabinet/Cabinet Committees. The fact that the draft note had been sent to PMO, can, however, be mentioned in 
the paragraph on interministerial consultations without referring to what comments were received from PMO” 
(Government of India, 2011: 15-16). In effect, this means that while a ministry may make a policy proposal, it is 
no longer at liberty to place on record any political interventions that may affect its substance, a clever ploy to 
exercise political power without its attendant responsibility on the part of the PMO. Meanwhile, the permanent 
bureaucracy must take responsibility for any negative fallout of such a political intervention should it later arise.  
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The NAC itself had no constitutional or procedural authority, but wielded immense political 
power, headed as it was by Sonia Gandhi.408 In many ways, the NAC could be seen as the 
culmination of the evolution of the impulse to wrest influence away from the bureaucracy, 
perhaps even the government, and locate it within the political class. “These people wanted to 
bypass the formal structure of government - the ministry, the secretary, the minister 
concerned, the Group of Ministers, the Cabinet - this is the formal structure... The NAC was a 
device, particularly because the lady [Sonia Gandhi] was not a part of government. [The 
question was] how to make that lady the de facto PM without actually her having to take the 
responsibility of the PM and doing the day to day work of the PM. Why did it come about 
and was not opposed very strongly? Because they said, we will also take into account a cross 
section of opinions, we’ll put one NGO, we’ll put one activist, we’ll put various shades of 
opinion. And it will be an eminent body with people who have done well in their own 
fields.”409 It is quite instructive to observe that several themes that have arisen previously in 
this thesis find sublimation in this perspective on the NAC viz. the necessity of seeking its 
legitimacy through the incorporation of ‘civil society’410; the argument of ‘eminence’ to 
justify its composition411; the social profile of its members412; and the bypassing of existing 
procedural norms as well as institutional actors in the policy-making process413. Further, it 
was also proposed that the selection of those invited to join the NAC was defined by the 
‘acceptability’ of their views, if not to further a larger political agenda. “I see [activists] as a 
pressure group, and these pressure groups are used quite often by political parties to put 
forward their point of view.”414 
                                                 
408 As discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  
409 Interview with NXW937, former civil servant, 17 December 2009.  
410 Akin to the legitimacy claimed by government committees that include non-government representatives.  
411 Similar to the argument proposed in the process of choosing the non-governmental members of the H.D. 
Shourie Committee.  
412 See Annexure V for details of the members of the NAC which resonates tremendously with the social profile 
of the established leadership of the ‘movement’ for an RTI Act (as discussed in Chapter 4).  
413 Similar to GoMs, which were eventually institutionalised. 
414 Interview with EFD094, former civil servant, 24 November 2009. Emphasis in interview.  
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The ‘Right Climate’ 
 
Given the discussion above, it could be proposed that on the three themes related to the 
bureaucratic resistance to the RTI Act mentioned above, the permanent executive may have 
indeed lost the battle, but this cannot be attributed merely to ‘pressures from below’.415 
Rather, structural changes related to the social composition of the higher bureaucracy, in 
conjunction with the greater assumption of power and influence by the political executive 
specifically and the political class generally, may have a more direct causal relationship with 
these outcomes. It was not as if the celebrated ‘steel frame’ of the country had been tamed by 
the collective will of the people, but it is more likely that an already emasculated entity had 
inevitably capitulated to the pressures of political processes that were far beyond its ability to 
resist. And yet, even such an emaciated and marginalised bureaucracy did win one battle at 
least - it succeeded in preventing the law from being extended to the private sector. How and 
why did this come to be, and what implications does this have?  
 
To answer this question, one must return to the issue of the social composition of the higher 
civil service and extend it further. If the bureaucracy is no longer being inhabited by the 
traditional upper caste, upper-middle class, urban elite, what spaces has this elite moved 
into?416 An important clue came to the fore during the data collection process for this 
research. None of the children of the 17 senior IAS officers (ranging from the batches of 1959 
to 1975) interviewed as a part of this research had joined the civil services at any level.417 
Most of these ‘IAS-kids’ worked for large multi-national corporations, private sector banks 
and other financial institutions, with a few having become journalists or academics, whether 
                                                 
415 The three issues being the nature of the review and appellate mechanisms, the extent of sanctions on errant 
officials, and the nature of exemptions to the law.  
416 There are significant overlaps between this elite and the elites defined in Chapter 4.  
417 The children of these bureaucrats themselves constituting the same elite.  
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in India or abroad.418 Although limited research on the profile of entrants into the higher civil 
services exists (as discussed above), no study has comprehensively analysed the caste, 
educational and social profile of the managerial class within the private sector in India, 
particularly with respect to disaggregating data by the occupation of the parents of 
respondents. However, a smattering of small-n sector-specific studies do show that the 
managerial class in the private sector is, at the very least, overwhelmingly upper caste and 
belongs to the middle and upper-middle classes.419 A recent study also shows that decision 
makers within the national media based in Delhi belong overwhelmingly to the upper 
castes.420 For example, high caste Hindus including Brahmins, Kayasthas, Rajputs, Vaishyas 
and Khatris occupy about 86% of the key decision making positions in the media. Of these, 
Brahmins alone constitute 49% of the key media personnel. Not even one of the 315 key 
decision-makers surveyed in the study belonged to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled 
Tribes, while only 4% had an OBC background. This does not necessarily mean that the 
social composition of the managerial class in the private sector and the media was 
substantially different prior to the changes taking place in the higher bureaucracy. What it 
does point to however, is that with the expansion of the private sector and the media over the 
past two decades, that elite fraction of the middle class that previously dominated the higher 
bureaucracy has now shifted its location to the private sector and the media.421  
 
When one juxtaposes these observations with the fourth bone of contention in the enactment 
process, it no longer comes as a surprise that the then senior bureaucracy that was involved in 
                                                 
418 Although I have not found any data on this, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is also a concurrent 
phenomenon of an increased rate of attrition of serving officers of the IAS, where mid-level officers resign from 
the service to take up lucrative positions in large multi-national companies. Apart from managerial experience, 
an additional attraction for such companies to hire former IAS officers is their ability to help the companies 
negotiate officialdom and garner large public contracts through their networks formed during their ‘service’ 
years.  
419 See Upadhya and Vasavi (2006) and Upadhya (2007).  
420 See Chamaria et al (2006). 
421 This resonates with the economic liberalisation as an ‘elite revolt’ thesis after Corbridge and Harriss (2000).  
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the process of the drafting of the RTI Act itself supported the cause of the private sector. The 
debate on the ambit of the RTI Act was primarily (and quite early in the process) restricted to 
greater government transparency (and not greater transparency of all institutions that affect 
public interest, including those within the private sector, or political parties, or for that matter 
the media), even as several functions of the mai-baap sarkar of yore were being privatised.422 
The climate was indeed right, for the state was in retreat, with the market scoring important 
victories over it.423 In such a climate, it also comes as no surprise that significant support for 
such a ‘people’s demand’ for greater government accountability came from the mainstream 
English-language media, led as it was with the elite fraction of the middle class, which was 
no longer vested in the state as it once was.424  
 
In sum, the timing of the enactment and the final form that the Act took must be seen in 
conjunction with each other to gain a nuanced understanding of the contours of this ‘right 
climate’. The early 1990s is then a critical period in the process for two very important 
reasons - the launch of the economic reforms project, along with the implementation of the 
Mandal Commission report that would further democratise the higher civil services. It is 
therefore only to be expected that the efforts to bring in greater government accountability 
that predated 1991 did not amount to anything substantial. At this point, the elite fraction of 
the middle class was still vested in the state, even as the democratisation of the higher civil 
service was relatively predictable and contained. That the early articulations of the legislation 
also envisaged the inclusion of the private sector directly within its ambit only serves to 
                                                 
422 Importantly, the RTI Act has largely been produced as a potential tool to hold the government, particularly 
the lower bureaucracy to account. Most campaigns, whether of government or NGO provenance, highlight the 
potential use of the RTI to ask information on service delivery concerns, rather than more political questions.  
423 See Kohli (2012) for a recent commentary on this phenomenon.  
424 An emblematic example is that of Sagarika Ghose, a career journalist and currently the Deputy Editor of 
CNN-IBN, a popular English language television news channel. Married to Rajdeep Sardesai, who is the Editor-
in-Chief of the same channel, she is the daughter of Bhaskar Ghose, an IAS officer of the 1960 batch who 
retired in 1998. Prior to retiring, he also held the position of Secretary, Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting. Unsurprisingly, both father and daughter are alumni of St. Stephen’s College, Delhi (see Chapter 
4 on the St. Stephen’s ‘phenomenon’).  
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strengthen this proposition from a different direction. Once it was obvious that the higher 
bureaucracy was no longer going to remain the preserve of this elite fraction of the middle 
class, concomitant as it was with the launch of the reforms project which imagined a greater 
role for the market vis-à-vis the state, the momentum for greater government transparency 
gained an inexorable momentum. The private sector, on the other hand, now could not be 
overtly placed within the radar of the legislation, for this was the space where the class that 
previously dominated the higher bureaucracy was moving into.  
 
Some Preliminary Conclusions 
 
Taking the twin issues of timing and content as a point of departure, the discussion can now 
return to the questions that the preceding chapter ended with. The celebratory discourse 
around the RTI Act is essentially founded on the proposition that it fundamentally alters the 
citizen-state relationship, and in that is an intensely political idea.425 However, if the nature 
and composition of the state itself is undergoing fundamental transformations, to what extent 
does this claim ring true? If the state itself is in retreat - its ‘traditional’ responsibilities being 
relocated to other actors, along with the established policy-making process being 
circumvented (in part due to the elites disinvesting from the bureaucracy), to what extent is 
increased government accountability through mechanisms such as the RTI Act a meaningful 
political exercise of democratic deepening? Had an effective legislation (similar to the current 
RTI Act) with its ambit limited only to public authorities been enacted prior to 1990, it could 
indeed have been considered as the victory of a ‘political’ idea. Conversely, had the current 
(post-1990) RTI Act incorporated the private sector (and through that the media as well) 
within its purview, that too could have been considered to be an ‘audacious reform’, and very 
                                                 
425 Even as the demand and the events surrounding its realisation being within the realm of political society was 
questioned in the preceding chapter.  
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politically so. With neither of these being true, the assertion that the RTI Act fundamentally 
alters the structure and location of power cannot be seen as an unquestionable truth. At best, 
perhaps it could be seen as an example of locking the stable doors after the horse has bolted. 
A more sinister reading would perhaps imagine the RTI Act as an important element within a 
larger project of the ring-fencing of the state. Every successful use of the RTI Act to unearth 
government corruption has led to a reiteration of the state being a venal, arbitrary, and 
inefficient entity. While this is a worthwhile exercise in itself, this has also had an 
(un)intended consequence of strengthening the discourse that promotes a ‘less-state, more-
market’ model of development. This profound irony has been completely ignored in the 
narratives that produce the RTI Act as an emblematic example of democratic deepening in 
India.  
 
Returning to the more proximate concerns highlighted in this chapter, what can be gleaned 
from a more nuanced understanding of the role that the state played in the process of the 
enactment of the RTI Act? In the first instance, the dominant view that relegates the role of 
the state as being primarily reactionary and resistant needs to be revisited. The implications 
of this are important. The state does not merely react to pressures from below. It also initiates 
processes of political change. This may occur as a result of ‘reform champions’, or because 
the ‘climate is right’. However, this appears to contradict the preceding assertion. If the state 
is the ‘prime mover’ in processes of political change, then it cannot at the same time be 
considered to be weak.  
 
This apparent contradiction can be resolved if the discussion is taken beyond the conceptual 
category of the state, and into the larger category of ‘power’. In this sense, the state remains 
but one location of power, even as the spaces that such power is located in are in a constant 
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state of flux. At the same time, those dominating these spaces of power constitute the ruling 
elite at any given moment in time, and one way to identify the location of power is to follow 
the movement of the ruling elite. This is not to say that the ‘ruling elite’ itself is an immutable 
category. An upward movement into the rarefied world of the ruling elite can and does take 
place, but this occurs at the margins and over generations, even as the defining attributes of 
this elite remains the same. The old rich were themselves nouveau riche once, but the social 
and cultural attributes that define the old rich remain the same.  
 
If prior to 1991 the bureaucracy was an important location of political power, the 
outmigration of the ruling elite from it, along with the reimagining of the role of the state has 
meant that the location of power is changing. “In that sense power has shifted to two 
categories, politicians and businessmen. Bureaucrats realise that as the economy matures, 
they become less relevant. Deal-making then of course gets confined to smaller numbers and 
higher sums. Ultimately, the politician and the businessman have a dialogue, they don’t need 
the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat now is the fellow who provides data, information and in the 
areas where there is no political angle, his advice can be accepted. The businessman has also 
realised that he does not need an interlocutor. If money is to be paid to the politicians, there is 
no reason why you should have a bureaucrat in between, and then of course you have muscle 
power... and then the businessman decided that it’s even easier to enter politics as a means of 
insurance.”426 In the context of the RTI Act, the state then becomes complicit in this process 
of relocation of power. To ensure the legitimacy of this move, it then becomes imperative to 
bring on board ‘independent’ and civil voices, themselves possessing the attributes of the 
                                                 
426 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant, 24 November 2009. A recent study carried out by the National 
Social Watch Coalition reported that “128 out of the 543 members of the 15th Lok Sabha belonged to the 
business class”. This included Vijay Mallya, a Member of Parliament from the Rajya Sabha. The owner of 
Kingfisher Airlines, he was quite conveniently on the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Civil Aviation. See 
“Su Casa Es Mi Casa”, Outlook magazine, 21 May 2012.  
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ruling elite, even as the process is produced as a shining example of a responsive and 
sensitive state.  
 
The above does not propose that the state in India has been completely emasculated and 
wields no power. As long as the formal structures of democracy continue to be in place, the 
political class will need to derive its legitimacy from within the scaffolding of the state. 
However, the nature of political power is essentially reflexive, in that political power is the 
ability to exert influence and direct social and economic processes to ensure that it remains 
with the holders at any given moment in time. In this context, the role of the state in the 
process of enactment of the RTI Act only appears to reinforce this assertion. Early reformist 
elements within the apparatus of the state failed to achieve greater government transparency, 
not least because sections of the ruling elite were still vested in the state through the 
domination of the higher bureaucracy. Once this section of the ruling elite had to relocate to 
new spaces, the resistance to the idea plummeted, as long as the demand for accountability 
would not be extended to the spaces it was to relocate to. The temporally and substantively 
differentiated bureaucratic resistance (as described above) then, was the ability of the ruling 
elite to protect its own interests, and took on forms related to the spaces it occupied at a given 
moment in time. That political parties were never imagined to fall directly within the purview 
of the RTI Act lends further credence to this proposition. Further, the RTI Act in its current 
form “does not affect the political class. They have a huge plethora of weapons. They have a 
hundred pots to eat from. If one or two are sealed off as a result of the RTI Act, it will not 
affect them.”427 Meanwhile, the democratisation of the higher bureaucracy has also meant 
that the bureaucratic space is now less able to influence political power, not least through 
limits imposed on it by mechanisms such as the RTI Act. In other words, even as the ruling 
                                                 
427 Interview with HFA533, former civil servant, 15 October 2009. 
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elite was previously manifested in the politician-business-bureaucrat alliance, it has now 
coalesced within the former two spaces, with the bureaucratic space having been vacated for 
those lower in the pecking order, their role being relegated to that of statisticians with the 
‘public’s’ RTI-tinted gaze focused firmly upon them. 
 
Finally, we must return to the slogans that the Hazare campaign threw up (mentioned at the 
commencement of this chapter). The days of the mai-baap sarkar may indeed be over. 
However, that familial relationship has also moved - to the relationship between the political 
class and the government. Sonia Gandhi is indeed the mother of the government, which 
therefore must discharge its obligations of filial duty. The governmental apparatus therefore 
did indeed respond in a suitably deferential manner to the push coming from the Gandhi-led 
NAC in the context of the RTI Act. And Manmohan Singh as the uncle of the government did 
seek and receive obeisance from a perhaps not-so-recalcitrant bureaucracy. To his credit, he 
tried to protect his flock (by attempting to keep file notings within the ‘family’). But family 
dynamics are capricious. The mother intervened.  
 
At this juncture, and with no reference to the origins of the mother, we turn to the third 
silence identified in the dominant narrative, that of the role of international processes in the 
enactment of the RTI Act. 
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Chapter 6 
The Foreign Hand 
 
“The West has today opened its doors, 
There are treasures for us to take. 
We will take and we will also give, 
From the open shores of India’s immense humanity.” 
- Extract from Rabindranath Tagore’s poem Bharat Tirtha, quoted by Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh428 
 
“We are now emerging as one of the important players on the world stage. There are many 
forces that would not like to see India realize its true place in the Comity of Nations. We must 
not play into their hands.” 
- Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India429 
 
Rabindranath Tagore wrote the poem “Bharat Tirtha” (“The Pilgrimage That is India”) in 
1911. In 2005, the Prime Minister of India referred to it when accepting an honorary Doctor 
of Civil Law degree from his alma mater, the University of Oxford. Six years later, and 
precisely one hundred years after the poem was written, the worldview of the same Prime 
Minister (now in his second term in office) appeared to have changed somewhat. In the 
context of allegations made by his party spokesperson that ‘foreign support’ had been 
extended to the Lokpal movement, Mr. Singh seemed to have forgotten his earlier invocation 
of Tagore. Outside ‘forces’ were not only a source of treasures, but could also be weaving a 
sinister plot to prevent India from claiming its rightful place at the international high-table. 
Six years in office, it would seem, had resulted in politics triumphing over poetry.430  
 
                                                 
428 This specific extract and translation was quoted by the Prime Minister in his acceptance speech at the 
University of Oxford upon being awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Civil Law on 8 July 2005.  
429 From the statement made by the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, to the Parliament on 17 August 2011, 
after Anna Hazare had been arrested in Delhi in the context of the agitation for a Lokpal Bill.  
430 Some months later, the Prime Minister’s concerns about outside forces were reiterated, albeit this time in the 
context of a proposed nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu. “Foreign hand nuking Tamil Nadu nuclear power 
project, says Prime Minister Manmohan Singh”, headline in Mail Today newspaper, 24 February 2012.  
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Although the relationship between politics and poetry is something that this thesis cannot 
dwell upon at any great length, Tagore’s poetry, his politics reflected therein, and his 
relationship with the Indian freedom struggle pose questions that are relevant to this thesis. In 
response to Gandhi’s call for non-cooperation, Tagore had said “The idea of India is against 
the intense consciousness of the separateness of one’s own people from others, and which 
inevitably leads to ceaseless conflicts... Let us be rid of all false pride and rejoice at any lamp 
being lit at any corner of the world, knowing that it is a part of the common illumination of 
our house” (Rabindranath Tagore, quoted in Guha, 1999). In response, Gandhi stated, “‘I 
hope I am as great a believer in free air as the great Poet. I do not want my house to be walled 
in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown 
about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any” (M.K. 
Gandhi, quoted in Guha, 1999).431  
 
This exchange provides us with useful clues when examining the third of the silences in the 
dominant narrative that seeks to explain the enactment of the RTI Act in India in 2005 (as 
identified in Chapter 3). To what extent, if any, did ‘lamps lit’ in other parts of the world 
influence the process in India? If international actors and process did indeed play a role, what 
was its nature? If there were external influences, then for what reasons is the dominant 
narrative pointedly silent on this aspect of the process? Do the reasons lie in the nature of the 
influences, or on local and international political realities? Was it a ‘give and take’, or was 
India ‘blown off its feet’ and ‘played into the hands’ of outside forces? Do these opposing 
pulls of acknowledgement and denial point to other anxieties that underpin the discourse on 
democratic deepening? Given that this is a recurring trope (from the independence struggle to 
more proximate ‘movements’), using the RTI Act as a lens to examine such questions may 
                                                 
431 As Guha’s essay points out, the second and third sentences of Gandhi’s statement have been oft-quoted out 
of context positing him as a great internationalist, a selective interpretation to say the least.  
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provide us with a more nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between the local 
and the global, the domestic and the international, the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ when 
investigating processes of social change in a post-colonial democratic polity.  
 
The Dominant Narrative: Mostly Home, a Little Away 
 
The dominant narrative that seeks to explain the reasons behind the enactment of the RTI Act 
in India unequivocally asserts that the process was exclusively ‘home-grown’, that it was 
almost completely insulated from external influences, and that this characteristic makes the 
Indian case exceptional and inspiring, especially as such a process deepens democracy more 
meaningfully. That this assertion is made not only by the established leadership of the 
‘people’s movement’ for an RTI Act, but is also endorsed by international actors, the 
mainstream media, some sections of the government, as well as existing research, has meant 
that this version of events is now considered to be an inviolable truth. In the telling of this 
‘truth’, the sheer absence of international trends, processes, or actors in this narrative is 
striking. In practically all of the literature that currently exists on the RTI Act in India 
(regardless of its source), there is barely a mention of the possibility of external entities 
having had any influence on the process that led to the enactment of the RTI Act in India.432 
The narrative limits itself to speaking of the ‘grassroots movement’, and at most extends the 
genesis of the RTI Act to the environmental movement of the 1980s.433 In this sense, the 
grassroots is conflated with the local (inhabited by marginalised, poor, and often illiterate 
people) - a radically different image compared to the transnational, networked, intellectual 
elites that have typically played a significant role in advocating for an FoI legislation in other 
                                                 
432 This literature was reviewed in Chapter 3.  
433 As reviewed in Chapter 3 and critically examined in Chapter 4.  
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counties.434 The resounding silence around the role of international actors and processes has 
thus allowed the Indian experience to be produced as a rare bottom-up process in stark 
contrast to the ubiquitous top-down processes that have typically informed the growth of FoI 
legislation across the world. In this context, this chapter is somewhat different from the 
previous two. While the silences examined in Chapters 4 and 5 took the claims made in the 
dominant narrative (on the role of the grassroots and the state) as a point of departure and 
offered alternative perspectives on the same, this chapter primarily engages with the silence 
around the influence of international processes and actors on the Indian RTI Act in a literal 
sense. There is, literally, a gargantuan gap in the dominant narrative on this issue, and 
therefore this chapter is qualitatively different from the preceding two in that it attempts to fill 
in a silence, rather than highlight alternative perspectives to existing claims.  
 
The concern around this silence is echoed in possibly the only paper to mention the 
international context (albeit cursorily) in relation to the Indian RTI Act. “How exactly did 
transnational institutions and processes affect the Indian movement? It is hard to answer this 
question because Campaign activists prefer to highlight the indigenous roots of RTI 
initiatives and emphasize that the process leading up to the Indian legislation was 
qualitatively different from that in other countries” (Baviskar, 2007: 20). That all existing 
analyses have drawn primarily on the perspectives of ‘campaign activists’ has meant that the 
question posed by Baviskar has been largely ignored.435 In the few instances where there is a 
reference to the international in the context of the explanatory narrative of the RTI Act in 
India, it exists only to explicitly negate its role, and reiterate that the Indian experience was 
largely unaffected by related events in other parts of the world, and is therefore exceptional.  
                                                 
434 See Blanton (2002a, 2002b), Roberts (2003), Banisar (2005, 2006), Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros 
(2006), Szekely (2007) and Obe (2007) for the role of such an elite in the RTI-related narratives pertaining to 
other countries.  
435 A silence that may have been highlighted, but left unexamined by Baviskar as well.  
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An example of such an analysis is Singh (2011), the most recent and detailed published 
account of ‘the genesis and evolution of the RTI regime in India’. In the paper, Singh 
suggests that “the impetus for operationalising the right to information... arose primarily out 
of the failure of the government to prevent corruption and to ensure effective and empathetic 
governance. The role, if any, of international agencies was marginal” (Singh, 2011: 45). A 
key ‘campaign activist’ respondent proposed a more expansive conceptualisation of 
international influences. “In India we are so immunised to what is happening abroad. I’ve 
been a part of this from the early 1980s and I’ve not even been aware of where there is an 
RTI Act and where there is not. One never looked out.”436 Such a perspective emanating from 
part of the established leadership of the ‘RTI movement’ - that the demand for an RTI Act in 
India grew primarily from the grassroots (and the ‘movement’ was therefore essentially 
‘local’), and that commonalities with international events were at best a mere coincidence - 
have been endorsed by the growing literature arising from the academic as well as 
international actor spaces, which hold up the Indian case as an exceptional one. “Unlike 
nearly every other country’s campaign for greater access to information access, spearheaded 
by middle-class professionals, India’s drive was fueled from the grassroots up (Florini, 2007: 
10). A regularly cited World Bank Institute commissioned research paper speaks of “the 
strictly “grassroots, home-grown” nature of the right-to-information movement across 
[India]” (Puddephatt, 2009: 25).437  
 
Similar endorsements litter the discourse emanating from international agencies and INGOs 
and posit the exceptionality of the Indian case against the experiences of other countries 
                                                 
436 Interview with YDS558, 13 January 2009.  
437 That the World Bank commissioned a paper on “Exploring the Role of Civil Society in the Formulation and 
Adoption of Access to Information Laws” is revealing in itself. Another example is the similarly titled UNDP 
publication, “Civil Society and Right to Information: A Perspective on India’s Experience” (Sharma, 2004). I 
have yet to come across a paper (commissioned or otherwise) that explicitly explores the role of international 
actors and agencies in the rise of FoI laws. The reasons behind such a silence are explored later in this chapter. 
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where other non-grassroots, non-local causal factors have been explicitly acknowledged. 
“Freedom of information laws are promoted in many ways, from top-down examples (as in 
Mexico, where a regime change led to excellent freedom of information legislation) to 
grassroots approaches (as in Rajasthan)” (World Bank, 2004: 1). “India is one of the only 
places in the Commonwealth where there has been strong grassroots mobilisation specifically 
around the issue of the right to information” (CHRI, 2003: 66, emphasis added). “India’s 
experience shows that an effective ATI [Access to Information] act can unleash a powerful 
movement of bottom-up accountability. In India ATI has enabled grassroots groups to obtain 
key information about government programs and demand their entitlements.”438 “It is often 
assumed that right to information laws are only of interest to the urban elites, or those 
concerned with policy-making. However, one of the most imaginative campaign histories can 
be found in India in which a grassroots organization was able to successfully illustrate the 
link between a lack of transparency and corruption” (UNDP, 2004: 16). “In India, the 
movement for right to information has been as vibrant in the hearts of marginalised people as 
it is on the pages of academic journals and in media coverage” (Article 19, 2001: 56).  
 
Although the production of the established narrative can be traced primarily to ‘campaign 
activists, international agencies, academia, and mainstream media spaces (as identified in 
Chapter 3), it is interesting to note in several instances, sections of the government endorsed 
this version of events.439 “The Indian legislation on the right to information is the result of a 
popular grassroots struggle for effective governance” (Central Information Commission, 
2006: 8, emphasis added) and the “campaign started by some prominent social groups like 
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and the National Campaign for the People’s Right 
                                                 
438 Extract from the speech of Sanjay Pradhan, Vice President, the World Bank Institute, at The African 
Regional Conference on the Right of Access to Information organized by The Carter Center, 7-9 February 2010, 
Accra.  
439 A vast majority of internal government papers invoke the ‘international experience’, but these are typically 
not acknowledged in the production of the dominant narrative.  
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to Information, took concrete shape when in January, 1997 the Government set up a Working 
Group on “Right to Information and Transparency”” (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2005: 3) are 
two emblematic examples. Further, with the establishment of the Indian case as an outlier in 
this regard, several other countries, particularly within the South Asian region, appear to be 
almost apologetic about their individual national trajectories in this context. For example, in 
the case of Bangladesh “The [RTI] law was passed through the efforts, effective lobbying and 
advocacy of many civil society organisations, academia, media, researchers and legal experts. 
It was not preceded by a grassroots level awareness and mobilization as in India” (Anam, 
2011: 2).440  
 
In sum, the existing explanatory narrative around the RTI Act in India proposes that the 
Indian experience is particularly noteworthy as not only can its roots be traced to the dusty 
weather-beaten paths of rural India, but also because the process was divorced from any 
perceptible international influences or trends. It is this defining characteristic of the Indian 
‘struggle’ for an RTI Act that accords it an almost mythical status within FoI-related 
advocacy, academic and activist spheres. Top-down, elite-led, externally influenced 
democratic ‘deepening’ after all, presents a far less attractive image compared to a bottom-up 
local struggle that succeeds in wresting power from above.  
 
 
                                                 
440 A respondent highlighted the negative consequences at the global level of promoting the claim that the Indian 
RTI Act was a result of a people’s movement, and had little to do with international processes. “It is doing 
disservice [to the cause]... Now there is this feeling that unless you have a mass movement like India, you can’t 
have an RTI Act... This is a myth. There was no mass movement that brought about this thing [in India]”. 
Interview with YDS558, 9 October 2011.  
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National Waters in a Global Flood 
 
This particular version of the ‘truth’ calls out for deeper examination, not least because of the 
timing of the enactment of the RTI Act in India. In 1990, only fourteen countries had some 
sort of a law that provided citizens with a formal and legal procedure to access government 
information. In 2010, this number stood at eighty four.441 In addition, another fifty countries 
seem to be on their way to enacting such legislation.442 Some international organisations, 
including the World Bank, have of late begun to draft disclosure policies somewhat on the 
lines of national FoI laws.443 Clearly, there seems to be a well-established global trend of 
adopting national (and international) FoI legislation and policies across the world, 
particularly over the last two decades.  
 
Figure 6.1:  Growth in the number of countries with Freedom of Information laws444 
 
                                                 
441 See Vleugels (2010).  
442 Ibid.  
443 For the World Bank’s disclosure policy, see http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/disclosure/policy.html. 
For an interview of Isabel Guerrero, Vice-President for South Asia at the World Bank, which was published in 
the April 2010 issue of Civil Society magazine, on how India’s RTI Act has inspired the World Bank’s 
disclosure policy, see http://go.worldbank.org/99PC5A8EA0. Accessed 10 October 2010.  
444 Data by year in which law came into force. Prior to 1950, only two countries, viz. Sweden and Colombia had 
such a law. While the history of the Swedish law is relatively well documented, the Colombian case remains a 
bit of a mystery, at least in the literature and resources available in English.  
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As the figure above suggests, the trend takes a sharp upward trajectory around the late 1990s, 
which continues up to the present without showing any signs of abating. Given this, it is 
mystifying that the dominant narrative that seeks to explain the enactment of the RTI Act in 
India in 2005 does not even acknowledge the presence of this global trend, far less identify 
any relationship between the two. This becomes all the more puzzling as the enactment of the 
RTI Act in India falls almost squarely in the middle of the high-growth phase of the 
enactment of such laws across the world. Could it indeed be possible that India was so 
insulated from a global trend that continues to overwhelm scores of countries around the 
world, and that the timing of the enactment of the RTI Act is therefore a mere coincidence? 
Or was there indeed a relationship between the national and the international processes that 
requires further examination? In the event that such a relationship did indeed exist, what was 
its nature, and why should the dominant narrative ignore it so pointedly?  
 
This chapter will attempt to answer these and other related questions by first examining the 
claim that international influences did not play any notable role in the enactment of the RTI 
Act in India. Data for this line of inquiry have been culled from government papers, 
documents sourced from civil society actors, as well as interviews with relevant individuals 
that span both the government and civil society spaces. After assessing the extent of the 
influence of the ‘outside’ on the Indian case, the chapter will then link it to the normative 
framework underlying the spectacular rise of FoI as an idea, both in India as well as globally. 
The chapter will finally attempt to explain why the dominant narrative is largely silent on the 
role of international processes on the enactment of the RTI Act in India and what 
implications this has on the democratic deepening debate. For reasons articulated in the 
preceding chapters, the anonymity of individual sources has been ensured throughout this 
chapter.  
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Ghare-Baire (The Home and the World)445 
 
 The Argument for Freedom of Information 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the first documented artefact that explicitly articulated the 
demand for an FoI legislation in India was the affidavit filed in the Supreme Court by 
Kalpavriksh, an environmental NGO, “for the limited purpose of bringing on record and 
submitting the various facts and issues concerning the Right to Know”.446 Section III of the 
affidavit dwelt significantly on “The right to know or the freedom of access to information in 
some of the other democracies”.447 These included Sweden, where “for over two hundred 
years the Constitution has provided for open access to official documents and full 
information to any citizen about administrative activities”;448 Denmark and Norway where 
“citizens must identify and request specific documents. This means that they must know that 
a document exists before they can ask for it”;449 Finland, France, the Netherlands, Canada 
and the USA.450 Salient features of the respective FoI legislation in each of these countries 
were highlighted in the affidavit. Importantly, this affidavit was the first of the background 
papers for the ‘famous’ workshop held in Mussoorie in 1995 where the now-established 
leadership of the RTI movement in India had foregathered. The country case studies 
mentioned in the affidavit highlighted several of the main themes which would later emerge 
in the debate on the content of the RTI Act in the Indian context, including response times to 
                                                 
445 Ghare-Baire was a novel written by Rabindranath Tagore in 1916, later adapted into a film directed by 
Satyajit Ray. Apart from several other themes, the novel also highlighted Tagore’s internal dilemmas with 
respect to Western culture.  
446 Affidavit on behalf of Kalpavriksh Environmental Action Group, Writ Petition No. 12739 of 1985 in the 
Matter of M.C. Mehta (Petitioner) versus Union of India and Others (Respondents) in the Supreme Court of 
India. Pp. 1.  
447 Ibid. Pp. 17.  
448 Ibid. Pp. 17-18.  
449 Ibid. Pp. 18.  
450 The affidavit cited Secrecy in Government, edited by T.N. Chaturvedi and published by the IIPA in 1980 (as 
mentioned in the preceding chapter) as the source for these case studies.  
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requests for information, exemptions, sanctions for non-disclosure, the nature of appellate 
mechanisms, and public awareness and sensitisation. For example, the affidavit dwelt at 
length on the American Freedom of Information Act (1966), particularly in the context of the 
duty of industrial firms, whether publicly or privately owned, to disclose environmental 
information. In this context, the affidavit cited extensively from a paper published in The New 
England Journal of Medicine,451 and concluded that the “disclosure of documents, whether 
held by the State (or industrial firms) is the rule and not the exception in various other 
democracies of the world”.452 The relief sought from the Supreme Court reflected this 
position and the affidavit strongly emphasised the need for a legal obligation to be placed on 
industrial firms to disclose relevant information.453  
 
This looking outward to ‘learn’ from other countries influenced other early events as well, 
including the “Workshop on Freedom of Information and Official Secrecy” organised by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi in March 1990 
(referred to in the preceding chapter), where the Australian, Swedish, Canadian and 
American FoI laws were discussed at length. In 1991, Prof. Manubhai Shah, Managing 
Trustee and Ms. Pritee Shah, Deputy Manager, Education and Research, Consumer 
Education and Research Centre (CERC), an NGO working on consumer rights in 
Ahmedabad, were funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Canada 
to travel to the USA, the UK and Canada to study the access to information regimes in each 
of these countries. Their report titled “A Study on the Access to Information in U.S., Canada 
                                                 
451 The paper referred to was “The Right to Know About Toxic Exposures: Implications for Physicians” 
authored by Jay. S. Himmelstein and Howard Frumkin, The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 312, March 
14, 1985, pp. 687.  
452 Affidavit on Behalf of Kalpavriksh Environmental Action Group, Writ Petition No. 12739 of 1985 in the 
Matter of M.C. Mehta (Petitioner) versus Union of India and Others (Respondents) in the Supreme Court of 
India. Pp. 26. 
453 This concern around hazardous industries and the direct responsibility of private industrial actors to 
proactively disclose information to the state as well as to the general public was reflected in the CERC draft FoI 
bill. It is another matter that the RTI Act of 2005 does not explicitly cover private entities, the reasons behind 
which were discussed in Chapter 5 and will continue to be elaborated in this chapter.  
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and U.K.” was published in the journal published by CERC, Consumer Confrontation, over 
1991-92. This report was subsequently considered by the Shourie Committee in 1997. In 
1995, CERC published a paper (funded by a German foundation that promotes ‘liberal 
politics’, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung) titled “Judicial Pronouncements on Access to 
Information”, which inter alia located the need for an RTI Act within India’s obligations as a 
signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1976, with respect to freedom of speech and 
expression. A year later, in 1996, CERC was the first entity to draft and propose a complete 
draft of an FoI legislation for India. Given that this was also the year that the NCPRI was 
formed, the testimony of Shekhar Singh (as founder-member of the organisation) in this 
context is insightful. “The process started in 1996. The paradigms were those that had been 
set up in international best practices. It wasn’t as if any one of us said let’s sit down and think 
what will be an Indian RTI Act. We looked at the international best practices - minimum 
exclusions, maximum coverage. Those were the paradigms that were used. And there is 
nothing to suggest that our law is [any] different. In fact if you look at the other laws, the 
American law and many others, there are structural similarities. The whole Information 
Commission institution we took from Canada to make it stronger.”454 The international 
experience, limited as it was at that time, was directly and significantly influencing the ‘RTI 
pioneers’ in India, and yet none of these influences find utterance in the dominant narrative.  
 
Even as ‘civil society’ was invoking international experiences to buttress its argument for the 
enactment of an FoI law, the influence of existing laws in other countries is clearly visible in 
the thinking within the government as well (if in negative terms in the early instances). 
Several years prior to the formation of the NCPRI (as part of the early efforts made during 
                                                 
454 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 9 October 2011, New Delhi.  
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V.P. Singh’s tenure as the Prime Minister), a team of officials had gone on an international 
tour to study FoI laws in countries where they existed. “[V.P. Singh] told me that all these 
officers went around the world, looked at various acts, and then drafted this terrible thing.”455 
Some years later, the background note authored by the DoPT that proposed the setting up of a 
working committee (later the H.D. Shourie Committee) opened its argument by stating that 
“there is a worldwide trend towards more open and transparent govt. where citizens are able 
to get information about all except the most sensitive matters connected to security and 
defence of the country”.456 The note went on to take the examples of FoI laws (and other 
transparency-related mechanisms) that existed at that time in New Zealand, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, the USA and Malaysia.457 The background material for the first meeting of 
the Shourie Committee included the paper “Transparency in Government by Mrs. Kiran 
Aggarwal, Secretary, Department of Supply, together with a copy each of the United States 
“Freedom of Information Act” and the “British Official Secrets Act 1989””.458 The paper 
authored by Aggarwal provided the details of FoI laws in the countries mentioned above, 
with special (if amusing) attention being accorded to New Zealand’s approach. “New 
Zealand has one of the most open systems of government in the world... Government service 
in New Zealand has been compared to the [sic] McDonald’s i.e., as soon as you enter a 
McDonald’s outlet, you can see the board showing what services are being offered and at 
what price... Services are being provided at most competitive rates in New Zealand by 
allowing open competition between State Owned Enterprises and private organisations to 
                                                 
455 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi.  
456 Note from Harinder Singh, Joint Secretary (E), to Secretary (Personnel) through Additional Secretary 
(Administrative Reforms), DoPT, dated 4 December 1996. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt (B). This quote 
is an example of the way in which the boundaries of a discourse is definitively framed by early articulations. 
Practically all subsequent government documents related to FoI invoke this ‘worldwide trend’ using the same 
phraseology, which in effect also refutes the claim of the ‘indigenousness’ of the idea of the RTI.  
457 This inclusion of Malaysia in this list is peculiar, as it does not have an FoI law till date. However, the 
document highlighted the Malaysian government’s efforts to set up an online information clearing house.  
458 Note from Y.G. Parande, Director, DoPT, dated 7 January 1997, to all members of the Shourie Committee. 
File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B).  
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provide the services” (Aggarwal, undated: 3).459 Other material subsequently shared with the 
Committee as inputs for their deliberations included the CERC report on the study tour of the 
UK, the USA and Canada to study their respective FoI laws, “a copy of the citizen’s guide on 
‘Freedom of Information Act’ prepared by the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. 
House of Representatives”,460 and a statement “comparing the salient features of the 
provisions relating to exemption from disclosure in... Australia, Canada, U.K. and U.S.A”.461  
 
From Laws to Clause: Cherry-Picking as a Strategy 
 
The Shourie Committee Report 
 
As the draft FoI Act proposed by the Shourie Committee became the point of reference for all 
subsequent efforts in the enactment process (as detailed in Chapter 5), examining the extent 
to which it was influenced by the ‘outside’ is an instructive exercise. In the first instance, the 
Committee examined the existing FoI legislation in the countries mentioned above (as well as 
others) in great detail, particularly with reference to their handling of appellate mechanisms, 
exemptions to the law, and the scope of the proposed legislation. For example, during its third 
meeting, the Committee “decided that a suitable draft exclusion clause would be prepared 
after a comparative study of the provisions relating to disclosure of such information in 
various other countries”.462 Another example from the same meeting related to the creation of 
new records. “The Bill should not result in an obligation to create records where none were 
operationally necessary. It was decided that provisions of clause 3(2) would be suitably 
                                                 
459 ‘Burgernomics’, it appears, was also influencing the thinking around administrative reforms in India.  
460 Note from Y.G. Parande, Director, DoPT, dated 24 January 1997, to all members of the Shourie Committee. 
File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B). 
461 Note from Y.G. Parande, Director, DoPT, dated 11 March 1997, to all members of the Shourie Committee. 
File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B). 
462 Proceedings of the third meeting of the Shourie Committee, held on 19 February 1997, dated 27 February 
1997. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), DoPT.  
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modified to ensure that they would not necessitate creation of such records - on the analogy 
of FOIA of US.”463 In the context of discussions on the exemption of internal deliberations of 
the government from disclosure, “it was noted that both, the Freedom of Information Act in 
the U.S. and the code of Practice on Access to Govt. Information in the U.K., provided for 
safeguards against disclosures of internal communications of the Govt. such as internal 
departmental memoranda etc.”464 That other existing laws, such as the Swedish one, did not 
accord such exemptions was not taken into account.465 
 
What can be clearly discerned through such examples is that arguments used during 
contentious debates invoked only those clauses from similar legislation in other countries 
which resonated with the thinking of the committee members on a given issue. The note sent 
by the DoPT to the Cabinet in early 1998 stated that, “While extension of the proposed 
legislation to private sector may have an emotive appeal, it is necessary to consider it with 
caution and circumspection. It is noteworthy that none of the advanced democracies such as 
the U.S., Australia and Canada have thought it fit to widen its laws to this extent”.466 Even as 
this was not necessarily the complete truth (the American law, for one, did include industrial 
firms in the context of environmental information within its ambit), the international 
experience was invoked only when it coincided with the perspective of the decision-makers. 
This pattern of selectively invoking international examples to strengthen the position of the 
government on different aspects of the proposed law recurred regularly over subsequent 
years.  
                                                 
463 Ibid. Emphasis in original.  
464 Proceedings of the second meeting of the “Working Group on right to information and promotion of open 
and transparent government” held on 18 January 1997, dated 27 January 1997. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-
Estt.(B), DoPT.  
465 Other examples of invoking the international during the proceedings of the Shourie Committee were 
provided in the preceding chapter and are not being repeated here.  
466 Note for the Cabinet dated - January 1998, sent by DoPT. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), DoPT. 
The notion of ‘advanced’ democracies here is important as it suggests an aspiration aspect, a theme we will 
return to later in the chapter. 
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The Examination of the FoI Bill by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, 
2001 
 
As the process unfolded, copies of existing legislation in other countries were also solicited 
by the DoPT, with missives being sent from Delhi to embassies around the world, including 
Japan, Ireland and the Netherlands.467 This formed a part of a “comparative statement on the 
provisions made in the ‘Right to Information/Freedom of Information’ Acts enacted by 
various countries vis-a-vis ‘Freedom of Information Bill, 2000; and ‘Freedom of Information 
Bill, 2000’ and Foreign Acts - appeal and penal provisions” that was provided to the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs (PSC-HA) that had been tasked to 
examine the FoI bill in 2001.468 The report of the PSC-HA is replete with examples of the 
ways in which the international experience was consistently brought to bear on the local. 
Explicit references to the laws of other countries made in the report (especially the position of 
the government on several critical clauses) are presented below in a tabular form. 
 
                                                 
467 A peculiar situation ensued in the case of the latter. The Indian embassy in the Netherlands wrote back to the 
DoPT saying that “the complete text of the ‘Freedom of Information Act 1991’ and amendments thereto run into 
584 pages. The text of this Act is available in Dutch only… The Embassy does not have a professional 
translator… The cheapest quotation by a qualified translation agency is Dfl 65,000 (approximately Rs. 12 lakhs) 
for translating 584 pages. The translation will take approx. six months to complete. I would like to seek your 
guidance as to whether we should proceed with getting the text and amendments thereto translated in the 
Netherlands?” Letter from V.B. Dhavle, First Secretary, Embassy of India, The Hague, to Harinder Singh, Joint 
Secretary, DoPT, dated 1 December 2000. File reference no. Hag/Pol/312/5/00, Embassy of India, The Hague. 
Eventually, an existing report (written in English) highlighting the salient features of the Act was sent.  
468 Office memorandum dated 6 February 2001from Rakesh Malhotra, Under Secretary, DoPT, to Tapan 
Chatterjee, Deputy Secretary, Rajya Sabha Secretariat. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B). The table 
compared the provisions of the proposed Indian FoI Act with those of similar legislations of New Zealand, 
Ireland, the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands.  
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Table 6.1: Government arguments invoking the international experience in the drafting 
of the FoI bill in 2001 
 
Issue Relevant extract from the report  
Need for an FoI 
law 
In the introduction itself, the report invoked the FoI-related laws of the 
USA, Japan, Ireland, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, France, the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and South Africa as part of the rationale 
for the Indian Act (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2001: 5).  
Title of the Act In response to demands made by civil society actors for the Act be 
called the ‘Right to Information’ in depositions before the PSC-HA, the 
government favoured the title ‘Freedom of Information’ using the titles 
of FoI-related laws of Australia, Ireland, the USA, the UK, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the Netherlands as examples (Rajya Sabha 
Secretariat, 2001: 32). 
Eligibility to use 
the Act 
On the issue of eligibility, the government cited clauses from the FoI-
related laws of the USA, the Netherlands, the UK and Canada, and did 
not have “any objection to the access to information being given to all 
citizens as also all persons who are present in India” (Rajya Sabha 
Secretariat, 2001: 32-33).469  
Timeframe for the 
implementation of 
the Act  
In the discussion on the date of implementation of the Act, the 
government took the example of the UK seeking time “to set up the 
infrastructure for the Act to become operational” (Rajya Sabha 
Secretariat, 2001: 33).  
Applicability of 
the Act to private 
bodies 
When the applicability of the Act to private bodies was discussed, the 
government used the examples of the USA, Australia and Canada to 
reject the proposal (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2001: 36).  
Response time for 
Public Authorities 
The government highlighted the relevant provisions of FoI laws of 
Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the USA, Ireland and the UK and 
argued that “the response time of 30 days provided in the Indian FOI 
Bill is not considered to be long” (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2001: 42).  
Exemptions On the critical issue of exemptions of types of information as well as 
specific organisations, the government argued that “It would be 
pertinent to mention that information which would prejudicially affect 
the conduct of international relations has been exempted from 
disclosure in the legislation enacted by Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, 
The Netherlands, USA, France and Canada. The provision in the Indian 
FOI Bill making a similar exemptions [sic], is therefore not an 
exception... According to the UK Government white paper presented to 
Parliament in 1997 in connection with the legislation of the FOI Act, 
the internal discussions and advice is exempted from disclosure in 
Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Netherlands, the USA, France and 
Canada.” (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2001: 46-47). 
Protection of 
officials for 
withholding 
information  
In arguing for the protection of government officials who withhold 
information ‘in good faith’, the government cited the examples of 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 
2001: 56). 
                                                 
469 In its final (and current) avatar, the RTI Act of 2005 states that it can be used by Indian citizens only.  
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Lack of an 
independent 
appeals body 
The government supported its position on the lack of an independent 
appeals mechanism using the examples of Ireland, the USA, Japan and 
Australia (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2001: 63). 
Protection of 
whistleblowers 
Finally, on the concerns around protecting whistleblowers, the 
government argued that “Protection to ‘whistleblowers’ is not the scope 
of the Bill and hence no provisions need be made therefore. As for 
immunity to Government servants who make available information in 
public interest, suffice to say that the Japanese law provides that a 
person who violates the Access to Information Law and discloses 
secrets shall be sentenced to a maximum of 1 year of imprisonment 
with hard labour, or a maximum fine of 300,000 yen” (Rajya Sabha 
Secretariat, 2001: 63-64).  
 
 
Given these substantial influences of the international on the drafting of the FoI Act (which 
served as the reference point for the drafting of the RTI Act in 2004-05), the fact that the 
dominant narrative maintains a studied silence on it continues to be puzzling. Some clues 
towards unravelling this phenomenon could perhaps be gleaned by assessing the role of 
international actors on the process, to which we turn next.  
 
Partaking of Common Wealth: The Influence of International NGOs, Agencies and 
Networks 
 
As this process evolved, it was not as if government functionaries involved in examining 
similar legislation in other countries were working in complete isolation from other actors 
who had also been looking ‘outward’. An entity that played a significant role in bringing the 
‘outside’ within the ‘home’ was an international NGO, the Commonwealth Human Rights 
Initiative (CHRI). The CHRI was founded in 1987 with a mandate “to ensure the practical 
realisation of human rights in the countries of the Commonwealth”.470 Initially headquartered 
in London, its offices moved to Delhi following a management restructuring in 1993, with 
                                                 
470 CHRI website, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org. Accessed 10 June 2011.  
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Maja Daruwala taking over as its Executive Director in 1996.471 “In 1997, the organisation 
decided to have a programmatic agenda. That was when Maja had come in, very new. They 
wanted to choose areas, which would be different from what other people chose, otherwise it 
would be very easy to choose women’s rights or children’s rights. What is it that is different, 
something that other organisations are not doing, but still connected with human rights? And 
they found three issues, police reforms, prison reforms, and RTI. [One of the reasons] they 
picked it up at that point in time [was because] they were also clued into what was happening 
in Eastern Europe, because 1990s was the time when those countries started having access to 
information laws. That was also the time when CHRI collaborated with the World Bank to 
come up with the status of RTI in South Asia.”472  
 
In addition, interest in the issue had also been developing within the Commonwealth 
Secretariat in London, where, for example, an Expert Group Meeting was held over 30-31 
March 1999 on the “Right to Know and the Promotion of Democracy and Development”473 
which inter alia recommended that “governments should enact freedom of information 
legislation containing appropriate administrative measures for its implementation”.474 This 
subsequently took the form of the Commonwealth Freedom of Information Principles which 
were ‘noted’ by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit held in Durban later that 
year, and endorsed by the Commonwealth Law Ministers at their meeting in the same year in 
                                                 
471 Maja Daruwala was previously at the Ford Foundation in New Delhi. Also belonging to the elite fraction of 
the middle class referred to in Chapter 4, she is the daughter of Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, who was India’s 
Chief of the Army during the victorious war with Pakistan in 1971.  
472 Interview with SCT844, 20 October 2009.  
473 Final document titled “Promoting Open Government: Commonwealth Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to Know” arising from the meetings of the Commonwealth Expert Group on the “Right to Know and the 
Promotion of Democracy and Development”, held at Marlborough House, London, 30-31 March 1999. The 
group drew upon a statement from a much earlier meeting of the Law Ministers of the Commonwealth held in 
1980 in Barbados, where it was stated that “public participation in the democratic and governmental process was 
at its most meaningful when citizens had adequate access to official information”.  
474 Ibid. 
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Trinidad and Tobago.475 The theme picked up momentum over the next couple of years, with 
the Commonwealth Secretariat proposing a model FoI Act “to assist member countries which 
have yet to enact laws on the subject”.476 Responding to this, the Indian government observed 
“that the ‘Freedom of Information Bill, 2000’ introduced by the Government of India 
compares favourably with the draft model bill of the Commonwealth Secretariat as most of 
its provisions are but a rephrasing of the provisions of the model Bill having regards to the 
conditions and governance procedures in our country. To an extent, the Indian FOI Bill may, 
therefore, be taken as an adaptation of the Commonwealth Secretariat’s draft model Bill”.477  
 
Following (and in part influencing) such leads generated by the Commonwealth Secretariat, 
the CHRI continued its work on the issue over this period, although “[it was] not very serious 
lobbying or advocacy. [It was] more in tune with public education - telling people that there 
is a right, telling people that there are other laws... [During this period,] CHRI was closely 
involved with the drafting committee [of the NCPRI], because at that point of time [it] had a 
person with the expertise of the laws, and this is something that was not planned for”.478 Soon 
                                                 
475 These principles were: “Member countries should be encouraged to regard freedom of information as a legal 
and enforceable right; There should be a presumption in favour of disclosure and governments should promote a 
culture of openness; The right of access to information may be subject to limited exemptions but these should be 
narrowly drawn; Government should maintain and preserve records; In principle, decisions to refuse access to 
records and information should be subject to independent review.” See report of the conference on “Parliament 
and the Media: Building an Effective Relationship”, held at the Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi on 15-18 
February 2000. Available at: http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/jpi/June2000/CHAP-3.htm. Accessed 20 May 2012.  
476 Internal note from Rakesh Malhotra, Under Secretary, DoPT to Joint Secretary (Establishment), DoPT, dated 
19 October 2001. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), DoPT. The note was drafted in response to a request 
from the Department of Legal Affairs seeking the government’s stand on the status of FoI in India in the context 
of impending meetings of the Law Ministers of Commonwealth countries.  
477 Letter from S. Chandrasekaran, Joint Secretary (Establishment), DoPT to A. Sinha, Joint Secretary and Legal 
Adviser, Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice, dated 22 October 2001. File reference no. 
34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), DoPT. This letter was sent in response to a request from the Department of Legal 
Affairs seeking the government’s stand on the status of FoI in India in the context of impending meetings of the 
Law Ministers of Commonwealth countries.  
478 Interview with SCT844, 20 October 2009. The lawyer referred to here is Charmaine Rodrigues, whose social 
profile, unsurprisingly, has much in common with the elite fraction of the middle class identified in Chapter 4. 
She is the niece of General S.F. Rodrigues, Chief of Army Staff between 1990 and 1993, and later Governor of 
Punjab. What is not commonly known is that she is an Australian national, putting on another layer of 
‘internationalism’ to the process. That an Australian national deposed before the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee and played an important role in the drafting of a cherished national law would certainly not go down 
very well with those concerned about the influence of the ‘foreign hand’ in India. 
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after, the CHRI conducted a comprehensive review of the status of FoI legislation amongst 
all the countries of the Commonwealth.479 “Every two years, [the CHRI submits] a report to 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government. [In] 2001, the theme was poverty eradication and 
human rights. That went nowhere. CHRI then did a study of all the Access [to Information] 
laws in the Commonwealth and were ready with a report. It had studied the laws, it knew 
what was good, what was bad, what was working, and then it had a lawyer who had some 
familiarity with non-Commonwealth laws as well, like Mexico”.480 All of this meant that the 
CHRI was “in a position to speak with authority on what should be a part of a good RTI, 
what should be part of an RTI law to make it a good law”.481 Efforts such as these had a 
direct impact on the way the government drew on the ‘expertise’ of the CHRI, not least 
because it “certainly had a certain level of comfort with it, because they were not in that 
typical jholawala mode, not a confrontational mode, and it saw that CHRI could give them 
credible research.482 And this is the reason the [Parliamentary] Standing Committee called it 
back a second time with additional research”.483 Yet, despite these major contributions made 
by the CHRI from an early stage, it is puzzling to note that the organisation itself publicly 
maintains that the “campaign for right to information has been effectively linked to the 
                                                 
479 Titled “Open Sesame: Looking for the Right to Information in the Commonwealth”, the report was presented 
at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held in Abuja in 2003. The report was authored by the 
International Advisory Commission of the CHRI, chaired by Margaret Reynolds, who was a former Minister 
and Senator in the Australian Parliament, as well as a Professor of Human Rights and Politics at the University 
of Queensland.  
480 Interview with SCT844, 20 October 2009. 
481 Ibid. 
482 In this context, jholawala means a left-leaning activist-intellectual, typically with some links to the 
grassroots, and very vocally critical of the government.  
483 Interview with SCT844, 20 October 2009. This refers to the depositions made by the CHRI to the 
Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice on 
14 and 16 February 2005. A supplementary submission was made by the CHRI on 21 February 2005 at the 
request of the Committee. The role of the CHRI was also acknowledged in the report of the earlier Department-
Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs that examined the FoI bill in 2001, which stated 
that “A special word of thanks is due to Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative who rendered valuable 
assistance to the Committee and its Secretariat in the course of the examination of the Bill” (Rajya Sabha 
Secretariat, 2001: 4). At the same time, it should be noted that the leadership of the CHRI was not invited to be a 
part of the NAC despite its substantial work on the RTI. This could in part be explained by the fact that the 
organisation was an international one, was open to receiving funds from abroad, and was not a ‘grassroots’ one. 
Furthermore, unlike other advocates, the CHRI maintained its position that private entities that perform public 
functions should fall directly within the ambit of any FoI legislation throughout the process of the evolution of 
the law.  
259 
 
livelihood issues of the rural person and is deeply rooted in the struggles and concerns of 
survival and justice of the most disadvantaged rural people.”484 Despite evidence to the 
contrary, this umpteenth reiteration of the ‘creation myth’ of the RTI in India points to the 
complexities of movement politics as well as the deeper anxieties that inform the interplay 
between the legitimacy of civil society actors on the one hand, and their publicly projected 
‘foreign’ versus ‘homegrown’ identities on the other. 
  
Apart from the role played by the CHRI, other international agencies also brought in global 
perspectives on the issue throughout the process. Organisations such as the UNDP, the World 
Bank and the American Embassy organised and/or funded several seminars, workshops and 
other meetings, brought in ‘experts’, as well as funded the visits of government officials to 
countries where FoI legislation existed.485 The UNDP, for example, paid for a “consultant on 
operationalising the Freedom of Information Act” under its project titled “Capacity Building 
and Civil Service, Administrative Reforms and Training in the Centre and the States”.486 A 
few years later, it funded the travel of two officials “for the Study tour on ‘Improving 
Citizen’s Access to Information and Right to Information’ to South Africa, UK and USA for 
12 day [sic].”487 Several other programmes were carried out in India over 2001-2004 under 
the project headings “Improving Citizens’ Access to Information”, “Access to Information” 
and “Media and Citizens’ Access to Information” (UNDP, 2003: 44). As another example, a 
“National Workshop on Right to Information” was jointly organised by the IIPA and the 
American Embassy in New Delhi on 15 September 2000 with the participation of, amongst 
                                                 
484 See the “History and Background” of the RTI in India on the CHRI website. Available at 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/india/history.htm. Accessed 10 June 2011.  
485 These trips were typically made to ‘advanced’ democracies.  
486 Letter from Tilak R. Maakan, Assistant Resident Representative (Governance and Institutional 
Development), UNDP India to A.K. Arora, Joint Secretary, DoPT, dated 20 August 1997. Letter reference 
number IND/95/008(99)X.  
487 Office Memorandum from A.B. Maindoliya, Senior Research Officer (Training), DoPT, to A.K. Soni, Under 
Secretary, UN Section, North Block, dated 19 December 2003. One of these officials was Rakesh Malhotra, 
Under Secretary, DoPT, who was the person directly responsible within the government for drafting the 
legislation throughout the process.  
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others, representatives from the American Embassy, Pranab Mukherjee, Prashant Bhushan 
and Shekhar Singh.488 
 
In 2004, as events approached their dénouement just prior to the NAC forwarding a list of 
amendments to the FoI Act 2002 to the government, the ‘international’ continued to play a 
critical role. “When the actual final drafting was taking place, we had two or three very 
strong international influences. The core group which sat and drafted this was Prashant 
Bhushan, Arvind Kejriwal, Charmaine Rodrigues and myself. At that time, two very strong 
“western influences” were there. Charmaine was very familiar with the Australian law, and 
had studied by that time a lot of international laws. She kept bringing to us knowledge about 
what is happening in the international scene. Many of the clauses were tailored, built in on 
the basis of her saying this is in X or Y law. Number two, I was at that time Co-Chair of this 
international task force. So for about 20 days before that, I was sending out to all the 
members emails about specific issues... I would send [them] out in the night, and by the 
morning, because most of those places were in the West, the responses would all be there. 
How is the private sector, for example, covered in other countries’ laws? And I remember 
[name of person] from South Africa responding and saying that though our law covers the 
private sector, however it is totally unworkable... There was a whole lot of interaction going 
on at that time with the international community...”489 The entity that Singh is referring to 
was a ‘Task Force on Transparency’ set up under the aegis of the Initiative for Policy 
Dialogue (based at Columbia University) launched by Joseph Stiglitz in 2000. Singh had 
been nominated as a Co-Chair of this task force whose mandate was to bring together 
“scholars and activists from all regions who are working to improve global understanding of 
                                                 
488 Pranab Mukherjee is one of most senior leaders of the Congress party.  
489 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 9 October 2011, New Delhi. Arvind Kejriwal is a former civil servant who 
has gained fame in the recent past as an anti-corruption crusader and part of the inner-group of Anna Hazare.  
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what transparency can accomplish and how it can be increased”.490 “People who were not 
involved with it [the drafting], who thought that Shekhar and Prashant and Arvind and 
Charmaine sat in this room would think that this is ‘indigenous’. But this room had an 
internet connection, this room had a telephone, this room had all sorts of documents from all 
over the world... I think 80% of the law was influenced by interactions with people in other 
parts of the world.”491 
 
The High-Table Beckons: The Politics of Aspiration 
 
The above discussion clearly shows that international experiences and actors played a 
significant role in imagining and producing the FoI and RTI Acts in 2002 and 2005 
respectively. However, there was a key difference in the way that this role was articulated in 
the evolution of the discourse in the two instances. In the case of the former, the argument 
was largely framed by projecting FoI legislation as an essential marker of democracy, and 
both civil society actors as well as the government used a similar strategy of invoking 
examples from ‘advanced democracies’ to buttress their respective arguments. When the 
matter resurfaced in 2004 after the UPA formed the government at the centre, the process that 
followed did not involve the explicit examination of existing legislation in any other 
country.492 The post-2004 phase took the Indian FoI Act of 2002 as its framing text (along 
with the UPA’s pledge in its Common Minimum Programme to make the FoI Act “more 
progressive, participatory and meaningful” as its causal argument), which later evolved into 
                                                 
490 See http://policydialogue.org/programs/taskforces/transparency/. Accessed 12 June 2011.  
491 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 9 October 2011, New Delhi. 
492 This holds true for at least the formal process. The ways in which international processes continued to have 
an influence even during this phase was discussed earlier in this chapter.  
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the RTI Act of 2005 without any explicit reference to any external legislation, at least within 
government or other published documents.493  
 
However, the international experience was invoked in the argument for an RTI Act, but this 
time linking it to India achieving its ‘rightful’ place in the ‘comity of nations’, and not merely 
to prove its democratic credentials. The report of the Department-Related Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice (PSC-PPG) that had 
been tasked to examine the RTI bill stated that, “It is being recognized globally that public 
participation in the democratic and governmental process is at its meaningful best when 
citizens have adequate access to official information. This access lays the foundation for good 
governance, transparency, accountability and participation. This realization has found 
expression with over fifty-five countries having enacted their comprehensive laws that 
protect the right to information and many more countries are coming forward to enact 
specific legislations in pursuit of this objective. Sweden, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
Beliez [sic], Pakistan, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Zimbabwe, 
Jamaica and USA are among the countries exhibiting their Governments’ commitment to 
open governance through legislative measures guaranteeing citizens access to information... 
India too is not left behind in the race. Growing realization for open governance and assured 
access to information has brought it on the world map” (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2005: 1, 
emphasis added). A more ambitious tone was struck by the Minister of State in the Ministry 
of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Suresh Pachauri, when he moved the RTI bill 
for the consideration of the Lok Sabha on 10 May 2005. “I believe that the provisions of the 
Bill will be a watershed in the evolution of the right to information in our country, and will 
bring India at par with only a handful of the countries which have enacted such legislations. 
                                                 
493 Although the authoring of the ‘NAC draft’ in 2004 had significant international influences as mentioned by 
Singh above.  
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In several respects, ours, when passed, will be a law far more liberal and advanced as it 
resolves the conflict between the State and the citizen in favour of the citizen. It is coming 
just in time when India is emerging and claiming its rightful place, as a major global player in 
the comity of nations.”494 During the same debate, Dr. R. Senthil, Member of Parliament 
representing the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK, part of the UPA at that time) from 
Dharmapuri, Tamil Nadu state, brought the attention of the house to the fact that, “Just a 
couple of days ago the President of Russia quoted the functioning of our democracy to justify 
his own actions in his country. This being the stature of our country, I think this Bill will 
actually help the image of our country in the international arena”.495  
 
These examples display a subtle, if critical shift in the framing of the argument for an FoI 
legislation. If earlier the argument invoked ‘a worldwide trend’ and was attempting to play 
‘catch-up’ with ‘advanced’ democracies, a competitive spirit and an aspiration to be 
recognised as a global leader and assume a position at the international high-table had now 
entered the framing of the argument. “One of the most important enabling conditions [for the 
RTI to be enacted was] India’s aspirations to now become part of the so-called developed 
nations. This is an important trigger that has allowed RTI to actually evolve the way it did... 
Therefore you have different classes responding to this. The political elite wanting to now 
become the part of the league of nations, to be acceptable as a governable society, because 
good governance has now become the talk of the town... The aspiration[s] of... the ones who 
are brokering power... They are in many respects opinion makers. They are the people who 
will provide the quotable quotes. This is a fairly large section in Delhi and state capitals. 
They are the ones who are moving globally, both physically and aspirationally. When I move 
                                                 
494 Lok Sabha debate titled “Discussion on the Right to Information Bill, 2004. (Not concluded).” Statement 
made on 10 May 2005 at 1423 hours. Emphasis added. Available through the Lok Sabha website 
http://loksabha.nic.in/. Accessed 20 June 2011.  
495 Ibid.  
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globally, I would like to be considered from a nation that has arrived. I have everything else 
that indicates that I have arrived. I probably have more wealth than the average person in that 
place. I have all that much more power, I have all that much more luxury, but I still don’t 
have the recognition of being part of a nation that has arrived. I’m still considered an inferior 
nation.”496 The RTI Act was thus no longer merely an instrument to empower hapless citizens 
against the whims of an arbitrary state. It also had to shoulder the onerous responsibility of 
showcasing the vibrancy and depth of Indian democracy to the world. This resonates with 
Sudipta Kaviraj’s critique of “the cognitive, the political, and the moral legitimacy of the 
whole institutional regime constructed after Independence” that arises (at least to some 
extent) from the fact that “the Indian elite was more concerned about justifying its initiatives 
to external audiences than to its own” (Kaviraj, 2010: 34). 
 
‘Looking Out’ or ‘Forcing In’? 
 
While this chapter will return later to the issue of such aspirations and their larger 
implications, the above discussion does provides ample evidence to suggest that both civil 
society as well as government actors were consciously looking ‘outward’ (facilitated to a 
certain extent by international actors) to seek input from the international experience on FoI. 
However, this cannot be considered as surprising in itself. Given that the Constitution 
drafting exercise at independence itself was the result of such an approach, this could be seen 
as a fairly benign process, even if it problematises the ‘creation myth’ of the RTI Act in the 
dominant narrative. However, other processes were also concurrently at play, which do not 
quite subscribe to the genteel image of progressive actors voluntarily looking beyond India’s 
shores to learn from others.  
                                                 
496 Interview with WKI942, 1 December 2009.  
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An early clue in this direction can be discerned in the enactment of state level FoI laws in 
India that preceded the national FoI Act of 2002 and the RTI Act of 2005. The specific case 
relates to the southern state of Karnataka. “[The CHRI] had a major role to play in Karnataka, 
where there was no people’s movement for RTI, but ADB [Asian Development Bank] was 
giving a loan, and they said, ‘conditionality’ - have an RTI law. So B.K. Chandrashekhar who 
was the Information Minister, he knew CHRI was working [on this issue], and he called 
[them] over, and they sat and drafted the law, not a terribly good law, but definitely not as 
bad as the Tamil Nadu one.”497 As a result, the Karnataka Right to Information Act was 
enacted in 2000. Soon after, in 2001, the President of the Asian Development Bank 
recommended the grant of a loan of USD 200 million for “infrastructure projects in specified 
infrastructure sectors in four selected Indian states: Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, and 
Madhya Pradesh”.498 Being financed under the Private Sector Infrastructure Facility (PSIF) 
project of the ADB, the “Access Criteria to PSIF II Financing” included the “Adoption of 
policy on transparency in the awarding of bids and concessions for individual projects”.499 In 
stating the rationale for granting the loan to Karnataka, the ADB highlighted that “Karnataka 
has in place the Rights [sic] to Information Act as well as Transparency in Public 
Procurement Act”.500  
 
A similar logic also played out at the national level, albeit in less obvious ways. An important 
element that informs the allocation of World Bank funds (lent at preferential rates for low-
                                                 
497 Interview with SCT844, 20 October 2009.  
498 “Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on Proposed Loans to Infrastructure 
Leasing and Financial Services Limited and Industrial Development Bank of India and Proposed Technical 
Assistance Grant to India for the Private Sector Infrastructure Facility at State Level Project”, Asian 
Development Bank, November 2001. Document number IND:34262. The five sectors under this project were 
power, roads, ports, airports and water supply and sewerage.  
499 Ibid.  
500 Ibid. Of the four states that were a part of this specific loan programme, only Gujarat did not have an FoI 
legislation at that point. However, on the point of transparency, the argument for Gujarat was made by stating 
that “The GIDA [Gujarat Industrial Development Authority] provides the procedures for selection through the 
process of competitive public bidding. This was prepared with the assistance of ADB TA 2716-Institutional 
Strengthening of Gujarat Infrastructure Board”.  
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income countries) under its International Development Association (IDA) programme is 
based on its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) framework. The CPIA 
rating for India in 2003 included a section on “Transparency, Accountability and Corruption 
in the Public Sector” where it stated that “Corruption remains a significant problem. India 
ranked 71 out of 102 in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions index... 
With the passage of the Freedom of Information legislation in March 2003 [sic], the GoI has 
followed in the path of some leading states and taken a significant step forward in improving 
the legal framework for transparency and this increase in rating reflects that... The effective 
implementation of this act will remain a major challenge in the next several years...”501 With 
rewards such as ‘increased ratings’ in the CPIA framework on offer, it comes as no surprise 
that the Ministry of Finance sent several missives to the DoPT seeking its input on the status 
of the implementation of the FoI Act to be able to respond to the assessment exercise of the 
World Bank.502 
 
International actors (particularly IFIs) applying subtle, when not overt, coercion was 
reiterated by several senior civil servants. “The World Bank started [influencing the process] 
on a more global scale. [It started with] the misuse of funds in Africa, then increasingly it 
started spreading, that must have passed on here. [There were] World Bank conditionalities 
and an emphasis on governance. Many of these things start because the World Bank goes to a 
country, finds that there are governance issues in the report, they say why not have an 
integrity pact... The effect of many of these international best practices came in procurement. 
But this is part of overall reforms at a world global level, where governance is a major 
                                                 
501 CPIA India 2003 document appended to letter from Ranjit Bannerji, Joint Secretary (FB), Department of 
Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, to Keshav Desiraju, Joint Secretary, DoPT, dated 12 February 2004. 
Reference DO No. 2/1/2003-F.B.II.  
502 Of course, this does not mean that the enactment of the RTI Act was solely responsible for the World Bank 
lending greater sums of money to India over successive years (India was the second-largest borrower of IDA 
funds in 2011). However, it also cannot be disregarded that this specific concern was a part of the assessment 
exercise and would therefore have had a role to play in the disbursement process.  
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component of growth. Governance has become an agenda now. In the 11th Plan we’ve talked 
about it. In the 10th Plan we mention this governance issue. This became an important 
issue.”503 This statement also points to the support such reforms had within the civil service, 
an assertion that was reaffirmed by others.504 “In the public policy making process, the role of 
the bureaucrat is now limited. But not absolutely negligible, because a lot of bureaucrats have 
been saying what the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, other countries have been saying, and 
selling reform has been something many civil servants have done... [And] the IMF favoured 
[having an RTI], the WTO favoured it, and the [World] Bank, because there were allegations 
of corruption within the Bank, and at that time the Bank was going through quite a few 
corruption scandals. Transparency International also spared no effort in indicating that we 
were amongst the most corrupt nations. They were players, but they weren’t prime 
movers”.505  
 
Whether or not these institutions were primarily responsible for the national RTI Act to be 
enacted is a moot point. However, that they had a direct influence on the ‘climate’ that 
allowed the idea of the RTI Act to blossom as it did was affirmed even by activists who were 
part of the leadership within the ‘movement’ space. “RTI is part of the transparency agenda 
that the World Bank was pushing for... There [was also] growing pressure from funding 
agencies like DfID [Department for International Development, the external development 
agency of the UK], who are big funders, who are no longer thinking of the money that they 
have as dole, now their money is more difficult to come by, so therefore you would like to get 
your money’s worth.”506 “I think perhaps around 30%-40% of the contribution for bringing 
the Act was the World Bank and the international community’s pressure on the government, 
                                                 
503 Interview with EFD094, former civil servant, 24 November 2009. References to good governance and the 
RTI within the 10th and 11th Plan documents were highlighted in Table 5.2.  
504 Some reasons behind this support were discussed in Chapter 5.  
505 Interview with FSQ974, former civil servant, 24 November 2009.  
506 Interview with WKI942, 1 December 2009.  
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which most of us normally don’t like to acknowledge. My own perception is that the Prime 
Minister of India unfortunately is fairly influenced by these factors. The World Bank and 
various international organisations were pressing to get in more transparency, less corruption. 
This is part of a worldwide agenda they have - they want to do business, they want these as 
essentials.”507  
 
The evidence above clearly suggests that the process that led to the enactment of the RTI Act 
in India in 2005 did not take place in an international vacuum. Similar laws and experiences 
of other countries were indeed a part of the potpourri of influences that impacted the process. 
These influences played their part primarily in two phases. First, advocates lobbying for a law 
on freedom of information, whether within the government or civil society actors, used 
examples of other countries (specifically democracies) to argue for the need for such a law. In 
this early phase, the invocation of other examples was framed within a context of 
strengthening the country’s democratic credentials, particularly in comparison to ‘advanced’ 
democracies. Here, FoI as an idea was conflated with democracy as the political ideal and the 
argument essentially proposed that no country could meaningfully claim to be democratic 
unless it possessed an FoI law. In the second phase, the discourse changed in a subtle way. 
The focus was no longer on proving ‘democratic points’. The ‘success’ of Indian democracy 
was now an established reality and was being celebrated as such. Consequently, the argument 
for an FoI legislation in this phase was framed in the context of India having ‘arrived’ on the 
international scene, and the enactment of a much ‘better’ law provided that much more 
credibility to such claims. At the same time, the specifics of the law that made it a ‘better’ 
one were also impacted through consistent (if selective) comparisons made with similar laws 
that existed in other countries, even as there was at least some pressure from international 
                                                 
507 Interview with YXR734, 18 November 2009. The influence of the market imperative is discussed in greater 
detail later in this chapter.  
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actors on the Indian government to enact an FoI legislation. In any event, the above 
discussion can now unequivocally propose that the ‘outside’ did have an influence on the RTI 
Act in India both in terms of enacting such a law in the first instance, as well as on the 
content of the law.  
 
However, a valid critique of this assertion could be that such an occurrence is not necessarily 
exceptional. International influences, particularly in the form of international ‘standards’ and 
‘norms’ being used instrumentally to create, support and redefine rights-based agendas by 
actors at the national level is hardly a rare phenomenon. Local actors have consistently used 
international conventions and agendas to buttress their arguments across a wide range of 
issues, in India as well as elsewhere (Levitt and Merry, 2009; Liu, 2006). Scholars have also 
documented and unpacked the ways in which international norms are diffused across 
countries (Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Relly, 2009; Roberts, 2003; Simmons et al, 2006). 
External pressure brought to bear in the production of domestic legislation is hardly an 
unknown phenomenon (Ferguson, 1990; Ghosh, 1997; Kiely, 1998; Roberts, 2003; Rodan, 
2004; Santiso, 2001). However, even as these phenomena cannot be considered as 
exceptional, there appears to be a consensus around the fact that in such processes of the 
diffusion of norms, at least some degree of vernacularisation does take place (Merry, 2006; 
Risse et al, 1999). To understand the nature and extent of international influences on the RTI 
Act in India better, it may thus be of some value to examine the degree of vernacularisation 
that took place in the process. In this context, examining the substantive aspects of the Indian 
RTI Act in comparison with international norms may provide important clues towards 
understanding the relationship between ghare and baire better, and by extension allow us to 
understand the reasons behind the silence on this issue in the dominant narrative.  
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The Content of the RTI Act 2005: How ‘Local’ is It? 
 
What is common to most national FoI laws is their conceptual underpinnings, which tend to 
emanate from the freedom of expression guarantees that many constitutions across the world 
claim to espouse.508 In this context, it is instructive to note that a leading international NGO 
whose work is focused on FoI research and advocacy is called Article 19, after article 19 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which states that “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers”.509 With this as the main element of coherence in the conceptual 
framework within which FoI laws across the world have been drafted, some formulations of a 
‘model’ law or ‘guiding principles’ of a ‘good’ FoI law have been developed and largely 
accepted by a majority of FoI advocates across the world.510 The substantive elements of 
national laws are often judged against these principles511 and can be summarised as 
follows:512 
                                                 
508 This is not necessarily true for all FoI laws. However, making, at the very least, a customary reference to 
freedom of expression in the context of FoI laws has become de rigueur in practically all literature related to 
FoI.  
509 See http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a19. Accessed 10 October 2010. In addition, Article 
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is an international treaty, 
reemphasises this. In the context of the international diffusion of norms related to FoI, there is an almost poetic 
circularity in the free movement of the idea of the free movement of ideas.  
510 See Banisar (2006) and Mendel (1999, 2008).  
511 It may be noted however, that only a handful, if that, of large-scale comparative surveys of FoI laws exist, 
and until more original comparative research is carried out, especially of a kind that questions the normative 
nature of these principles, the available global perspective for researchers to draw on will remain quite limited 
and homogeneous. Such a singularly limited perspective also reinforces a kind of ‘first-mover advantage’, in 
that the same perspective is continually repeated and replicated both by researchers and advocacy groups (both 
new and old) thus turning it into an axiomatic and uncontested truth. This also points to a larger concern of the 
FoI agenda being formulated and developed by a small number of actors at the global level. 
512 See Mendel (2008), pp 31-42. In this book published by UNESCO (first edition in 2003), Mendel prefaces 
the principles with the following text. “ARTICLE 19 has published a set of principles, The Public’s Right To 
Know: Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation (the ARTICLE 19 Principles), setting out best practice 
standards on right to information legislation. These Principles are based on international and regional law and 
standards, evolving State practice (as reflected, inter alia, in national laws and judgments of national courts) and 
the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations… This chapter is organised around the 
nine primary principles set out in The Public’s Right To Know” (Mendel, 2008: 30-31). Interestingly, a closer 
look at the Article 19 document (published in 1999) referred to reveals that Mr. Mendel is also the author of the 
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1. Maximum disclosure 
2. Obligation to publish 
3. Promotion of open government 
4. Limited scope of exceptions 
5. Processes to facilitate access 
6. Costs 
7. Open meetings 
8. Disclosure takes precedence 
9. Protection for whistleblowers 
 
When the Indian legislation is compared to these principles, a revealing picture of the 
relationship between international standards and the RTI Act 2005 begins to emerge.  
 
Table 6.2:  Comparison of the RTI Act 2005 to international principles of a ‘good’ RTI 
Act 
 
International Principle Indian RTI Act 2005 
Maximum disclosure: 
Freedom of information 
legislation should be guided 
by the principle of 
maximum disclosure.  
Broadly, this holds true in terms of geographical scope, what 
constitutes information, and what the citizen is entitled to 
access. The Act is applicable to all public authorities at all 
levels of government (except for the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir due to its special status within the Indian 
constitution), and all bodies substantially financed by the 
government are also covered within the Act’s ambit. However, 
private entities are outside the purview of the Act.  
Obligation to publish: 
Public bodies should be 
under an obligation to 
publish key information. 
Each Public Authority is obliged to publish a host of 
information including its functions and duties, the powers and 
duties of its officers and employees, the procedure followed in 
its decision-making process, and the particulars of all plans, 
proposed expenditures, and reports on disbursements made. 
All of this information is to be updated annually.  
                                                                                                                                                        
same, which is a good example of how a set of ideas emanating from a limited number of sources can be 
reinforced by repetition, even as greater legitimacy is provided by creating an impression of multiplicity of 
sources. It should be noted that Mr. Mendel has also authored several reports on FoI for the World Bank. Not 
surprisingly, a model freedom of information law proposed by the World Bank largely corresponds to these 
principles. See http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/LearningProgram/Judicial/ModelFOILaw.doc. 
Accessed 10 February 2012.  
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Promotion of open 
government: Public bodies 
must actively promote open 
government. 
Section 26 of the Act states that state and central governments 
must promote the Act.  
Limited scope of 
exceptions: Exceptions 
should be clearly and 
narrowly drawn and subject 
to strict “harm” and “public 
interest” tests. 
Clauses relevant to this principle are present in the Act, but 
open to interpretation. Exemptions include typical categories 
related to national security, foreign affairs and commercial 
interests. However, a public interest override exists for all 
exemptions.  
Processes to facilitate 
access: Requests for 
information should be 
processed rapidly and fairly 
and an independent review 
of any refusals should be 
available. 
The Public Information Officer (PIO) must respond within 30 
days to each application. In cases related to life and liberty, the 
time limit is 48 hours. The first review is carried out by the 
relevant public authority (for which the maximum time 
allowed for taking a decision is 45 days) and the second by an 
independent Information Commission (which has no time 
limit).  
Costs: Individuals should 
not be deterred from 
making requests for 
information by excessive 
costs. 
While the Act allows each state and the central government to 
fix its own fees and charges, it states that these must be 
‘reasonable’. However, those who have been categorised as 
“Below Poverty Line” do not need to pay any fees. A majority 
of states and the central government have fixed the charges as 
INR 10/- (USD 0.22) for each application, and INR 2/- (USD 
0.04) per page for photocopies. Further, if the information is 
provided after the 30-day time limit, no charges need to be 
paid by the applicant.  
Open meetings: Meetings of 
public bodies should be 
open to the public. 
This is not mandatory under the RTI Act 2005. However, 
Section 4 (vii) and (viii) of the Act makes it obligatory for 
each public authority to publish the particulars of any 
arrangement that exists for public consultations on matters of 
policy and implementation, whether meetings of boards, 
councils, committees and other bodies consisting of two or 
more persons are open to the public, and whether the minutes 
of such meetings are accessible to the public.  
Disclosure takes 
precedence: Laws which are 
inconsistent with the 
principle of maximum 
disclosure should be 
amended or repealed. 
While no laws inconsistent with the RTI Act 2005 have been 
repealed, Section 22 of the Act overrides the provisions of the 
Official Secrets Act, 1923, and also any other Act or 
instrument with which there might be any conflict.  
Protection for 
whistleblowers: Individuals 
who release information on 
wrongdoing - 
whistleblowers - must be 
protected. 
No specific reference is made to whistleblowers in the Act.  
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The table above thus shows an uncanny overlap between international norms and the Indian 
RTI Act. However, some elements of vernacularisation do exist in the RTI Act, which are not 
quite captured in the table above. These relate to financial sanctions on erring officials 
(discussed in Chapter 5), bringing security agencies within the ambit of the law when there 
are “allegations of corruption and human rights violations” (Section 24(1) of the RTI Act 
2005), and the expansion of the responsibilities of Public (and Assistant Public) Information 
Officers to assist applicants who may be illiterate or otherwise need help in filing an 
application. In this instance therefore, vernacularisation appears to have extended 
international standards rather than diluted them, a phenomenon that is not particularly 
common in the context of the diffusion of rights-based norms. Uncommon as this may be, 
what is clear from the above analysis is that the Indian RTI Act appears to be an excellent 
extant example of the normative ideal within the international discourse on FoI-related 
legislation.513 The Platonic ideal, at least in this instance, seems to have been surpassed by its 
more earthly representation.  
 
It can thus be proposed that international influences not only played a significant role in the 
enactment of the RTI Act in India in 2005, but did so very substantially. The normative ideal 
as represented by the principles above appears to have found an exemplary manifestation in 
the Indian RTI Act. However, this finding points to a deep disjuncture between the dominant 
narrative’s seemingly wilful ignorance of the influence of international processes and actors 
on the Indian experience and the existence of contradictory findings within alternate bodies 
of evidence. If the Indian law displays all that is good and noble in commonly accepted 
international principles of freedom of information (in fact taking it further), why is it that the 
dominant narrative denies any linkages between the two so pointedly? Almost all the actors 
                                                 
513 This is articulated as such by a wide array of experts. One such example is the “RTI Rating” study, which 
will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
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involved in producing the dominant narrative - activists, the media, civil servants, politicians, 
as well as researchers (who constitute the policy elite) - appear to display a collective 
amnesia of sorts when it comes to acknowledging the illumination provided by ‘lamps lit’ in 
other parts of the world. Some clues towards unravelling this puzzling phenomenon could 
perhaps be gleaned by analysing the bases of this normative ideal and understanding the 
causal impulses underlying it, and then assessing their relationship with the political and 
social context extant in India in this period. Examining this is essential not only for the 
specifics of the case at hand, but this may also provide critical perspectives on the reasons 
behind the global rise of FoI laws within the last two decades, a phenomenon within which 
the Indian case is squarely located.  
 
The Bases of the Normative Ideal of an FoI Law 
 
Despite their taking on such widespread acceptance, only a limited literature has attempted to 
examine the crucible of ideas from which the normative ideal of FoI legislation has 
emanated. In its most direct form, it has been argued that these principles “are based on 
international and regional law and standards, evolving State practice (as reflected, inter alia, 
in national laws and judgments of national courts) and the general principles of law 
recognised by the community of nations” (Mendel, 2008: 30-31). Other scholars 
acknowledge these principles in their analysis of the spectacular global rise of FoI legislation, 
finding causality in the international acceptance of democracy as the political ideal. “In many 
instances, nations sought a dramatic way to repudiate the secrecy of collapsed authoritarian 
regimes and signal their new alliance with the remaining superpower, and the constitutional 
or statutory recognition of a right to information was an effective way of doing this” 
(Roberts, 2006: 15); “A number of paradigmatic changes sweeping the globe have 
275 
 
undoubtedly contributed to growing acceptance of the right to information. These include the 
transitions to democracy, albeit more or less successful, that have occurred in several regions 
of the world since 1990” (Mendel, 2008: 4); and “The fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
subsequent crumbling of the USSR led to a rush of laws in the former communist world, 
starting with the Ukraine and Hungary in 1992 and moving through the region to Serbia in 
2004. George Soros’s Open Society Institute funded national and international organisations 
across Central and Eastern Europe and took the lead in promoting transparency as an 
essential component in the development of democracy” (Banisar, 2005: 81) are some 
examples of such a view. The normative ideal of an FoI law in this sense, largely draws its 
sustenance from the perspective that the “movement [for access to information] is creating a 
new norm, a new expectation, and a new threshold requirement for any government to be 
considered a democracy” (Blanton, 2002b: 56). Apart from this major trope, other factors that 
have supported this phenomenal growth of FoI laws, as well as contributed to the 
establishment of the principles of a ‘good’ FoI legislation have also been identified. These 
include the changes in and spread of information technologies (Mendel, 2008); 
‘globalisation’, including the efforts of a transnational networked civil society actors 
(Blanton, 2002; Roberts, 2003; Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006; Relly, 2009); and 
the role of international financial institutions (Roberts, 2003).  
 
While all of the above are plausible factors that influenced the establishment of the normative 
ideal of an FoI law (which in turn significantly impacted the Indian RTI Act), there is perhaps 
one foundational element which has been largely neglected in the existing literature. This 
relates to the existential principle underlying the imagination (and subsequent production and 
assessment) of FoI laws. A commonly accepted definition of an FoI law is that it “gives 
citizens, other residents, and interested parties the right to access documents held by the 
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government without being obliged to demonstrate any legal interest or “standing”” 
(Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006: 93). Thus, an FoI law, by definition¸ should only 
apply to institutions of the state. This conceptual delimitation is reflected in the Indian case as 
well. The almost self-congratulatory tone of the letter from the Secretary of the DoPT in his 
note to all other Secretaries to the government upon the enactment of the RTI Act in 2005 
suggests the extent to which the establishment in India had internalised such a definition. 
“The ambit [of the RTI Act] covers the two Houses of Parliament, State legislatures, the 
Supreme Court / High Court / Subordinate Courts including their administrative offices, 
Constitutional Authorities like Election Commission, Comptroller and Auditor General, 
Union Public Service Commission etc. Only domestic and foreign private bodies working 
within the country have been excluded from the purview of the Act.”514  
 
Another revealing manifestation of such a conception of FoI laws (and how this relates to the 
Indian case) can be found in a recent study that ranked FoI legislation in 89 countries of the 
world.515 Given the immense overlap between the Indian RTI Act and the established 
international principles of a ‘good’ FoI law, it is unsurprising that the study adjudged the 
Indian law to be the second best amongst the legislation surveyed.516 However, it is in 
examining the methodology of this study that further clues about the framing of the 
international principles themselves, and consequently their relationship with the Indian law, 
                                                 
514 Letter from A.N. Tiwari, Secretary (Personnel), to all Secretaries to the Government of India, dated 27 May 
2005. File reference number D.O. No. 34012/4/(s)/2005-Estt(B). Emphasis in original.  
515 See http://www.rti-rating.org/results.html. Accessed 10 February 2012. The study was carried out by two 
international NGOs working on human rights issues, Access Info Europe and the Centre for Law and 
Democracy. Unsurprisingly, the ubiquitous Mr. Mendel heads the latter. In yet another example of how a small 
group of people appear to be defining the global agenda on FoI, the Executive Director of Access Info Europe is 
Helen Darbishire, who was previously with Article 19 and the George Soros funded Open Society Initiative, and 
is the author of another World Bank Institute paper titled “Proactive Transparency: The future of the right to 
information? A review of standards, challenges, and opportunities” published in 2010. Incidentally, the paper 
states that Darbishire is the “current Chair of the FOI Advocates [FOIA] Network”, while the FOI network 
website lists Mr. Mendel as the Chair of the Steering Committee. See http://www.foiadvocates.net/en/about-
foianet. Accessed 20 June 2012.  
516 The Serbian law stood first, while the Indian law shared honours with the Slovenian one at the number two 
position. The next large country was Mexico at number seven. The South African law, despite its visionary 
approach in the context of FoI laws, managed to attain only the twelfth spot.  
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can be garnered. “At the heart of the methodology for applying the RTI Rating are 61 
indicators. For each Indicator, countries earn points within a set range of scores (in most 
cases 0-2), depending on how well the legal framework delivers the Indicator, for a possible 
total of 150 points...517 The Indicators are grouped into seven main categories, as follows:”518 
 
Table 6.3:  Weightages given to different indicators in the RTI Rating study 
 
Section Maximum Points
1. Right of Access 6 
2. Scope 30 
3. Requesting Procedures 30 
4. Exceptions and Refusals 30 
5. Appeals 30 
6. Sanctions and Protections 8 
7. Promotional Measures 16 
Total score 150
 
Source:  Global Right to Information Rating, Access Info Europe and Centre for Law 
and Democracy 
 
 
 
Even as the rationale provided for according these weightages is debatable, examining the 
indicators under the ‘Scope’ category provides a key insight into the politics underlying the 
evolution of international ‘standards’.519 Of the 30 points that could potentially be ‘scored’ 
within this category, 20 points (across five indicators) are allocated to the applicability of the 
law to various organs of the state. However, a mere two additional points can be ‘scored’ if 
the legislation covers within its ambit “a) private bodies that perform a public function and b) 
                                                 
517 Serbia ‘scored’ 135 points, while India and Slovenia tied at second place with 130 points.  
518 See http://www.rti-rating.org/methodology.html. Accessed 10 February 2012.  
519 “Each of the four central elements of a right to information system - Scope, Requesting Procedures, 
Exceptions and Refusals, and Appeals - are given an equal weighting of 30 points, while the other three 
elements have been allocated fewer points. In this way, the Indicators give appropriate weight to the different 
legal mechanisms needed to ensure respect for the right of access to information in practice.” See 
http://www.rti-rating.org/methodology.html. Accessed 10 February 2012.  
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private bodies that receive significant public funding”.520 This means that while the Indian 
law ‘scores’ highly within this category, the South African law, which is quite unique (and 
radical) in incorporating all private entities within the ambit of its Act (in the exercise of any 
other rights of the citizens, and not limited to the context of private entities performing public 
functions or being publicly funded), would not be considered qualitatively better, all other 
things being equal. The study then serves as a stark (and ‘quantifiable’) example of an 
overwhelming bias within international norms on FoI legislation towards holding the state 
more transparent and accountable, while private entities (even when they perform public 
functions) are considered to be relatively peripheral to such concerns. Thus, in such an 
imagination of what a ‘good’ FoI law must be, the Indian RTI Act is celebrated and upheld as 
an example to be emulated as it is designed to hold the state to account very exigently, while 
a country that may desire to widen the ambit of its law further may end up being considered 
as an outlier.521 It therefore comes as no surprise that the Cabinet note authored by the DoPT 
in January 1998 in the context of the FoI bill clearly stated that extending the Act to the 
private sector would be “fraught with grave implications for the national economy as it would 
affect the investment climate at a time when we are liberalising and opening the economy”.522 
 
Not only does such a normative framework exclude private entities from the ambit of this 
type of law, it goes even further in practice. In imagining and producing freedom of 
information as a democratic ‘must-have’, this framework invokes the noble ideals of 
democratic deepening, citizen participation, transparency and accountability - and then 
extends these privileges to the body corporate. “Providing citizens with open access to 
information is a cornerstone of good governance. Transparency is essential to allow citizens 
                                                 
520 See http://www.rti-rating.org/xls/India.xls. Accessed 10 February 2012.  
521 In many important ways, this recalls the discussion in the preceding chapter on the exclusion of private 
entities from the Indian RTI Act, and reinforces the immense overlap between it and international ‘norms’. 
522 Note for the Cabinet dated - January 1998, sent by DoPT. File reference no. 34011/1(s)/97-Estt.(B), DoPT. 
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and markets to hold institutions accountable for their policies and performance, to foster trust 
in government and minimize corruption” (World Bank, 2008: 1, emphasis added). “Access to 
information promotes the fight against corruption, decisively contributes to the establishment 
of transparency policies needed to strengthen democracies and respect for human rights, 
promotes stable economic markets and socioeconomic justice, and enables effective business 
practices.”523 It responds to the question of “How is [the right to access public information] a 
useful tool for companies?”524 by exhorting such entities to partake of its bounty. “The right 
to access public information yields information related to regulations, decisions by 
government organizations and agencies (such as procurement plans, statistics, and market 
data), and other important trade information that many times only the government can 
generate. Exercising our right to know promotes economic development because it enables us 
to better plan business activities, favors legitimate competition, and reduces barriers to 
business operations, all of which in turn is beneficial for the country... The right to access 
public information is a cornerstone of the rule of law: it ensures participation in and checks 
on the body politic and favors the development of companies in the private sector, thereby 
laying the foundation for prosperity.”525 Citizenship, rights, benefits, participation, economic 
growth and prosperity thus come to rest (arguably through several leaps of faith) upon the 
normatively and morally irresistible mantle of government transparency.526 Meanwhile, the 
                                                 
523 A statement made by the Organization of American States quoted in the Report of the Companies and the 
Right to Access Public Information round-table held on 26 April 2007, in Buenos Aires, Argentina (emphasis 
added). The round-table was organised “as part of the joint effort by the civil rights association Asociación por 
los Derechos Civiles (ADC) and the British Embassy to make the private sector aware of the right  
to access public information. The World Bank Institute and the Inter-American Investment Corporation  
also supported and participated in the event”. It is not surprising that five years prior to this round-table,  
the World Development Report of the World Bank for 2002 focused on “Building Institutions for  
Markets” stating that “Weak institutions - tangled laws, corrupt courts, deeply biased credit systems, and 
elaborate business registration requirements - hurt poor people and hinder development”. See 
http://go.worldbank.org/YGBBFHL1Y0. Accessed 12 June 2012.  
524 Report of the Companies and the Right to Access Public Information round-table held on 26 April 2007 in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina.  
525 Ibid.  
526 Interestingly, similar impulses seem to have been at play over two centuries ago resulting in what is widely 
acknowledged to be the first modern FoI law, enacted in Sweden in 1766. The law was pioneered by Anders 
Chydenius, a clergyman-politician, and a strong votary of free trade. “In Chydenius’s day, the leading debates 
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same founts of wealth and prosperity, while ostensibly contributing substantially to the larger 
social good, themselves remain outside the imagination of any such mechanism of 
transparency.  
 
In practice (at least in some countries), this potential use of FoI laws has not been lost upon 
private entities. In the UK, Freedom of Information Ltd is a company that “exists to help you 
get the most from the UK’s freedom of information (FoI) legislation... [It works] with 
companies seeking public sector contracts and commercial intelligence, pressure groups 
looking to influence public policy, and citizens who wish to exercise their right to open 
government... The FOIA is a fantastic tool for business, especially if your company is seeking 
public sector contracts.”527 “In the U.S. and Canada, which respectively adopted access laws 
in 1966 and 1983, it was expected that the legislation would primarily provide citizens with 
an ability to hold their governments to higher levels of accountability, which it has. But today 
the biggest users of those nations’ laws are from the business sector, users who are either 
seeking government procurement contracts or are members of a regulated environment and 
are trying to divine their regulators’ strategies... In the U.S., the federal government 
responded to 769,986 FOIA requests in 2004, an estimated 450,000 of which were filed by 
                                                                                                                                                        
concerned the trade monopolies enjoyed by wealthy Stockholm merchants that prevented the towns along the 
Gulf of Bothnia (specifically Chydenius’s own Kokkola) from trading their pine-tar (essential for naval stores) 
or engaging in shipping and ship-building. As the mercantilist Hats party lost power to the more agrarian-
centered Caps in the Swedish Diet in the mid 1760s during an extended period of parliamentary rule, the free 
trade debates opened other secrecy issues such as the closed committee of the Diet that made secret budgeting 
and foreign policy decisions, as well as the government’s censorship regime - both of which became targets of 
Chydenius’s polemics and parliamentary maneuvering. The culmination on 1 December 1766 was the first 
freedom of information statute, in the Freedom of the Press Act that stands as one of the four fundamental 
constitutional laws in Sweden” (Blanton, 2006: 82). 
527 From the website of the Freedom of Information Ltd. See http://www.freedomofinformation.co.uk. Accessed 
15 June 2012.  
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businesses... In Canada in 2004 there were 25,207 access requests made to the federal 
government, of which 11,847, or 47 per cent, came from business.”528  
 
Although there are no similar statistics available for India, what can be safely said is that 
given the fine exemplar of international FoI norms that the Indian RTI Act is, it certainly 
appears to have ingratiated itself to this specific ‘international’ imagination of what an ideal 
FoI law must be. This thinking was also reflected in an intervention made by the senior 
Congress Party leader Pranab Mukherjee during the examination of the draft FoI bill by the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee in 2000 of which he was then Chair. “All over the world, 
with globalisation, international tendering, one of the major complaints is, lack of 
transparency, not only in India, but in advanced countries also... Always, in cases of 
purchases, agreements and contracts -- whether it is overseas contract or any other 
international bidding -- there will be multiple parties. Therefore... there is a need for 
providing all the relevant information... I am not talking of small contracts, but of major 
contracts.”529  
 
Such a focus on reimagining the role of the state primarily as a facilitator for markets is not 
new in the Indian context, and is part of a larger international project of reforming the state, 
not least by judging its ‘efficiency’ against business principles. “This started in the beginning 
because of a need for good governance, [against] corruption. NDA had come after some time, 
they wanted to show results. All the initiatives started [around then] - the Citizen Charter 
initiative. What are all these? All these initiatives are in the way of making [the government] 
more accountable. There was no public pressure for Citizen’s Charters. How did it come? 
                                                 
528 From “Access to Information - The Commercial Side” an unpublished paper by Roderick Macdonell, “a 
long-time journalist and media development consultant, [who] was a consultant at the World Bank for five 
years, where he participated in access-to-information initiatives in Nigeria and Sierra Leone”. 
529 Proceedings of the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, held at 1500 
hours on 23 October 2000 in Committee Room ‘A’, Parliament House Annexe, New Delhi, pp. 23-24.  
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Because there was a feeling in the political class, supported by the civil servants that we need 
to bring in more accountability. This [the RTI Act] is a part of this initiative that 
continued.”530 Citizen Charters, pioneered amongst others by the World Bank, came into the 
Indian administrative lexicon in the mid-1990s. A central element of this initiative was the 
repositioning of the citizen as a ‘client’ or ‘consumer’ in her relationship with the state. “The 
emphasis of the Citizens’ Charter is on citizens as customers of public services” (ARC, 2009: 
33, emphasis added). Much influenced by the New Public Management thinking that had 
come to dominate discussions on administrative reforms at this time, such arguments were 
located within the vocabulary of more ‘efficient’ business practices and management. “Total 
Quality Management [TQM] is no longer restricted to manufacturing operations in India, but 
is expected to permeate all sectors with a customer interface... The Department of ARPG 
[Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances] has made an arrangement with the Quality 
Division of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) to introduce TQM practices in the 
centre and states and to evaluate current initiatives in organisations like the Department of 
ARPG, Delhi Sales Tax Department and the Department of Defence Accounts” (Sundaram, 
2004: 147-148). Unsurprisingly, such initiatives of reimagining the state in the image of 
market principles were instituted soon after the launch of the economic liberalisation project 
in 1991.  
 
Thus, the international influence on the enactment of the RTI Act in India can trace its roots 
at least in part to the discourse that underpinned the reform process that was launched in the 
early 1990s. “From 1991 onwards, this liberalisation question has been there. When you talk 
about liberalisation, the first thing which comes is that procedure should be liberalised, and 
unnecessary controls should be given up. The concepts of a more open society were floating 
                                                 
530 Interview with EFD094, 24 November 2009.  
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around. Take this whole business of [the] money laundering act. It is not so that suddenly the 
Indian government decided that there should be a money laundering law. Nations kept on 
debating for maybe twenty years that we need to have a broad law, which is an overarching 
law across countries to tackle problems like money laundering. The moment you say that, it 
means a kind of liberalisation across boundaries in very core areas like money, the movement 
of dollars, the financial markets. Basically what are you doing? You are opening up your 
information systems. We have also become a part of that system now, in a much deeper sense 
than what was going on earlier. The transparency of systems, the transparency of economic 
interplays. These are not things that we can say came domestically. The whole of WTO is 
exactly this.”531  
 
With one of the foundational principles of the WTO being to establish a transparent and 
predictable international trade regime, the Indian RTI Act thus shares much of its conceptual 
bases with the larger international project of imagining the world as a single seamless market. 
In this context, it is perhaps not a coincidence that India joined the WTO as a founder-
member in 1995, and it was around this very time that the idea of ‘freeing’ government 
information began to take root and become more acceptable, not least within government 
circles.532 In this context, it is interesting to note that an overwhelming 74 countries of the 84 
                                                 
531 Interview with NXW937, 17 December 2009. It is interesting to note that in the case of the RTI, pressures 
from international financial institutions intersected with the international rights-based framework quite 
conveniently. This was not only visible in the ‘grassroots’ demand located in the context of livelihood rights (as 
highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4), but also in other international fora such as the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights. The Ministry of External Affairs sought a brief on “legislation on Freedom of Information and 
its salient features” from DoPT to “present a coordinated picture of GOI’s efforts to secure the rights of citizens 
and their promotion and protection” for the 59th Session of the Commission on Human Rights held in Geneva 
from 17 March - 25 April 2003. Letter from Deepa Gopalan Wadhwa, Joint Secretary (UNES), Ministry of 
External Affairs, to Keshav Desiraju, Joint Secretary, DoPT, dated 17 March 2003. Reference no. UI/352/57/02, 
Ministry of External Affairs.  
532 Readers may recall (as highlighted in Chapter 5) that the 1991-1996 period was one where there was a stable 
government at the centre which ran its full term, and was also the period when the Congress party was to have 
enacted an FoI legislation if it had followed up on the promises made in its 1991 manifesto. However, this 
period saw practically no activity on the FoI front within the government. On the other hand, 1991 saw a 
concentrated push towards economic liberalisation.  
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that have enacted and enforced FoI laws are members of the WTO.533 Further analysis of the 
mapping between the WTO members, observers (which is the stage prior to full membership) 
and non-members, is also revealing.534 Of the ten countries that have FoI laws but are not 
members of WTO, eight are currently negotiating to become members of the WTO.535 In 
other words, if one was to look at ‘FoI-compliant’ countries in conjunction with WTO 
membership (including observer status), it appears that almost all countries that have FoI 
laws are members of or observers to the WTO. This picture is reemphasised when one looks 
at the set of 50 countries that are considering enacting an FoI legislation. Again, almost all 
countries are either members of or observers to the WTO.536 However, while the WTO does 
not impose any specific requirement to enact an FoI law upon member countries, it does 
demand that certain transparency procedures related to trade be put in place so that other 
member governments as well as private investors are able to access relevant government 
information, ostensibly to ensure that trade is carried out predictably, transparently and 
efficiently.537  
 
On the face of it, few could argue against such a proposition. However, the argument needs to 
be made at a more subtle level. The WTO as an organisation would be loath to either see 
itself, or be described as operating on coercive principles. Consensus is the defining thematic 
within which the organisation locates itself. And yet, the fact of the rise of the WTO is itself 
                                                 
533 The WTO currently has 153 members and 31 observers. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. Accessed 10 September 2010.  
534 See Annexure VI for a comparative table mapping countries with FoI laws with WTO membership.  
535 These are Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Cook Islands, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Montenegro, Russia, 
Serbia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Cook Islands and Kosovo are the only two territories where FoI laws 
exist but are neither members of the WTO nor observers. The status of Kosovo as a sovereign nation remains 
under debate, which is why it has not been granted observer status yet. However the political leadership of 
Kosovo has already indicated its interest in joining the WTO. If one was to take this into account, the overlap 
would be almost complete, save a small island nation.  
536 Nauru, Palestine and Zambia are the three territories which are considering enacting FoI laws but do not have 
member or observer status in the WTO.  
537 These include clauses in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement), and Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Agreement on Government Procurement. For a detailed 
analysis of how these relate to transparency and access to information, see Roberts (2003; 2006, Chapter 8).  
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an indicator of a larger homogenising of the global economic imagination, which is premised 
on liberal capitalist democracy and free markets, with the international debate and foreign 
policy negotiations located within the world of minutiae, but not questioning the overarching 
framework. The origins of this framework itself could perhaps be traced to the 
democratisation project and the concomitant push towards economic liberalisation in 
countries across the world. As noted in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the good governance agenda 
arose embedded in the ‘third wave of democratisation’. Freedom of information formed a part 
of the good governance agenda, inspired by ideas of open and transparent government. Along 
with this distillation, as it were, of the political imagination of how a country should be 
governed, a flattening of the economic discourse was taking place in tandem, one which 
anointed free-market capitalism as the model of economic development in countries across 
the world. This was a period when a particular imagination of the world was being fashioned, 
where “the discipline of capital... would operate along rationalist principles based on full 
access to relevant public and private information” (Gill, 2000: 11, quoted in Roberts, 2000: 
15). However, while there has indeed been a significant loosening of the strings around 
public information, releasing private information has in fact seen an opposite trend, with 
greater conservatism ruling the roost in the form of more stringent data protection regulations 
as well as a greater focus on intellectual property rights. The playing field has indeed been 
levelled, with a distinct tilt towards the market and the individual, the lead actors within a 
neoliberal imagination.538 In this context, “Transparency’s fundamental purpose is that of 
rendering greater discipline and accountability of policymakers and actors to the market. 
Forms of transparency that might increase the market’s accountability to policymakers and 
citizens have been either marginal to, or completely outside, this framework... Yet this may 
                                                 
538 Extending such concerns to develop the notion of the ‘neoliberal state’, Haque enumerates the following as 
its defining characteristics: “the minimal scope and diminished role of the state sector; the replacement of public 
ownership and control by private enterprise and management; the increased alliance between the state and 
private capital; the withdrawal of welfare programs and adoption of market-led goods and the transformation of 
public institutions based on businesslike structures and strategies” (Haque, 2008: 13-14). 
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well be the most significant feature of the neoliberal transparency drive: its potential to 
depoliticise an inherently political process that protects and advances certain interests to the 
exclusion of others” (Rodan, 2004: 2). It is within such a conceptual continuum that FoI 
legislation sits quite comfortably, for not only does it provide a useful tool which furthers (or 
‘deepens’) liberal democracy on the moral-normative plane, but it also provides admirable 
support to the principles of the market economy that require information, particularly public 
information, to be available freely to maximise predictability, and of course, profitability.539 
As “one of the world’s most comprehensive disclosure laws” (Florini, 2007: 9-10), the Indian 
RTI Act thus strengthens this imagination considerably - a willing comprador in the project 
of ring-fencing the state to the advantage of the market, both globally, as well in its own 
‘India Rising’ coloured backyard. In doing so, it appears to strengthen the argument that 
neoliberalism itself is undergoing a transition from “‘shallow neoliberalism’ emphasising a 
minimal state to a ‘deep neoliberalism’ attempting to shape social relations and institutions to 
make markets more competitive” (Rodan, 2004: 6).  
 
Returning ‘Home’ 
 
It is at this juncture that it might be instructive to return to the silence of the dominant 
narrative on the influence of larger global processes on the evolution of the Indian RTI Act. 
As the discussion above shows, the RTI Act in its form, content, as well as its timing draws 
its sustenance from the same conceptual continuum that led to the launch of the economic 
liberalisation project in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time, the push towards 
the market-led model of growth and development is a deeply contested idea in India, not least 
                                                 
539 A telling example is another tool within the same continuum - Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index. Not only does it rank corruption levels in countries based on perceptions, but on the 
perceptions of business leaders, a majority of whom are located outside of that country. See Andersson et al 
(2009) for more details.  
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engendering cacophonous debate, but also spawning numerous (at times violent) resistance 
movements. ‘Reforms by stealth’ has been one strategy of the political elites to negotiate and 
circumvent this resistance.540 A related but different strategy can be perhaps unearthed here, 
acknowledged by some activists. “For the government [acknowledging the influence of 
international actors and processes] is not good publicity, so the government would be 
reluctant to talk about it publicly. For the movement, it’s not nice to believe that actually we 
only had a part role to play. We’d like to believe that we did it, India did it. When you have to 
attribute it to foreign countries, it doesn’t look nice for the country, for the political class, for 
the movements, [or] for the civil society, who would like to take the entire credit. It hurts me 
somewhere to acknowledge that it wasn’t even India, it was probably a foreign master telling 
me what to do and that’s why we did it. None of us normally want to talk of it. You have to 
take too much away from our own contribution or what we’d like to believe.”541 
 
Here, YXR734 is pointing to a phenomenon that displays a peculiar joining of forces in the 
production of the silence on the influence of international processes and actors on the 
enactment of the RTI Act in India. Voices that sought to empower the vulnerable and the 
marginalised by advocating for greater government transparency appear to have willingly 
participated in the production of this silence in the narrative. Even if the politics of claiming 
credit is set aside, such an exercise in self-censorship could indeed be seen as supporting a 
larger cause - that of privileging a ‘people’s movement’ - and in doing so strengthening the 
idea that ordinary citizens can force the government to respond to their demands. But at the 
same time, it also served another purpose. Participating in this veritable conspiracy of silence 
also accorded critical legitimacy to ‘activist’ voices. Premised existentially on a vociferous 
negation of anything ‘foreign’, be they ethereal ideas or earthly funds, activists could not 
                                                 
540 See Jenkins (1999). By ‘political’, here I mean not just those who are in the formal political arena, but those 
wielding the power to influence social and economic processes, as well as those desirous to do so.  
541 Interview with YXR734, 18 November 2009. Emphasis in expression.  
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have publicly acknowledged that the conceptual bases of freedom of information, at least in 
part, lay in a specific imagination of the world that was antithetical to their own closely- and 
publicly-held beliefs and politics. The explanatory narrative thus had to be delinked and 
sanitised from any association with international influences for their own legitimacy to 
remain unthreatened.  
 
However, this also meant that stronger and more politically canny forces endorsed, 
strengthened and reproduced this discourse as this in turn provided them with the legitimacy 
that would otherwise have had to be manufactured by other means.542 Global processes 
(within which the ruling elites are deeply embedded) and pressures would have ensured that 
the government enacted an FoI legislation during this period in any event. That a ‘people’s 
movement’ arose at the same time making just such a demand, allowed the government (with 
unequivocal support from the ruling elites, including the mainstream media) to ‘accept’ this 
demand and show itself to be an entity that was responsive and sensitive to the wishes of the 
‘masses’, even as it pre-empted any potential allegations of succumbing to ‘outside forces’ - 
both of which strengthened its own legitimacy. Meanwhile, international actors (particularly 
IFIs), also endorsed and promoted the ‘RTI Act as a bottom-up process’ narrative in great 
earnest as it suited their own political interests. Acknowledging the coercive power of 
international actors over a large established democracy seeking great-power status does not 
make for good politics for either international actors or the government. As a respondent 
asserted, “This is what the World Bank would like to put across - that [the RTI Act] is now 
the aspiration of the masses. But this is not the aspiration of most masses”.543  
 
                                                 
542 Or pushed through by stealth. Foucault would have seen this as example of ‘governmentality’ at its insidious 
best.  
543 Interview with WKI942, 1 December 2009. The nature and extent of the ‘people’s movement’ was discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
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Why independent academic researchers appear to have participated in the production of this 
discourse remains somewhat of a mystery. In part, this could be attributed to limiting their 
inquiry to campaign activist circles, which has only resulted in the reinforcement of the 
dominant narrative.544 At the same time, a researcher commented, “I cannot afford to critique 
the activists or the process explicitly as I am dependent on the same people for carrying out 
future research”.545 Self-censorship, it would seem, is not the preserve of campaign activists 
only. The noble ideals underlying the production of ‘knowledge’ appear to be as susceptible 
to political compulsions as any other process of truth-making. Critically though, this complex 
interplay of interests and the production of the dominant discourse from within it, ensured 
that this most ‘radical’ of laws would remain circumscribed within the conceptual continuum 
referred to above, wherein the interests of the market could not be jeopardised.546  
 
In this context, YXR734’s agonised ruminations above do not necessarily recognise that the 
dichotomy between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ is perhaps no longer very stark. The ‘foreign 
master’ is no longer the World Bank or the United States. There is a ‘master’, but one who is 
not necessarily ‘foreign’. In the post-Cold War globalised logic of economic processes, this 
‘master’ is a transnational ruling elite which is defined by the imagination of the world it 
shares with its own kind, in which individual nationalities are minor irritants. However, 
national identity does possess great value when invoked as an emotive symbol to further a 
nationalist aspiration to great-power status, which itself strengthens the selfsame imagination 
of market- and growth-led development as the only possible way forward - a project which is 
served well by ‘freeing’ government information. In this context, an insightful comment from 
a respondent provides a disturbing conclusion. “The truth doesn’t create heroes. What civil 
society wants is heroes and heroines. And these heroes and heroines are the counter to the 
                                                 
544 Some directions on why this should be so were discussed in Chapter 4.  
545 Interview with PSW309, 4 April 2012.  
546 Hence, even private entities performing public functions lie outside the ambit of the Indian RTI Act.  
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other side of a total collapse of civility in governance. You need these counter-heroes, you 
continuously need [them]... This is the irony of what is happening - that you are having one 
Act after the other that is declaring rights when your governance frame is completely 
collapsing; where the whole nation is in the grips of a new lumpen elite, no longer a lumpen 
proletariat, who have the reins of government in their hands. Therefore you get into 
government to hush up illegality.”547 
 
In Conclusion  
 
In sum, it can now be suggested that international influences had more than a peripheral role 
to play in the process that led to the enactment of the RTI Act in India on several counts. 
First, invoking the examples of countries that already had such legislation formed an 
important weapon in the arsenal of those advocating for an RTI-related law in India from at 
least the mid-1980s. As the thinking within the government began to take on its own 
momentum, the international experience was regularly invoked and used as politically 
expedient to justify the positions of the government on the more substantive aspects of such a 
law. However, even as laws of other countries informed the development of different clauses 
of the FoI Act in India, the larger need for enacting an FoI legislation was at least partially 
framed within an aspirational desire to be counted as an ‘advanced’ democracy, especially 
within government circles. In this sense, not only was the RTI Act produced as a tool that had 
instrumental value (in terms of reducing corruption, empowering citizens etc.), but also as 
something which had acquired important symbolic value in the evolution of the meta-
narrative of Indian democracy. The second way in which the international came to bear on 
the national was through the pressures of international institutions. By the mid-1990s (as 
                                                 
547 Interview with WKI942, 1 December 2009. Big industrialists entering the Parliament (as reported in Chapter 
5) are an emblematic example of this ‘lumpen elite’, which is part of a transnational business elite, directly 
assuming control over the state.  
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highlighted in Chapter 1 of this thesis), the good governance and new public management 
agendas had acquired impressive proportions, and a focus on the transparency and 
accountability of state institutions was deeply embedded within this discourse.548 India was 
hardly immune to these international pressures, which had by now begun to link the lending 
policies of international financial institutions like the ADB and the World Bank to greater 
transparency in the functioning of public institutions. Furthermore, this was also the period 
during which the WTO was formed (of which India was a founder-member), which had 
placed a related set of transparency obligations on signatory states. 
 
But perhaps most importantly, these events and processes eventually draw their sustenance 
from the conceptual continuum circumscribed by two defining ideas, both of which saw a 
global rise concomitant with the evolution of the RTI Act in India (as well as in several other 
countries of the world) - the establishment of liberal capitalist democracy as the political and 
economic ideal, and the related recalibration of the role of the state vis-à-vis the market in the 
international development discourse. It could thus be proposed that even as the dominant 
explanatory narrative surrounding the Indian RTI Act is richly embellished with stories of 
pioneering reformers, valiant civil society, popular protests, truculent bureaucracies, epic 
struggles, and above all, the victory of openness over secrecy in a grand battle of ideas, 
perhaps these accounts can be traced to a space more ethereal, more omnipresent, and more 
global than thus far imagined. Looking back at that specific period of recent history, a 
singular vision of a particular kind of economic and political governance was being forged 
and was well on its way to acquiring hegemonic contours. The pillars of capitalist democracy 
and the supremacy of the market over the state had developed deep foundations, and the 
edifice of the global structure had transferred its weight onto them. In that context, the Indian 
                                                 
548 This was emblematically manifested in the World Development Report of the World Bank in 1997, “The 
State in a Changing World”, where it set out to examine “the role and effectiveness of the state: what it should 
do, how it should do it, and how it can improve in a rapidly changing world”.  
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RTI Act could perhaps be seen as a richly detailed accoutrement to those pillars, providing 
them with both strength and beauty - the former through its insistence on democratic 
deepening, and the latter through its morally indisputable promise of openness and 
transparency. Form and content thus fused together, much like the Grecian urn, with a 
tantalising invitation to gaze upon it, even as the structure housing it grew to such vast 
proportions, that observers became oblivious to it.  
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Chapter 7 
How Deep is My Democracy? 
 
“Go to any post office or railway station in Tamil Nadu and try to extract information out of 
any employee there. You have to put up with “Get lost!” barked out a hundred times within a 
single minute. Never do these men realize they are public servants, or that their monthly 
salaries come from the tax payers.” 
 Extract from the Tamil short story Vishamandiram (1925)549 
 
“We write in reference to the abovementioned application received by Mumbai International 
Airport Private Limited (MIAL) under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (the “Act”) 
requesting for information relating to various government notifications. MIAL is not a public 
authority under the provisions of the Act and therefore the Act does not apply to MIAL.” 
 Letter from MIAL, 18 December 2007550 
 
When ‘Kalki’ R. Krishnamurthy wrote Vishamandiram in 1925, India was a very different 
place. A railway station was public property. A railway official was a public servant. Public 
servants seemed to be routinely dismissive of ordinary citizens. Citizens would gripe 
privately, writers would critique such happenings with “the zeal of the reformer” 
(Krishnamurthy, 1999: 18), but most accepted this as the way of the world.  
 
Eighty years later, the way of the world was to change dramatically. The Right to Information 
Act of 2005 gave citizens the legally enforceable right to seek government-held information. 
Public servants could no longer disdainfully disregard citizens’ requests for information. 
They were bound by law, on fear of personal sanctions, to respond to requests for information 
in a time-bound manner. The reformist zeal appeared to have won in the end, eight decades 
notwithstanding.  
                                                 
549 From Vishamandiram (The Poison Cure), a Tamil short story by ‘Kalki’ R. Krishnamurthy, originally 
published in the Tamil magazine Navashakti in 1925. Translation by Gowri Ramnarayan. See Krishnamurthy 
(1999).  
550 Letter from the “Authorised Signatory” of Mumbai International Airport Private Limited to Sanjay Ramesh 
Shirodkar dated 18 December 2007 with the subject “Application dated December 11, 2007 under the Right to 
Information Act, 2005”. 
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However, other changes had also taken place in the intervening years. It was no longer clear 
what was public and what was private. If in 1925 the post office and the railway station were 
unequivocally ‘public’, in 2007 airports were insisting (albeit quite politely) that they were 
not. However, other things remained unchanged.551 Much like the reviled railway employee 
of the early twentieth century, Mumbai International Airport Limited (MIAL) would not 
disclose any information to citizens in the twenty-first.552  
 
Despite the word ‘private’ in its name, MIAL is an emblematic example of Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) projects, particularly in the development of infrastructure such as ports, 
highways, and airports in India. In 2006, the government agency Airports Authority of India 
(AAI) leased 2000 acres of land (with an estimated market value of USD 9 billion) to MIAL, 
74% of which is owned by the company GVK Airport Holdings Private Limited and its 
subsidiaries, for a nominal fee of INR 100 (~USD 2) per annum for thirty years extendable 
by another thirty. Further, “the State Government has waived stamp duty worth Rs. 200-250 
crore [~USD 35-45 million] with respect to MIAL... Thus, MIAL clearly reaps the benefits of 
the substantial amounts received by way of waiver, equity, concessional land use inter alia 
which otherwise, will not be extended to a private incorporation by the Central Government 
without any reasons. Such contributions are crystal clear in themselves to affirm our 
conclusion as to how MIAL has received “substantial financing indirectly” by the funds 
provided by the appropriate Government.”553 In addition, “a consortium of banks, most of 
                                                 
551 Including the fact that the concerns of ordinary folk continue to be articulated primarily by the socially 
privileged. ‘Kalki’ Krishnamurthy was of a similar social background as much of the leadership of the RTI 
movement.  
552 An uncannily similar case relates to Delhi International Airport Private Limited (DIAL), where despite it 
being declared a Public Authority by the Central Information Commission (CIC), it did not release any 
information to the applicant Lt. Col. (Retd.) Anil Heble. See CIC order No.CIC/OK/C/2006/00125 dated 17 
January 2007. After stonewalling both the CIC as well as other requests for information for several years, DIAL 
obtained a stay order from the Delhi High Court in 2011 on the CIC decision. See “CIC order declaring DIAL a 
public authority stayed”, The Hindu newspaper, 31 May 2011.  
553 Decision dated 30 May 2011 by Sushma Singh, Information Commissioner, Central Information 
Commission, on Complaint No. CIC/MA/C/2008/000195/SS.  
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them in the public sector, gave an infrastructure loan of Rs 4,200 crore [~USD 750 million] 
to MIAL”.554 For reasons such as these, along with the governance structure of MIAL, which 
includes government representatives, the Central Information Commission (CIC) on 30 May 
2011 ruled that, “We find no hesitancy in declaring MIAL as a Public Authority... MIAL 
shall appoint a [Central Public Information Officer] CPIO and [First Appellate Authority] 
FAA within 30 days of the receipt of this order and shall also fulfill [sic] the mandate of 
Section 4(1) disclosure as mandated under the RTI Act, within two months of the receipt of 
this order.”555  
 
However, MIAL did not comply with this order and filed a writ petition in the Delhi High 
Court questioning the order of the CIC.556 As is often the norm, several months and hearings 
later, the case still rests there pending a judgement.557 As is also the norm, the staying power 
of a company like the MIAL with respect to the legal process is far greater than the individual 
citizen who had filed the application for information from MIAL in the first instance, and has 
had to “spend over 3 lakh rupees [~USD 5500] over the past 5 years on this issue”.558  
 
PPPs are only one type of entity doggedly resisting attempts to provide information to 
citizens. In recent years, several privately-owned hospitals (and schools) have been granted 
public land at nominal rates to set up their operations, with a contractual obligation to provide 
                                                 
554 See “Why not sell the Taj, when we can do it with Mumbai airport?”, Firstpost newspaper, 12 June 2012. 
http://www.firstpost.com/business/why-not-sell-the-taj-when-we-can-do-it-with-mumbai-airport-340529.html. 
Accessed 10 July 2012. 
555 Decision dated 30 May 2011 by Sushma Singh, Information Commissioner, Central Information 
Commission on Complaint No. CIC/MA/C/2008/000195/SS. Section 4(1) of the RTI Act pertains to certain 
categories of information about the structure and functioning of a public authority that must be proactively and 
regularly placed in the public domain.  
556 Writ Petition (Civil) 4341/2011 in the Delhi High Court.  
557 The next hearing is scheduled for 19 October 2012 according to Sanjay Ramesh Shirodkar, the respondent in 
the case. Telephone interview on 26 July 2012. A former judge of the Delhi High Court has suggested that “the 
court was so much up to its neck in arrears that it would take 466 years to clear the gigantic backlog”. From “At 
5 minutes per case, Delhi high court clears 94,000 in 2 years”, The Times of India newspaper, 30 May 2012.  
558 Telephone interview with Sanjay Ramesh Shirodkar, 26 July 2012.  
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at least 25% of their services free of cost to people belonging to ‘economically weaker 
sections’ (EWS).559 On 28 October 2009, Rakesh Gupta “filed an information request with 
the Income Tax (IT) Department to inspect the IT Assessment records of 20 [such] hospitals 
in order to ascertain their financial position vis-à-vis their commitment to serve the EWS 
segments of society”.560 His application was rejected by the Public Information Officer, as 
well as the First Appellate Authority. “The IT Department has refused to allow inspection 
and access to copies of assessment records on grounds of commercial confidence, fiduciary 
relationship and personal information protected under Section 8(1)(d), (e) and (j) of the RTI 
Act respectively.”561 The case now rests with the CIC, which has yet to schedule a date for a 
full-bench hearing. In the event that the CIC rules in favour of the plaintiff, it is almost 
certain that the matter will be taken to the High Court by the respondents, including the 
concerned hospitals which are third parties to the case - another example of “the ferocity with 
which the private sector is trying to exclude itself and its doings from the public view”.562 
 
The cases above highlight the larger context within which this research is located. No doubt 
India has changed much in the last eighty years. At the same time, the pace of these changes 
has intensified tremendously over the last two decades. It would appear that the oceans are 
being churned again, throwing up several unresolved dichotomies - the public and the private, 
the powerful and the vulnerable, the civil and the political, the state and the market, the state 
and the citizen, and the global and the national - all within an overarching framework of 
                                                 
559 “For the purpose of identifying the economically weaker sections and low income groups, the family income 
limit of INR 1,20,000 [~USD 2400] per annum, irrespective of the location, is prescribed.” Reserve Bank of 
India, 20 July 2012. See http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/19072012RG.pdf. Accessed 28 July 
2012.  
560 Email of 2 July 2012 from Venkatesh Nayak, Programme Coordinator, Access to Information Programme, 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, New Delhi, to several RTI-related networks.  
561 Ibid.  
562 Email communication from Justice P.B. Sawant, 29 July 2012.  
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democracy.563 While these dichotomies have been examined in the preceding chapters, in this 
concluding chapter I will attempt to locate them within the organising questions that were 
identified in the opening chapter of this thesis.  
 
How and why was the RTI Act enacted in India at the time that it was?  
How and why did it take the specific form that it did?564  
 
Having examined several bodies of evidence in the preceding chapters, an attempt may now 
be made to ascertain the causal factors that led to the enactment of the RTI Act in 2005. Thus 
far, the investigation has followed a pattern of moving outwards from the local. It began by 
problematising the role of the grassroots in the dominant narrative, then examined the role of 
the state (at the national level) in the process, and finally focused on the impact of 
international processes. I will invert the order here, not to privilege any particular factor to a 
greater degree, but to provide a counterpoise to the narrative as it currently exists, and in that, 
offer a more evenly balanced perspective on the ‘story of the RTI Act’ in India.  
 
With the end of the Cold War, the early 1990s saw the unassailable rise of two normative 
ideals within the global discourse - liberal democracy as the only acceptable form of political 
organisation of a country, and free-market capitalism as the definitive form of economic 
growth and development. This is not to say that these ideals displayed homogeneous contours 
in the larger discourse, advocacy efforts, or in practice. However, contestation was largely 
                                                 
563 This metaphor traces its roots to the episode of samudra manthan (literally, churning of the oceans), which 
appears in the Bhagavata Purana, the Mahabharata and the Vishnu Purana, all texts within the larger Hindu 
tradition. In sum, the episode speaks of a collaborative effort of the devas (demigods), representing ‘good’, and 
the asuras (demons), representing ‘evil’, to obtain amrit (the nectar of immortality) by churning the oceans 
(ksheersagar, or the Milky Way galaxy). Eventually, with the support and guidance of Vishnu, only the devas 
manage to obtain it and subsequently defeated the asuras in battle. By likening the RTI Act to amrit, interesting 
analogies could be drawn between the process and the samudra manthan episode, but perhaps this would be best 
left to a different work.  
564 I am addressing both these questions together as the issues involved are deeply intertwined.  
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relegated to quibbling over the paths towards, and the degree of adherence to, these 
normative ideals. Emblematic manifestations of this discourse took the form of the ‘third 
wave of democratisation’ in the case of the former. In the case of the latter, this meant greater 
integration and expansion of the world’s markets (the establishment of the WTO in 1995 
being an exemplary event), as well as the reimagining of the role of the state (including the 
rise of the good governance and new public management agendas). Further, with the 
geopolitical compulsions of the Cold War no longer in play, donor countries, as well as 
influential IFIs which predictably functioned as their handmaidens, could vocalise the 
rhetoric of democratisation and anti-corruption within the international development 
discourse with renewed vigour (as well as conditionalities on aid), as the fear of recalcitrant 
regimes going over to the ‘other side’ had been thwarted. It was within this discursive 
continuum of democracy, ‘less state, more market’, and anti-corruption that the idea of 
freedom of information grew as an indisputable desirable - both to prove a country’s 
democratic credentials, and to allow markets to function in a more predictable and profitable 
manner.  
 
India proved to be fertile ground for this discourse to flourish in, as this period saw the 
unleashing of unprecedented forces of economic and social change. Beginning in the mid-
1980s, the project to liberalise the economy (understood iconically as beginning in 1991) was 
launched within a familiar vocabulary. The state was to focus on developing regulatory 
frameworks, while the production of goods (whether public or otherwise) and the delivery of 
services was to be increasingly handed over to the market. This vision was premised on the 
simplistic thesis of ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’; deeper integration with international 
economic processes would result in a high-growth path that would lead to greater and quicker 
development for all.  
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Some perspectives have suggested that the economic liberalisation project was launched in 
India as part of an ‘elite revolt’.565 To what extent this holds true is not directly relevant to 
this thesis. However, what is clear is that by the 1990s, several decades of affirmative action 
policies had meant that the traditional bastion of the urban, educated, upper caste, upper 
middle class elite - the higher civil services - had been significantly democratised. This also 
meant that this elite fraction had to relocate to other spaces, and the liberalisation project, 
concomitant with an explosive growth in the media, provided (or created) the avenues for this 
exodus. The state was no longer the preferred destination for the next generation of this elite 
fraction of the middle class. Multinational companies, large corporates, investment banks, 
and the mainstream (primarily English language) media became the spaces of choice for this 
elite. In sum, this meant that just as the state was beginning to disengage from several of its 
previously-held responsibilities, this elite was disengaging from the state.  
 
It was in this social and economic context that the idea of freedom of information as an 
essential marker of a modern democracy began to find greater traction in India. This is not to 
say that progressive and reformist elements within the state (or civil society) had not 
attempted to introduce greater government transparency prior to the 1990s. However, all 
previous attempts had been successfully stymied as until then the elite fraction of the middle 
class was still vested in the state, and therefore greater government transparency at that point 
in time would have been anathema to it. With the powers and privileges necessary to maintain 
its supremacy, this elite possessed the wherewithal to resist any such demands. As the social 
composition of the higher civil service changed, the elite moved out of it, leading to two 
outcomes. First, with the flight of this elite, the ability of the bureaucracy to successfully 
resist pressures from above or below was reduced significantly. This was also informed in 
                                                 
565 Discussed in Chapter 5.  
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part by the political class steadily wresting greater power from the permanent bureaucracy. 
Second, this elite, including the media, now no longer had a conflict of interest with the 
voices that were clamouring for greater transparency, as long as they were limited to 
government transparency. However, now that this elite had moved to an increasingly 
globalised corporate India, it would not allow demands for greater transparency to be 
extended to the private sector. In this sense, it is unsurprising that the imagination of freedom 
of information in the Indian context overlaps significantly with its origins in the international 
discursive continuum mentioned above. This also points to changes taking place in the 
functional spaces where power resides. Whereas power earlier resided in the politician-
business-bureaucrat troika, the latter has been increasingly marginalised. The interests of the 
political class and big business appear to be coalescing rapidly, a crude manifestation of 
which is the increasing number of ‘high net-worth’ businessmen who are becoming MPs, 
often through the Rajya Sabha.  
 
As these international and national processes unfolded, international pressures and trends 
would have ensured that an FoI legislation of some sort would have been enacted in India 
during this period. However, the ruling elite could not have publicly acknowledged that the 
impetus behind enacting an FoI legislation had arisen outside national boundaries and was 
part of a larger project of privileging the market over the state. In a context where an 
aspiration to great-power status was being produced by a globally mobile urban middle class, 
fuelled as it was by a high GDP-growth rate from the late 1990s onwards and greater 
international attention being showered upon a potentially gargantuan market, such an 
acceptance would have resulted in political hara-kiri for those in power. That at this juncture 
a geographically limited rural struggle emerged demanding just such a right meant that the 
enactment of the RTI Act could now be produced as an emblematic event showcasing the 
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resilience and depth of Indian democracy. This served the purposes of several actors. For 
international actors, promoting the grassroots aspect of the Indian experience absolved them, 
at least in the case of India, of using any coercive tactics on the government to enact an RTI 
law (although evidence does suggest otherwise). For the government, endorsing such a 
narrative resulted in increased legitimacy as it could now position itself as a progressive and 
sensitive entity that responded positively to popular demands from below (and in doing so, 
deflect attention from its other, not so ‘popular’ actions). For activists, the benefits were 
obvious. Focusing on the ‘grassroots’ element in the process provided them legitimacy and 
visibility, as well as a strengthening of the belief that social policies could be positively 
impacted by pressures from below. It must however be noted that the state endorsed and 
celebrated the grassroots narrative (for example, through the NAC) only after the imagination 
of the RTI Act had been aligned with the internationally accepted normative ideal of FoI 
legislation - one that did not directly include the private sector within its ambit. Activists, it 
would appear, had used a political strategy of compromise to good effect.566 At the same 
time, the RTI Act of 2005 does display some substantive characteristics that suggest that the 
impact of the grassroots struggle did not play itself out only on the symbolic and political 
planes. However, these characteristics (such as personal financial sanctions on erring officials 
and an obligation on the state to facilitate the usage of the Act by the poor and the illiterate) 
remain circumscribed within the larger international imagination of what an FoI legislation 
can be allowed to do. The focus remains on the state, even as several ‘public’ functions are 
being systematically parcelled out to private entities.  
 
None of this is to say that the role of the grassroots in the enactment of the RTI Act in 2005 is 
merely a manufactured myth. However, its role has been exaggerated, perhaps for important 
                                                 
566 This recalls Ashis Nandy’s fears, “Conformity can never be as dangerous as tamed, defanged, predictable 
dissent, for such dissent allows dominance to turn into hegemony” (Nandy, 2012: 43). 
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political reasons. The sheer dominance of a singular narrative (that also ignores political 
compromises made along the way) has also meant that a depoliticised understanding of the 
process has come to colonise the explanatory narrative around the RTI Act in India. This 
depoliticised perspective is strengthened by the propensity of the dominant narrative to 
disregard the play of power premised on social class in the spaces where social movements 
intersect with the policy process. These silences or partial truths may indeed serve a larger 
purpose of promoting an idealised vision of the importance of ‘non-party political processes’ 
in processes of social change. However, not acknowledging uncomfortable truths perhaps 
may cause more harm to the much vaunted ideal of democratic deepening in the longer term. 
If the ‘success’ of a grassroots-based struggle is premised on the usual suspects - resources, 
privileges, networks, access to centres of power, and political compromises with the 
dominant ideology, then there is little to distinguish such a process from any other. This is 
profoundly ironical, as these are precisely the strategies that social activists often point to 
(admittedly belonging to a different order of magnitude) when critiquing the actions of other 
interest groups.  
 
Depoliticisation aside, a valid critique of such an analysis could highlight the positive impacts 
of the RTI Act, both in the context of anti-corruption, as well as the changes it brings about in 
the citizen-state relationship. It cannot be contested that the Act has indeed empowered 
citizens to hold the government to account. Celebrated examples range from marginalised 
citizens receiving their entitlements from an arbitrary state (for example getting their ration 
cards or passports without having to pay speed-money), or the exposing of large scandals 
such as those related to the 2G spectrum scam and the Commonwealth Games in 2010, in 
part due to the usage of the RTI Act by the media or NGOs. However, such examples need to 
be nuanced further. Receiving ration cards or passports on time and without having to pay 
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bribes is something that could have been ensured by enacting a strong legislation on public 
service delivery, as has seemingly been done to good effect in the state of Bihar.567 As far as 
RTI-informed large-scale exposés are concerned, these have been few and far between, and 
as several senior civil servants pointed out, the RTI Act can at best uncover a paper trail, and 
grand corruption typically does not take place on files. “Has corruption reduced because of 
[the RTI Act]? I don’t see it. All that it has meant is that you have access to record, but [you 
have] to prove the difference between the record and the reality. That’s why I don’t think it 
has changed things much. People are a bit cautious now, but they are still making money, a 
lot of money.”568 In addition, major scams have often enough been exposed prior to the 
enactment of the RTI Act, which suggests that the RTI Act is not necessarily essential for 
instances of grand corruption to come to light.  
 
In any event, to what extent the RTI Act has impacted corruption is not the focus of this 
thesis. What can be proposed is that the popular discourse that celebrates the role of the RTI 
Act to unearth the perfidy of the state and its functionaries has generally been limited to 
exposing corruption. It does not, for example, go on to say that while the state is corrupt, and 
there is a pressing need for it to be made transparent, accountable and efficient, it is also 
necessary. It thus, perhaps unwittingly, reiterates the trope that defines the state as a venal, 
arbitrary and corrupt entity that hinders growth and development, and further proposes that 
the production and delivery of public goods and services must therefore be handed over to the 
market. By halting at merely exposing corruption, the popular discourse around the RTI Act 
                                                 
567 In Bihar, “The Right to Service Act 2011, implemented on August 15, 2011, had made it mandatory for the 
state government and its agencies to extend services to people within a stipulated time frame. Officials failing to 
meet the deadline can face penalties ranging from INR 500 to 5,000 [~USD 10 to 100] and dismissal form [sic] 
service, in extreme cases. The Act currently covers 30 services and 10 departments” (One World Foundation 
India, 2011: 3). 
568 Interview with N.C. Saxena, 15 October 2010, New Delhi. 
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thus strengthens those voices that privilege the market over the state, with its axiomatic, 
unquestioned promise of efficiency. 
 
Another positive impact that advocates of the RTI Act often highlight relates to it changing 
the citizen-state relationship in a fundamental way. This could be considered as largely true, 
at least in a theoretical sense. However, this contention also needs to be nuanced further. If 
the state is in retreat, then to what extent can the RTI Act be considered as an example of a 
greater equalisation of power? As the location of power shifts inexorably to ‘market forces’ 
that definitively influence government policies, political processes and social norms, is it 
possible for the citizen to effectively exercise her sovereignty, armed (or not) with the RTI 
Act (PPPs being an emblematic example of this process)?569 This remains an unresolved and 
complex question that requires deeper investigation.  
 
In sum, it could indeed be suggested that the RTI Act was enacted at the time that it was and 
in the manner that it was because the ‘climate was right’. The international, the national, and 
the local came together to give impetus to an idea whose ‘time had come’. However, it is not 
being argued that this process was a linear one, and that the international impacted the 
national, which in turn impacted the local. In this sense, tracing the roots of an idea to a 
single space or event is a Sisyphean task. The demand for freedom of information had seen 
sporadic, oftentimes unconnected articulations across the international, national and local 
spheres. For example, early national laws that had been enacted in some countries prior to the 
1990s; the efforts of early reformers within the government during the 1960s in India; 
sympathetic Supreme Court judgements spanning the 1970s and 1980s; the environmental 
movement-led demands for greater freedom of information in the 1980s; the academia-
                                                 
569 As a respondent (who has unsuccessfully used the RTI Act to prise out information from PPPs) put it, “There 
is no point farting against thunder. No one will hear you.” Telephone interview with SDX475, 28 July 2012.  
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inspired efforts of the V.P. Singh government in the late 1980s; and the grassroots struggle of 
the 1990s are but some of the examples that have been highlighted in the preceding pages of 
this thesis. However, none of these events were necessary or sufficient in themselves. Not 
only was a specific historically-informed concatenation of such events necessary, it was 
essential that the political, economic and social impulses underlying them had to harmonise 
in a manner that ensured that the distribution of power was not compromised in any 
fundamental way. The fact that the final form that the RTI Act eventually took was restricted 
to the state and left the market to its own devices strengthens this argument from the other 
direction. A ‘strong’ RTI Act can be imagined only within a context of transparency 
mechanisms applicable to the state. The market, and those who benefit from its ascendance, 
cannot be held to account in any similar way. If power is the ability to direct economic, social 
and political processes towards maintaining the status quo, then indeed power appears to be 
relocating to the functional space of the market, even as its inhabitants retain their social 
attributes.  
 
What does this tell us about the nature of the democratic process in India? 
 
The dominant narrative that explains the evolution (and subsequent usage) of the RTI Act in 
India consistently celebrates it as an example of the democratic process at work at the level of 
the local and the quotidian outside of the well-established practices of procedural democracy. 
The grassroots struggle and the jan sunwais that were its important constituents; popular 
protests; alliance-building activities to elicit wide-ranging support; the formation of a 
national-level umbrella coalition and its extraordinarily successful lobbying efforts; the 
victory of the collective over stiff bureaucratic resistance; and the influence of the periphery 
on the core through new institutional arrangements such as the NAC, have all been produced 
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as inspiring instances of popular political mobilisation and the quotidian exercise of 
citizenship in the democratic process, and how these can achieve great successes in bringing 
about large-scale social and political change in contemporary India. In this context, the 
narrative around the RTI Act in India has also been produced as an example of a maturing 
political system where the collective voice can prevail over powerful interest groups, and 
resonates well with scholarship that celebrates the deepening of Indian democracy.570  
 
However, this research has argued that while indeed there is some credence to this version of 
events, the reality of the democratic process in India is perhaps more complex and less 
edifying than has been claimed by this narrative. Insights from two key respondents point to 
the limitations of this celebratory discourse. “One definition of political development [is that] 
individuals, and their whims and fancies and powers start declining, and systems start taking 
over. In that sense India is not very politically developed... and you’ll find that actually the 
impact of an individual is very high in our system... You have a system which is still not 
mature, where individuals can do a lot of good, and do a lot of harm. Once the system 
matures, the ability of an individual to do that much good or that much harm becomes 
less.”571 “Something comes about because of almost random circumstances... You want tax 
reform, and suddenly somebody who you know becomes the Finance Minister, so you can go 
and tell him. And therefore because he has become the Finance Minister and not somebody 
else, [another] fellow is not able to get access to him, [and an] equally valid proposition that 
he wanted to advance, doesn’t get a hearing... It’s an informal society, a freewheeling society. 
We should not look for formal structures... Change is actually brought about by somebody 
knowing somebody. The announcement of a change may come about because somebody 
knows somebody, but whether the change will take place will depend upon whether the 
                                                 
570 An emblematic example being Kohli (2002b).  
571 Interview with Shekhar Singh, 13 January 2009, New Delhi. This contention finds significant resonances in 
Harberger (1993).  
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system is ripe enough or rotten enough for that change to come about.”572 In this context, who 
these ‘somebodies’ are and their position in the social hierarchy become defining elements in 
the process.  
 
Further, a popularly-held belief, particularly in the context of bringing about ‘progressive’ 
social policies in India, is that the impetus for bringing in such changes more often than not 
comes from spaces (whether through individuals or the collective) that are outside the formal 
institutions of the state. This is not necessarily true. The experience of the RTI Act shows that 
changes can and do arise from within the state apparatus, although typically through reform-
orientated individuals within it. However, whether or not such policies are truly progressive, 
audacious or radical is an altogether different question.  
 
We thus come to a difficult conundrum. If ‘progressive’ social policies are primarily brought 
about through random, informal, individual-led actions that are definitively impacted by 
social hierarchy and class, which are themselves attributes of the accident of birth, to what 
extent can this be seen as the democratic process at work?573 The experience of the RTI Act 
reminds us that the democratic process, in a substantive, redistributive, and bottom-up 
manner has not yet taken very deep roots in India. Procedural democracy aside, the ability of 
the individual to exercise her citizenship in quotidian ways continues to be circumscribed by 
deeply entrenched hierarchies of class and caste, both critical markers of power.574 Seen 
through the lens of the experience of the RTI Act, perhaps the democratic process (of which 
the movement space is an important constitutive element) in India displays both oligarchical 
as well as feudal characteristics. The former manifests itself in the fact that the most 
                                                 
572 Interview with Arun Shourie, 28 November 2009, New Delhi.  
573 A pithy and evocative example such processes lies in a statement made by one of Harriss’ respondents, a 
civil society activist and former IAS officer, “Only the poor agitate; the rich operate” (Harriss, 2006: 445).  
574 This is not a problem exclusive to India. Overcoming class and race barriers in exercising citizenship in 
substantive ways is a significant problem in ‘advanced’ democracies as well. 
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influential spaces for articulating the concerns of the poor and the marginalised is peopled by 
a chosen few. That these spaces are accessible only to those who are already in possession of 
the social attributes of power points to the feudal aspects of this process. At the same time, 
the fact that both the state and civil society actors are obliged to derive part of their 
legitimacy (at the very least in form) from the ‘popular’ and the ‘vernacular’ means that the 
normative ideal of the democratic process continues to draw its sustenance from the 
unwashed masses. This highlights an “incompatibility between the institutional logic of 
democratic forms and the logic of popular mobilization” (Kaviraj, 2010: 32), pointing to deep 
fissures that continue to impact the evolution of the postcolonial state.  
 
At the same time, the experience of the RTI Act also points to the fact that the democratic 
process appears to be structurally circumscribed by ideas that are civil in nature.575 Political 
ideas and demands that fundamentally question the distribution of power are either defanged 
and ‘civilised’ (as in the case of the RTI Act by exempting new locations of power from 
within it), or deemed illegal (such as the Maoist upsurge) only to be quashed by the state with 
force. Deepening democracy thus remains an infinitely incomplete project. Even as political 
mobilisation and participation have increased, even as spaces for making claims have 
expanded, and even as the expression of dissent has become more frequent and more visible, 
redistribution and equalisation of power has not yet occurred in a meaningful or widespread 
way.  
 
 
                                                 
575 As discussed in Chapter 4. 
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How does this improve our understanding of debates on democratic deepening, the 
location and exercise of power, and the relationship between these? 
 
‘Deepening democracy’ has been commonly understood as “the political project of 
developing and sustaining more substantive and empowered citizen participation in the 
political process” (Gaventa, 2006: 7). A typology of the same was reviewed in the opening 
chapter of this thesis, including civil society democracy, participatory democracy, 
deliberative democracy, the intensification of citizenship, and the expansion of the sites and 
frequency of the exercise of accountability.  
 
On the face of it, the experience of the RTI Act in India, both in its process and outcome, cuts 
across and strengthens all of these intersecting and overlapping conceptual categories. 
Ennobling notions of ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘accountability’ come 
to rest very comfortably (and comfortingly) within the RTI Act. However, this thesis has 
argued that both the process and outcome were definitively impacted by the location and 
exercise of power, leading to the enactment of an RTI Act of a particular kind at a specific 
point in time. This raises several questions about the conflation of the RTI Act with the 
democratic deepening project. To what extent are citizens empowered if the direction and 
substance of political processes are significantly impacted by existing social hierarchies? 
Who is able to participate in these processes, and to what extent? Should citizenship be 
imagined only vis-à-vis the state, especially in a context where the boundaries between the 
activities of the state and the market are becoming increasingly blurred? 576 Is accountability 
to be understood only with respect to the state, or should it be reimagined in terms of holding 
power to account, the state being but one location of power? By problematising these 
                                                 
576 This has been articulated as ‘state effects’, which are “never obtain[ed] solely through national institutions or 
in governmental sites” (Trouillot, 2001: 125).  
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conceptual categories, this thesis has attempted to temper the celebratory discourse 
surrounding the relationship between the RTI Act and democratic deepening.  
 
This is not say that the democratic deepening project in India has not benefited at all from the 
experience of the RTI Act. If the government can be held to account on an everyday basis 
even by limited sections of society, this could indeed be seen as tiny roots reaching down 
tentatively in an attempt to entrench themselves in democratic soil, and this must be seen as 
reason enough to celebrate. However, several fears bring such celebrations back down to 
earth. The attributes of this ‘democratic soil’ must be assessed, for if the soil itself is being 
thinned out, roots can only go so deep. No doubt the practice of democracy over the past six 
decades has resulted in several profound (and positive) changes in the Indian social and 
political landscape. Amongst others, there has been significant political empowerment of 
several historically subordinate classes and communities, mostly realised through large-scale 
political mobilisations. However, if these continuing changes are to be seen through the lens 
of the experience of the RTI Act, the bases on which social and policy changes are being 
wrought are not necessarily being forged within the realm of popular politics. More insidious 
processes seem to be at work - processes that are more dependent on big capital than ever 
before, that emanate from existing social and economic hierarchies and entrench them 
further, that are ‘civil’ in what they demand and how they demand it, that systematically  
co-opt voices of dissent, that cannily influence the process of truth-making, and finally, that 
strengthen existing structures of power even as they convincingly claim to redistribute it.  
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Directions for Future Research 
 
Limited as every research project is, this one too must attempt to seek continued relevance by 
proposing areas for further research. The first relates to the usage and impact of the RTI Act, 
especially in the context of corruption. Who is using the RTI Act, and to seek what kind of 
information? Is the usage skewed towards any specific social or geographical group? To what 
extent has the Act and its usage impacted corruption in India? Has the impact been on petty 
corruption, or grand corruption, or both? In the states where legislation related to public 
service delivery exists, what has had a greater impact on providing citizens corruption-free 
services?  
 
Such a line of questioning could also conduct a comparative analysis of the differences that 
may have occurred in the decision-making process before and after the enactment of the RTI 
Act. Has, for example, the RTI Act resulted in government functionaries becoming more 
circumspect in what they do and do not express on paper? This could potentially provide 
important insights into the impact of the RTI Act on administrative procedures, and by 
extension on the technologies of rule in India. The above could contribute significantly to a 
woefully under-researched question - do more transparent governments govern better?  
 
A second area of potential research relates to changes occurring in the higher civil services of 
India. No comprehensive longitudinal study exists that examines the changes that have taken 
place in the social profile of the higher civil services over the past several decades. What is 
the nature of these changes, and what has been the impact of greater democratisation of the 
higher civil services on the governance of the country? Further, how has the role of the 
permanent bureaucracy, particularly the IAS, changed in the policy process over the past two 
312 
 
decades? Is there a relationship between the two? What impact has the apparent shift of 
power towards the political class had on the policy process specifically, and the architecture 
of democratic governance generally?  
 
A third related area of research could examine the creation of new institutional arrangements 
that ostensibly exist to promote social policies, even as they circumvent established 
procedures of governance and law-making, such as the NAC. Such research would need to 
assess not only the extent to which this stated aim has been actualised, but also investigate its 
implications on the larger legal-administrative governance architecture.  
 
Finally, given the profound changes taking place in contemporary India, a larger project that 
requires urgent attention must engage with some fundamental questions - who wields power 
in India today, what are its bases, how has this changed, if at all, over the last two decades, 
and what implications does this have on processes of social and political change? 
Investigating such questions is essential not only to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of the practice of democracy in complex societies, but eventually contribute to 
achieving even a fraction of the promises it holds.  
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Back to the Future: Of Truth and Power in a Flawed World 
 
In this discussion on the nature, location and exercise of power, it is perhaps serendipitous 
that the nom de plume of one of the earliest authors in India to have written about the 
propensity of public officials to withhold information is ‘Kalki’.577 Kalki is the name of the 
tenth avatar of Vishnu who is to take earthly form at the end of the current epoch, kaliyug, to 
rid the world of immorality and darkness. The defining characteristics of this epoch during 
which humanity sinks to its nadir, include:578 
 
“Wealth alone will be considered the sign of a man’s good birth, proper behavior and fine 
qualities. And law and justice will be applied only on the basis of one’s power”579; “Success 
in business will depend on deceit”580; “A person will be judged unholy if he does not have 
money, and hypocrisy will be accepted as virtue”581; “Filling the belly will become the goal 
of life, and one who is audacious will be accepted as truthful”582; and “As the earth thus 
becomes crowded with a corrupt population, whoever among any of the social classes shows 
himself to be the strongest will gain political power.”583 
 
To what extent this holds true remains open to debate. However, if there is even an iota of 
truth in such a description of the contemporary world, then there is cause for concern - not 
merely for what this means for humanity, but for the sheer length of time this will continue 
for. Some versions of this cosmology suggest that kaliyug began at midnight on 18 February, 
                                                 
577 Quoted at the commencement of this chapter.  
578 From the Srimad Bhagavatam, a text within the Hindu tradition. Translation by the Bhaktivedanta Book 
Trust. Available at http://vedabase.net/sb/12/2/en. Accessed 30 July2012. Relevant cantos and verses referenced 
below are based on this translation.  
579 SB 12.2.2 
580 SB 12.2.3 
581 SB 12.2.5 
582 SB 12.2.6 
583 SB 12.2.7 
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3102 BCE. Five thousand years may have passed since then, but the end, unfortunately, is not 
near - kaliyug is to last 432,000 years.  
 
On a positive note, this does provide enough time to continue with the scholarly quest of 
understanding the nature of power. But in this epoch of darkness, the practice of scholarship 
too is suspect. During kaliyug, “one who is very clever at juggling words will be considered a 
learned scholar”.584  
 
In acknowledging this potential pitfall of any research, this thesis is reiterating the fact that it 
does not make any claims to clever articulations of the truth, but only one version of it. In 
that, it possesses only the modest hope of adding a minute drop to the vast ocean of 
knowledge that precedes it.  
                                                 
584 SB 12.2.4 
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Annexure I 
 
The Right to Information Act, 2005 
 
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT, 2005  
No. 22 of 2005  
[15th June, 2005]  
An Act to provide for setting out the practical regime of right to information for citizens 
to secure access to information under the control of public authorities, in order to 
promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority, the 
constitution of a Central Information Commission and State Information Commissions 
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.  
Whereas the Constitution of India has established democratic Republic;  
And whereas democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information 
which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and 
their instrumentalities accountable to the governed;  
And whereas revelation of information in actual practice is likely to conflict with other public 
interests including efficient operations of the Governments, optimum use of limited fiscal 
resources and the preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information;  
And whereas it is necessary to harmonise these conflicting interests while preserving the 
paramountcy of the democratic ideal;  
Now, therefore, it is expedient to provide for furnishing certain information to citizens who 
desire to have it.  
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Fifty-sixth Year of the Republic of India as follows:—  
  
CHAPTER I  
Preliminary
1 (1)     This Act may be called the Right to Information Act, 2005. 
  (2)     It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
  (3)     The provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4, sub-sections (1) and (2) of 
section 5, sections 12, 13, 15,16, 24 , 27 and 28 shall come into force at once, 
and the remaining provisions of this Act shall come into force on the one 
hundred and twentieth day of its enactment. 
2     In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— 
  (a)   "appropriate Government" means in relation to a public authority which is 
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established, constituted, owned, controlled or substantially financed by funds 
provided directly or indirectly— 
    (i)  by the Central Government or the Union territory administration, the Central 
Government; 
    (ii) by the State Government, the State Government; 
  (b)   "Central Information Commission" means the Central Information 
Commission constituted under sub-section (1) of section 12; 
  (c)   "Central Public Information Officer" means the Central Public Information 
Officer designated under sub-section (1) and includes a Central Assistant 
Public Information Officer designated as such under sub-section (2) of section 
5; 
  (d)   "Chief Information Commissioner" and "Information Commissioner" mean 
the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioner 
appointed under sub-section (3) of section 12; 
  (e)   "competent authority" means— 
    (i) the Speaker in the case of the House of the People or the Legislative 
Assembly of a State or a Union territory having such Assembly and the 
Chairman in the case of the Council of States or Legislative Council of a 
State; 
    (ii) the Chief Justice of India in the case of the Supreme Court; 
    (iii) the Chief Justice of the High Court in the case of a High Court; 
    (iv) the President or the Governor, as the case may be, in the case of other 
authorities established or constituted by or under the Constitution; 
    (v) the administrator appointed under article 239 of the Constitution; 
  (f)   "information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, 
memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, 
contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any 
electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be 
accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force;
  (g)   "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this Act by the appropriate 
Government or the competent authority, as the case may be; 
  (h)   "public authority" means any authority or body or institution of self- 
government established or constituted— 
    (a) by or under the Constitution; 
    (b) by any other law made by Parliament; 
    (c) by any other law made by State Legislature; 
    (d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and 
includes any— 
      (i)  body owned, controlled or substantially financed; 
      (ii)  non-Government organization substantially financed, directly or 
indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government; 
  (i)   "record" includes— 
    (a) any document, manuscript and file; 
    (b) any microfilm, microfiche and facsimile copy of a document; 
    (c) any reproduction of image or images embodied in such microfilm (whether 
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enlarged or not); and 
    (d) any other material produced by a computer or any other device; 
  (j)   "right to information" means the right to information accessible under this Act 
which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the 
right to— 
    (i) inspection of work, documents, records; 
    (ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or records; 
    (iii) taking certified samples of material; 
    (iv)  obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes 
or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where such information is 
stored in a computer or in any other device; 
  (k)    "State Information Commission" means the State Information Commission 
constituted under sub-section (1) of section 15; 
  (l)    "State Chief Information Commissioner" and "State Information 
Commissioner" mean the State Chief Information Commissioner and the State 
Information Commissioner appointed under sub-section (3) of section 15; 
  (m)   "State Public Information Officer" means the State Public Information Officer 
designated under sub-section (1) and includes a State Assistant Public 
Information Officer designated as such under sub-section (2) of section 5; 
  (n)   "third party" means a person other than the citizen making a request for 
information and includes a public authority. 
        
CHAPTER II  
Right to information and obligations of public authorities 
3     Subject to the provisions of this Act, all citizens shall have the right to 
information. 
4 (1)   Every public authority shall— 
    (a) maintain all its records duly catalogued and indexed in a manner and the form 
which facilitates the right to information under this Act and ensure that all 
records that are appropriate to be computerised are, within a reasonable time 
and subject to availability of resources, computerised and connected through a 
network all over the country on different systems so that access to such 
records is facilitated; 
    (b) publish within one hundred and twenty days from the enactment of this Act,—
      (i)  the particulars of its organisation, functions and duties; 
      (ii)  the powers and duties of its officers and employees; 
      (iii) the procedure followed in the decision making process, including 
channels of supervision and accountability; 
      (iv) the norms set by it for the discharge of its functions; 
      (v) the rules, regulations, instructions, manuals and records, held by it or 
under its control or used by its employees for discharging its functions; 
      (vi) a statement of the categories of documents that are held by it or under 
its control; 
      (vii) the particulars of any arrangement that exists for consultation with, or 
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representation by, the members of the public in relation to the 
formulation of its policy or implementation thereof; 
      (viii) a statement of the boards, councils, committees and other bodies 
consisting of two or more persons constituted as its part or for the 
purpose of its advice, and as to whether meetings of those boards, 
councils, committees and other bodies are open to the public, or the 
minutes of such meetings are accessible for public; 
      (ix) a directory of its officers and employees; 
      (x) the monthly remuneration received by each of its officers and 
employees, including the system of compensation as provided in its 
regulations; 
      (xi)  the budget allocated to each of its agency, indicating the particulars of 
all plans, proposed expenditures and reports on disbursements made; 
      (xii)  the manner of execution of subsidy programmes, including the amounts 
allocated and the details of beneficiaries of such programmes; 
      (xiii) particulars of recipients of concessions, permits or authorisations 
granted by it; 
      (xiv) details in respect of the information, available to or held by it, reduced 
in an electronic form; 
      (xv)  the particulars of facilities available to citizens for obtaining 
information, including the working hours of a library or reading room, if 
maintained for public use; 
      (xvi)  the names, designations and other particulars of the Public Information 
Officers; 
      (xvii) such other information as may be prescribed and thereafter update these 
publications every year; 
    (c)  publish all relevant facts while formulating important policies or announcing 
the decisions which affect public; 
    (d) provide reasons for its administrative or quasi-judicial decisions to affected 
persons. 
  (2)   It shall be a constant endeavour of every public authority to take steps in 
accordance with the requirements of clause (b) of sub-section (1) to provide as 
much information suo motu to the public at regular intervals through various 
means of communications, including internet, so that the public have 
minimum resort to the use of this Act to obtain information. 
  (3)   For the purposes of sub-section (1), every information shall be disseminated 
widely and in such form and manner which is easily accessible to the public. 
  (4)   All materials shall be disseminated taking into consideration the cost 
effectiveness, local language and the most effective method of communication 
in that local area and the information should be easily accessible, to the extent 
possible in electronic format with the Central Public Information Officer or 
State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, available free or at such 
cost of the medium or the print cost price as may be prescribed. 
      Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-sections (3) and (4), "disseminated" 
means making known or communicated the information to the public through 
notice boards, newspapers, public announcements, media broadcasts, the 
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internet or any other means, including inspection of offices of any public 
authority. 
5   (1)   Every public authority shall, within one hundred days of the enactment of this 
Act, designate as many officers as the Central Public Information Officers or 
State Public Information Officers, as the case may be, in all administrative 
units or offices under it as may be necessary to provide information to persons 
requesting for the information under this Act. 
  (2)   Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), every public authority 
shall designate an officer, within one hundred days of the enactment of this 
Act, at each sub-divisional level or other sub-district level as a Central 
Assistant Public Information Officer or a State Assistant Public Information 
Officer, as the case may be, to receive the applications for information or 
appeals under this Act for forwarding the same forthwith to the Central Public 
Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or senior officer 
specified under sub-section (1) of section 19 or the Central Information 
Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be:  
Provided that where an application for information or appeal is given to a 
Central Assistant Public Information Officer or a State Assistant Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be, a period of five days shall be added 
in computing the period for response specified under sub-section (1) of 
section 7. 
  (3)   Every Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, 
as the case may be, shall deal with requests from persons seeking information 
and render reasonable assistance to the persons seeking such information. 
  (4)   The Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as 
the case may be, may seek the assistance of any other officer as he or she 
considers it necessary for the proper discharge of his or her duties. 
  (5)   Any officer, whose assistance has been sought under sub-section (4), shall 
render all assistance to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be, seeking his or her assistance and for 
the purposes of any contravention of the provisions of this Act, such other 
officer shall be treated as a Central Public Information Officer or State Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be. 
6  (1)   A person, who desires to obtain any information under this Act, shall make a 
request in writing or through electronic means in English or Hindi or in the 
official language of the area in which the application is being made, 
accompanying such fee as may be prescribed, to— 
    (a) the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as 
the case may be, of the concerned public authority; 
    (b) the Central Assistant Public Information Officer or State Assistant Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be, 
 
specifying the particulars of the information sought by him or her: 
 
Provided that where such request cannot be made in writing, the Central 
Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case 
may be, shall render all reasonable assistance to the person making the request 
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orally to reduce the same in writing. 
  (2)   An applicant making request for information shall not be required to give any 
reason for requesting the information or any other personal details except 
those that may be necessary for contacting him. 
  (3)   Where an application is made to a public authority requesting for an 
information,— 
    (i) which is held by another public authority; or 
    (ii) the subject matter of which is more closely connected with the functions of 
another public authority, 
 
the public authority, to which such application is made, shall transfer the 
application or such part of it as may be appropriate to that other public 
authority and inform the applicant immediately about such transfer: 
 
Provided that the transfer of an application pursuant to this sub-section shall 
be made as soon as practicable but in no case later than five days from the 
date of receipt of the application. 
7 (1)    Subject to the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 5 or the proviso to sub-
section (3) of section 6, the Central Public Information Officer or State Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be, on receipt of a request under section 
6 shall, as expeditiously as possible, and in any case within thirty days of the 
receipt of the request, either provide the information on payment of such fee 
as may be prescribed or reject the request for any of the reasons specified in 
sections 8 and 9:  
Provided that where the information sought for concerns the life or liberty of a 
person, the same shall be provided within forty-eight hours of the receipt of 
the request. 
  (2)   If the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, 
as the case may be, fails to give decision on the request for information within 
the period specified under sub-section (1), the Central Public Information 
Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall be 
deemed to have refused the request. 
  (3)   Where a decision is taken to provide the information on payment of any 
further fee representing the cost of providing the information, the Central 
Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case 
may be, shall send an intimation to the person making the request, giving— 
    (a) the details of further fees representing the cost of providing the information as 
determined by him, together with the calculations made to arrive at the 
amount in accordance with fee prescribed under sub-section (1), requesting 
him to deposit that fees, and the period intervening between the despatch of 
the said intimation and payment of fees shall be excluded for the purpose of 
calculating the period of thirty days referred to in that sub-section; 
    (b) information concerning his or her right with respect to review the decision as 
to the amount of fees charged or the form of access provided, including the 
particulars of the appellate authority, time limit, process and any other forms. 
  (4)   Where access to the record or a part thereof is required to be provided under 
this Act and the person to whom access is to be provided is sensorily disabled, 
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the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as 
the case may be, shall provide assistance to enable access to the information, 
including providing such assistance as may be appropriate for the inspection. 
  (5)   Where access to information is to be provided in the printed or in any 
electronic format, the applicant shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section 
(6), pay such fee as may be prescribed:  
Provided that the fee prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 6 and sub-
sections (1) and (5) of section 7 shall be reasonable and no such fee shall be 
charged from the persons who are of below poverty line as may be determined 
by the appropriate Government.  
  (6)   Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (5), the person making  
request for the information shall be provided the information free of charge 
where a public authority fails to comply with the time limits specified in sub-
section (1). 
  (7)   Before taking any decision under sub-section (1), the Central Public 
Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, 
shall take into consideration the representation made by a third party under 
section 11. 
  (8)   Where a request has been rejected under sub-section (1), the Central Public 
Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, 
shall communicate to the person making the request,— 
    (i) the reasons for such rejection; 
    (ii) the period within which an appeal against such rejection may be preferred; 
and 
    (iii) the particulars of the appellate authority. 
  (9)   An information shall ordinarily be provided in the form in which it is sought 
unless it would disproportionately divert the resources of the public authority 
or would be detrimental to the safety or preservation of the record in question.
8  (1)   Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation to 
give any citizen,— 
    (a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty 
and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interests 
of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offence; 
    (b) information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any court 
of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court;
    (c) information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of privilege of 
Parliament or the State Legislature; 
    (d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual 
property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a 
third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public 
interest warrants the disclosure of such information; 
      (e) information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the 
competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the 
disclosure of such information;  
    (f)  information received in confidence from foreign Government; 
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    (g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical 
safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given 
in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes; 
    (h) information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension 
or prosecution of offenders; 
    (i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, 
Secretaries and other officers: 
      Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons thereof, and 
the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made 
public after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or over:  
Provided further that those matters which come under the exemptions 
specified in this section shall not be disclosed;  
    (j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has 
no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause 
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the Central 
Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the 
appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger public 
interest justifies the disclosure of such information: 
      Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a 
State Legislature shall not be denied to any person. 
  (2)   Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 nor any of the 
exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section (1), a public authority 
may allow access to information, if public interest in disclosure outweighs the 
harm to the protected interests. 
  (3)   Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i) of sub-section (1), any 
information relating to any occurrence, event or matter which has taken place, 
occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is 
made under secton 6 shall be provided to any person making a request under 
that section: 
      Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which the said 
period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of the Central 
Government shall be final, subject to the usual appeals provided for in this 
Act.  
9     Without prejudice to the provisions of section 8, a Central Public Information 
Officer or a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, may reject a 
request for information where such a request for providing access would 
involve an infringement of copyright subsisting in a person other than the 
State. 
10 (1)   Where a request for access to information is rejected on the ground that it is in 
relation to information which is exempt from disclosure, then, 
notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, access may be provided to 
that part of the record which does not contain any information which is 
exempt from disclosure under this Act and which can reasonably be severed 
from any part that contains exempt information. 
  (2)   Where access is granted to a part of the record under sub-section (1), the 
Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the 
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case may be, shall give a notice to the applicant, informing— 
    (a) that only part of the record requested, after severance of the record containing 
information which is exempt from disclosure, is being provided; 
    (b) the reasons for the decision, including any findings on any material question 
of fact, referring to the material on which those findings were based; 
    (c) the name and designation of the person giving the decision; 
    (d)  the details of the fees calculated by him or her and the amount of fee which 
the applicant is required to deposit; and 
    (e) his or her rights with respect to review of the decision regarding non-
disclosure of part of the information, the amount of fee charged or the form of 
access provided, including the particulars of the senior officer specified under 
sub-section (1) of section 19 or the Central Information Commission or the 
State Information Commission, as the case may be, time limit, process and 
any other form of access. 
11  (1)   Where a Central Public Information Officer or a State Public Information 
Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose any information or record, or 
part thereof on a request made under this Act, which relates to or has been 
supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third 
party, the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information 
Officer, as the case may be, shall, within five days from the receipt of the 
request, give a written notice to such third party of the request and of the fact 
that the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information 
Officer, as the case may be, intends to disclose the information or record, or 
part thereof, and invite the third party to make a submission in writing or 
orally, regarding whether the information should be disclosed, and such 
submission of the third party shall be kept in view while taking a decision 
about disclosure of information:  
Provided that except in the case of trade or commercial secrets protected by 
law, disclosure may be allowed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs 
in importance any possible harm or injury to the interests of such third party.  
  (2)   Where a notice is served by the Central Public Information Officer or State 
Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under sub-section (1) to a 
third party in respect of any information or record or part thereof, the third 
party shall, within ten days from the date of receipt of such notice, be given 
the opportunity to make representation against the proposed disclosure. 
  (3)    Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, the Central Public 
Information Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, 
shall, within forty days after receipt of the request under section 6, if the third 
party has been given an opportunity to make representation under sub-section 
(2), make a decision as to whether or not to disclose the information or record 
or part thereof and give in writing the notice of his decision to the third party. 
  (4)   A notice given under sub-section (3) shall include a statement that the third 
party to whom the notice is given is entitled to prefer an appeal under section 
19 against the decision. 
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CHAPTER III  
The Central Information Commission
12 (1)   The Central Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, 
constitute a body to be known as the Central Information Commission to 
exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform the functions assigned to, it 
under this Act. 
  (2)   The Central Information Commission shall consist of— 
    (a)  the Chief Information Commissioner; and 
    (b) such number of Central Information Commissioners, not exceeding ten, as 
may be deemed necessary. 
  (3)   The Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners shall 
be appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee 
consisting of— 
    (i) the Prime Minister, who shall be the Chairperson of the committee; 
    (ii) the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha; and 
    (iii) a Union Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Prime Minister. 
      Explanation.—For the purposes of removal of doubts, it is hereby declared 
that where the Leader of Opposition in the House of the People has not been 
recognised as such, the Leader of the single largest group in opposition of the 
Government in the House of the People shall be deemed to be the Leader of 
Opposition. 
  (4)    The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the 
Central Information Commission shall vest in the Chief Information 
Commissioner who shall be assisted by the Information Commissioners and 
may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things which may be 
exercised or done by the Central Information Commission autonomously 
without being subjected to directions by any other authority under this Act. 
  (5)   The Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners shall 
be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in 
law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass 
media or administration and governance. 
  (6)   The Chief Information Commissioner or an Information Commissioner shall 
not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or 
Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any other office of profit or 
connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any 
profession. 
  (7)   The headquarters of the Central Information Commission shall be at Delhi and 
the Central Information Commission may, with the previous approval of the 
Central Government, establish offices at other places in India. 
13  (1)   The Chief Information Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years 
from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall not be eligible for 
reappointment:  
Provided that no Chief Information Commissioner shall hold office as such 
after he has attained the age of sixty-five years.  
  (2)   Every Information Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years 
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from the date on which he enters upon his office or till he attains the age of 
sixty-five years, whichever is earlier, and shall not be eligible for 
reappointment as such Information Commissioner:  
Provided that every Information Commissioner shall, on vacating his office 
under this sub-section be eligible for appointment as the Chief Information 
Commissioner in the manner specified in sub-section (3) of section 12:  
Provided further that where the Information Commissioner is appointed as the 
Chief Information Commissioner, his term of office shall not be more than 
five years in aggregate as the Information Commissioner and the Chief 
Information Commissioner.  
  (3)   The Chief Information Commissioner or an Information Commissioner shall 
before he enters upon his office make and subscribe before the President or 
some other person appointed by him in that behalf, an oath or affirmation 
according to the form set out for the purpose in the First Schedule. 
  (4)   The Chief Information Commissioner or an Information Commissioner may, 
at any time, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign from 
his office:  
Provided that the Chief Information Commissioner or an Information 
Commissioner may be removed in the manner specified under section 14. 
  (5)   The salaries and allowances payable to and other terms and conditions of 
service of — 
    (a) the Chief Information Commissioner shall be the same as that of the Chief 
Election Commissioner; 
    (b) an Information Commissioner shall be the same as that of an Election 
Commissioner: 
      Provided that if the Chief Information Commissioner or an Information 
Commissioner, at the time of his appointment is, in receipt of a pension, other 
than a disability or wound pension, in respect of any previous service under 
the Government of India or under the Government of a State, his salary in 
respect of the service as the Chief Information Commissioner or an 
Information Commissioner shall be reduced by the amount of that pension 
including any portion of pension which was commuted and pension equivalent 
of other forms of retirement benefits excluding pension equivalent of 
retirement gratuity: 
      Provided further that if the Chief Information Commissioner or an 
Information Commissioner if, at the time of his appointment is, in receipt of 
retirement benefits in respect of any previous service rendered in a 
Corporation established by or under any Central Act or State Act or a 
Government company owned or controlled by the Central Government or the 
State Government, his salary in respect of the service as the Chief Information 
Commissioner or an Information Commissioner shall be reduced by the 
amount of pension equivalent to the retirement benefits: 
      Provided also that the salaries, allowances and other conditions of service of 
the Chief Information Commissioner and the Information Commissioners 
shall not be varied to their disadvantage after their appointment. 
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  (6)   The Central Government shall provide the Chief Information Commissioner 
and the Information Commissioners with such officers and employees as may 
be necessary for the efficient performance of their functions under this Act, 
and the salaries and allowances payable to and the terms and conditions of 
service of the officers and other employees appointed for the purpose of this 
Act shall be such as may be prescribed. 
14 (1)   Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the Chief Information 
Commissioner or any Information Commissioner shall be removed from his 
office only by order of the President on the ground of proved misbehaviour or 
incapacity after the Supreme Court, on a reference made to it by the President, 
has, on inquiry, reported that the Chief Information Commissioner or any 
Information Commissioner, as the case may be, ought on such ground be 
removed. 
  (2)   The President may suspend from office, and if deem necessary prohibit also 
from attending the office during inquiry, the Chief Information Commissioner 
or Information Commissioner in respect of whom a reference has been made 
to the Supreme Court under sub-section (1) until the President has passed 
orders on receipt of the report of the Supreme Court on such reference. 
  (3)   Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the President may by 
order remove from office the Chief Information Commissioner or any 
Information Commissioner if the Chief Information Commissioner or a 
Information Commissioner, as the case may be,— 
    (a) is adjudged an insolvent; or 
    (b) has been convicted of an offence which, in the opinion of the President, 
involves moral turpitude; or 
    (c) engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the duties 
of his office; or 
    (d) is, in the opinion of the President, unfit to continue in office by reason of 
infirmity of mind or body; or 
    (e) has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially 
his functions as the Chief Information Commissioner or a Information 
Commissioner. 
  (4)    If the Chief Information Commissioner or a Information Commissioner in any 
way, concerned or interested in any contract or agreement made by or on 
behalf of the Government of India or participates in any way in the profit 
thereof or in any benefit or emolument arising there from otherwise than as a 
member and in common with the other members of an incorporated company, 
he shall, for the purposes of sub-section (1), be deemed to be guilty of 
misbehavior. 
CHAPTER IV  
The State Information Commission
15 (1)   Every State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, 
constitute a body to be known as the ......... (name of the State) Information 
Commission to exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform the functions 
assigned to, it under this Act. 
  (2)    The State Information Commission shall consist of— 
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    (a) the State Chief Information Commissioner, and 
    (b) such number of State Information Commissioners, not exceeding ten, as may 
be deemed necessary. 
  (3)   The State Chief Information Commissioner and the State Information 
Commissioners shall be appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of 
a committee consisting of— 
    (i)  the Chief Minister, who shall be the Chairperson of the committee; 
    (ii)  the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly; and 
    (iii) a Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Chief Minister. 
      Explanation.—For the purposes of removal of doubts, it is hereby declared 
that where the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly has not been 
recognised as such, the Leader of the single largest group in opposition of the 
Government in the Legislative Assembly shall be deemed to be the Leader of 
Opposition. 
  (4)   The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the 
State Information Commission shall vest in the State Chief Information 
Commissioner who shall be assisted by the State Information Commissioners 
and may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things which may 
be exercised or done by the State Information Commission autonomously 
without being subjected to directions by any other authority under this Act. 
  (5)   The State Chief Information Commissioner and the State Information 
Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide 
knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, 
management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance. 
  (6)   The State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information 
Commissioner shall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the 
Legislature of any State or Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any 
other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any 
business or pursuing any profession. 
  (7)   The headquarters of the State Information Commission shall be at such place 
in the State as the State Government may, by notification in the Official 
Gazette, specify and the State Information Commission may, with the 
previous approval of the State Government, establish offices at other places in 
the State. 
16 (1)    The State Chief Information Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five 
years from the date on which he enters upon his office and shall not be 
eligible for reappointment: 
      Provided that no State Chief Information Commissioner shall hold office as 
such after he has attained the age of sixty-five years. 
  (2)   Every State Information Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five 
years from the date on which he enters upon his office or till he attains the age 
of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier, and shall not be eligible for 
reappointment as such State Information Commissioner: 
      Provided that every State Information Commissioner shall, on vacating his 
office under this sub-section, be eligible for appointment as the State Chief 
Information Commissioner in the manner specified in sub-section (3) of 
section 15: 
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      Provided further that where the State Information Commissioner is appointed 
as the State Chief Information Commissioner, his term of office shall not be 
more than five years in aggregate as the State Information Commissioner and 
the State Chief Information Commissioner. 
  (3)   The State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information 
Commissioner, shall before he enters upon his office make and subscribe 
before the Governor or some other person appointed by him in that behalf, an 
oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose in the First 
Schedule. 
  (4)   The State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information 
Commissioner may, at any time, by writing under his hand addressed to the 
Governor, resign from his office: 
      Provided that the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State 
Information Commissioner may be removed in the manner specified under 
section 17. 
  (5)   The salaries and allowances payable to and other terms and conditions of 
service of— 
    (a) the State Chief Information Commissioner shall be the same as that of an 
Election Commissioner; 
    (b) the State Information Commissioner shall be the same as that of the Chief 
Secretary to the State Government: 
      Provided that if the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State 
Information Commissioner, at the time of his appointment is, in receipt of a 
pension, other than a disability or wound pension, in respect of any previous 
service under the Government of India or under the Government of a State, his 
salary in respect of the service as the State Chief Information Commissioner 
or a State Information Commissioner shall be reduced by the amount of that 
pension including any portion of pension which was commuted and pension 
equivalent of other forms of retirement benefits excluding pension equivalent 
of retirement gratuity: 
      Provided further that where the State Chief Information Commissioner or a 
State Information Commissioner if, at the time of his appointment is, in 
receipt of retirement benefits in respect of any previous service rendered in a 
Corporation established by or under any Central Act or State Act or a 
Government company owned or controlled by the Central Government or the 
State Government, his salary in respect of the service as the State Chief 
Information Commissioner or the State Information Commissioner shall be 
reduced by the amount of pension equivalent to the retirement benefits: 
      Provided also that the salaries, allowances and other conditions of service of 
the State Chief Information Commissioner and the State Information 
Commissioners shall not be varied to their disadvantage after their 
appointment. 
  (6)   The State Government shall provide the State Chief Information 
Commissioner and the State Information Commissioners with such officers 
and employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of their 
functions under this Act, and the salaries and allowances payable to and the 
terms and conditions of service of the officers and other employees appointed 
for the purpose of this Act shall be such as may be prescribed. 
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17 (1)   Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the State Chief Information 
Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner shall be removed from 
his office only by order of the Governor on the ground of proved 
misbehaviour or incapacity after the Supreme Court, on a reference made to it 
by the Governor, has on inquiry, reported that the State Chief Information 
Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner, as the case may be, 
ought on such ground be removed. 
  (2)   The Governor may suspend from office, and if deem necessary prohibit also 
from attending the office during inquiry, the State Chief Information 
Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner in respect of whom a 
reference has been made to the Supreme Court under sub-section (1) until the 
Governor has passed orders on receipt of the report of the Supreme Court on 
such reference. 
  (3)   Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Governor may by 
order remove from office the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State 
Information Commissioner if a State Chief Information Commissioner or a 
State Information Commissioner, as the case may be,— 
      (a) is adjudged an insolvent; or  
    (b)  has been convicted of an offence which, in the opinion of the Governor, 
involves moral turpitude; or 
    (c) engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the duties 
of his office; or 
    (d) is, in the opinion of the Governor, unfit to continue in office by reason of 
infirmity of mind or body; or 
    (e) has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially 
his functions as the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State 
Information Commissioner. 
  (4)   If the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information 
Commissioner in any way, concerned or interested in any contract or 
agreement made by or on behalf of the Government of the State or participates 
in any way in the profit thereof or in any benefit or emoluments arising 
therefrom otherwise than as a member and in common with the other 
members of an incorporated company, he shall, for the purposes of sub-
section (1), be deemed to be guilty of misbehaviour. 
CHAPTER V  
Powers and functions of the Information Commissions, appeal and penalties
18 (1)   Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the Central 
Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may 
be, to receive and inquire into a complaint from any person,— 
    (a)  who has been unable to submit a request to a Central Public Information 
Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, either by 
reason that no such officer has been appointed under this Act, or because the 
Central Assistant Public Information Officer or State Assistant Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be, has refused to accept his or her 
application for information or appeal under this Act for forwarding the same 
to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer 
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or senior officer specified in sub-section (1) of section 19 or the Central 
Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case 
may be; 
    (b)  who has been refused access to any information requested under this Act; 
    (c) who has not been given a response to a request for information or access to 
information within the time limit specified under this Act; 
    (d) who has been required to pay an amount of fee which he or she considers 
unreasonable; 
    (e) who believes that he or she has been given incomplete, misleading or false 
information under this Act; and 
    (f) in respect of any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to 
records under this Act. 
  (2)   Where the Central Information Commission or State Information 
Commission, as the case may be, is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds 
to inquire into the matter, it may initiate an inquiry in respect thereof. 
  (3)   The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as 
the case may be, shall, while inquiring into any matter under this section, have 
the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of the following matters, namely:—
    (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and compel them to give 
oral or written evidence on oath and to produce the documents or things; 
    (b)  requiring the discovery and inspection of documents; 
    (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; 
    (d)  requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any court or office; 
    (e)  issuing summons for examination of witnesses or documents; and 
    (f)  any other matter which may be prescribed. 
  (4)   Notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other Act of 
Parliament or State Legislature, as the case may be, the Central Information 
Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, may, 
during the inquiry of any complaint under this Act, examine any record to 
which this Act applies which is under the control of the public authority, and 
no such record may be withheld from it on any grounds. 
19  (1)   Any person who, does not receive a decision within the time specified in sub-
section (1) or clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 7, or is aggrieved by a 
decision of the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information 
Officer, as the case may be, may within thirty days from the expiry of such 
period or from the receipt of such a decision prefer an appeal to such officer 
who is senior in rank to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public 
Information Officer as the case may be, in each public authority: 
      Provided that such officer may admit the appeal after the expiry of the period 
of thirty days if he or she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by 
sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. 
  (2)    Where an appeal is preferred against an order made by a Central Public 
Information Officer or a State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, 
under section 11 to disclose third party information, the appeal by the 
concerned third party shall be made within thirty days from the date of the 
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order. 
  (3)   A second appeal against the decision under sub-section (1) shall lie within 
ninety days from the date on which the decision should have been made or 
was actually received, with the Central Information Commission or the State 
Information Commission: 
      Provided that the Central Information Commission or the State Information 
Commission, as the case may be, may admit the appeal after the expiry of the 
period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by 
sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. 
  (4)    If the decision of the Central Public Information Officer or State Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be, against which an appeal is preferred 
relates to information of a third party, the Central Information Commission or 
State Information Commission, as the case may be, shall give a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard to that third party. 
  (5)   In any appeal proceedings, the onus to prove that a denial of a request was 
justified shall be on the Central Public Information Officer or State Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be, who denied the request. 
  (6)   An appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be disposed of within 
thirty days of the receipt of the appeal or within such extended period not 
exceeding a total of forty-five days from the date of filing thereof, as the case 
may be, for reasons to be recorded in writing. 
  (7)   The decision of the Central Information Commission or State Information 
Commission, as the case may be, shall be binding. 
  (8)   In its decision, the Central Information Commission or State Information 
Commission, as the case may be, has the power to— 
    (a) require the public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to 
secure compliance with the provisions of this Act, including— 
      (i)  by providing access to information, if so requested, in a particular form;
      (ii) by appointing a Central Public Information Officer or State Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be; 
      (iii)  by publishing certain information or categories of information; 
      (iv) by making necessary changes to its practices in relation to the 
maintenance, management and destruction of records; 
      (v) by enhancing the provision of training on the right to information for its 
officials; 
      (vi)  by providing it with an annual report in compliance with clause (b) of 
sub-section (1) of section 4; 
    (b)  require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss or 
other detriment suffered; 
    (c) impose any of the penalties provided under this Act; 
    (d) reject the application. 
  (9)   The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as 
the case may be, shall give notice of its decision, including any right of 
appeal, to the complainant and the public authority. 
  (10)   The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as 
the case may be, shall decide the appeal in accordance with such procedure as 
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may be prescribed. 
20 (1)   Where the Central Information Commission or the State Information 
Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or 
appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information Officer or the 
State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has, without any 
reasonable cause, refused to receive an application for information or has not 
furnished information within the time specified under sub-section (1) of 
section 7 or malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly given 
incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information 
which was the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in furnishing 
the information, it shall impose a penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees each 
day till application is received or information is furnished, so however, the 
total amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees: 
      Provided that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public 
Information Officer, as the case may be, shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed on him:  
      Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted reasonably and 
diligently shall be on the Central Public Information Officer or the State 
Public Information Officer, as the case may be. 
  (2)   Where the Central Information Commission or the State Information 
Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or 
appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information Officer or the 
State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has, without any 
reasonable cause and persistently, failed to receive an application for 
information or has not furnished information within the time specified under 
sub-section (1) of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for information or 
knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed 
information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner 
in furnishing the information, it shall recommend for disciplinary action 
against the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information 
Officer, as the case may be, under the service rules applicable to him. 
CHAPTER VI  
Miscellaneous
21     No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for 
anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act or 
any rule made thereunder. 
22     The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything 
inconsistent therewith contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923, and any 
other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by 
virtue of any law other than this Act. 
23     No court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceeding in respect of 
any order made under this Act and no such order shall be called in question 
otherwise than by way of an appeal under this Act. 
24 (1)    Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the intelligence and security 
organisations specified in the Second Schedule, being organisations 
established by the Central Government or any information furnished by such 
organisations to that Government: 
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      Provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and 
human rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub-section:  
      Provided further that in the case of information sought for is in respect of 
allegations of violation of human rights, the information shall only be 
provided after the approval of the Central Information Commission, and 
notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, such information shall be 
provided within forty-five days from the date of the receipt of request. 
  (2)   The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend 
the Schedule by including therein any other intelligence or security 
organisation established by that Government or omitting therefrom any 
organisation already specified therein and on the publication of such 
notification, such organisation shall be deemed to be included in or, as the 
case may be, omitted from the Schedule. 
  (3)   Every notification issued under sub-section (2) shall be laid before each 
House of Parliament. 
  (4)   Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to such intelligence and security 
organisation being organisations established by the State Government, as that 
Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, 
specify: 
      Provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of corruption and 
human rights violations shall not be excluded under this sub-section: 
      Provided further that in the case of information sought for is in respect of 
allegations of violation of human rights, the information shall only be 
provided after the approval of the State Information Commission and, 
notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, such information shall be 
provided within forty-five days from the date of the receipt of request. 
  (5)   Every notification issued under sub-section (4) shall be laid before the State 
Legislature. 
25 (1)    The Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as 
the case may be, shall, as soon as practicable after the end of each year, 
prepare a report on the implementation of the provisions of this Act during 
that year and forward a copy thereof to the appropriate Government. 
  (2)   Each Ministry or Department shall, in relation to the public authorities within 
their jurisdiction, collect and provide such information to the Central 
Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may 
be, as is required to prepare the report under this section and comply with the 
requirements concerning the furnishing of that information and keeping of 
records for the purposes of this section. 
  (3)    Each report shall state in respect of the year to which the report relates,— 
    (a)  the number of requests made to each public authority; 
    (b) the number of decisions where applicants were not entitled to access to the 
documents pursuant to the requests, the provisions of this Act under which 
these decisions were made and the number of times such provisions were 
invoked; 
    (c)  the number of appeals referred to the Central Information Commission or 
State Information Commission, as the case may be, for review, the nature of 
the appeals and the outcome of the appeals;  
364 
 
    (d) particulars of any disciplinary action taken against any officer in respect of the 
administration of this Act; 
    (e) the amount of charges collected by each public authority under this Act; 
    (f) any facts which indicate an effort by the public authorities to administer and 
implement the spirit and intention of this Act; 
    (g)  recommendations for reform, including recommendations in respect of the 
particular public authorities, for the development, improvement, 
modernisation, reform or amendment to this Act or other legislation or 
common law or any other matter relevant for operationalising the right to 
access information. 
  (4)    The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may, 
as soon as practicable after the end of each year, cause a copy of the report of 
the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as 
the case may be, referred to in sub-section (1) to be laid before each House of 
Parliament or, as the case may be, before each House of the State Legislature, 
where there are two Houses, and where there is one House of the State 
Legislature before that House. 
  (5)    If it appears to the Central Information Commission or State Information 
Commission, as the case may be, that the practice of a public authority in 
relation to the exercise of its functions under this Act does not conform with 
the provisions or spirit of this Act, it may give to the authority a 
recommendation specifying the steps which ought in its opinion to be taken 
for promoting such conformity. 
26 (1)   The appropriate Government may, to the extent of availability of financial and 
other resources,— 
    (a) develop and organise educational programmes to advance the understanding 
of the public, in particular of disadvantaged communities as to how to 
exercise the rights contemplated under this Act; 
    (b) encourage public authorities to participate in the development and 
organisation of programmes referred to in clause (a) and to undertake such 
programmes themselves; 
    (c) promote timely and effective dissemination of accurate information by public 
authorities about their activities; and 
    (d)  train Central Public Information Officers or State Public Information 
Officers, as the case may be, of public authorities and produce relevant 
training materials for use by the public authorities themselves.  
  (2)    The appropriate Government shall, within eighteen months from the 
commencement of this Act, compile in its official language a guide containing 
such information, in an easily comprehensible form and manner, as may 
reasonably be required by a person who wishes to exercise any right specified 
in this Act. 
  (3)   The appropriate Government shall, if necessary, update and publish the 
guidelines referred to in sub-section (2) at regular intervals which shall, in 
particular and without prejudice to the generality of sub-section (2), include—
    (a)  the objects of this Act; 
    (b) the postal and street address, the phone and fax number and, if available, 
electronic mail address of the Central Public Information Officer or State 
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Public Information Officer, as the case may be, of every public authority 
appointed under sub-section (1) of section 5; 
    (c) the manner and the form in which request for access to an information shall be 
made to a Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information 
Officer, as the case may be; 
    (d) the assistance available from and the duties of the Central Public Information 
Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, of a public 
authority under this Act; 
    (e)  the assistance available from the Central Information Commission or State 
Information Commission, as the case may be; 
    (f) all remedies in law available regarding an act or failure to act in respect of a 
right or duty conferred or imposed by this Act including the manner of filing 
an appeal to the Commission; 
    (g) the provisions providing for the voluntary disclosure of categories of records 
in accordance with section 4; 
    (h) the notices regarding fees to be paid in relation to requests for access to an 
information; and 
    (i) any additional regulations or circulars made or issued in relation to obtaining 
access to an information in accordance with this Act. 
  (4)   The appropriate Government must, if necessary, update and publish the 
guidelines at regular intervals. 
27 (1)   The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, 
make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act. 
  (2)   In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, 
such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:— 
    (a) the cost of the medium or print cost price of the materials to be disseminated 
under sub-section (4) of section 4; 
    (b) the fee payable under sub-section (1) of section 6; 
    (c) the fee payable under sub-sections (1) and (5) of section 7; 
    (d)  the salaries and allowances payable to and the terms and conditions of service 
of the officers and other employees under sub-section (6) of section 13 and 
sub-section (6) of section 16; 
    (e) the procedure to be adopted by the Central Information Commission or State 
Information Commission, as the case may be, in deciding the appeals under 
sub-section (10) of section 19; and 
    (f) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed. 
28 (1)   The competent authority may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make 
rules to carry out the provisions of this Act. 
  (2)   In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, 
such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:— 
    (i) the cost of the medium or print cost price of the materials to be disseminated 
under sub-section (4) of section 4; 
    (ii) the fee payable under sub-section (1) of section 6; 
    (iii) the fee payable under sub-section (1) of section 7; and 
    (iv) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed. 
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29 (1)   Every rule made by the Central Government under this Act shall be laid, as 
soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in 
session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one 
session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the 
session immediately following the session or the successive sessions 
aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both 
Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have 
effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, 
however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice 
to the validity of anything previously done under that rule. 
  (2)   Every rule made under this Act by a State Government shall be laid, as soon 
as may be after it is notified, before the State Legislature. 
30  (1)   If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the 
Central Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, make 
such provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as appear to it 
to be necessary or expedient for removal of the difficulty: 
      Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of a period of two 
years from the date of the commencement of this Act. 
  (2)   Every order made under this section shall, as soon as may be after it is made, 
be laid before each House of Parliament. 
31     The Freedom of Information Act, 2002 is hereby repealed. 
THE FIRST SCHEDULE  
[See sections 13(3) and 16(3)]
      Form of oath or affirmation to be made by the Chief Information 
Commissioner/the Information Commissioner/the State Chief 
Information Commissioner/the State Information Commissioner  
“I, ....................., having been appointed Chief Information 
Commissioner/Information Commissioner/State Chief Information 
Commissioner/State Information Commissioner  
swear in the name of God 
solemnly affirm  
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law 
established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will 
duly and faithfully and to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment 
perform the duties of my office without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and 
that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws.”. 
THE SECOND SCHEDULE  
(See section 24)
      Intelligence and security organisation established by the Central Government 
    1. Intelligence Bureau. 
    2. Research and Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat. 
    3. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence. 
    4. Central Economic Intelligence Bureau. 
    5. Directorate of Enforcement. 
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    6. Narcotics Control Bureau. 
    7. Aviation Research Centre. 
    8.  Special Frontier Force. 
    9.  Border Security Force. 
    10. Central Reserve Police Force. 
    11. Indo-Tibetan Border Police. 
    12. Central Industrial Security Force. 
    13. National Security Guards. 
    14. Assam Rifles. 
    15. Special Service Bureau. 
    16. Special Branch (CID), Andaman and Nicobar. 
    17. The Crime Branch-C.I.D.- CB, Dadra and Nagar Haveli. 
    18. Special Branch, Lakshadweep Police. 
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Annexure II 
 
 
State-Level RTI Laws 
 
 
Table A.II.1:  Overview of state-level RTI laws  
 
State Name of Act Date of Enactment Date of Notification 
Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu Right to 
Information Act, 1997 
4 May 1997 5 May 1997 
Goa Goa Right to Information 
Act, 1997 
29 October 1997 2 December 1997 
Rajasthan Rajasthan Right to 
Information Act, 2000 
11 May 2000 28 June 2000 
Karnataka Karnataka Right to 
Information Act, 2000 
10 December 2000 7 February 2001 
Delhi Delhi Right to 
Information Act, 2001 
14 May 2001 16 May 2001 
Assam Assam Right to 
Information Act, 2001 
1 May 2002 7 May 2002 
Madhya Pradesh Madhya  
Pradesh Jankari ki 
Swatantrata Adhiniyam, 
2002 
24 January 2003 31 January 2003 
Maharashtra Maharashtra Right to 
Information Act, 2002 
10 August 2003 11 August 2003 
Jammu and 
Kashmir586 
Jammu and Kashmir 
Right to Information Act, 
2004 
5 January 2004 7 January 2004 
 
 
Background notes on state-level RTI laws enacted prior to the national Right to 
Information Act, 2005587 
 
Source: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), New Delhi 
 
 
Tamil Nadu 
 
Tamil Nadu was the first state in India to enact an access law, namely the Tamil Nadu Right 
to Information Act 1997. The Act was passed by the Legislative Assembly in the first half of 
1997, received the assent of the Governor on 4 May 1997 and was notified the following day. 
It is notable that the government initiated the process of developing a law. There was no civil 
society movement advocating for the right to information in the State. 
                                                 
586 The Jammu and Kashmir Right to Information Act, 2004 was replaced by the Jammu and Kashmir Right to 
Information Act, 2009 on 20 March 2009.  
587 The background for each of the state-level laws has been quoted from the website of the CHRI. See 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/india/states/default.htm. Accessed 10 October 2011.  
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Goa 
 
The Goa Right to Information Act 1997 was the second right to information law enacted in 
India, after Tamil Nadu. It was passed on 31 July 1997 and received Governor's assent on 29 
October 1997. It is notable that the development of the law was the result of Government 
initiative and not a civil society campaign. However, while the Government was responsible 
for initiating the Bill, civil society, led by the Goa Union of Journalists, was active in 
responding to the shortcomings in the Act as initially passed. Journalists protested in the 
Assembly against penal provisions they feared could be used against the Press. Consequently, 
the objectionable provisions were amended by the Government soon after the initial 
enactment of the law.  
 
Rajasthan 
 
The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) spearheaded the right to information 
movement in Rajasthan - and subsequently, throughout India. MKSS famously used the right 
to information as tool to draw attention to the underpayment of daily wage earners and 
farmers on government projects, and more generally, to expose corruption in government 
expenditure. Initially, MKSS lobbied government to obtain information such as muster rolls 
(employment and payment records) and bills and vouchers relating to purchase and 
transportation of materials. This information was then crosschecked at Jan Sunwais (public 
hearings) against actual testimonies of workers. The public hearings were incredibly 
successful in drawing attention to corruption and exposing leakages in the system. They were 
particularly significant because of their use of hard documentary evidence to support the 
claims of villagers. 
 
Over time, the media and the government paid increasing attention to the results of the Jan 
Sunwais. Consequently, greater attention was focused on the importance of the right to 
information as a means for increasing transparency and accountability, as well as 
empowering poor people. Although MKSS was able to obtain some information from 
Government during the early 1990s, it was not easy. The difficulties experienced by MKSS in 
trying to access information reinforced the importance of a comprehensive right to 
information law for Rajasthan. 
 
On 5 April 1995, the Chief Minister of Rajasthan announced in the Legislative Assembly that 
his Government would be the first in the country to provide access to information to citizens 
on all local developmental works. However, no action was taken for months. Exactly a year 
later on 6 April 1996, MKSS started an indefinite Dharna (protest demonstration) in Bewar 
town. Their immediate demand was that the State Government pass Executive Orders to 
provide a limited right to information in relation to local development expenditure. The 
government responded by issuing Orders to inspect relevant documents on payment of fees. 
However, the Order was rejected by civil society as ineffective because it did not allow 
taking photocopies of documents. 
 
On 6 May 1996, one month later, the Dharna was extended to Jaipur, the state capital. The 
Dharna was strongly supported by the people of the State. On 14 May 1996, the Government 
responded, announcing the establishment of a committee to look into the practical aspects of 
implementing right to information within two months. In response, MKSS called off the 
Dharna. Unfortunately, Government interest again lapsed, such that in May 1997 another 
series of Dharnas commenced, which continued for 52 long days. At the end of this time, the 
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Government announced that the Government had already notified the right to receive 
photocopies relating to local level government functions six months earlier! Civil society was 
taken by surprise - through all their discussions with Government it was the first time they 
had been told about the order providing access to information to people. 
 
In 1998, during the State elections the Opposition Party promised in its election manifesto to 
enact a law on right to information if it came to power. Following their election, the Party 
appointed a committee of bureaucrats, headed by Mr P.N. Bhandari, a Secretary of the 
Rajasthan Government, to draft a bill on the right to information. As the Committee was 
comprised only bureaucrats, stong objections were raised by civil society organisations, 
following which the members of MKSS and National Campaign for Peoples Right to 
Information were invited to assist in drafting the bill. 
 
MKSS and NCPRI conducted a host of consultations in each divisional headquarters of the 
State. Drawing on the input from these consultations, a draft civil society Right to 
Information Bill was prepared, which was then submitted to the Committee. The Committee 
drew on the citizens draft Bill for its recommendations, but refused to accept the Bill in toto. 
 
The Rajasthan Right to Information Act 2000 was eventually passed on 11 May 2000, but 
only came into force on 26 January 2001 - after the rules were framed. The Act in its final 
form retained many of the suggestions of the RTI movement, but diluted others. Activists in 
the state have stated that it is stronger that some state Acts, like Tamil Nadu, but lags behind 
those of Goa, Karnataka and Delhi. 
 
Karnataka 
 
The Karnataka Government took steps to make information available to the public as far back 
as 1997. From that time, many Government departments issued Executive Orders to provide 
access to information on developmental projects undertaken by their Departments and to keep 
relevant records open for inspection or available for copying for a nominal fee. 
 
On 25 August 2000, the Executive Orders were supplemented by the Right to Information 
Ordinance. The Ordinance was brought in because the Karnataka Government recognised it 
was necessary to enact a comprehensive law to ensure openness, transparency and 
accountability in government administration as a matter of priority. As the State Assembly 
was not in session at the time this policy decision was made, the Governor passed an 
Ordinance on the matter as a first step. 
 
The Karnataka Right to Information Act 2000 was enacted soon after by the State Assembly 
on 10 December 2000. Section 13 of the Karnataka Right to Information Act, 2000 explicitly 
repeals the Karnataka Right to Information Ordinance 2000 although it saves all actions taken 
under the Ordinance. Unfortunately, the Act was not properly operationalised until July 2002, 
when the Government of Karnataka notified the Karnataka Right to Information Rules.  
 
Delhi 
 
Until recently, Delhi was one of only 9 States in India to have enacted right to information 
laws. The Delhi Right to Information Act 2001 was passed on 16 May 2001 and came into 
force on 2 October 2001. About 119 departments have been brought under the preview of the 
Act. 
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Before enacting the Act, the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi formed a 
Working Group under the auspices of the Secretary Services, General Administration, 
Training, Administrative Reforms and Public Relations. The Working Group made 
recommendations to enact a law along the lines of the Goa Right to Information Act. The 
Working Group emphasised the value of setting up a Right to Information Council to oversee 
the implementation of the new right to information law. This suggestion was included in the 
Act as it was finally passed, although the effectiveness of the Delhi Right to Information 
Council in overseeing the Act and ensuring proper implementation was arguable. 
 
The Delhi Public Grievances Commission (PGC) headed by Chairman, Shailaja Chandra was 
set up as the Appellate Authority to hear appeals under the Delhi Right to Information Act. 
Citizens could lodge complaints with the Commission via the PGC website. 
 
Assam 
 
Assam was until recently the only state in the North East which had enacted right to 
information legislation. The passage of the Assam Right to Information Act 2002 came as a 
surprise to most. The State Act was brought in so quietly that there was hardly any discussion 
on its content.  
 
Madhya Pradesh 
 
Madhya Pradesh was one of the first states in India to actively engage in securing the right to 
information for the public. In October 1996, the Commissioner of Bilaspur Division, Mr 
Harsh Mander, issued executive orders to give people in the districts of Bilaspur, Raigarh and 
Sarguja the right to scrutinise government records pertaining to the public distribution 
system. 
 
In May 1997, at the same time that Tamil Nadu and Goa were passing right to information 
laws, the Madhya Pradesh Government also drafted a Right to Information Bill. On 30th 
April 1998 the assembly passed the bill by voice vote. Significantly, after passing the Bill in 
the State Assembly, the Government chose to send the Bill to the President of India for 
assent. Unfortunately, it appears that due to a disagreement about whether the states or the 
Centre have competence to enact right to information laws, Presidential assent was denied to 
the Bill and it was shelved. 
 
As a solution, the State Government issued a number of Executive Orders from February 
1998 which operated to allow access to information from close to 50 departments. The series 
of Executive Orders have been compiled by the Department of General Administration in a 
book titled ‘Janane Ka Haq’. The Executive Orders specifically identified a number of topics 
on which Departments were required to provide information to the public. The Orders also 
provided for appeals on non-disclosure decisions and penalties in accordance with the MP 
Civil Services Conduct Rules 1965 and the MP Civil Services Classification Control and 
Appeal Act 1966. 
 
Despite the existence of the Executive Orders, the Madhya Pradesh Government in 2003 
again decided to pursue legislation on the right to information in order to set up a more 
comprehensive access to information regime. Ultimately, on 24 January 2003 the Madhya 
Pradesh Jankari Ki Swatantrata Adhiniyam 2002 received the assent of the Governor and on 
31 January 2003 was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette. 
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Maharashtra 
 
In 2000, a sustained advocacy campaign by social activist Anna Hazare forced the 
Maharashtra Government to pass the Maharashtra Right to Information Act 2000. However, 
civil society groups were unhappy with the Act, criticising it for being too weak and 
demanding that it be replaced with better legislation. 
 
In 2001, the Government formed a committee comprising senior serving and retired 
bureaucrats, such as former Union Home Secretary Dr Madhav Godbole, eminent jurists and 
Shri Anna Hazare, to prepare a draft of a Freedom of Information Bill. 
 
Before the Committee could release its draft Bill, the Maharashtra Government repealed the 
Maharashtra Right to Information Act 2000 and replaced it with the Right to Information 
Ordinance 2002. The Ordinance was promulgated on 23 September 2002. However, the 
Ordinance lapsed on 23 January 2003 because, in accordance with Article 213(2) of the 
Constitution of India, an Ordinance must be converted into an Act within 6 weeks of the 
commencement of the next session of the Legislative Assembly following the enactment of 
an Ordinance. In this instance, the Maharashtra Government did not convert the Right to 
Information Ordinance in the winter session of the Legislative Assembly; hence it lapsed. 
 
Public pressure to enact a law on right to information continued. Consequently, in the budget 
session of the legislature in March 2003, the Maharashtra Government passed the 
Maharashtra Right to Information Act which it then sent to the President of India for assent. 
The Act stalled, as no action was taken for months. 
 
Finally, on 1 August 2003, Anna Hazare wrote a letter to Mr L.K. Advani, the Deputy Prime 
Minister of India requesting him to advise the Honourable President to give his assent to the 
Maharashtra Right to Information Act. Failing such action, Sri Hazare warned he would 
commence a fast unto death. No action was taken, and on 9 August 2003 Anna Hazare started 
his fast. Within one day, the Government responded. On 10 August 2003, the President of 
India gave his assent to the Maharashtra Right to Information Act 2002 and on 11 August 
2003 the Maharashtra Government notified the Act in the Government Gazette. The 
Maharashtra Right to Information Rules, which were initially prepared under the Maharashtra 
Right to Information Ordinance, are equally applicable to Maharashtra Right to Information 
Act 2002.  
 
Jammu and Kashmir 
 
The Jammu and Kasmir Right to Information Act 2009 was passed by the State Legislature 
and it received the assent of the Governor on 20 March 2009. This law replaces an earlier law 
called the Jammu and Kashmir Right to Information Act passed by the State Legislature on 
18 December 2003 and notified in the Government Gazette on 7 January 2004.The 
Government of Jammu and Kashmir has published the Jammu and Kashmir Right to 
Information Rules, 2009 on 20th July, 2009 . 
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Notably, due to the special constitutional position occupied by Jammu and Kashmir, the 
Central Right to Information Act 2005 is not applicable in Jammu and Kashmir. Civil society 
groups, activists and advocators of transparency and accountability had been advocating for 
the adoption of a progressive Information Access law in J&K. CHRI has worked closely with 
government and civil society organizations and activists in the campaign for enacting an 
Information Access Law in J&K. 
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Annexure III 
 
 
Terms of Reference of the ‘Working Group on Right to Information and 
Promotion of Open and Transparent Government’588 
 
 
a. To examine the feasibility and need of either a full fledged Right to Information 
Act or its introduction in a phased manner to meet the needs of open and 
responsive Government. 
b.  To identify specific areas where Right to Information can be built into the 
working procedures and working system especially in large departmental 
undertakings including Railways, Telecommunications, Postal Services, 
Passports and Banking at the Central Government level.  
c.  To examine the internal working procedures with a view to introducing greater 
openness and transparency in handling of employee grievances and internal 
consultation. 
d.  To examine the rules framework with particular reference to existing Conduct 
Rules and Manual of Office Procedure with a view to introducing greater 
openness and transparency in Government working including dealing with 
employees. 
e.  To examine the nature and content of training to promote greater openness and 
more customer responsive public dealings. 
                                                 
588 Office Memorandum dated 2 January 1997, DoPT. File reference no. 34011/1(S)/97-Estt. (B). 
375 
 
Annexure IV 
 
 
The Freedom of Information Act, 2002 
 
 
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, 2002 
 
NO. 5 OF 2003  
 
[6th January, 2003.]  
 
An Act to provide for freedom to every citizen to secure access to information under the 
control of public authorities, consistent with public interest, in order to promote openness, 
transparency and accountability in administration and in relation to matters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto. BE it enacted by Parliament in the Fifty-third Year of the 
Republic of India as follows:-  
 
 
CHAPTER I: PRELIMINARY  
 
1. Short title, extent and commencement.- 
 
(1) This Act may be called the Freedom of Information Act, 2002.  
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.  
(3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in 
the Official Gazette, appoint.  
 
2. Definitions.- 
 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-  
 
(a) "appropriate Government" means in relation to a public authority established, constituted, 
owned, substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly or controlled-  
(i) by the Central Government, the Central Government;  
(ii) by the State Government, the State Government;  
(iii) by the Union territory, the Central Government;  
 
(b) "competent authority" means-  
(i) the Speaker in the case of the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly and 
the Chairman in the case of the Council of States or the Legislative Council;  
(ii) the Chief Justice of India in the case of the Supreme Court;  
(iii) the Chief Justice of the High Court in the case of a High Court;  
(iv) the President or the Governor, as the case may be, in the case of other authorities 
created by or under the Constitution;  
(v) the administrator appointed under article 239 of the Constitution;  
 
(c) "freedom of information" means the right to obtain information from any public authority 
by means of,-  
(i) inspection, taking of extracts and notes;  
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(ii) certified copies of any records of such public authority;  
(iii) diskettes, floppies or in any other electronic mode or through print-outs where 
such information is stored in a computer or in any other device;  
 
(d) "information" means any material in any form relating to the administration, operations or 
decisions of a public authority;  
 
(e) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this Act by the appropriate 
Government or the competent authority, as the case may be;  
 
(f) "public authority" means any authority or body established or constituted,-  
(i) by or under the Constitution;  
(ii) by any law made by the appropriate Government, and includes any other body 
owned, controlled or substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly by 
the appropriate Government;  
 
(g) "Public Information Officer" means the Public Information Officer appointed under sub-
section (1) of section 5;  
 
(h) "record" includes-  
(i) any document, manuscript and file;  
(ii) any microfilm, microfiche and facsimile copy of a document;  
(iii) any reproduction of image or images embodied in such microfilm (whether 
enlarged or not); and  
(iv) any other material produced by a computer or by any other device;  
 
(i) "third party" means a person other than the person making a request for information and 
includes a public authority.  
 
 
CHAPTER II: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND OBLIGATIONS OF PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES  
 
3. Freedom of information.- 
 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, all citizens shall have freedom of information.  
 
4. Obligations on public authorities.- 
 
Every public authority shall-  
 
(a) maintain all its records, in such manner and form as is consistent with its operational 
requirements duly catalogued and indexed;  
 
(b) publish at such intervals as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government or 
competent authority,-  
(i) the particulars of its organisation, functions and duties;  
(ii) the powers and duties of its officers and employees and the procedure followed by 
them in the decision making process;  
(iii) the norms set by the public authority for the discharge of its functions;  
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(iv) rules, regulations, instructions, manuals and other categories of records under its 
control used by its employees for discharging its functions;  
(v) the details of facilities available to citizens for obtaining information; and  
(vi) the name, designation and other particulars of the Public Information Officer;  
 
(c) publish all relevant facts concerning important decisions and policies that affect the public 
while announcing such decisions and policies;  
 
(d) give reasons for its decisions, whether administrative or quasi-judicial to those affected by 
such decisions;  
 
(e) before initiating any project, publish or communicate to the public generally or to the 
persons affected or likely to be affected by the project in particular, the facts available to it or 
to which it has reasonable access which in its opinion should be known to them in the best 
interests of natural justice and promotion of democratic principles.  
 
5. Appointment of Public Information Officers.- 
 
(1) Every public authority shall for the purposes of this Act, appoint one or more officers as 
Public Information Officers.  
 
(2) Every Public Information Officer shall deal with requests for information and shall render 
reasonable assistance to any person seeking such information.  
 
(3) The Public Information Officer may seek the assistance of any other officer as he 
considers necessary for the proper discharge of his duties.  
 
(4) Any officer whose assistance has been sought under sub-section (3), shall render all 
assistance to the Public Information Officer seeking his assistance.  
 
6. Request for obtaining information.- 
 
A person desirous of obtaining information shall make a request in writing or through 
electronic means, to the concerned Public Information Officer specifying the particulars of 
the information sought by him: Provided that where such request cannot be made in writing, 
the Public Information Officer shall render all reasonable assistance to the person making the 
request orally to reduce it in writing.  
 
7. Disposal of requests.- 
 
(1) On receipt of a request under section 6, the Public Information Officer shall, as 
expeditiously as possible, and in any case within thirty days of the receipt of the request, 
either provide the information requested on payment of such fee as may be prescribed or 
reject the request for any of the reasons specified in sections 8 and 9: Provided that where the 
information sought for concerns the life and liberty of a person, the same should be provided 
within forty-eight hours of the receipt of the request: Provided further that where it is decided 
to provide the information on payment of any further fee representing the cost of providing 
the information, he shall send an intimation to the person making the request, giving the 
details of the fees determined by him, requesting him to deposit the fees and the period 
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intervening between the despatch of the said intimation and payment of fees shall be 
excluded for the purpose of calculating the period of thirty days referred to above.  
 
(2) Before taking any decision under sub-section (1), the Public Information Officer shall 
take into consideration the representation made by a third party under section 11.  
 
(3) Where a request is rejected under sub-section (2), the Public Information Officer shall 
communicate to the person making request,-  
(i) the reasons for such rejection;  
(ii) the period within which an appeal against such rejections may be preferred;  
(iii) the particulars of the appellate authority.  
 
(4) Information shall ordinarily be provided in the form in which it is sought unless it would 
disproportionately divert the resources of the public authority or would be detrimental to the 
safety or preservation of the record in question.  
 
8. Exemption from disclosure of information.- 
 
(1) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the following information not being 
information relating to any matter referred to in sub-section (2), shall be exempted from 
disclosure, namely:-  
(a) information, the disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and 
integrity of India, security of the State, strategic scientific or economic interest of 
India or conduct of international relations;  
(b) information, the disclosure of which would prejudicially affect public safety and 
order, detection and investigation of an offence or which may lead to an incitement to 
commit an offence or prejudicially affect fair trial or adjudication of a pending case;  
(c) information, the disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the conduct of 
Centre-State relations, including information exchanged in confidence between the 
Central and State Governments or any of their authorities or agencies;  
(d) Cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, 
Secretaries and other officers;  
(e) minutes or records of advice including legal advice, opinions or recommendations 
made by any officer of a public authority during the decision making process prior to 
the executive decision or policy formulation;  
(f) trade or commercial secrets protected by law or information, the disclosure of 
which would prejudicially affect the legitimate economic and commercial interests or 
the competitive position of a public authority; or would cause unfair gain or loss to 
any person; and  
(g) information, the disclosure of which may result in the breach of privileges of 
Parliament or the Legislature of a State, or contravention of a lawful order of a court.  
 
(2) Subject to the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1), any information relating to any 
occurrence, event or matter which has taken place occurred or happened twenty-five years 
before the date on which any request is made under section 6 shall be provided to any person 
making a request under that section: Provided that where any question arises as to the date 
from which the said period of twenty-five years has to be computed, the decision of the 
Central Government shall be final.  
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9. Grounds for refusal to access in certain cases.- 
 
Without prejudice to the provisions of section 8, a Public Information Officer may reject a 
request for information also where such request-  
 
(a) is too general in nature or is of such a nature that, having regard to the volume of 
information required to be retrieved or processed would involve unreasonable diversion of 
the resources of a public authority or would adversely interfere with the functioning of such 
authority: Provided that where such request is rejected on the ground that the request is too 
general, it would be the duty of the Public Information Officer to render help as far as 
possible to the person making request to reframe his request in such a manner as ay facilitate 
compliance with it;  
 
(b) relates to information that is required by law, rules, regulations or orders to be published 
at a particular time and such information is likely to be so published within thirty days of the 
receipt of such request;  
 
(c) relates to information that is contained in published material available to public; or  
 
(d) relates to information which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of any 
person.  
 
10. Severability.- 
 
(1) If a request for access to information is rejected on the ground that it is in relation to 
information which is exempted from disclosure, then notwithstanding anything contained in 
this Act, access may be given to that part of the record which does not obtain any information 
that is exempted from disclosure under this Act and which can reasonably be severed from 
any part that contains exempted information.  
 
(2) Where access is granted to a part of the record in accordance with sub-section (1), the 
person making the request shall be informed,-  
(a) that only part of the record requested, after severance of the record containing 
information which is exempted from disclosure, is being furnished; and  
(b) of the provisions of the Act under which the severed part is exempted from 
disclosure.  
 
11. Third party information.- 
 
(1) Where a public authority intends to disclose any information or record, or part thereof, on 
a request made under this Act which relates to, or has been supplied by a third party and has 
been treated as confidential by that third party, the Public Information Officer shall, within 
twenty-five days from the receipt of a request, give written notice to such third party of the 
request and of the fact that the public authority intends to disclose the information or record, 
or part thereof: Provided that except in the case of trade or commercial secrets protected by 
law, disclosure may be allowed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance 
any possible harm or injury to the interests of such third party.  
 
(2) Where a notice is given by the Public Information Officer under sub-section (1) to a third 
party in respect of any information or record or part thereof, the third party shall, within 
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twenty days from the date of issuance of notice, be given the opportunity to make 
representation against the proposed disclosure.  
 
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, the Public Information Officer shall, 
within sixty days after receipt of the request under section 6, if the third party has been given 
an opportunity to make representation under sub-section (2), make a decision as to whether or 
not to disclose the information or record or part thereof and give in writing the notice of his 
decision to the third party.  
 
(4) A notice given under sub-section (3) shall include a statement that the third party to whom 
the notice is given is entitled to prefer an appeal against the decision under section 12.  
 
12. Appeals.- 
 
(1) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Public Information Officer may, within thirty 
days of receipt of such decision, prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed: 
Provided that such authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of 
thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the 
appeal in time.  
 
(2) A second appeal against the decision under sub-section (1) shall lie within thirty days of 
such decision, to the Central Government or the State Government or the competent 
authority, as the case may be: Provided that the Central Government or the State Government 
or the competent authority, as the case may be, may entertain the appeal after the expiry of 
the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient 
cause from filing the appeal in time.  
 
(3) The appeals referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be disposed of within thirty days 
of the receipt of such appeals or within such extended period, as the case may be, for reasons 
to be recorded in writing.  
 
(4) If the decision of the Public Information Officer against which the appeal is preferred 
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) also relates to information of third party, the 
appellate authority shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to that party.  
 
 
CHAPTER III: MISCELLANEOUS  
 
13. Protection of action taken in good faith.- 
 
No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which 
is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act or any rule made thereunder.  
 
14. Act to have overriding effect.- 
 
The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith 
contained in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), and any other law for the time being 
in force or in any instrument aving effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.  
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15. Bar of jurisdiction of courts.- 
 
No court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceeding in respect of any order made 
under this Act and no such order shall be called in question otherwise than by way of an 
appeal under this Act.  
 
16. Act not to apply to certain organizations.- 
 
(1) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the intelligence and security organisations, 
specified in the Schedule, being organisations established by the Central Government or any 
information furnished by such organisations to that Government.  
 
(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend the Schedule 
by including therein any other intelligence or security organisation established by that 
Government or omitting therefrom any organisation already specified there n and on the 
publication of such notification, such organisation shall be deemed to be included in or, as the 
case may be, omitted from the Schedule.  
 
(3) Every notification issued under sub-section (2) shall be laid before each House of 
Parliament.  
 
(4) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to such intelligence and security organisations 
which may be specified, by a notification in the Official Gazette, by a State Government from 
time to time.  
 
(5) Every notification issued under sub-section (4) shall be laid before the State Legislature.  
 
17. Power to make rules by Central Government.- 
 
(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry 
out the provisions of this Act.  
 
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules 
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-  
(a) intervals at which matters referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (vi) of clause (b) of 
section 4 shall be published;  
(b) the fee payable under sub-section (1) of section 7;  
(c) the authority before whom an appeal may be preferred under sub-section (1) of 
section 12; 
(d) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed. 
 
18. Power to make rules by State Government.- 
 
(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry 
out the provisions of this Act.  
 
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules 
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-  
(a) the fee payable under sub-section (1) of section 7;  
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(b) the authority before whom an appeal may be preferred under sub-section (1) of 
section 12;  
(c) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed: Provided that 
initially the rules shall be made by the Central Government by notification in the 
Official Gazette.  
 
19. Rule making power by competent authority.- 
 
(1) The competent authority may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry 
out the provisions of this Act.  
 
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules 
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-  
(a) the fee payable under sub-section (1) of section 7;  
(b) the authority before whom an appeal may be preferred under sub-section (1) of 
section 12;  
(c) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed.  
 
20. Laying of rules.- 
 
(1) Every rule made by the Central Government under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may 
be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period 
of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, 
and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive 
sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses 
agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such 
modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification 
or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under tha 
rule.  
 
(2) Every rule made under this Act by a State Government shall be laid, as soon as may be 
after it is notified, before the State Legislature.  
 
21. Power to remove difficulties.- 
 
(1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Central 
Government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, make such provisions necessary 
or expedient for removal of the difficulty: not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act s 
appear to it to be Provided that no such order shall be made after the expiry of a period of two 
years from the date of the commencement of this Act.  
 
(2) Every order made under this section shall, as soon as may be after it is made, be laid 
before each House of Parliament.  
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Annexure V 
 
 
Profiles of NAC Members 
 
 
Table A.V.1:  Brief profiles of members nominated to the National Advisory Council589 
 
 
Name NAC1590 NAC2591 Sector Education Profile 
Aruna Roy Yes Yes Social 
Activist 
MA, Delhi Former IAS 
officer; 
Magsaysay 
Award winner 
Jean Dreze Yes Yes Development 
Economist 
Essex; PhD, 
Delhi 
Taught at LSE 
and the Delhi 
School of 
Economics; 
Visiting Professor 
at Allahabad 
University 
N.C. Saxena Yes Yes Agriculture, 
Rural 
Development 
PhD, Oxford Former IAS 
officer; Secretary 
Rural 
Development; 
Adviser, UNICEF 
India 
A.K. Shiva 
Kumar 
Yes Yes Development 
Economist 
IIM 
Ahmedabad; 
PhD, Harvard  
Adviser, 
UNICEF, India; 
Visiting 
Professor, Indian 
School of 
Business, 
Hyderabad; 
Teaches 
economics and 
public policy at 
Harvard’s 
Kennedy School 
of Government 
                                                 
589 As on 21 June 2011.  
590 National Advisory Council during the first United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, 2004-09. 
591 National Advisory Council during the second (and current) United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, 
2009-present. 
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C.H. 
Hanumantha 
Rao 
Yes  Agricultural 
Economist 
Post-Doctoral 
Fellow, 
University of 
Chicago; PhD, 
Delhi 
Former Director, 
Institute of 
Economic 
Growth; Former 
Member, Planning 
Commission; 
Former Member, 
Seventh and 
Eighth Finance 
Commissions 
Madhav 
Chavan 
Yes  Education PhD, Ohio State 
University 
Founder Director, 
Pratham 
D. 
Swaminadhan 
Yes  Education, 
Technology 
India; PhD, 
Liverpool 
Belongs to a 
Scheduled Tribe; 
Member, Planning 
Commission; 
Vice-Chancellor, 
Jawaharlal Nehru 
Technological 
University 
Jairam 
Ramesh 
Yes  Technology, 
Politician 
IIT Mumbai; 
Carnegie-
Mellon 
University; MIT 
Member of 
Parliament, Rajya 
Sabha; Senior 
Congress Party 
member 
Jayaprakash 
Narayan 
Yes  Social 
activist; 
Politician 
India Former IAS 
officer 
V. 
Krishnamurthy 
Yes  Public 
Sector, 
Industry 
India; PhD, 
Russia 
Former Secretary, 
Ministry of 
Industries 
Sam Pitroda Yes  Technology India; Chicago Chairman and 
CEO of World-
Tel Limited; 
Chairman 
National 
Knowledge 
Commission 
Mrinal Miri Yes  Education PhD, 
Cambridge 
Vice-Chancellor, 
Northeastern Hill 
University 
Sehba Hussain Yes  Community 
Development 
Fulbright 
Scholar, 
University of 
Pennsylvania 
Co-Founder and 
Self Employed 
Women’s 
Association 
(SEWA), 
Lucknow; 
Formerly with 
UNICEF 
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M.S. 
Swaminathan 
 Yes Agriculture PhD, 
Cambridge 
Member of 
Parliament, Rajya 
Sabha; 
Magsaysay 
Award winner; 
Former Director 
of the Indian 
Agricultural 
Research 
Institute; Director 
General of Indian 
Council of 
Agricultural 
Research; 
Secretary to the 
Government of 
India, Department 
of Agricultural 
Research and 
Education 
Ram Dayal 
Munda 
 Yes Education, 
Tribal issues 
PhD, Chicago Belongs to a 
Scheduled Tribe; 
Chief president of 
India 
Confederation of 
Indigenous and 
Tribal People; 
Former Vice 
Chancellor of 
Ranchi University 
Narendra 
Jadhav 
 Yes Education, 
Economics 
PhD, Indiana 
University 
Dalit; Member, 
Planning 
Commission 
Harsh Mander  Yes Social 
Activist 
St. Stephen’s 
College, Delhi 
Former IAS 
officer 
Pramod 
Tandon 
 Yes Science and 
technology 
Post-doctoral 
fellow, 
University of 
California 
Vice-Chancellor, 
Northeastern Hill 
University 
Deep Joshi  Yes Rural 
development 
MIT, USA; 
Sloan School of 
Management at 
MIT 
Founder of 
Pradan; 
Magsaysay 
Award winner 
Madhav 
Gadgil 
 Yes Environment PhD, Harvard Lecturer, Harvard; 
Lecturer at UC 
Berkeley; Visiting 
Professor 
Stanford; Faculty 
of Indian Institute 
of Science 
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Farah Naqvi  Yes Gender Post-graduate 
degree, 
Columbia 
University 
Co-founder of 
Nirantar; Board 
Member of 
Oxfam India 
Anu Aga  Yes Industry, 
Technology 
Fulbright 
Scholar 
Director, Thermax
Mirai 
Chatterjee 
 Yes Health Harvard; Johns 
Hopkins 
University 
Director, SEWA 
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Annexure VI 
 
 
FoI and the WTO 
 
 
An overwhelming 74 countries of the 84 that have enacted and enforced FoI laws are 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).592 Further analysis of the mapping 
between the WTO members, observers (which is the stage prior to full membership), and 
non-members is also revealing. Of the ten countries that have FoI laws but are not members 
of WTO, eight are currently negotiating to become members of the WTO.593 In other words, 
if one was to look at ‘FoI compliant’ countries in conjunction with WTO membership 
(including observer status), it appears that almost all countries that have FoI laws are 
members of or observers to the WTO. This picture is reemphasised when one looks at the set 
of 50 countries that are considering enacting an FoI legislation. Again, almost all countries 
are either members of or observers to the WTO.594 
 
 
Table A.VI.1:  Relationship between FoI legislation and WTO membership status 
 
 
Country Status of FoI Type Law595 
Year Law 
Came into 
Force596 
Year of joining / 
status with respect 
to WTO597 
Albania In place 1999 2000 
Angola In place 2002 1996 
Antigua & Barbuda In place 2004 1995 
Argentina In place 2003 1995 
Armenia In place 2003 2003 
Australia In place 1982 1995 
Austria In place 1987 1995 
Azerbaijan In place 2005 Observer 
Bangladesh In place 2009 1995 
Belgium In place 1994 1995 
Belize In place 1994 1995 
Bosnia-Herzegovina In place 2002 Observer 
Bulgaria In place 2000 1996 
                                                 
592 The WTO currently has 153 members and 31 observers. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. Accessed 10 September 2010.  
593 These are Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Cook Islands, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Montenegro, Russia, 
Serbia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Cook Islands and Kosovo are the only two territories where FoI laws 
exist but are neither members of the WTO nor observers. The status of Kosovo as a sovereign nation remains 
under debate, which is why it has not been granted observer status yet. However the political leadership of 
Kosovo has already indicated its interest in joining the WTO. If one was to take this into account, the overlap 
would be almost complete, save a small island nation.  
594 Nauru, Palestine and Zambia are the three territories which are considering enacting FoI laws but do not have 
member or observer status in the WTO.  
595 Data from Vleugels (2010).  
596 Ibid.  
597 Data from the WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. Accessed 10 
September 2010.  
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Canada In place 1983 1995 
Chile In place 2009 1995 
China In place 2008 2001 
Colombia In place 1888 1995 
Cook Islands In place 2009   
Croatia In place 2003 2000 
Czech Republic In place 2000 1995 
Denmark In place 1970 1995 
Dominican Republic In place 2004 1995 
Ecuador In place 2004 1996 
Estonia In place 2001 1995 
Finland In place 1951 1995 
France In place 1978 1995 
Georgia In place 2000 2000 
Germany In place 2006 1995 
Greece In place 1986 1995 
Guatemala In place 2009 1995 
Honduras In place 2006 1995 
Hungary In place 1992 1995 
Iceland In place 1997 1995 
India In place 2005 1995 
Indonesia In place 2010 1995 
Ireland In place 1998 1995 
Israel In place 1999 1995 
Italy In place 1990 1995 
Jamaica In place 2003 1995 
Japan In place 2001 1995 
Jordan In place 2007 2000 
Kazakhstan In place 1993 Observer 
Kosovo In place 2003   
Kyrgyzstan In place 2007 1998 
Latvia In place 1998 1999 
Liechtenstein In place 2000 1995 
Lithuania In place 2000 2001 
Macedonia In place 2006 2003 
Mexico In place 2003 1995 
Moldova In place 2000 2001 
Montenegro In place 2005 Observer 
Nepal In place 2007 2004 
Netherlands In place 1978 1995 
New Zealand In place 1983 1995 
Nicaragua In place 2007 1995 
Norway In place 1970 1995 
Pakistan In place 2002 1995 
Panama In place 2002 1997 
Peru In place 2003 1995 
Poland In place 2002 1995 
Portugal In place 1993 1995 
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Romania In place 2001 1995 
Russia In place 2010 Observer 
Serbia In place 2004 Observer 
Slovakia In place 2001 1995 
Slovenia In place 2003 1995 
South Africa In place 2001 1995 
South Korea In place 1998 1995 
Spain In place 1992 1995 
St. Vincent & Grenadines In place 2003 1995 
Sweden In place 1766 1995 
Switzerland In place 2006 1995 
Taiwan In place 2005 2002 
Tajikistan In place 2002 Observer 
Thailand In place 1997 1995 
Trinidad & Tobago In place 2001 1995 
Turkey In place 2004 1995 
Uganda In place 2006 1995 
Ukraine In place 1992 2008 
United Kingdom In place 2005 1995 
United States In place 1967 1995 
Uruguay In place 2009 1995 
Uzbekistan In place 1997 Observer 
Zimbabwe In place 2002 1995 
Afghanistan Under consideration   Observer 
Bahrain Under consideration   1995 
Barbados Under consideration   1995 
Belarus Under consideration   Observer 
Bolivia Under consideration   1995 
Brazil Under consideration   1995 
Burkina Faso Under consideration   1995 
Cambodia Under consideration   2004 
Cameroon Under consideration   1995 
Costa Rica Under consideration   1995 
Egypt Under consideration   1995 
El Salvador Under consideration   1995 
Ethiopia Under consideration   Observer 
Fiji Under consideration   1996 
Ghana Under consideration   1995 
Guyana Under consideration   1995 
Iran Under consideration   Observer 
Iraq Under consideration   Observer 
Kenya Under consideration   1995 
Kuwait Under consideration   1995 
Lebanon Under consideration   Observer 
Lesotho Under consideration   1995 
Liberia Under consideration   Observer 
Luxembourg Under consideration   1995 
Malawi Under consideration   1995 
390 
 
Malaysia Under consideration   1995 
Maldives Under consideration   1995 
Mali Under consideration   1995 
Malta Under consideration   1995 
Mongolia Under consideration   1997 
Morocco Under consideration   1995 
Mozambique Under consideration   1995 
Nauru Under consideration     
Nigeria Under consideration   1995 
Palestine Under consideration     
Papua New Guinea Under consideration   1996 
Paraguay Under consideration   1995 
Philippines Under consideration   1995 
Rwanda Under consideration   1996 
Senegal Under consideration   1995 
Sierra Leone Under consideration   1995 
Solomon Islands Under consideration   1996 
Sri Lanka Under consideration   1995 
St. Kitts & Nevis Under consideration   1996 
Suriname Under consideration   1995 
Tanzania Under consideration   1995 
Vanuatu Under consideration     
Vietnam Under consideration   2007 
Yemen Under consideration   Observer 
Zambia Under consideration   1995 
Algeria No law   Observer 
Andorra No law   Observer 
Bahamas No law   Observer 
Benin No law   1996 
Bhutan No law   1995 
Botswana No law   1995 
Brunei No law   1995 
Burundi No law   1995 
Cape Verde No law   2008 
Central African Republic No law   1995 
Chad No law   1995 
Comoros No law   Observer 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of No law   1997 
Congo, Rep. of No law   1995 
Cote d'Ivoire No law   1995 
Cuba No law   1995 
Cyprus No law   1995 
Djibouti No law   1995 
Dominica No law   1995 
East Timor No law     
Equatorial Guinea No law   Observer 
Eritrea No law     
Gabon No law   1995 
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Gambia, The No law   1996 
Grenada No law   1996 
Guinea No law   1995 
Guinea-Bissau No law   1995 
Haiti No law   1996 
Kiribati No law     
Laos No law   Observer 
Libya No law   Observer 
Madagascar No law   1995 
Marshall Islands No law     
Mauritania No law   1995 
Mauritius No law   1995 
Monaco No law     
Myanmar No law   1995 
Namibia No law   1995 
Niger No law   1996 
North Korea No law     
Oman No law   2000 
Palau No law     
Qatar No law   1996 
Samoa No law   Observer 
San Marino No law     
Sao Tome & Principe No law   Observer 
Saudi Arabia No law   2005 
Seychelles No law   Observer 
Singapore No law   1995 
Somalia No law     
St. Lucia No law   1995 
Sudan No law   Observer 
Swaziland No law   1995 
Syria No law   Observer 
Togo No law   1995 
Tonga No law   2007 
Tunisia No law   1995 
Turkmenistan No law     
Tuvalu No law     
United Arab Emirates No law   1996 
Vatican No law   Observer 
Venezuela No law   1995 
Western Sahara No law     
 Micronesia (Federated 
States of) No law   
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Figure A.VI.1:  Countries with FoI legislation with reference to WTO membership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
